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Abstract
In this thesis, we explore the contractual nature o f so-called “derivatives” and 
how they might be incorporated into existing legal concepts. This thesis takes 
the position that derivatives are in essence contracts to trade risk, and argues that 
commodity future delivery contracts fall within the legal meaning o f “futures” if 
they are traded as notional transactions settled by cash. We also argue that 
derivative instruments and traditional gambling instruments are both aleatory in 
nature. The question then is: “How should we allocate the function between 
gambling and financial laws in order to control speculation?” Moreover, this 
thesis argues that derivative instruments in general are not traditional insurance 
policies. We find no convincing reason to see derivative instruments as another 
contract uberrimae fidei and to restrict the use o f derivative instruments with an 
equivalent o f the insurable interest test. However, whether a firm selling 
derivative instruments should be regulated (and furthermore, be regulated like 
insurance companies) may require further consideration. In addition, securities 
laws are constructed upon the special characteristic of “securities”, which is not 
shared by most derivatives. Caution is required when applying rules developed 
in securities regulation to derivative instruments. However, we also recognise 
the potential for problems with insider dealing and market abuse in the 
derivatives market such that regulators might have to intervene. In the end, 
although derivatives do not fit well in existing categories, this does not mean that 
we need a special set o f derivative contract laws: derivative instruments are based 
on general contract law, and without more substance, any derivative contract law 
is meaningless.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
In this thesis, we will examine what are generally called “derivatives” .1 We will 
answer the questions “what is the contractual nature o f so-called ‘derivative 
instruments’?” and “how could we fit them into the existing legal system?” As 
will be discussed further in Chapter 2, this thesis will adopt Henderson’s 
distinction that classifies derivatives into three groups: exchange-traded 
products, OTC products, and hybrid instrum ents.2 As we explain below, 
derivative instruments serve a function similar to insurance, gambling and 
investment. They may exist in the form of a sale o f goods contract or an existing 
type o f capital market instrument (e.g. securities). Categorising a derivative 
instrument as one existing type o f instrument may not only have regulatory 
implications but also raise the application o f certain private law doctrines.
Therefore, a question arises: should we classify a derivative instrument as any 
existing type o f contract? A natural response to questions regarding 
classification would start with definitional issues, and a large part o f 
practitioners’ concerns may be resolved by making a proper distinction based on 
a conceptual definition. However, this still leaves us with an unanswered 
question: why do we have special regulatory or private law rules for certain types 
o f transactions in the first instance? This represents how the present thesis will 
approach certain problems o f classification. In short, we will examine the legal 
classification o f modem derivative instruments.3 In this thesis, we will focus on 
the two major functions o f derivative instruments— hedging and
1 In general, derivatives may be defined as instruments the value o f  which depends upon the value 
o f  other assets. Das, Derivative Products & Pricing, at 4 (3rd ed. rev. edn, John W iley & Sons, 
2006). See also infra 2.2.2 for the meaning o f  “derivatives” .
2 See infra 2 .2.2.1.
3 See infra 1.3.2 for the scope o f  this thesis.
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speculation— and we will take derivative instruments as contracts to trade risks. 
From here, we will explore the contractual nature o f derivative instruments and 
certain regulatory issues that are implied by the classification o f contracts.
1.1 Five Angles for Analysing Derivatives
In the past two decades, the derivatives market has grown at an amazing speed. 
According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the 
outstanding notional amount of all interest rate swaps, currency swaps and 
interest rate options in the first half of 2007 was more than 347 trillion US 
dollars, in comparison with 1.654 trillion at the end of 1988.4 The notional 
amount of credit derivatives reached 26 trillion US dollars by mid 2006, up from
17.1 trillion six months earlier.' Although derivative instruments are useful 
tools for hedging risk for market participants, derivatives have also been 
described as a financial “weapon o f mass destruction” .6 One commentator has 
called the derivatives market “Jurassic park” .7 The use and misuse of derivative 
instruments has caused spectacular losses,8 but no matter whether we like them 
or not, derivatives have become a force in the global market that we cannot 
ignore.
If we temporarily leave behind the entanglement o f current laws, there are several 
fronts on which we could examine modem derivative instruments. First, we are 
faced with the transition from physical trading to notional trading. Some 
derivative transactions may lead to physical delivery, like commercial sales, but
4 See ISDA market survey from <
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdfISDA-M arket-Survey-historical-data.pdf > (visited on 18 
January 2008).
5 See ISDA Press release on 19 September 2006 from < http://www.isda.org/> (visited on 4 
October 2006).
6 See for example, “Buffet warns on investment ‘time bom b’”, BBC (4 March 2003), from 
<http:7news.bbc.co .u k /l/h i/b u sin ess/2817995.stm> (visited on 6 October 2006). A lso quoted in 
Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives, at 1.1, note 3 (L exisN exis Butterworths, 2003).
7 Hu, “Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance o f  the Corporate 
Objective” (1995) 73 Tex L Rev 985, at 989.
8 The best-known case is probably the Barings Bank scandal from the m id-1990s. Other famous 
victims include Orange County, Gibson Greeting, Procter & Gamble, etc. See Cohen, “Financial 
Services Regulation: A M id-Decade Review: Colloquium: The Challenge o f  Derivatives” (1995) 
63 Fordham L Rev 1993, at 1994-1996; Maready, “Regulating for Disaster: Federal Attempts to 
Control the Derivatives Market” (1996) 31 Wake Forest L Rev 885, at 887 -888  (the Orange 
County scandal).
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most result in cash settlement. Some underlying assets, like com, may be 
deliverable but some, like indices, are not. Some commodities are deliverable, 
but the contract specifically allows cash settlement only (e.g. Brent oil futures). 
Derivative transactions originated from physical commodities trading, but many 
of them have become only notional— an exchange o f cash.
Secondly, while a derivative transaction might be carried out entirely for 
commercial or financial purposes, it might bear no relationship to other business 
transactions. Derivative instruments are frequently used to hedge against 
market or credit risk, yet this does not hide the fact that a derivative transaction 
could be intended purely for speculation, a conduct that may be seen as no 
different from gambling.9
Thirdly, there is the transition from non-standardised transactions toward 
standardised trading. The futures market provides an ultra-standardised trading 
platform. Nonetheless, we should not ignore the possibility of totally 
individualised and privately negotiated derivative transactions.
Fourthly, there is the contrast between regulated contracts and unregulated 
instruments. While exchange trading is regulated in both the UK and the US, the 
status of certain off-exchange contracts is not very clear. 10 Nonetheless, 
regulated or not, derivative transactions are based on contract(s) and the common 
law still forms the foundation for derivatives trading.
Fifthly, the variety o f market participants complicates the matter. While we 
frequently see derivative transactions conducted between financial institutions, 
they are also widely used by business entities of various sizes. In addition, 
derivative instruments are capable of being employed by ordinary 
investors/consumers who might have no particular need to hedge but who wish to 
make profit. An individual might conduct derivatives trading via a broker or a 
specialised firm, but two individuals might also borrow the transactional 
structure and make a deal between themselves.
y See infra Chapter 4 for further discussion o f  this issue.
10 See infra Chapter 3.
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The five angles mentioned above suggest several ways in which derivative 
instruments could be approached and examined. Taken together, these different 
angles give us a multi-dimensional view o f derivative instruments. Each 
derivative instrument could be independently characterised as physical/notional, 
hedging/gambling, non-standardised/standardised, regulated/unregulated, and 
business/consumer. To consider the legal implications o f derivative 
instruments, we have to consider the different perspectives o f derivatives trading.
1.2 Purposes o f this Research
In this thesis, we focus on the two major functions of derivatives— hedging and 
speculation, and we approach them as contracts to trade risks. As will be 
explained in Chapter 2, derivatives help to commoditise “risk”, a rather abstract 
concept, into something that can be bought and sold.11 The use of the more 
neutral term “risk trading” could provide us with a broader scope to review these 
contracts, as distinguished from contracts related to exchange for goods or 
services. Since new derivative instruments are being invented at a very fast 
pace, viewing them as “risk trading instruments” will help us to avoid the 
question concerning whether any particular instrument may be defined as a 
“derivative” .12 We may also avoid the question concerning whether we have a 
firm definition of “derivatives” in la w .13 This approach will give us the 
advantage o f having a better overview o f hedging, speculation, insurance and 
gambling. Instead o f limiting ourselves to financial institutions, we will have an 
opportunity to explore risk trading from inter-bank connections to individual 
customers.
11 See infra 2.2.2.
12 For example, see Henderson, supra  note 6, at 5.10; Feder, “Deconstructing Over-the-counter 
Derivatives” [2002] Colum Bus L Rev 677. at 713 (regarding credit spread options).
1 ’ The term "derivative” can be so broadly defined that it is difficult not to include non-derivative 
transactions. See Henderson, supra  note 6, at 1.1. Henderson has also compiled several 
statutory or academic definitions o f  “derivatives”. See Henderson, Appendix A to Chapter 1. 
See also Hu, supra  note 7, at 996 et seq.
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From a legal point of view, derivative instruments stand in an area o f overlap.14 
In a broader sense, banking, securities, insurance and gambling regulation all 
have a place in the derivatives market. On the private law side, derivative 
instruments might be open to the application o f insurance contract law, to 
illegality as a form of gambling contract15, or to being recharacterised as a 
secured loan or guarantee. Nevertheless, general contract law remains the basis 
o f trading. Fiduciary duty, the tort o f negligence and fraud or misrepresentation 
might come into play to shape the relationship between any two given contracting 
parties. The legal consequences o f related regulatory regimes or common law 
concepts might range from non-interference of law to civil unenforceability and 
even criminal penalties.
Thus, risk trading as a whole is subject to a significant degree o f legal risk,16 
deriving from the fact that risk trading instruments might be characterised or 
recharacterised as one or several existing legal concepts; thus, certain rules in that 
area o f law would follow. One might also argue that certain special doctrines 
should be applied or extended to risk trading contracts.
The significance of the legal risks involved leaves us with two questions: “What 
is the nature of risk trading instruments?” and “How do they fit into existing legal 
concepts?” On the one hand, we may discuss whether derivative instruments 
belong to a regulated kind or whether they should enjoy freedom of contract 
without further regulatory intervention. On the other hand, there are already 
dedicated rules in each legal field to deal with various problems. Do
derivative instruments raise similar concerns that might invite further legal 
intervention? These are the questions the present thesis attempts to answer. 
The approach we take may look like civil law, as the common law places less 
emphasis on special contracts at the expense of general contract law. 
Nevertheless, it is still a real issue in common law jurisdictions, in light o f the 
existence o f insurance law, gambling law, securities regulation and futures
u Derivative instruments have been described as being in the comm on law no m an’s land beyond 
regulations. Cohen, supra  note 8, at 2013.
15 This is based on an assumption that gambling is prohibited or unenforceable in a jurisdiction. 
See infra Chapter 4 for further introduction to gambling laws in the UK..
16 See also infra 2.3.
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regulation. Using this approach, we may also form a more coherent line o f 
thinking about laws relating to instruments that involve a certain degree o f future 
uncertainty.
It may be a challenge for a civil law lawyer to write on common law. However, 
the case law developed in the UK and the US does provide an abundance of 
materials for any lawyer around the world to consider. This thesis does not 
argue that there is, or will be, a uniform law regarding derivative instruments that 
is valid globally, as each country might have its own concerns, and it is beyond 
the scope o f the present thesis to provide legal solutions for every country. 
However, we do attempt to identify certain general legal issues relating to the 
trading o f risk that might occur in any country, and to provide certain 
fundamental arguments to resolve these issues based on English law and 
American law.
1.3 Scope o f the T hesis
As derivative instruments could be approached in many different ways, and as it 
is impossible to host every discussion on every perspective, it is necessary to 
define the exact scope of the thesis and state what will not be covered in later 
chapters.
1.3.1 Relating to Exchange Trading and OTC  
Trading
First, while much o f the discussion of this thesis centres on over-the-counter 
(OTC) transactions,17 this thesis also takes into account exchange transactions. 
It is apparent that OTC trading involves far more contract negotiation and thus is 
exposed to a higher degree of legal uncertainties than is the case with exchange 
traded products. However, this thesis takes the position that it would be 
beneficial to have a certain degree o f discussion on exchange trading alongside 
OTC transactions for the following reasons.
17 See infra 2.2.2.1 for the distinction between exchange-traded and OTC products.
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First, the general purpose o f the present research is to provide an overview o f the 
trading o f risk, illustrated by modem derivative instruments. Exchange-traded 
contracts, though highly standardised, are still powerful tools for hedging risk 
and speculating on market prices, and we cannot afford to ignore them. In 
addition, the exchange market and the OTC market are interrelated. Not only is 
the pricing of some OTC products derived from a more liquid and transparent 
exchange market, but a firm might also use both the futures market and the OTC 
market to hedge risks.
Secondly, there must be a reason why there are far fewer contractual disputes and 
far less legal discussion with regard to exchange trading. The regulation o f 
futures exchanges only provides part o f the answer. The contractual design o f 
exchange provides another angle for explaining certain legal issues and the 
shortage o f contractual disputes in the exchange market. After all, while heavily 
governed by exchange and clearing house rules, futures trading remains deeply 
rooted in contract.
Thirdly, given that exchange-traded contracts are largely regulated by financial 
regulators, the question sometimes arises whether a particular transaction is a 
regulated “futures” contract as a matter o f law .18 Understanding the exchange 
market would help us to provide better arguments to protect off-exchange trading 
schemes from being invaded by futures regulation.
This thesis does not argue that every aspect of exchange trading and OTC trading 
should be analysed in the same way merely because they might serve similar 
functions or because in general they are all called “derivatives”. On the 
contrary, in the present thesis it is proposed to take an overview of potential 
problems arising in various contexts.
1.3.2 Other Issues outside this T hesis
There are a few related issues that will not be covered in this thesis. First, this 
thesis will not enter into serious discussion o f the documentation issues. This
18 See infra 3.1.
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thesis likewise does not intend to take on the content o f the popular master 
agreement scheme provided by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA).
Secondly, this thesis will not analyse derivatives in the context o f insolvency law 
and tax law. Thus, we will refrain from discussing the nature of obligation 
originating from a derivative transaction in relation to insolvency proceedings or 
for the purpose o f calculating tax.
Thirdly, there is no intention to engage in a full-scale regulatory analysis. 
Although this thesis will touch upon some issues that might draw regulators’ 
attention, we will not directly answer the question: “How may derivatives be 
regulated?” Instead, by examining the issue about classification, we may 
discuss the reasons why certain instruments are already regulated and why there 
are certain special private law rules in certain legal fields, and we may further 
examine whether derivative instruments might raise similar problems that might 
justify further legal intervention. In addition, apart from regulatory solutions, 
we believe that certain private law aspects should be out in the spotlight before a 
full regulatory discussion is undertaken. After all, private law solutions should 
always be taken into consideration before we examine the purposes o f regulation 
and the means to regulate the risk trading market.19
Fourthly, this thesis does not provide an in-depth analysis of the restitution issues 
flowing from local authority cases.20 O f course, such cases incite much 
academic debate. However, the main interest of this thesis pertains to the 
contractual nature and classification of derivative instruments. Thus, we will 
not enter into details o f local authority cases and issues concerning restitution.
Lastly, there are many contractual and regulatory issues relating to modem 
derivative instruments, and this thesis cannot provide a detailed analysis of every 
possible issue. Apart from those introduced in Chapters 2 to 5, other contractual
19 N evertheless, whether it is better (in terms o f  econom ic efficiency or other factors) to use 
private law or regulations to address problems arising from derivatives trading is another question  
that should be further examined. See generally. Partnoy, “The Shifting Contours o f  Global 
Derivatives Regulation” (2001) 22 U Pa J lnt’1 Econ L 421.
20 See infra 2.3.1.
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issues of derivative instruments (e.g. breach o f contract and damage as well as 
collateral and credit risk) are not covered, and the reader should excuse the author 
for being unable to handle them within this limited space.
1.4 Map o f This T hesis
We begin our analysis by setting the scene. Chapter 2 will illustrate the meaning 
of risk, certain legal instruments designed to control risk, modem derivative 
instruments, and certain lawsuits and characterisation problems associated with 
derivatives trading. We will also explore the problem whether derivative 
instruments should be seen as capital market instruments or insurance policies.
In Chapter 3, we will focus mainly on the commodity market to examine the 
turning point between real sales and notional sales, an issue that has serious 
regulatory implications. To this end, we will analyse the contractual structure of 
standardised trading and introduce certain judgments to illustrate the boundary 
between “futures” regulation and commercial sales.
In Chapter 4, we move on to the speculative side of the subject: notional 
transactions and gambling. The general prohibition on gambling may provide a 
borderline for acceptable risk trading. We will explore the nature o f gambling 
and notional derivative instruments and provide an analytical structure to host 
different policy concerns regarding gambling and speculation.
Chapter 5 will focus on the problem of the lack o f information inherent in all 
“risk”, a problem that underlines certain rules in laws related to securities and 
insurance. As information is crucial for risk assessment, we will examine the 
applicability o f legal doctrines regarding pre-contractual disclosure (e.g. duty of 
disclosure and insider trading) and whether risk-trading contracts should be 
categorised as contracts uberrimae Jidei in insurance law. Chapter 6 presents 
the conclusion.
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1.5 Clarification
Before moving on, it is necessary to clarify certain points to avoid confusion. 
First, given the fast-moving nature o f the market and the creativity of financial 
engineers, it is impossible to discuss all the details of each derivative instrument 
in this thesis. Thus, this thesis only spotlights certain products in order to 
generate a better understanding o f the issues involved. We will also attempt to 
point out the possible variations o f our main argument necessitated by some less 
typical products.
Secondly, to avoid monotony, we will use the terms “derivative(s)”, “derivative 
instruments/transactions”, “risk trading contracts/transactions/instruments” and 
“hedging/speculative instruments/transactions” interchangeably. As there is in 
this area much financial jargon, we will attempt to avoid stifling readers with 
market terminology and will explain important terms where necessary. For 
simplicity’s sake, we will use the term “derivative” to refer to derivative 
instruments traded in the OTC market, unless otherwise indicated.
Thirdly, to avoid the confusion between “future” and “futures”, this thesis will 
use the plural form (“futures”) to refer to exchange-traded forward contracts and 
futures regulation. The singular form (“future”) will be used to refer to 
something that may occur in a time to come.
Fourthly, given that the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America 
(US) host the biggest derivatives markets in the world, it is unavoidable that this 
thesis should start from legal arguments developed in the UK and the US, where 
case laws provide us with abundant materials to analyse. This thesis is mainly 
based on UK law, but adds certain US law perspectives for the purpose o f 
comparison. To be more specific, we focus on UK law applying to England. 
As for US law, we focus on New York and Illinois law (sites o f New York City 
and Chicago, respectively) as samples of US state law, and on US federal law. 
Limited perspectives on European law will be added where necessary.
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Chapter 2 Risk: Commoditisation and 
Derivatives
In this chapter, we introduce the background of risk trading, the rise of derivative 
instruments, and certain legal risks involved in derivatives trading. In the 
following sections, we will first consider the meaning o f risk and various types o f 
risks. Then we will introduce some contract-based legal instruments that help to 
manage risk and certain legal problems that arise when we attempt to fit 
derivative transactions into existing legal concepts.
2.1 The M eaning o f “Risk”
2.1.1 D efinition
Although widely used in statutes, the term “risk” is not strictly defined in legal 
language. In the Oxford English Dictionary, risk is defined as a “[hjazard, 
danger; exposure to mischance or peril” or the “chance or hazard of commercial 
loss.... A lso ,... the chance that is accepted in economic enterprise and considered 
the source o f (an entrepreneur’s) profit.” 1 Relevant to the notion o f “risk” is the 
term “uncertainty”, which is defined in the same dictionary as “a business risk 
which cannot be measured and whose outcome cannot be predicted or insured 
against.”2 In a way, risk is “the chancing of negativity— of some loss or harm.
... Risk faces us with the possibility that something untoward may occur, while
1 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edn, 1989), < http://dictionary.oed.com> (visited on 10 August 
2006).
2 Id.
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leaving us unable to foretell any specific outcome with categorical assurance.”3 
Some commentators distinguish “risk” further from “uncertainty” on the ground 
that the probability o f a risk is known (though whether it will actually occur 
remains unknown), while the probability o f an uncertainty remains unknown.4
The meaning o f “risk” may also be approached from a sociological view. In an 
article, Giddens describes the rise o f a “risk society”, which refers to “a society 
increasingly preoccupied with the future”.5 As he explains,
“ [t]he idea of risk was first used by Western explorers when they travelled 
around the world. ... The word refers to a world which we are both 
exploring and seeking to normalise and control. Essentially, ‘risk’ always 
has a negative connotation, since it refers to the chance o f avoiding an 
unwanted outcome. But it can quite often be seen in a positive light, in 
terms o f taking bold initiatives in the face of a problematic future”.6
Giddens differentiates two types o f risk: external risk (which is “risk of events 
that may strike individuals unexpectedly ... but that happen regularly enough and 
often enough in a whole population o f people to be broadly predictable, and so 
insurable”) and manufactured risk (which is “risk created by the very progression 
of human development, especially by the science and technology”).7 However, 
he also distinguishes “risk” from hazard or danger, as he argues that a risk society 
is not necessarily more hazardous or dangerous than in the Middle Ages, a time
o
when dangers were experienced as given. To quote Giddens, “[t]he idea o f risk 
is bound up with the aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of 
controlling the future.”9
If we leave behind the meaning o f and distinctions between risk, uncertainty, 
hazard or danger, in a business sense, “risk” should have monetary effects. For
3 Rescher, “Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory o f  Risk Evaluation and 
Management”, at 1 (University Press o f  America, 1983).
4 See Eppel, “Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises” (2002) 40  Colum J 
Transnat'l L 677, at 687; Stout, “Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private 
Ordering in the Market for OTC D erivatives” (1999) 48 Duke LJ 701, at 743.
5 Giddens, “Risk and Responsibility” (1999) 62( 1) MLR 1, at 3
6 Id., at 3-4.
7 Id., at 4.
s ]d„ at 3.
9 Id.
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example, goods damaged during delivery represent a loss to the owner. Rising 
crude oil prices will increase the costs o f flying and thus reduce airlines’ profits. 
For households, the fluctuation o f interest rates might affect their mortgage 
payments or their returns from a savings account in a bank. It is because o f these 
monetary impacts that risk has to be managed. If the realisation o f risk had no 
impact on their wealth or property values, market participants would not have 
any interest in controlling it.
In financial terms, there are four basic types of risks.10 First, there is “market 
risk”, which refers to changes in market prices (e.g. oil prices, stock prices, etc.) 
or rates (e.g. interest rates).11 Secondly, there is “credit risk”, which arises from 
the default or insolvency of the counterparty in a transaction.12 Thirdly, there is 
“liquidity risk”, which refers to the inability to trade instruments due to the 
absence of counterparties, to finance, or find cash. 13 Fourthly, there is 
“operational risk”, which is generally defined as the risk o f loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people or systems, or from external 
events, including computer systems processing failures, enforceability of 
contracts or regulatory factors etc.14
Monetary loss may come about through hazards: natural disasters, human 
misbehaviours, or both. Earthquakes, typhoons, tornadoes, floods, landslides, 
mudslides, high winds, etc. all are capable o f causing loss o f human life, damage 
to property, and economic loss. In addition, monetary losses may also occur 
through intentional or negligent human behaviour (e.g. car accidents caused by 
speeding). Sometimes losses are, arguably, caused by both natural forces and 
human misconduct (e.g. a landslide following torrential rain on an illegally 
over-developed hill).
10 Das, Risk Management, at 5 (3rd edn, rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006).
" Id.
12 Id-
13 Id-
14 Id., at 5 & 1110 (quoting Bank o f  International Settlement, International Convergence o f  
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 2004)
25
The next question is: what does risk mean as a matter o f law? The term “risk” is 
widely used in statutory provisions without a definition.15 Contractual parties 
are free to define “risks” by themselves. For example, in an insurance policy, 
parties might prefer to clearly define what “risk” (or event) is insured so as to 
determine the insurance coverage. Outside o f insurance, the meaning of “risk” 
can be inferred from sale o f goods laws, which make strong references to the 
transfer of ownership or the possession of goods.16 However, any inference 
from the contract or statute needs to be considered on its own particular grounds, 
and it may be inappropriate to extend such an inference to other contexts.
Risks are eventually translated into rights and obligations.17 In the sale of 
goods, the concern is about which party should bear the loss. If a contractual 
party defaults, the concern is about the rights o f the non-defaulting party to seek a 
remedy. The law itself need not define “risk”, but it has to clarify the rights and 
obligations between the relevant parties regarding the occurrence o f uncertain 
future events.
Taking into account the different perspectives o f “risk” as outlined above, this
thesis generally defines it as future uncertainties that may cause monetary losses
to a party. From here, we may assess a broader range of transactions intended to
cover those future uncertainties, which might arise through market fluctuations
(market risk), default o f a contractual counterparty (credit risk), an inability to
transform an asset into cash or find necessary finance (liquidity risk), system
errors or other forms of operational failure during trading (operational risk),
18changes to the law itself (legal risk ), natural disasters, human wrongdoings, and 
even the longevity o f human lives (“mortality risk” 19), and anything else that 
might (or might not) happen in the future but will have a monetary effect on a 
person or a firm. The scope of this thesis is not limited to the “financial risks”
15 Using “risk” as a key word to search L exisN exis databases yields more than 700 results from 
among UK statutes (visited on 10 February 2008). However, no definition o f  “risk” is found in 
the UK statutes, nor does the Financial Services Authority (FSA ) define it in its handbook.
16 Sale o f  Goods Act 1979, section 20( 1). See also Bridge, The Sale o f  Goods, at 112 et seq. 
(Clarendon Press, 1997).
17 Bridge, id., at 112.
18 See also infra 2.3.
19 Sec infra 2.5.4.
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illustrated above, though, o f course, these financial risks are the driving forces 
behind the development o f modem derivatives trading.20 However, loss might 
also occur through natural disasters or other sources o f future uncertainty, and so 
derivative techniques may also be applied to other non-fmancial risks.21 Thus, 
the present thesis takes a broader view o f the meaning of “risk” in order to 
consider the different sources o f future uncertainties.
For clarification, this thesis uses the terms “risk” and “future uncertainty” 
inter-changeably. There is no distinguishing between “uncertainty” and “risk” 
on the basis of the probability o f occurrence. One may suffer losses through the 
occurrence of an uncertain event, even though the probability of it happening was 
formerly unknown. Thus, it does not suit the purpose o f this thesis to limit 
“risks” to those events whose probability can be quantified in percentage points.
2.1.2 Risk M anagem ent, H edgin g  and Speculation
Why do people submit themselves to risk? We may place the background of risk 
management in the context of the “risk society”, where people start to control the 
future.22 In fact, profit and risk are two sides of the same coin. Although risk 
may lead to a loss, it may also lead to a profit. To some extent, it is similar to 
gambling: one takes the risk o f losing money when one places a bet, but the 
expected gains might also be high. In a grain sale, if  two parties do not want to 
take on the risks associated with future delivery, their reluctance will greatly limit 
the amount, price and quality they can bargain for. By undertaking a future 
delivery contract, they have more choice and might secure a better deal. The 
advantage is more obvious in an investment. Where an investor buying a stock 
might profit from the success o f a company, he might also suffer losses owing to 
bad management.
People may have different attitudes toward risks, some being risk-avoiders, 
others risk-preferers, and still others risk-neutral. The same person might prefer 
risk in one case, but avoid it in another. This diversity o f attitudes contributes to
20 See infra 2.2.2.
For example, weather derivatives. See infra 2 .2.2.3.
"  Giddens, supra  note 5.
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the growth o f the “risk” market. On the one hand, a risk-preferer might attempt 
to earn a profit from or make better use of his assets in light o f future 
uncertainties: a typical kind o f risk-preferrer is what is generally called a 
“speculator” /  On the other hand, a risk-avoider might attempt to control or 
minimise the potential negative effects o f future uncertainties, which leads to the 
management of risks. “Hedging” is the word commonly used to refer to how 
market participants control their risk exposure.24 In this thesis, we will use the 
term “hedging” loosely to cover the behaviour to control risk exposure. Like the 
supply and demand for goods, the voluntary exchange o f risk involves a buyer 
and a seller o f risk. Thus, hedging and speculation necessarily co-exist in the 
market.25 In order for risk-avoiding parties to sell their unwanted risks, there 
must be risk-takers willing to buy them.
Generally, there are two levels o f risk management: “trading risk management” 
and “firm wide risk management”/  The former refers to risk management at 
the level of individual traders and trading desks in relation to specific transactions 
(e.g. a lender’s hedge for a loan o f GBP £100 million). The latter refers to the 
aggregate risk management at the level o f the trading desk, business unit or firm 
itself where the aim is to match risk with capital (e.g. hedging for the overall risk 
exposure o f a bank).27 Which risk management strategy is chosen depends not 
only on the attitude of the market participant but also on the type o f trader he is. 
It is one thing when the need to hedge comes from a single transaction (e.g. a 
bank’s entering into a loan agreement with a borrower). It is a different story if a 
trader faces continuous exposure to market prices (e.g. an airline company’s
-) o
exposure to fuel p rices)/
23 We will further examine the meaning o f  speculation and its difference from gambling in 
Chapter 4. See infra 4.4.1.
24 Hudson, Law on Financial Derivatives, at 2-14 (4th edn, Sweet & M axwell, 2006).
See Clark, “Genealogy and Genetics o f  ‘Contract o f  Sale o f  a Commodity for Future D elivery’ 
in the Commodity Exchange A ct” (1978) 27 Emory LJ 1175, at 1205 et seq.
26 Das, supra  note 10, at 4.
27 Id-
28 Id-, at 10-12.
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2.2 Contractual Instruments for M anaging 
Risk
Given the monetary effects o f risk on human beings, it is not surprising that 
people have developed contractual instruments to control risk exposure. Before 
introducing these contractual instruments, there is a need to recognise the role of 
some other non-contractual legal regimes in controlling risk. First, property law 
and tort law serve some risk allocation functions. The law o f property deals with 
the ownership and control of a property, allocating risks in terms of property 
rights and obligations. The law o f tort tracks the consequences of a human 
wrongdoing, by imposing liabilities on the wrongdoer to compensate the victim. 
In economic theory, “[t]he economic purpose of tort liability is to induce injurers 
to internalize these costs. ... When potential wrongdoers internalize the costs of 
the harm that they cause, they have incentives to invest in safety at the efficient
->g
level”~ , and thus, the potential risk can be reduced. Secondly, some laws and 
regulations set up certain standards of conduct. For example, labour laws 
require employers to establish safety measures to protect the health of their 
employees.30 Product safety regulations require manufacturers to follow certain 
rules in order to ensure the safety of their product.31 Financial regulations 
impose prudential requirements and conduct o f business standards to protect
32 • . . . .investors. It is not our intention in this thesis to cover every safety measure or 
deterrence regime. Rather, we will focus on how parties can control their risk 
exposure using contracts.
2.2.1 Traditional Instruments
It is natural for contractual parties to manage risks in a contract. First, to some 
extent, the contract itself has an insurance function.33 Parties can also use
29 Cooter & Ulen, Law and Economics, at 290 (3rd edn, Addison-W esley Longman, 2000).
30 For example, the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974.
31 See Consumer Protection Act 1987, s 11. For example. Toys (Safety) Regulations 1995, SI 
1995/204.
32 See FSA Handbook, Prudential Standards and Business Standards.
33 Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law, at 104 et seq. (6th edn. Aspen, 2003).
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contractual terms to cope with the potential realisation of risk during the 
performance o f a contract (e.g. the default o f the counterparty, a hazard occurring 
during delivery, etc.), subject to their bargaining power and negotiation skills. 
Standard contracts may provide an acceptable risk allocation mechanism, and so 
partly solve some problems if  parties use the same standard form.34
Whenever parties cannot allocate risk in the contract, the law o f contract can fill 
the gap. For example, the doctrine o f frustration addresses those future 
uncertain events that render a contract impossible to perform.35 Transfer of 
ownership or delivery of possession o f goods sometimes determines who bears 
the risk of loss.36
However, even the law o f contract cannot provide perfect hedging. For 
example, some doctrines, such as that of frustration, are interpreted so strictly 
that they are difficult to apply.37 Under English law, price movement alone 
cannot normally trigger the application o f the doctrine of frustration. 38 
Although Lord Reid seems to reserve his opinions on the position “if the increase 
had reached an astronomical figure”39, as no such claim having been made, we 
find it difficult to create much room to apply the doctrine of frustration to a 
commodity sale only because of a dramatic movement o f commodity prices. As 
the main purpose of a fixed-price contract of sale is to buy and sell at the contract 
price, the buyer’s pain is the seller’s gain, and vice versa. Thus, the conflict of 
interest o f the two parties implies that the purpose o f a fixed-price transaction 
cannot easily be frustrated as it serves at least one party’s benefit. US law also 
takes the same position on this subject.40
34 For example, the FOSFA Contract for Vegetable and Marine Oil (in bulk) FOB terms (FOSFA  
No. 53) provides a Force Majeure clause to cope with various natural or human hazards, a 
Bankruptcy/Insolvency clause in the case where one party goes bankrupt, and a Default clause to 
determine the effect o f  default by one party. See FOSFA Contract No. 53, clauses 22, 24 & 26.
35 See Taylor v C aldw ell (1863) 3 B&S 826.
36 Sale o f  Goods Act 1979, section 20( 1).
37 In J  Lauritzen AS  v W ijsmuller B V (the ”Super Servant Two "), Bingham LJ opined that “[s]ince 
the effect o f  frustration is to kill the contract and discharge the parties from further liability under
it, the doctrine is not to be lightly invoked, must be kept within narrow limits and ought not to be
extended.” [1990] 1 L loyd’s Rep 1, at 8.
38 Cf. D avis C ontractors L td  v Fareham U D C  [ 1956] AC 696.
39 Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd  v N oblee Thorl G m bH  [1962] AC 93, at 118.
40 See Restatement o f  Contracts 2d, section 261, Comment d.
30
Nevertheless, even if parties may not hedge all the risks o f a transaction in a 
single contract, and even if the law o f contract cannot fill the gap perfectly, 
contracts still play a pivotal role in managing risk. Contracts also represent how 
parties intend to allocate between them the risks from a transaction. Not only do 
many of the legal instruments that will be mentioned take the form of a contract, 
but also they are often specified in the core contract o f a transaction. For 
example, a loan agreement normally requires the borrower to provide security 
interests or a guarantee, and long-distance trade frequently requires insurance. 
Whenever it is not clear how contract law or other private law regimes would 
allocate risk exposure between contractual parties, the contract itself is the only 
point of reference that we might draw to establish the intention o f the parties 
concerned. Thus, the basic contractual instrument should be the starting point.
Secondly, it is common for one party o f a transaction to require the other party to 
provide extra protection. The purpose of providing extra protection is to give 
the first party additional resources either to secure payment or to seek damages. 
A broader concept o f such protection is indicated by the term “collateral” . Extra 
protection can be obtained by providing either additional promises of a third 
party or properties for value. The former is exemplified by guarantees and the 
latter by security interests. .
Parties can support their contractual position by securing a promise from another 
credible person. A guarantee is a promise of a third party to repay the money if 
the principal debtor is in default, or to compensate for loss if the principal debtor 
does not perform according to the contract (e.g. the guarantor of an employment 
contract).41
Property-based protection is far more complicated. In England, security 
interests can be attached to realty and personalty, and to tangible or intangible 
properties. Some require a transfer of title (e.g. mortgage), some only the 
delivery of possession (e.g. pledge), and some neither (e.g. charge). They can be 
attached to existing or future assets. There is also an important distinction 
between a fixed security and a floating security. The former is attached to specific
41 See M oschi v Lep A ir Services L td [ 1973] AC 331 {per  Lord Diplock).
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property and the latter to a shifting fund o f assets where the debtor’s management 
power (the exercise of which is a source o f risk for the creditor) is brought to an 
end when the charge crystallises.42 In addition, it is also possible to arrange for 
the goods supplied under a contract o f sale to amount to security against future 
payments. In a conditional sale, the seller retains the title o f the goods until the 
price is paid, while the buyer enjoys the possession and use o f the goods in 
advance and acquires the title after full payment.
It is not the purpose o f this thesis to outline the absolute limit of what security 
interests, guarantees or other types o f collateral (or credit enhancement) could or 
could not do other than securing against credit risk. Security interests and 
guarantees are useful tools to control credit risk, but they are not able to solve all 
problems arising from market fluctuations. However, the line between 
instruments for controlling credit and market risks may be blurred in light of 
modem developments with financial transactions. As will be discussed below, 
the “margin” in the exchange trading market operates as a way to limit a trader’s 
loss (and thus the credit risk) if he cannot meet a margin call after the daily 
settlement of his exchange contracts (see 3.2.3.1 below). The same 
mark-to-market strategy (see 3.2.3.1 below) could be used in many off-exchange 
transactions (and collateral agreements).43 In this way, collateral might be 
linked to market fluctuations. To a certain extent, it is up to the creativity of 
practitioners and market participants. We argue simply that these instruments 
are created mainly for credit risk purposes. Market participants are of course 
free to develop further uses for these instruments.
Thirdly, insurance44 is a traditional method for managing risk. If we 
temporarily leave the definition o f insurance for the time being (see 2.5.1 below),
42 Goode, Legal Problems o f  Credit and Security, at 1-10 (3rd ed., Sweet & M axwell, 2003).
43 See generally. Hudson, Law on Financial Derivatives, chapter 12 (4th edn, Sweet & M axwell, 
2006); Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives, chapter 21 (L exisN exis Butterworths, 2003).
44 A dictionary definition o f  insurance is '*[t]he act or system o f  insuring property, life, etc.; a 
contract by which the one party (usually a company or corporation) undertakes, in consideration 
o f a payment (called a premium) proportioned to the nature o f  the risk contemplated, to secure the 
other against pecuniary loss, by payment o f  a sum o f  money in the event o f  destruction o f  or 
damage to property (as by disaster at sea, fire, or other accident), or o f  the death or disablement o f  
a person; the department o f  business which deals with such contracts” Oxford English 
Dictionary (2nd edn, 1989), < http://dictionary.oed.com/> (visited on 10 August 2006).
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in essence, an insurance contract shifts a specific risk from the insured to the 
insurer. The insured has to pay a certain amount o f money in return for the 
insurer’s indemnification o f his loss or payment on the occurrence o f a certain 
event irrespective o f the loss.45
It is necessary at this stage to take note of the types o f insurance policies on the 
market under current regulations. Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (RAO 2001),46 a “contract for 
insurance” means “any contract o f insurance which is a contract of long-term 
insurance or a contract o f general insurance . . .”47. Under the RAO 2001, 
“contracts o f long-term insurance” include: contracts of insurance and contracts 
to pay annuities on human life (life and annuity);48 contracts o f insurance (for 
more than 1 year) to provide a sum on marriage or on the birth of a child 
(marriage and birth);49 contracts o f insurance (or to pay annuities) on human life 
where the benefit is determined by reference to the value (or income) o f a 
property (linked long-term); 50 contracts o f insurance providing specified 
benefits against risks of a person becoming incapacitated in consequence of 
sustaining injuries as a result o f an accident (permanent health);51 tontine,52 
capital redemption contracts by non-banking insurance businesses, pension 
fund management;54 collective insurance;55 and social insurance.56
45 “[I]t appears that there are two categories o f  insurance which may respectively be called 
indemnity insurance and contingency insurance. Indemnity insurance provides an indemnity 
against lo s s ... Within the limits o f  the policy the measure o f  the loss is the measure o f  the 
payment. C ontingency insurance provides no indemnity but instead a payment upon a 
contingent, as in a life policy or a personal injury policy.” M edical D efence Union v D epartm ent 
o f  Trade [ 1982] Ch 82, at 89 (per  Sir Robert Megarry VC).
46 SI 2001/554.
47 RAO 2001, paragraph 3(1). This distinction generally corresponds to the distinctions between 
life insurance and non-life insurance under European legislation. See Paul, “Insurance 
Regulation” in Blair (ed.), Financial Services Law, at 14.01 & 14.23-25 (OUP 2006).
48 Id., Schedule 1, Part 2, paragraph I.
49 Id., paragraph II.
50 Id., paragraph III.
51 Id., paragraph IV.
Id., paragraph V.
53 Id-, paragraph VI.
54 Id., paragraph VII.
55 Id., paragraph VIII.
56 Id-, paragraph IX.
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On the other hand, contracts o f general insurance include: insurance policies for 
accidents (for a person’s sustaining an injury or suffering death following an 
accident);57 contracts o f insurance against risks of loss attributable to sickness
CO
or infirmity; insurance against the risk of loss or damage to a vehicle on land, 
railway rolling stock, aircraft, ships, goods in transit, fire and natural forces, and 
insurance against damage to property (including theft);59 insurance against 
damage in connection with the use o f motor vehicles on land, aircraft and 
ships;60 insurance against the risk o f incurring liability against a third party;61 
insurance against the risk o f loss from the insolvency o f debtors or from failure 
of payment;62 suretyship;63 insurance against miscellaneous financial loss;64 
insurance against incurring legal expenses;65 and contracts of insurance to 
provide assistance should the assured get into difficulties while traveling or in 
other circumstances. 66 Frequently, an insurance company can package 
different types o f insurance into one policy.67
As the introduction above shows, insurance companies provide protection 
against accidents, sickness, natural hazards, credit default o f a person, human 
wrongs and the life or death o f a human being. A more thorough analysis of 
insurance and insurance laws will be given later in this chapter (see 2.5 below).
Lastly, shifting risk exposure from one person to another is one way to reduce 
risk exposure. However, a risk buyer is still exposed to the same risk if a 
potential loss is simply shifted from one party to another. The risk buyer in one 
transaction might have to shift the risk to another party or in some cases to many
57 RAO 2001, Schedule 1, Part 1, paragraph 1.
58 Id., paragraph 2.
'9 Id., paragraphs 3 -9 .
60 Id., paragraphs 10-12.
61 Id., paragraph 13.
6“ Id., paragraph 14.
63 Id., paragraph 15.
64 Id., paragraph 16. See also infra 2.5.1.
65 Id., paragraph 17.
66 Id., paragraph 18.
67 For example, the Hom eowner’s Insurance provided by Providential can cover damage to the 
main property, personal belongings, loss o f  use, personal liability and third parties’ medical 
expenses, depending on the policy. See
< http://www.prudential.eom/productsAndServices/0,1474,intPageID% 253D3908% 2526blnPrin  
terFriendly%253DO,OO.html> (visited on 10 August 2006).
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other parties. The impact o f risk is minimised if it is shared by other people 
rather than staying with one person.
Before the modem creation o f derivatives, the traditional way of hedging was to 
seek help from other people who were in a similar position. Thus, there emerged 
mutual associations or clubs whose members would share the burden if one of 
their fellows suffered losses. Since money is required to cover losses, members 
might have to make a promise to share any loss suffered by another member or to 
contribute a certain amount of money to form a pool o f funds in order to cope 
with the realisation o f risks.
To some extent, the idea o f mutuality is similar to insurance. Mutual protection 
has existed for hundreds o f years in many parts o f the world. It first started in 
agricultural societies, where people in a relatively close community would share 
property or human losses. For example, if ten villagers decided to share the 
losses of cattle from theft, they might form a mutual association where each 
villager periodically contributes a certain amount o f money into a pool. Then 
whenever a villager’s cattle are stolen, the pooled money is used to compensate 
him for his loss: in this way, the risk o f theft is shared among ten villagers rather 
than remaining with the one person. In the UK, this could be what is generally 
called a “friendly society” . The same idea has survived the emergence of 
insurance policies. Protection and indemnity clubs for marine insurance in the 
UK are a good example.68 The structure of mutual risk sharing could range from 
contractual agreement(s) to the establishment of trusts, pools o f funds, and 
mutual associations controlled by membership. In the modem era, a mutual 
association could also be incorporated as a company.69
To some extent, the same thing happens in an indirect way to retail insurance 
policies. An insurer might try several ways to minimise its risk exposure. 
Apart from using reinsurance, an insurer actually spreads his risk to a majority of
h8 For the historical developm ent o f  P&I clubs and their predecessors, see chapter 1 o f  
Hazelwood, P&I Clubs: Law and Practice (3rd edn, LLP, 2000).
69 If a mutual association is incorporated as a company, members contract with the company 
rather than with other members. Therefore, a member could enforce his right against the 
company but not against other members.
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assureds facing the same situation by carefully calculating premiums to reflect 
not only the personal traits o f each assured but also the general tendency to 
exposure to the same type o f risk, following the law of large numbers. In this 
way, risk exposure is to some extent shared by all assureds. Social insurance is 
more inclined in this direction.
The discussion above focuses on instruments that help market participants to 
control risk exposure. In contrast, there are also instruments that help market 
participants to make speculative profits by gaining risk exposure. Gambling 
contracts are typical examples o f contracts to take a risk. 70 A punter to a 
gambling contract intentionally exposes himself to future uncertainties by 
placing a bet. In a way, investment activities may also be seen as contracts to 
make a profit from future uncertainties. Whatever investment vehicle (stock, 
bonds, commodities, real estate, collectible goods, etc.) that an investor 
purchases or sells, he attempts to make a profit out o f future market movements 
o f the underlying instruments.
O f course, every transaction or human activity may invite a certain degree of 
risk exposure. Thus, it is meaningless to argue that all contracts are risk 
trading contracts. In contrast, the purpose of the above discussion is to show 
that there are legal instruments that help market participants to control or avoid 
risk exposure as well as make profits by exposure to future uncertainties.
2.2.2 Derivatives
2.2.2.1 General D efin ition
In general, a derivative “can be defined as a financial instrument whose values 
depend on (or derive from) the values of other, more basic underlying 
variables.” 71 In a way, derivatives “allow trading in the return or price 
fluctuations o f other assets without the necessity o f trading in the assets 
themselves”.12 Although derivatives have been developing since the 1970s and
70 See infra 4.2.1 for types o f  gambling.
71 Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, at 1 (6th edn, Prentice Hall, 2006).
7' Das, Derivative Products & Pricing, at 4 (3rd ed., rev. edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006).
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in particular since the 1980s, some derivatives, such as forward contracts and 
options, have existed for centuries.73 Even if the derivative itself is highly 
risky,74 it is still a powerful weapon for combating risk. In a way, “applications 
of derivative instruments focus on using derivatives to transfer risk”.75
The umbrella term o f “derivative” may refer to a wide range of financial products 
traded in different forms and based on a variety o f underlying assets. The four 
general categories o f derivatives include options, futures, forward contracts, and 
swap agreements. There are so-called hybrid (or structured) instruments that 
incorporate certain derivative techniques into a traditional instrument (such as 
bonds). If we focus on the types of underlying asset, we might also divide 
derivatives into categories such as credit derivatives (e.g. derivatives on 
corporate bonds), currency derivatives (e.g. relating to foreign exchange), equity 
derivatives (e.g. relating to stock), and commodity derivatives (e.g. relating to 
crude oil). Looking at the place where derivative instruments are traded, those 
traded on organised exchanges may be differentiated from those traded in the 
over-the-counter (OTC) market.
The most basic elements of derivatives trading are option and forward 
contracts.76 Options require the holder to pay an amount o f money (the 
premium) in return for a right (but not an obligation) to buy (a “call” option) or 
sell (a “put” option) certain underlying assets or products at a certain fixed price 
(the strike price). The basic structure may be varied to make a so-called “exotic 
option”. 77 For example, market participants might reset the strike price
78according to a certain pre-determined formula (e.g. a “lookback option” ),
73 For a historical background, see Gengatharen, Derivatives Law and Regulation, at 8-12 
(Kluwer Law International, 2001). For developm ent o f  the swap agreement, see Henderson, 
supra  note 43, at 1.13; Hudson, supra  note 24, at 2-01 (4th edn, Sw eet & M axwell, 2006); 
Romano, “A Thumbnail Sketch o f  Derivative Securities and Their Regulation” (1996) 55 Md L 
Rev 1, at 7 & 40 -41 .
74 See infra 2 .2.2.5 for further discussion o f  the risks o f  derivative trading.
75 Das, Structured Products Volume 1: Exotic Options; Interest Rates & Currency, at 117 (3rd ed., 
rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006).
6 Das, supra  note 72, at 8; Hudson, supra  note 24, at 2-05.
77 See generally. Das, supra  note 75, Chapters 5 et seq.
78 A “lookback option” is an option where the optionholder has the right to set the strike price at 
the expiration o f  the option at the most favourable price for the underlying asset that has obtained 
during a specified time. Das, id, at 212 & 288.
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“knock in” or “knock out” the validity of an option (e.g. a “barrier option”79), or 
revise the option’s pay-off structure (e.g. a “digital option”80). In addition, by 
combining several options together, one may create a different pay-off structure. 
For example, a “bull spread” involves “buying a call option on a stock with a
certain strike price and selling a call option on the same stock with a higher strike
81 s”>price”. This strategy limits both the investor’s upside and downside risks.
In a forward contract, the buyer agrees to buy and the seller agrees to sell a 
specified underlying asset on a specified date at a specified price (the “forward 
price”).83 Depending on the underlying asset, a forward contract might require 
the delivery o f the underlying asset (e.g. equity or commodities) or a cash 
settlement (e.g. for interest rates or index forwards). However, a forward 
contract for a physically deliverable underlying asset may be settled in cash if so 
desired. Both forward contracts and options can be traded on an exchange. 
Exchange-traded forward contracts are generally called “futures” by market 
participants.84
85In addition, a swap is in essence an exchange of cash flows: thus, in a way a
swap could be seen as a composition of forward contracts. The calculation of 
cash flows might be based on interest rates (an “interest rate swap”87), currency 
rates (a “currency swap”88) or any other rates, indices or measures (e.g. the 
“forward freight rate swap”89). There is an abundance o f swap transactions, 
some o f which will be introduced later in this chapter (see 2.2.2.3 below).
79 A barrier option would activate (knock in) or expire (knock out) i f  the price o f  the underlying 
asset breaches a specified level (the “barrier”). A barrier option might provide the holder with a 
structured hedge with a lower premium. See Das, id., at 333 et seq.
80 A digital option is an option with a fixed payout, regardless to what extent the option is
“in-the-m oney”. See Das, id., at 385 et seq.
81 Hull, supra  note 71, at 225-226 .
82 Id., at 226.
83 Das, supra  note 72, at 9.
84 In contrast, the meaning o f  “futures” in law might contain both exchange-traded futures and
off-exchange forward contracts. See infra 3.1.
85 Hudson, supra  note 24, at 2-73.
86 “Swap contracts are essentially a package or portfolio o f  forward contracts that are combined  
into a single transaction.” Das, supra  note 72, at 83.
87 See infra 2 2 .2 .3 .
88 See infra 2 .2 .2 3 .
89 See infra 2 .2 .2 3 .
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Having the above introduction in mind, this thesis takes the position that, from a 
legal point of view, it is better to analyse each derivative instrument according to 
the market where it is traded. To quote Henderson’s classification:
“Broadly speaking, the term ‘derivatives’ includes three main groups of
financial products:
■ Individually negotiated, bilateral, [over-the-counter (OTC)] transactions 
such as swaps and forwards, with payments or deliveries based and 
valued on movements in interest, currency, equity or commodity rates, 
prices, or indices or other priceable variables applied to a notional 
amount or quantity, and swap-related products which are, or have 
certain characteristics similar to, options (including caps, floors and 
OTC options on those rates, prices, indices or variables or on the 
securities, commodities or other underlying physical assets themselves);
■ debt obligations (hybrid securities or securitised derivatives) with 
‘unusual’ rate of return, which can be viewed as standard debt securities 
with OTC derivatives of the preceding type embedded into them; and
■ exchange-traded futures and options which, since they are traded on 
regulated exchanges in a standardised form, do not present most o f the 
credit and structural issues arising from OTC derivatives . . .”90
Exchange trading is much standardised, with the result that contractual problems 
tend to be resolved on the basis of the rules of an exchange/clearing house (see 
Chapter 3 below). The OTC market, in contrast, allows much more contract 
negotiation, so there is more room for private law to intervene. Hybrid 
instruments create another class o f problems, as they might be seen as securities 
or other existing capital market instruments. This thesis assumes that analysing 
derivative instruments under this classification is beneficial as it reflects the 
different contractual structures having legal implications for contract lawyers and 
regulators. In the following sections, we will introduce some derivative 
instruments and their applications according to three categories: exchange-traded 
products, OTC products, and hybrid instruments.
2.2.2.2 E xchange-traded Products
Modem futures trading first developed in the grain market. Initially, grains were 
traded on the spot. Since this could only take place during periods o f grain
90 Henderson, supra  note 43, at 1.1 (L exisN exis Butterworths, 2003).
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production, it was risky for both the farmers and buyers alike because grain prices 
depended on many external factors. A later development was to contract in 
advance for future deliveries, which, most importantly, allowed the price to be 
fixed even before the grain was produced.
In 1848, the Chicago Board o f Trade (CBOT), the first modem organised futures 
market in the world, was established.91 Traders soon realised that the futures 
market provided an effective playground for hedging and speculation, because 
traders did not need to make a delivery unless they held an open position (i.e. 
contracts not being liquidated92) at the end of trading. Therefore, trading 
volume in a contract month might be more than the actual quantity available for 
delivery. Since the 1970s the market has grown with futures trading spreading 
from grain sales to the notional trading of commodities, to securities trading and 
to purely financial futures (such as index futures).93 Financial engineers have 
masterminded many complex hedging strategies that involve the use of forward 
contracts, futures and options in combination with spot market transactions in 
order to balance expected losses with risks and potential profits.94
How can the futures market be used to hedge risks?95 For example, if a buyer 
fears that the cost of Brent oil will be higher than £50 per barrel in July (i.e. the 
time delivery is required), he can enter into the London Brent futures market to 
buy Brent Crude Oil futures (July delivery) for £50 per barrel to cover his future 
transactions in July. Assuming that the spot market Brent price is £55 per barrel 
in July (and also assuming that the futures prices and spot prices converge at the
91 See < http://ww w.cbot.eom /cbot/pub/page/0,3181,942,00.htm l> (visited on 10 August 2006).
It has also been reported that Japan’s ancient rice futures market, which first appeared in the 17th 
century, was the first ever organised futures exchange in history. Turner & Suzuki, “Japan Plans 
to Resurrect Rice Futures Market” Financial Times (9 December 2005).
92 The process o f  liquidation is introduced in infra 3.2.3.2.
93 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange claimed that it launched the first financial future in the 
world, the Japanese Yen futures, in 1972. See <http
http://www.cm e.com /about/ins/caag/history2801.htm l > (visited on 10 August 2006). Chicago  
Board o f  Trade launched the first financial futures, the GNM A futures, in 1975. See 
< http://www.cbot.eom /cbot/pub/page/0,3181,942,00.htm l> (visited on 10 August 2006).
94 For example, the N Y M E X ’s website also introduces several trading strategies involving 
futures and options. See < http://www.nym ex.com /option strat.aspx> (visited on 3 December
2006).
95 We should be aware that the same hedging strategy could be em ployed with an off-exchange 
forward contract. Thus, w e would not repeat when w e discuss OTC products later.
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end), the buyer pays £55 per barrel for the spot market contract but can recover £5 
if he settles the futures contract in cash at £55 per barrel. However, if the spot 
market price is £45 per barrel in July, then the cheaper spot prices are offset by 
the loss of £5 (£45 - £50) in the futures contract. Thus, putting to one side the 
costs of trading, the oil price is fixed at £50.96 A seller can use a similar strategy
97except that he is selling a futures contract instead o f buying. We should be 
aware that the result of fixing a future price is not always desirable. In the above 
example, the hedge pays off when the July price exceeds £50 per barrel; however, 
the hedge literally becomes a loss if  the price stays below £50. This is a risk that 
the buyer has to take when entering into a hedging transaction. It also reflects 
the fact that a hedge may work against the hedger if the market moves in an 
unexpected direction.
By using the hedging strategy described above, a trader effectively turns the 
combination of spot market transactions and futures transactions into what 
financial engineers call “basis” trading. A “basis” is defined as the difference 
between the spot market price (e.g. May com price) and the most imminent
QQ
futures prices (May com futures price in the CBOT). Suppose a farmer wants 
to take advantage o f the relatively higher May com futures to hedge against 
potential price movements. The farmer sells a certain amount of May com 
futures in the CBOT at price FI. In May 2008, the farmer sells his com in the 
spot market to another trader at price S2, and also settles his com futures at price 
F2. Thus, the overall sale price for the farmer is the spot price (S2) plus any gain 
or loss from his futures transactions (F1-F2). The farmer’s real earnings are the 
futures prices in the first period (F 1) plus a “basis” in period 2 (S2-F2).99 In this 
way, a fanner can use current futures prices as a starting point to hedge his spot 
transactions in the future. The farmer (as the seller) must pick the best time to
96 This strategy is com m only called a “long hedge”.
97 This is com m only called a “short hedge”. See also G ebruder Metelmann Gm bH  & Co KG  v 
NBR (London) Ltd  [1984] 1 L loyd’s Rep 614, at 6 2 3 -624  (per  Mustill J).
98 If the future price is higher, the basis can be lower than zero. See Das, supra note 75, at 47-51.
99 In short, the formula works in this way: (Real costs) = S2+(F1-F2) = F1+(S2-F2) = FI + Basis. 
FI refers to the futures price in period one, when the farmer starts to contend for hedging. F2 is 
the futures price in period 2, when the spot transaction is made. S2 is the sale price in the spot 
market.
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enter into spot market trading (i.e. when the basis is highest) to maximise his sale 
price.100 The same is applicable to a buyer and a long hedge, except that the 
buyer would want the basis to be as small as possible. Once commodity traders 
merge the above strategy into a single transaction, it becomes what people call a 
“hedge-to-arrive” contract or basis contract (discussed in 3.3.1 below).
For some final comments, the futures market is highly standardised, so price is
virtually the only term subject to negotiation during the trading sessions. As will
be explained in Chapter 3, the exchange market has almost become a “contract
market”, 101 where market participants no longer trade the underlying asset o f a
• 102futures contract but the “futures contract” itself.
2.2.2.3 O TC Products
A variety o f standard or exotic options, forward contracts, swaps and structured 
products are traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, linking to equity, 
bond, commodity, and/or currency prices. As the market continues to grow, it is 
becoming virtually impossible to make a complete list o f the products available 
to market participants. As we have briefly introduced the meaning of forward 
contracts and options above (section 2.2.2.1) and the techniques for using 
forward contracts to hedge and speculate are very much the same as those for 
using exchange-traded contracts, we will focus on certain types of swap 
agreements in this section.
In a typical interest rate swap, one party pays at a fixed interest rate (the fixed rate 
payer) and the other pays at a floating rate (the floating rate payer), based on a 
notional principal am ount103. The fixed-rate payer enjoys more controllable 
cash flows because his interest payment is fixed, but he may suffer if the market
100 This simple example does not consider the costs o f  the futures trading (e.g. brokers’ 
com m ission) and the potential need to roll over futures positions if  a trader does not make a spot 
transaction when his futures positions mature.
101 The term is used in the US Commodity Exchange Act to refer to futures exchanges. See 7 
U S C A  l a .
I0~ This is a point that w ill be elaborated further in infra Chapter 3.
103 The principal amount in an interest rate swap is notional because there is no real exchange o f  
cash flow regarding the principal. The principal amount is deemed to exist only for calculation  
purposes.
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rate later declines. On the other hand, the floating-rate payer may gain from a 
lower market but suffer if the market rises.
Frequently, parties enter into interest rate swaps because of their financial or 
commercial needs. For example, a company issues a bond with floating-rate 
interest payment obligations. By entering into a swap, this company might 
change its floating rate obligation into a fixed rate obligation thereby making its 
cash flow more predictable. In contrast, a bondholder with a fixed rate cash 
inflow each period might turn his fixed payment into a floating payment if he 
expects a rising market rate. Since it is not always easy to find another party 
with the same needs in the market, financial intermediaries (such as banks) play 
an important role in matching transactions or actually stepping into the market to 
buy or sell swaps. In such cases, financial institutions often enter into 
back-to-back swaps on the same terms with another institution.104
Currency swaps are more complicated. In a traditional currency swap, the first 
step is for the two parties to exchange amounts in different currencies on the basis 
of an agreed exchange rate (e.g. 2 million US dollars and 1 million pounds 
sterling). Then, there will be periodic payments (usually calculated according to 
an agreed interest rate for the underlying currency) between the parties in the 
currency that each one receives (e.g. the party receiving 1 million pounds at the 
first stage makes periodic payments in pounds sterling to the other party). At the 
end, there is another exchange o f currency, which is the reverse of the first 
stage.105 In this way, a UK company with an income in US dollars might 
exchange with a US company having an income in pounds sterling without being 
exposed to fluctuations in the exchange rate between the US dollars and British 
pounds until the end o f the currency swap.
The use o f a fixed-for-floating strategy is not limited to interest or currency rates. 
For example, in an equity swap, one party makes a fixed or floating interest
104 For example, taken facts from C aisse N ationale de C redit A gricole  v CBI Industries, Inc, 90 F 
3d 1264 (1996), while contracting with CBI, Caisse Nationale de Credit entered into a 
back-to-back agreement under the same terms and conditions with the Bankers Trust. See also 
Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd  v Welwyn H atfield  D istrict Council [1995] 1 All ER 1; infra 4.1.1.
105 See Hudson, supra  note 24, at 2-100.
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payment on the basis of a notional amount plus any depreciation o f an equity 
price or index, in exchange for the return on the equity price or index (including 
any appreciation of prices and distribution o f dividends), calculated notionally 
in monetary term s.106 Nor are swaps limited to market prices or indices. For 
example, in weather derivatives, a party planning to hedge against an 
unexpectedly warm or cool season (e.g. an air-conditioner manufacturer) may 
pay a fixed sum of money for an option to buy a weather index, calculated 
according to the total number of heating degree days (HDD), in order to measure 
a year’s relative “coolness” .107 In short, it is like an index option or swap, except 
that the index refers to the weather. In theory, any floating price, such as 
maritime freight rates,108 is susceptible of being swapped.
Credit derivatives provide another facet. 109 In a credit default swap (CDS), a 
party wishing to hedge the credit risk o f a “reference obligation” (e.g. a bond) 
makes a fixed payment periodically or in a lump sum and receives payment from 
the other party if  the “reference entity” (e.g. the bond issuer) defaults, thereby 
allowing bondholders to hedge the credit risks of the bond issuer. The credit 
default swap has evolved to cover not only the default of a single debt instrument 
but also the default o f one or several debt instruments in a portfolio.110 There 
also exists a so-called loan-only credit default swap (LCDS) to cover loans made 
by banks.111 In essence, a CDS is similar to credit insurance (though legally
106 Hull, supra  note 71, at 704. Das, Structured Product Volum e 2: Equity; Commodity; Credit 
& N ew  Markets, at 81 (3rd ed., rev. edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006).
107 See Hull, supra  note 71, at 552-553. A s o f  now, weather derivatives are no longer limited to 
an index o f  temperature. Weather indices have been developed for snowfalls, frosty days and 
hurricanes for the weather products traded in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. See 
<http://www.cme.com/trading/prd/weather/> (visited on 14 August 2007).
108 For example, a forward freight rate swap in D am pskibsselskabet “Norden ” A/S  v Andre & 
CIE SA [2003] 1 L loyd’s Rep 287; A fVB (Geneva) SA v North Am erica Steam ships Ltd  
[2007]EW CA 1167 (Comm). Henderson describes the application o f  derivative techniques to 
such new areas as the fourth wave o f  innovation. Henderson, supra  note 43, Chapter 3.
109 Das defines credit derivatives as “a class o f  financial instrument, the value o f  which is derived 
from an underlying market value driven by the credit risk o f  private or government entities other 
than the counterparties to the credit derivative transaction itself.” Das, Credit Derivatives: 
CDOs & Structured Credit Products, at 6 (3rd edn, John W iley, Singapore 2005).
110 This is called a portfolio or basket credit default swap. See Deutsche Bank AG  v Ambac 
Credit Products, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 45322.
111 See Barlam, "Loan-Only Credit Default Swaps” (2007) 22(1) JIBFL 16.
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speaking, a CDS may not be defined as “insurance”— see 2.5.3 below) as it 
protects a creditor from potential default (or other credit events).
Many new derivatives products are launched each year, and new contracts or
products are often combinations o f several previous products. Some major
112exchanges also attempt to provide standardised versions o f interest rate swaps 
or credit default sw aps113. Some products can be further securitised (see 
2 .2 .2 .4 ).
2.2.2.4 H ybrid and Securitised Instrum ents
Market participants can also incorporate derivative techniques into existing types 
o f investment vehicles, and thus make “hybrid” derivatives. An example is the 
catastrophe bond (CAT bond), where, instead o f shifting risks by way of 
traditional reinsurance, an insurer can hedge risks originating from a catastrophic 
event by issuing a catastrophe bond. The bond issuer receives money from 
investors. If the catastrophic event does not occur, the catastrophe bond is 
similar to a normal bond, with periodic interest payments and a final principal 
repayment. However, if the event does occur, the bond issuer can deduct an 
amount from the principal that is returned to the bondholder. Thus, risks from a 
catastrophic event can be transferred from an insurer (as bond issuer) to the 
investors.114 Hybrid instruments raise certain other problems as they are not 
based on single bilateral contracts but are in essence securities (or other 
instruments) with additional hedging or speculative functions incorporated into 
them.
112 For example, the CBOT provides interest rate swap futures that refer to swap rates. See 
< http://ww w.cbot.eom /cbot/pub/cont_detail/0,3206,1562+39888,00.html> (visited on 22 May
2007).
" 3 The alleged “CDS futures” traded on Eurex are actually futures contracts on iTraxx indices, 
which are published as a market benchmark to determine the price o f  a credit default swap. See 
< http://www.eurexchange.com/trading/products/CRD_en.html> (visited on 22 May 2007).
114 See Das, Structured Products Volum e 2: Equity; Commodity; Credit & N ew  Markets, at 1212 
et seq. (3rd ed. rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006); Hull, supra  note 71, at 556-557. An insurer 
can use a combination o f  the CAT bond and traditional reinsurance contract to cover his potential 
liability.
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2.2.2.5 Risks o f Derivative Instrum ents
Even though derivative instruments are powerful tools for risk management, they 
are not free from all risk exposure. Thus, a dealer or user is also exposed to a 
certain degree o f risk by entering into a derivative transaction. The amount that 
a market participant might lose varies product by product. For example, the 
maximum amount an optionholder can lose is the premium of the option:115 but, 
the seller (writer) of an option is exposed to virtually unlimited losses, if the 
market price moves in an unexpected direction.
Various risks arise during derivatives trading.116 First, derivatives are exposed 
to market risk. As was discussed earlier, a buyer may use a forward contract to 
lock the prices o f a commodity, but the forward contract might become a burden 
if the actual future price falls below the current prices (see 2.2.2.2 above). Some 
of the cases outlined below are testimonials as to why it is unwise to ignore the 
might o f the market.
Secondly, since derivative instruments are based on contracts, they are exposed 
to credit risk. In Henderson’s words, “[derivatives convert other existing risks 
into credit risk.” 117 The general lines o f how market participants control credit 
risk from derivative transactions cannot be discussed here due to lack o f space.118 
However, controlling credit risk is an important issue for all derivative traders. 
Apart from providing collateral, it is also possible to use credit insurance to
115 However, it w ould be very different if  the optionholder bought an excessive quantity o f  
options.
116 See generally. Henderson, supra  note 43, at 9.1 et seq.
1,7 Henderson, supra  note 43, at 281.
118 See generally. Hudson, supra  note 24, Chapters 11 & 12; Henderson, supra  note 43, Chapter 
2 1 .
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reduce the credit exposure from a derivative transaction.119 This has further 
implications for the control of systemic risk in the market.120
Thirdly, there is also liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is especially likely to arise in 
the case of off-exchange transactions (including OTC transactions and 
off-exchange hybrid instruments), where the market is less transparent and it 
might be more difficult for a trader to liquidate his position quickly. However, 
traders can also suffer from a lack o f liquidity in the exchange market: it is not 
impossible that an exchange could fail to attract enough traders to enter the 
market, the results being that liquidity is literally reduced. It might also happen
1 9 1that a trader has a large number of positions that cannot be easily liquidated.
Lastly, there is the operational risk in derivatives trading. Any mismanagement 
of records, collateral, or documentation might later cause chaos for a trader or the 
market as a whole. Backlogs occur when the speed of finalising documentation 
in the back office does not match the pace o f trading at the trading desk.122 A 
bank’s failure to find credible legal opinions could also be seen as another type of 
operational risk.123
The risks of derivative transactions are not merely a matter for academic 
discussion. The dark side of derivative instruments has shown itself in several
119 For example, in M errill Lynch v Winterthur Swiss Insurance Co [2007] EWHC 893 (Comm), 
Merrill Lynch purchased '‘credit indemnity insurance” from an insurance company to protect 
itse lf from credit exposure from the 1SDA master agreement and certain interest collar 
transactions that Merrill Lynch had with a third-party company. The issue o f  the case was 
whether an event o f  default has occurred under the 1SDA master agreement that might trigger 
the indemnity o f  the subsequent credit insurance. Merrill Lynch eventually won the case and 
was able to claim indemnity from the insurance company. See also Das, supra  note 114, at 
752.
120 Henderson argues that derivatives may result in greater aggregated credit risk in the financial 
system, but he also argues that credit risk does not rise to the system ic level if  non-delivery is 
reduced, netting agreements are enforceable, and collateralisation is effective. Henderson, supra  
note 43, at 9.20. See also Paredes, “On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's 
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and M ission” [2006] U 111 L Rev 975, at 983.
For example, in the early 1990s, MG Refining had to hedge over 150 million barrels o f  crude 
oil from trading contracts with its customers. When oil prices fell sharply in 1993, MG suffered 
huge losses from its hedging transactions. MG could not meet the margin call in the N ew  York 
Mercantile Exchange (estimated at about U SD  1 billion) and the losses eventually led to the 
downfall o f  the parent company, M etallgesellschaft AG. See Das, Traders, Guns & Money: 
Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World o f  Derivatives, at 95-97 (Prentice Hall, 2006).
See Henderson, supra  note 43, at 16.21.
123 Das, supra  note 10, at 464 et seq.
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cases involving spectacular losses. The credit crunch after the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the US after August 2007 is also a good example.124 The 
victims o f derivative instruments range from financial institutions, government 
bodies and big corporate entities to relatively small businesses and wealthy
P 5
private individuals. In BankAtlantic v Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc, “ 
the bank suffered losses in excess o f USD 30 million from two interest rate 
swaps.126 Orange County lost USD 1.5 billion of taxpayers’ money through 
buying certain structured notes.127 Procter & Gamble (P&G) was initially under 
an obligation to pay 200 million US dollars out o f two highly leveraged swaps, 
with the Bankers Trust.128 P&G eventually settled with the Bankers Trust for 
USD 35 million plus a USD 14 million sw ap.129 Kwiatkowski, a wealthy
130individual, lost more than USD 200 million trading currency futures.
When big losses occur, an intuitive response is to either attempt to get rid of the 
contract(s) or to at least seek damages from the counterparty. Legal claims 
(either as causes of action or defences) range from statutory violation to common 
law claims (such as misrepresentation, breach of contract, negligence, breach of 
fiduciary, etc.).131 These cases provide an important interface where judges
124 See Lieberman, “Subprime Fallout: Where Do Exposures Lie?” (2007) 11 JIBFL 657; Walker, 
“Credit Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform” (2007) 10 JIBFL 567.
125 12 F 3d 1045(1994).
1-6 BankAtlantic then unsuccessfully sued its advisor (rather than the counterparty) for failure to 
disclose the risks involved in the swap transactions. Unfortunately, the judgment was about 
Paine W ebber’s failure to produce documents in the proceedings rather than the merits o f  the 
case.
127 Das, supra  note 121, at 50.
128 See P rocter & G am ble Co v Bankers Trust Co, 925 F Supp 1270 (1996).
129 Kokkoris, “Liability o f  Swaps Dealers against Users” 2006 17(2) ICCLR 63, at 70.
130 See D e K w iatkow ski v Bear, Stearns & Co, Inc, 306 F 3d 1293 (2002). Kwiatkowski then 
unsuccessfully brought claims against the bank for damages on the grounds o f  fraud, 
misrepresentation, negligence and fiduciary relationship.
131 To take the example o f  a US case. In K 3C  Inc v Bank o f  America, 2006 US App LEXIS 
27437, K3C lost a sum o f  money from entering interest rate swaps with the Bank o f  America. 
K3C brought exactly 11 different causes o f  action to the court: “(1) fraud, (2) gross negligence, 
(3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) breach o f  fiduciary duty, (5) breach o f  duty to disclose, (6) 
breach o f  duty to deal fairly and in good faith, (7) rescission due to misrepresentation, (8) 
violation o f  the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, (9) violation o f  the Texas Business 
Opportunity Act, (10) violation o f  the Texas Securities Act, and (11) violation o f  the Bank 
Holding Company Act.” At 2. Unfortunately for K3C, the Second Circuit Court rejected all the 
claims.
A similar situation might also occur when a party is a defendant in a lawsuit. For example, in 
Lehman Brothers C om m ercial Corp  v M inmetals International N on-Ferrous M etals Trading Co, 
179 F Supp 2d 118 (2000), Lehman sued Minmentals for money out o f  a few foreign exchange
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express their views on derivative transactions. This thesis cannot provide an 
in-depth analysis of every claim, but later in this chapter there will be a summary 
of certain case laws to date (see section 2.3 below). At this stage, it is important 
to be aware that the powers o f derivative instruments should not be taken lightly. 
The use or misuse of derivative instruments may eventually lead to legal battles.
2.2.2.6 C om m oditisation o f  R isk and Risk Trading
Following the preceding discussion, it is clear that derivative instruments open a 
new door to hedge against risk exposure from future uncertainties. With the 
help o f financial technology, the risk management strategy o f today is far more 
advanced than a few decades ago. Nowadays, a market participant may hedge 
risks ranging from market and credit risks, to global warming and human life 
expectancies. As financial techniques develop, managing risk becomes a more
132complicated business. Financial engineering has also made it possible to 
hedge and speculate some future uncertainties that were originally beyond the 
control o f market participants.
In a way, derivative instruments have helped to commoditise the rather abstract 
concept of “risk” into something that can be bought and sold .133 One can 
transform uncertainties into certainties or vice versa. Market terminology, such 
as “long” (buy), “short” (sell), “position” (number o f contracts held) etc., also 
indicates the sense of commoditisation: by quantifying the possibilities of the 
realisation of risk, one can calculate an expected loss or gain more accurately.
transactions and Minmetals brought 18 defences to the court: “(1) Lehman failed to state a claim  
upon which relief can be granted; (2) the transactions at issue were not authorized; (3) Lehman 
was negligent and breached its fiduciary duties; (4) Lehman inequitably failed to advise 
Non-Ferrous o f  the risks o f  the transactions at issue; (5) Lehman committed fraud and 
misrepresentation; (6) the transactions at issue were illegal; (7) Lehman's claims are barred by the 
doctrine o f  unclean hands; (8) Lehman provided information that was incorrect and misleading; 
(9) Lehman breached the contracts at issue; (10) the contracts at issue lack consideration; (11) 
Lehman's claims are barred by the doctrines o f  mutual or unilateral mistake; (12) the transactions 
were in violation o f  the Commodity Exchange A c t ...; (13) Lehman's claims are barred by the 
doctrines o f  estoppel and equitable estoppel; (14) Lehman's claims are barred by the doctrine o f  
laches; (15) Lehman's claims are barred by the doctrine o f  waiver; (16) Lehman failed to mitigate 
its damages; (17) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants; and (18) in essence, 
Lehman acted unfairly and deceitfully.” at 133.
132 See generally. Das, supra  note 10.
133 Professor Walker also describes it as the “deconstruction o f  financial risk”. See Walker, 
“Credit Crisis: Regulatory and Financial System s Reform” (2007) 10 JIBFL 567.
As more data (about all aspects) has accumulated over the past decades, 
merchants have developed a greater ability to calculate risk on the basis of past 
performances and to look for potential gains. In the confines o f this text, this 
will be called the process of “commoditisation of risk”.134
2.3 Overall View of Legal D isputes about 
Derivatives
In this section, we will briefly review case laws of the past two decades relating to 
derivative transactions mainly in the UK but also in the US. First we will 
introduce a series of local authority cases from the UK. There will also be an 
overview o f contractual lawsuits relating to derivative instruments and the 
so-called “suitability” issues and the liability of derivative brokers/dealers. A 
reader should bear in mind that the following categorisation is made for the 
convenience of discussion only, and not based on legal causes o f actions.
2.3.1 Local Authority Cases in the UK
There arose several lawsuits involving the use of interest rate swaps by certain 
local authorities in the UK. In the 1980s, it was popular for certain local 
authorities in the UK to enter into interest rate swaps with banks. Then, one of 
the auditors o f the Hammersmith council brought a claim to court arguing that 
these interest rate swaps were not allowed by the Local Government Act 1972. 
In Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council,135 the House 
o f Lords held that interest rate swaps entered into by local authorities were ultra 
vires and thus void ab initio.
It is interesting to note that several interest rate swaps entered into by local 
authorities involved an upfront payment by a counterparty bank, which would
134 This process is also noticed by the industry. See speech o f  Peter Fisher, Executive V ice 
President o f  N ew  York Federal Reserv e Bank in 1998
< http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/1998/pf981015.htm l> (visited on 10 August 2006).
135 [1992] 2 AC 1.
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then be balanced by an adjustment o f the parties’ respective liabilities. It was 
found that:
“ [t]he practical result o f this is to achieve a form of borrowing. It appears 
that it was this feature which, in particular, attracted local authorities to 
enter into transactions o f this kind, since they enabled local authorities 
subject to rate-capping to obtain upfront payments uninhibited by the 
relevant statutory controls, though they must in the process have been 
storing up trouble for themselves in the future.” 136
After the Hazell judgment, the issue was whether a party (usually a bank) in an 
interest rate swap which involved a local authority could recover the money it 
had paid to the other party. This in turn led to the question as to whether there
137must be a total failure of consideration to trigger unjust enrichment, and 
whether one party could recover money on the ground o f mistake of law.138 The 
House o f Lords also had to address the issue o f whether there was a resulting trust 
(so as to establish an equitable proprietary claim) between the parties after a swap 
had been declared void.139 If recovery was allowed, then the next question was 
whether compounded interest should be granted.140 In some cases, limitation 
became a major issue, which was also related to the mistake o f law argument.141 
In addition, the recovery claim was not limited to transactions that were still 
“open” (i.e. swap agreements not yet completely executed). Restitution claims 
also arose for completely executed transactions (“closed swaps”) .142
In general, restitution claims were allowed, for both the open and closed 
swaps.143 In a close decision, the compound interest claim was rejected.144 In 
another close decision, the recovery of money was allowed for a payment made
136 Kleinw ort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, at 362 (per  Lord Goff).
137 W estdeutsche Landesbank G irozentrale  v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669; 
K leinwort Benson L td  v Birmingham C ity Council [1997] QB 380.
138 Kleinw ort Benson Ltd  v Lincoln C ity Council [1999] 2 AC 349.
139 W estdeutsche Landesbank, supra  note 137.
140 Id.
141 K leinwort Benson Ltd  v Lincoln C itv Council [1999] 2 AC 349; K leinwort Benson Ltd v 
G lasgow City Council [2002] SLT 1190.
14“ Kleinwort Benson v Sandwell Borough Council [1994] 4 All ER 890; Guinness Mahon & Co 
Ltd v Kensington and Chelsea R oyal London Borough Council [1999] QB 215.
143 Id.; Westdeutsche Landesbank, supra  note 137.
144 Westdeutsche Landesbank, supra  note 137.
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under mistake o f law.145 The defence of “passing on” was rejected in one case 
so the claimant did not need to suffer substantive losses in order to claim unjust 
enrichment.146 However, the House o f Lords found no resulting trust between a 
bank and a local council to support an equitable proprietary claim .147 In one 
case, a party argued that interest rate swaps were a type o f gaming or wagering,
148but the argument was rejected.
This series of local authority cases contributed greatly to the development o f the 
law for restitution and equity in the UK and incited academic debate in this 
area.149 We will not join the debate about restitution, mistake, compound 
interest and equity in these judgments (or how the same issues might be resolved 
in other jurisdictions), as they are outside the scope o f this thesis. However, 
there are certain points in the local authority cases that we may indicate.
First, the local authority cases illustrate the complexity of legal issues that may 
occur when a derivative instrument is set aside, particularly for transactions with 
multiple performances (such as an interest rate swap). Thus, it might be argued 
that it is better to refrain from avoiding a derivative transaction so as not to raise 
legal problems like those seen in the local authority cases. This thesis makes 
two responses to this argument. On the one hand, it is one thing for a party to 
avoid a contract by applying an existing legal doctrine (such as misrepresentation 
or undue influence). So we should not reject the application of a doctrine
145 K leinw ort Benson Ltd  v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349.
146 K leinw ort Benson L td  v Birmingham C ity Council [1997] QB 380.
147 Westdeutsche Landesbank, supra  note 137.
148 M organ Grenfell & Co Ltd  v Welwyn H atfield D istrict Council [1995] 1 All ER 1. See also 
infra 4.1.1.
149 See for example, Hudson, Swaps, Restitution, and Trusts (Sw eet & M axwell, 1999); Hudson, 
supra  note 24, at 7-25 et seq.; ; Burrows, “Swaps and the Friction between Common Law and 
Equity” (1995) RLR 15; Swadling, “Restitution for N o Consideration” (1994) RLR 73; Birks, 
“N o Consideration: Restitution after Void Contracts” (1993) 23 WALR 195; G iglio, “A 
Systematic Approach To 'Unjust' And 'Unjustified' Enrichment” (2003) 23 OJLS 455;
Burrows, “We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity” (2002) 22 OJLS 11; Chen-Wishart, 
“Unjust Factors and the Restitutionary Response” (2000) 20 OJLS 557; McCormack, 
“Proprietary Claims and Insolvency in the Wake o f  W estdeutsche“ (1997) JBL 48; Cohen “Is 
Equity Sterile? N o Award o f  Compound Interest in Local Authority Swaps Litigation11 (1996)
11(9) J1BL 347; Cohen, “Swaps, Restitution and Compound Interest: W estdeutsche 
Landesbanke v Islington” (1995) 10(3) JIBL 105; Cope, “Compound Interest and Restitution” 
(1996) 112 LQR 521; Gretton, “Swap and Unjust Enrichment11 (1996) JBL 327; Jones, “Ultra 
Vires Swaps: the Common Law and Equitable Fall-out” (1996) 55(3) CLJ 432; Stallworthy, 
“Restitution” (1993) 11(12) IBFL 133.
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merely because there would be complicated legal issues afterwards. On the 
other hand, it is another to discuss whether it is feasible to create a legal concept 
or extend an existing one (e.g. the doctrine of disclosure as discussed in Chapter 
5) to derivative instruments. Potential legal consequences and complexities are 
important aspects of the different solutions to such a problem.
Secondly, the doctrine of ultra vires is not without concern for market 
participants. No comment will be made as to whether a government entity 
should be able to use taxpayers’ money to conduct derivatives trading, as this 
subject involves policy concerns beyond the scope of this thesis.150 If a market 
participant is organised as a company, the Companies Act 2006 provides that 
“[t]he validity o f an act done by a company shall not be called into question on 
the ground of lack o f capacity by reason of anything in the company’s 
constitution”.151 Also, the law might make it clear that the violation of rules 
which restrict a certain type o f institution to enter into derivative transactions 
would not invalidate any transaction;152 nevertheless, where no such clarification 
exists, the validity of a transaction may still be called into question on the ground 
of ultra vires.
Lastly, a derivative transaction could become a tool for evading rules that restrict 
what an institution can or cannot do. For example, in Korean Life Insurance Co, 
Ltd v Morgan Guaranty Trust Company o f New York,153 both parties entered, 
through their subsidiaries, into a complex transaction that involved at least five 
different corporate entities and a combination of a shares subscription, a purchase 
o f certificates o f deposit, total return swaps and a guarantee. In short, the 
Korean Life Insurance (KLI) acquired additional finance that was not usually
150 See Loughlin, “Innovative Financing in Local Government: the Limits o f  Legal 
Instrumentalism: Part 1” (1990) PL 372; Loughlin, “Innovative Financing in Local Government: 
the Limits o f  Legal Instrumentalism: Part 2” (1991) PL 568; Aisbett, “Participation o f  Local 
Authorities in the Capital Markets and the Hammersmith Case” (1990) 5(1) JIBL 33; Ayres and 
Polglase, “The Ultra Vires Doctrine as Applied to Swaps” (1989) 4(12) JIBFL 537; Newman, 
“Local Authorities and the Capital Markets: the Decision o f  the House o f  Lords in the 
Hammersmith Case” (1990) 5(12) JIBL 503.
151 Companies Act 2006, section 39.
152 For example. Building Societies Act 1986, section 9A (inserted by Building Societies Act 
1997, section 10); see also FSA Handbook, INSPRU 3.2.5, ELM 3.7; Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, section 151(2). See infra Appendix 1 for the statutory texts.
153 269 F Supp 2d 424 (2003).
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available to it under Korean insurance laws. The purpose o f the whole 
undertaking was found to be “to mask the transaction from Korean regulators” .154 
The US court only dealt with KLI’s contractual claims and thus did not answer 
the question o f whether the whole transaction might be void (for reasons of ultra 
vires or on other grounds) under Korean law. However, regulators undoubtedly 
have a clear interest to uncover such disguised transactions.155
In sum, the local authority cases illustrate how complicated legal issues might 
become when a derivative transaction is rendered void. It is too early to argue 
that the local authority cases have resolved all potential issues or provided clear 
guidelines for market participants. However, these judgments provide a basis 
on which a market participant might draft a term or design a contractual structure 
to minimise potential ultra vires or other claims that might influence the validity 
or enforceability of a transaction. Judges and practitioners might take note from 
these cases and resolve to improve their documentation.
2.3.2 Contractual Claims
Since derivative instruments are based on contracts, they are not free from 
contractual dispute, which may arise from breach of contract or differing 
interpretations of contractual terms. The following is not a complete list o f the 
current case laws in the UK and US regarding contractual claims related to 
derivative transactions, but rather a select class of cases that may shed some light 
on what has happened so far.
First, let us examine a couple o f cases dealing with the calculation of damages 
after a breach o f contract for a derivative transaction has occurred. It has been 
held that it is proper to calculate damages for a breach of contract according to the 
price differences between the original swap and a replacement swap, if a market 
is available.156 Another relevant question is whether a party may claim costs of 
(or losses from) related hedging transactions as damages for the breach of an
154 id., at 427.
155 See Partnoy, “Financial Derivatives and the Costs o f  Regulatory Arbitrage” (1997) 22 Iowa J 
Corp L 211.
156 D am pskibsselskabet “Norden ” A/S  v Andre & CIE SA [2003] 1 L loyd’s Rep 287.
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underlying sale of goods or loan agreement. In other words, the issue is whether 
the loss o f hedge is too remote to be allowed. English courts have awarded 
damages for the costs of a hedge caused by the late delivery o f crude oil,157 and 
English law also allows a non-defaulting seller to resell in the futures market if  it 
is a reasonable way to mitigate his losses.158 However, a US court has refused to 
grant damages for costs to unwind a hedge owing to a party’s failure to apply for 
a loan.159 These cases may not arise directly out of a derivative transaction: 
however, as derivative instruments gain in popularity, damages and losses from 
hedging transactions will become important issues for contract law in the future.
Secondly, standard forms are not exempt from contractual disputes, even the 
most popular form published by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA). Disputes arose as to the choice o f “market quotation” and 
“loss” after an early termination in the 1992 ISDA form .160 One dispute related
to whether a transaction was rightfully terminated.161 Another concerned a
162condition precedent to payment and an exclusive jurisdiction clause. These 
cases may help us to further improve the clarity o f standard documentation.
Thirdly, quite a few lawsuits have come about in relation to credit derivatives, 
especially credit default swaps (see 2.2.2.3 above). Disputes have taken place 
over the meaning of “credit event” and whether a particular event falls within the 
scope of the “credit event” as defined in the contract.163 In some cases, it is the 
lack of clarity o f the contractual terms or poor drafting o f the contract that raised 
the question as to whether a credit event actually occurred.164 Moreover, an
l?7 A ddax L td  v A rcadia Petroleum  Ltd  [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 493.
158 G ebruder Metelmann Gm bH  & Co K G  v NBR (London) L td  [1984] 1 L loyd’s Rep 614.
I:'9 N ationwide Life Insurance Co  v St C lair M obile Home Parks, LLC, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 
82965.
160 See Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd  v Societe G enerale [2000] 1 A ll ER 
(Comm) 682; Peregrine F ixed Income Ltd  v Robinson D epartm ent Store Public Co Ltd  [2000] 
Lloyd's Rep Bank 304.
161 Nuova Sqfim SpA v Sakura Bank Ltd  [ 1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 526.
I6' A WB (Geneva) SA v North Am erica Steam ships Ltd  [2007] EWCA 1167 (Comm). The 
dispute is pending on further English judgment on the construction o f  relevant terms in the 
ISDA form.
163 See Deutsche Bank AG  v ANZ Banking Group Ltd  2000 WL 1151384; Eternity G lobal 
M aster Fund Ltd  v Morgan Guaranty Trust Co o f  N ew York, 375 F 3d 168 (2004).
164 For example, Aon Financial Products, Inc v Societe G enerate, 476 F 3d 90 (2007) and URSA 
M inor Ltd  v Aon Financial Products, Inc , 7 Fed Appx 129 (2001). The factual background o f
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English court once held that a convertible bond was not “subject to contingency” 
and was deliverable under the 1999 ISDA Credit Definitions.165 Meanwhile, in 
the US, a bank lost its breach o f contract claim (for money) because it failed to 
deliver the underlying bond within the timeframe specified by the contract.166
Finally, like other contracts, contractual disputes about derivative transactions 
may arise in relation to the formation, validity, performance, or breach of 
contract. One dispute as to the incorporation of the standard form o f contract 
occurred when an agreement was reached by telephone. 167 Another took place
1 ARin reference to the date o f exercising an option. O f course, disputes have 
also erupted regarding the choice o f law and forum selection.169 A complete 
accounting of such judgments cannot be provided within the confines of this 
thesis, but, there may be indications in passing that more and more contractual 
lawsuits are being generated. While the above judgments have not actually 
created new common law doctrines, they have helped to improve the standard 
documentation and the contractual negotiation o f derivatives (particularly OTC 
transactions).
the two cases is related. Aon entered into a credit default swap with the plaintiff in URSA and 
agreed to pay against the failure o f  one Philippine government agency to honour the surety 
bonds the agency issued. Aon then entered into a second credit default swap with Societe 
Generale to hedge its exposure in the first swap. The two swaps have a similar but slightly 
different term to define the “credit event”. The Philippine agency then refused to honour the 
surety bonds by claiming that the bonds were invalid. In the end, Aon was obliged to pay 
under the first swap in URSA, as a credit event was held to have occurred. However, Aon 
failed to recover its money under the second swap, as the Second Circuit Court held that a credit 
event had not been triggered in Aon Financial Products (2007). In sum, the supposed-to-be 
back-to-back swaps did not work for Aon because o f  the different credit event terms in the two 
swap agreements.
165 Nomura International p ic  v C redit Suisse First Boston International [2003] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 56.
166 D eutsche Bank AG  v Am bac C redit Products, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 45322. The US court 
rejected Deutsche Bank’s argument that industrial practices allowed more flexibility over the 
time o f  delivery than their contract required. Instead, the court found there was a reason that 
the time o f  delivery for a CDS had be strictly specified and enforced.
167 C redit Suisse Financial Products v Societe G enerale d'Enterprises [1997] CLC 168.
168 See C aisse N ationale de Credit A gricole  v CBI Industries. Inc, 90 F 3d 1264 (1996).
169 See R oyal Bank o f  Canada  v C ooperative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA [2004] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 471; Erne Shipping Inc v H BC H am burg Bulk C arriers GmbH, 409 F Supp 2d 427  
(2006).
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2.3.3 Suitability Claims
Another class of lawsuits involves what this thesis broadly calls “suitability” 
claims, or, in other words, the liability of derivative brokers/dealers. Since 
derivative instruments are still risky by nature, it is arguable whether the seller o f 
a derivative instrument should take more responsibility for entering into a 
derivative transaction with a client. Suitability claims raise two questions. On 
the one hand, such claims might come directly from the violation of statutory 
suitability rules; on the other, a market participant might still seek protection on 
other common law grounds. In this section, we will briefly discuss these two 
aspects with reference to certain existing UK case laws.
Under UK law there is an obligation of “suitability” under the rules of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA).170 Under current rules, an investment firm 
should take reasonable steps to ensure that its advice to a client is suitable when it 
makes any personal recommendation to buy or sell “designated investment”.171 
In addition, a firm must assess the appropriateness of its client when providing 
investment services, and must warn the client if the firm considers that the 
investment is not appropriate for them .172 However, the firm’s obligation might 
be reduced if the client is considered a “professional client”.173 It is interesting 
to note that there are few lawsuits pertaining to the suitability rule, though the 
violation o f such a rule is actionable for damages174. For comparison purposes, 
the suitability rule in the US comes from rules o f self-regulatory bodies175 rather 
than federal or state laws. It is arguable whether an investor may sue a firm for 
damages for the violation o f the suitability rule of a self-regulatory body.176
170 See FSA Handbook, PRIN 2.1.1 (Principle 9); FSA Handbook, COBS 9.
171 See FSA Handbook, COBS 9.
172 See FSA Handbook, COBS 10.
173 See FSA Handbook, COBS 10.2.1 (2)(b). See also FSA Handbook, COBS 3 for classification
o f  clients under the new conduct o f  business rules.
174 FSMA 2000, section 150.
175 See for example, N A SD  Rule 2860(b)(19)(A ); NFA Compliance Rules, Rule 2-30(4).
176 See M errill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc v Goldm an , 593 F 2d 129 (1979); Avern Trust 
v Clarke, 415 F 2d 1238 (1969). However, contradictory authority also exists. Regina (Rega) 
Jablon  v Dean Witter & Co, 614 F 2d 677 (1980).
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However, in certain circumstances failing to ensure the suitability o f a client
1 77might violate the anti-fraud provision o f the Securities Exchange Act o f 1934.
In Morgan Stanley UK Group v Puglisi Cosentino178, Mr. Puglisi (P), a wealthy 
Italian, claimed that Morgan Stanley (MS) breached the suitability rule of the 
then Securities Association (TSA) when selling a structured product called a 
“principal exchange rate linked security” (PERLS),179 which then lost a large 
part of its value after a series o f events in the 1990s. MS requested P to 
repurchase the PERLS as they had previously agreed upon but P refused. MS 
then sold the PERLS in the market and claimed the difference between the 
repurchase and resale prices (roughly USD 6.6 million). P counterclaimed that 
MS had violated the suitability and risk warning rule of the then Securities 
Association (TSA). Longmore J held that the PERLS was a kind of “contract 
for differences” that would trigger the TSA rules. In addition, MS had agreed 
that P should be classified as a “private customer”. Longmore J eventually 
held that the PERLS was not suitable for P, though he did not really define the 
meaning o f the term “suitability” .
As Hudson observes, Longmore J seemed to suggest a “double-barrelled concept 
of suitability: first, the means by which the product is sold must be suitable and 
secondly, the substance of the product which is sold must itself be suitable” .180
177 For example, it might be a violation o f  the anti-fraud clause (section 10(b)) o f  the US 
Securities Exchange Act o f  1934 if  a person solicited unknown persons to buy securities 
without any attempt to determine the financial position or investment needs o f  such persons (a 
so-called “boiler-room” operation). For example, see SEC  v RJ Allen & A ssociates, Inct 386 F 
Supp 866 (1974). See also Brown v EF Hutton Group, Inc, 991 F 2d 1020 (1993). In EF  
H utton , som e 400 plus investors lost m oney on a limited partnership and subsequently brought 
claim against the defendant alleging that the defendant breached the anti-fraud provision by 
representing that investment in the partnership was suitable for the investors. This created the 
so-called “unsuitability fraud” claims. However, the court in EF Hutton found that the legal 
documents clearly stated the nature and risk o f  the product and thus investors could not lawfully  
rely on this representation so that the fraud claim failed. The EF Hutton case is not directly 
applicable to products that do not fall within the definition o f  “security” under the Securities Act 
o f  1933 or the Securities Exchange Act o f  1934. In Lehman Brothers C om m ercial Corp  v 
Minmetals International Non-Ferrous M etals Trading C o , 179 F Supp 2d 159 (2001), the 
Second Circuit court rejected the claim ants’ argument that there was a common law  
unsuitability claim.
178 [1998] C L C 481.
179 The PERLS was a fixed interest US dollar bond whose redemption value would exceed the 
principal amount i f  the hard currencies depreciated and would be less than the principal amount 
if  they appreciated.
180 Hudson supra note 24, at 7-16.
58
The substantive aspect o f “suitability” was reflected in Longmore J ’s description 
that the PERLS was considerably greater than any o f P ’s other investments and 
that P was at considerable risk finding money every 6 months to meet M S’s 
repurchase demand. The procedural aspect was shown by the fact that MS did 
not present the transaction properly and that several key documents were not sent 
to P before the transaction.
Outside the application of the FSA’s suitability rule, lawsuits may arise in 
circumstances where a firm fails to do something (usually to provide ongoing 
advice or warn o f the risk of a transaction). This constitutes another aspect of 
the “suitability” issue. As there is no general doctrine of suitability in common 
law, a claimant often resorts to claims of fraud, misrepresentation, breach o f 
fiduciary duty and breach of a tortious duty of care as causes o f actions.
In Bankers Trust International pic  v PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera,]s] PT 
Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera (DSS) entered into two interest rate swaps with the 
Bankers Trust (BT). The parties performed the first swap (“swap 1”) in 
January 1994, but soon replaced it with a second swap (“swap 2”), under which 
DSS “would receive interest at the six-month US dollar LIBOR rate plus 1.25 
per cent per annum, and would pay interest at the six-month LIBOR rate less 
2.25 per cent per annum ‘plus spread’”. 182 Unfortunately for DSS, the
183LIBOR continued to rise in the following months and DSS suffered losses. 
Upon BT’s action for money, DSS counterclaimed for lack o f authority, 
misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of duty o f care.
DSS made a long list o f charges o f false representation, and a large part of the 
judgment was a lengthy examination of the evidence and facts. As to swap 1, 
Mance J held that
18' [1996] CLC 518.
182 [1996] CLC 518. at 520-521. The trick was that the “[s]pread was to be zero, if  the six-month  
LIBOR rate did not go above 5.25 per cent per annum at any time during a ‘look’ period 
consisting o f  the next year. If the rate did go above that level (or ‘barrier’) at any time during the 
next year, spread was to be established for each o f  the two years o f  swap 2 by taking whatever was 
the six-month LIBOR rate (called ‘rate’ in the proposal) at the year end”. At 521.
183 LIBOR is the acronym o f  “London Interbank Offered Rate”, one o f  the most popular 
benchmark for interest rates.
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“there is no basis upon which [BT] ... can in my judgment be said to have 
represented that swap 1 was ‘suitable’ or ‘safe’ for DSS, or that the only 
relevant historical rates for six-month LIBOR were those in Appendix 6 or 
that it was intended to replace swap 1 ‘at no cost’ if the barrier was reached. 
[BT] did pass on and provide ... economic forecast stay below the barrier 
in the relevant swap year. The only representation made was that this was a 
reasonable forecast, based on proper research and reasonable grounds, as it
Mance J was more critical o f BT’s practice regarding swap 2. Mance J 
distinguished two issues: whether a representation is false and whether DSS was 
indeed misled by the representation. Mance J found that the quality o f BT’s 
sales presentation was probably not high; however, DSS held itself out as a 
sophisticated investor and was capable of evaluating and looking after its own 
position. Thus, DSS was held not to have been misled by BT’s representation
185and DSS’s misrepresentation claim was rejected.
As to the duty of care claim, two o f DSS’s arguments were quite interesting: on 
the one hand, DSS argued that BT failed to give adequate warning to DSS as to 
the risks for DSS inherent in each proposed swap; and on the other, BT failed to 
consider or advise DSS as to the desirability of achieving its stated objectives 
using a range of different products or transactions and not just by the two 
proposed swaps.186
Mance J held that
“[DSS raised] the question to what extent a duty should be recognised 
requiring [BT] to warn DSS about the wisdom or unwisdom of this type of 
speculative transaction. Again, this was not in my view a role which DSS 
can or would have expected or have been entitled to expect [BT] to 
fulfil.” 187
Mance J further held that “
“I have considered whether [BT] should be regarded as under a duty ... to 
disclose this adverse current market value to DSS. ... I accept that it would, 
if disclosed, have been likely to cause DSS to think very hard about swap 2. 
The fact remains that this is not information of a nature which anyone at
184 id-, at 555. _
185 Id., at 573.
186 id-, at 528.
187 id-, at 575.
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the time would have expected to be disclosed before such a transaction. 
DSS in particular never sought any information or assurances about [BT’s] 
profit or about the possibility or cost of reversal o f either swap before 
entering into either. Each swap was entered into as a longer term 
speculation, and with a view to awaiting events and profiting (or, if the 
worst occurred, losing) according to the actual movements of rates over the
next year. Neither swap was entered into with a view to reversing or
188trading the transaction on the current market at an earlier stage.”
In the end, Mance J rejected all o f DSS’s claims. Mance J raised an important 
principle that, if a party is capable of evaluating the transaction (or like DSS, 
holding itself out as a sophisticated investor), the counterparty may not be said to 
have been misled by the misrepresentation (if any). In short, if a transaction 
appears to be within arm’s length, the court normally does not intervene. The 
quality of BT’s presentation was far from perfect, but Mance J did not find it to 
constitute misrepresentation or a further breach of a tortious duty of care.
Dharmala was not a lone decision. In Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,m  the ANZ led Peekay to believe that the 
transaction it was entering into conferred an interest in Russian treasury bonds. 
However, the transaction was in fact a structured deposit, as was stated in the 
Final Terms and Conditions (FTCs). What makes this case interesting is that 
Peekay only glanced through the FTCs and signed a risk disclosure document 
without checking the details. After realising the real nature of the investment, 
Peekay sued ANZ for misrepresentation. In the first instance, Richard Siberry 
QC held that the true nature o f the transaction was misrepresented because it 
was very different from what ANZ told Peekay.190 In the Court o f Appeal, 
Moore-Bick LJ took a different view of whether or not Peekay relied on ANZ’s 
representation. Moore-Bick LJ agreed that ANZ did to some extent 
misrepresent the nature of the transaction during negotiation. However, as the 
High Court judge also found, the information given before the FTCs was merely 
“rough and ready”. Thus, the FTCs were “the first and only opportunity that 
[Peekay] was given to satisfy himself that the nature of the investment and the
188 Id.
189 [2006] 2 L loyd’s Rep 511.
190 [2005] 2 CLC 111, at 142.
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terms relating to it were consistent with the broad description [given by 
ANZ].” 191 Therefore, Moore-Bick LJ held that Peekay was not induced to 
enter into the transaction by ANZ’s misrepresentation, but “by [its] own 
assumption that the investment product to which they related corresponded to 
the description [it] had previously been given.” 192 As for the risk disclosure 
statement, Moore-Bick LJ held that by signing the statement Peekay confirmed 
that it understood the nature o f the transaction. Since ANZ had not 
misrepresented the FTCs and the risk disclosure statement, Peekay was 
estopped from claiming that it had been induced by ANZ’s earlier 
representation of the nature of the transaction.193
The Peekay case reflects the tension between the misleading nature o f ANZ’s 
representation and Peekay’s ignorance. On the one hand, ANZ did not 
promote its product properly as Peekay was not the only customer complaining 
about this product.194 But, on the other hand, Peekay’s total ignorance when 
signing contractual documents was inexcusable. The High Court preferred to 
protect Peekay from ANZ’s sale practices; but the Court o f Appeal preferred to 
have Peekay take more responsibility for its own behaviour.
There are also several US judgments dealing with similar issues. Like English 
courts, US judges were also reluctant to impose a fiduciary or tortious duty o f 
care on a derivative broker/dealer to provide ongoing advice or to provide risk 
warnings.195 In short, both the UK and US courts have shown a reluctance to 
intervene in arm’s length transactions. However, we should be aware that 
neither UK nor US law rules out the possibility that there could be a fiduciary 
duty of care between parties to a derivative transaction if there is a special 
circumstance existing (see 5.4.1 below). As to the tort o f negligence, we may 
assume that a client’s loss is probably foreseeable and that the relationship
191 [2006] 2 L loyd’s Rep 511, at 522.
192 id., at 522.
193 Id-, at 522-523 .
194 [2005] 2 CLC 111, at 132.
195 See De Kwiatkow ski v Bear, Stearns & Co, Inc, 306 F 3d 1293 (2002); K 3C  Inc v Bank o f  
America, 2006 US App LEXIS 27437; P ow er & Telephone Supply Company, Inc v Suntrust 
Banks, Inc, 447 F 3d 923 (2006).
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between parties is proximate enough. Thus, the issue would then depend on 
whether it is “fair, justice and reasonable” to impose a duty o f care.196
This thesis takes the position that, given the risky nature of derivative 
transactions, the suitability issue will be tested further in the future in both the 
UK and US courts. While this thesis cannot afford to examine the judgments in 
full, we believe that these judgments also send a signal to market participants 
about how derivative transactions should be promoted and what clients can do to 
protect themselves. Perhaps another scandal or economic downturn is needed in 
order to bring more cases to court. The subprime crisis and credit debacle 
occurring since August 2007 might also result in more cases in the years to come. 
If this should happen, then we will see the next round o f cases where judges are 
forced to consider the suitability issue and the relationship between a derivative 
seller and a client.
2.3.4 Characterisation: An Overview
In the commoditisation process, we may see derivative instruments 
(exchange-traded or OTC) as contracts to trade risks. Seeing derivative 
instruments as risk trading contracts does not alter the fact that derivative 
instruments might be used for purposes other than hedging and speculation.197
As derivative instruments may be settled in cash or even by the physical delivery 
o f goods, they may be used for commercial/hedging purposes or purely for 
speculation, and may be standardised or non-standardised (see 1.1 above). It 
then provides several ways by which “risk trading contracts” might intrude on 
other existing types o f contracts. This raises the key question of this thesis: what 
is the contractual nature of derivative instruments? This question evokes not 
only private law issues (e.g. the application of insurance contract law) but also 
regulatory problems. The effects of private law might be minimal, as the
196 See Custom s and Excise Com m issioners v B arclays Bank p ic  [2007] 1 AC 181; C aparo  
Industries p ic  v Dickman  [1990] 2 AC 605.
197 Apart from hedging and speculation, derivative instruments could also be used for asset 
management or for arbitraging market prices. See generally, Hudson, supra  note 24, at 2-11 et
seq.
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common law in general places less emphasis on special contracts. However, the 
question as to whether a derivative instrument belongs to a regulated type of 
contract is more serious, because a transaction may be rendered void and 
unenforceable if it is of a regulated kind and a party has not obtained proper
198authority or a licence from regulators.
Therefore, there are claims that a derivative instrument may be invalid or 
unenforceable if it can be defined as an existing type o f contract/instrument that 
is either prohibited or regulated (if a person does not acquire the proper licence 
from a regulator).199 This is often called “recharacterisation risk” .200 It also 
reflects the fact that the law regarding instruments that involve a certain degree of 
future uncertainty is fragmented.
UK law is relatively simple, as the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA 2000) created a comprehensive scheme to regulate a variety of 
transactions. However, problems might still arise over whether or not an 
instrument is o f a regulated kind (e.g. “futures” and commercial forward delivery 
contracts— see Chapter 3 below). In addition, characterisation is still important 
in order to determine which kinds o f regulated investment are instruments under 
the FSMA 2000. Different rules (e.g. listing and disclosure rules regarding 
“securities”) could be applied to different instruments, so derivative instruments 
must still be assigned to their proper categories under the umbrella of the FSMA 
2000.
In contrast, US law is more complicated. In the US, the securities regulation is
based mainly on the Securities Act of 1933201 and the Securities Exchange Act of
->021934 “ , governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Commodity regulation is based on the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)
198 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, section 26.
199 For example, see CR Sugar Trading Ltd  v China N ational Sugar and Alcohol Group Corp
[2003] 1 L loyd’s Rep 279 (about options on futures); P rocter & G am ble Co v Bankers Trust C o ,
925 F Supp 1270 (1996)(about securities).
200 See generally. Berg, “Recharacterisation” (2001) 16(8) JIBFL 346; Benjamin, 
“Recharacterisation Risk and Conflict o f  Laws” (1997) 12(11) JIBFL 513.
201 15 USCA 77a et seq.
202 1 5 USCA 78a et seq.
203 7 USCA 1 e ts e q .
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governed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). US banks 
are regulated both under both federal and state laws by both federal and state 
banking regulators (the former includes the Board of Governors o f the Federal 
Reserve System, the Office of Comptroller of Currency, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation). Insurance business, in contrast, is regulated under state 
law.
For practitioners, answers to the question o f characterisation or recharacterisation 
naturally start from the definition o f relevant concepts. However, a deeper 
analysis would lead to an examination of the underlying rationale behind any 
private law or regulated rules of the relevant types of contracts. In other words, 
why are there certain special rules in insurance contract law? Why is gambling 
normally treated so negatively (or, as under the Gambling Act 2005, regulated)? 
Why does there exist a disclosure rule and an insider rule regarding securities 
trading? And why is exchange trading regulated? Derivative instruments 
might not look like insurance in most cases (see 2.5 below) or securities (apart 
from certain hybrid instruments). However, if  derivative instruments raise 
similar problems to gambling, securities or insurance, they raise the question of 
whether we should apply the special rules, either in private law or in regulations, 
in each area to derivative instruments. This is the main theme of the present 
thesis.
This thesis will not develop a full and general theory o f risk trading which 
requires the formation of a coherent view of laws regarding investment, 
insurance, futures, and gambling.204 The purpose of this thesis is not to provide 
a basis on which to generalise laws regarding all sorts o f investments (including 
securities, futures, insurance or others) and gambling. But instead, this thesis 
will examine certain arguments that test the boundaries between derivative 
instruments and related concepts.
204 See Hazen, “Disparate Regulatory Schem es for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, 
Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance” (2005) 24 Ann Rev Banking & Fin L 375; 
Hurt, “Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet 
Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox” (2006) 86 BU L Rev 371; Pickens, “O f Bookies and 
Brokers: Are Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does It Even Matter?” (2006) 14 Geo 
Mason L Rev 227.
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We will approach from several dimensions. First, are future delivery contracts 
(traded on or off exchanges) true sales or notional sales? This relates to the 
boundary o f “futures” regulation and the reasons why we regulate 
exchange-traded and OTC forward contracts, and forms the main theme in 
Chapter 3. Secondly, are cash-settled derivative instruments any different from 
gambling and should they be regulated in the same way as gambling? This issue 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. Thirdly, are derivative instruments insurance? 
Insurance law is rather special as it has both private law (i.e. insurance contract 
law) and regulatory implications (i.e. regulation o f insurance business). Later in 
this chapter, we will discuss issues relating to the definition o f insurance and 
insurance business. The private law aspect of insurance law would be 
incorporated into Chapters 4 and 5 when we discuss issues regarding gambling 
and information. Fourthly, derivative instruments undoubtedly have a close 
connection with other financial instruments. We will briefly examine whether 
derivative instruments can be seen as securities, and will also discuss certain 
issues relating to securities law (about disclosure) and insurance law (the duty of 
utmost good faith) in Chapter 5.
Before we move on, we should note that, apart from the themes introduced 
below, derivatives may cause further problems in corporate or securities law (e.g. 
disclosing ownership of shares, voting, and equity derivatives205), insolvency 
law (e.g. whether a party can claim set-off for obligations arising from derivative 
transactions206), banking law (e.g. how to evaluate derivative transactions for 
capital adequacy purposes" ), tax law," or in any branch o f law where 
derivative transactions might create confusion or ambiguity.
205 For example, E.On AG  v A cciona , SA, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 84179; Ithaca (Custodians) L td  
v P erry Corp  [2003] 2 NZLR 216. See also Hu, “The N ew  Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership” (2006) 79 S Cal L Rev 811; Curran & Turitto, “FIAT/IFIL:
The Securities Law Implications for Equity Derivative” (2006) 21(7) JIBFL 2297.
206 For example, W allace v M errill Lynch C apital Services, Inc, 819 N Y S 2d 214 (2006); 
Finance One Public Company L td  v Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc, 414 F 3d 325 
(2005).
207 See Matthews, “Capital Adequacy, Netting, and Derivatives” (1995) 2 Stan JL Bus & Fin 167; 
Matthew Elderfield, “OTC Directives and the EC Capital Adequacy Directive” in Bettelheim et al. 
(ed.), Swaps and Off-exchange Derivatives Trading: Law and Regulation (FT Law & Tax,
1996); Das, supra  note 114, at 755 et seq.
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2.4 Financing and Capital Market 
Instruments
Categorising derivatives as financing agreements or capital market instruments 
might cause problems in certain regards. On the one hand, institutions may be 
under certain restrictions related to financing; but on the other, the possibility of a 
derivative being defined as a “security” might cause legal problems for market 
participants in the face of the registration/authorisation requirements and 
disclosure rules.209
Derivatives are generally seen as hedging or speculative instruments rather than 
fund-raising tools. The futures market provides a sharp contrast with the 
securities market. As an American judge has observed, "[securities usually 
arise out o f capital formation and aggregation (entrusting funds to an 
entrepreneur), while futures are means of hedging, speculation, and price 
revelation without transfer o f capital” .210
In contrast, the status of certain OTC transactions is less clear. First, a derivative 
transaction might actually look like a loan between parties if  we apply a variation 
to the conventional structure: for example, a variation on a basic interest rate 
swap (see 2.2.2.3 above) requiring an upfront payment by the fixed rate payer 
might make an interest rate swap more like a loan. The best examples are the 
interest rate swaps with upfront payments that have been seen in certain local 
authority cases (see 2.3.1 above).
Secondly, a special argument that has been deployed in the US is whether a
derivative transaction comes within the definition of “security” in the securities
regulation, such that swaps might be considered regulated “securities” .211 The 
application of US securities regulation is not merely a matter of registration with
208 For example, see HSBC Life (UK) L td  v Stubbs [2002] STC (SC D) 9; Inland Revenue 
Comm issioners v Scottish P rovident Institution  [2003] STC 1035; and Finance Act 2005, section  
83 and paragraph 1 o f  Schedule 26.
209 We will briefly discuss securities disclosure rules in infra 5.2.
210 Chicago M ercantile Exchange v SEC, 883 F 2d 53'7, at 543 (1989).
211 See 15 USCA 77b (a)(l) & 77b -1; 15 USCA 78c(a)(10)._
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the SEC and the validity of a transaction. It also includes the application of the 
anti-fraud provision, which might result in civil liability or criminal penalty.212 
In Procter & Gamble Co v Bankers Trust Co,2n Procter & Gamble (P&G) lost a 
lot of money through two swaps with the Bankers Trust. P&G argued that the 
swaps in question were “security” in the form of “investment contracts”, “notes”, 
“evidence of indebtedness”, “options on securities”, and “instruments commonly 
known as securities” in US securities regulation. The court rejected these 
arguments. It is outside the scope o f this thesis to reproduce the lengthy 
development o f US securities laws. However, crucial factors provided by the 
P&G  judgment included the fact that the two swaps provided no pool of fund, no 
exchange principal, and no exercise of a right (like an option). Thus, the swaps 
in the P&G  case were not securities under US law. The judgment was not 
favourable to P&G, but the case was eventually settled.214
■J 1 c
In Caiola v Citibank, the US court faced a further issue o f whether synthetic 
options216 and equity swaps were “security”. The Caiola case was concerned 
with Citibank’s refusal to continue conducting a more complicated trading 
strategy (more favourable to Caiola) as had been agreed upon and performed 
earlier. Caiola brought claims based on the anti-fraud provision of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and misrepresentation. The District Court declined to 
apply the securities regulation to these options and equity swaps. Upon appeal, 
the Second Circuit Court held that cash-settled options that referred to stock
9 1 7prices were within the meaning of “security” ." As to the equity swap, the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) actually excludes swap 
agreements from the definition o f “security”, but the anti-fraud provision remains 
applicable to swap agreements based on securities.218 Transactions between
212 See 15 USCA 78j.
213 925 F Supp 1270 (1996).
214 See Kokkoris, “Liability o f  Swaps Dealers against Users” 2006 17(2) ICCLR 63, at 70.
215 295 F 3d 312 (2002).
216 In this judgment, the synthetic options were options that were settled in cash (by referring to 
the value o f  the underlying stock), in contrast to a conventional stock option that required the 
writer o f  an option to deliver stocks once the option was exercised.
217 295 F 3d 312, at 327 (2002).
218 See sections 302 & 303 o f  the CFM A, Public Law 106-554. See also 15 USCA 7 8 c -1; 5 
USCA 77q(a); Gramm-Leach-Billey Act o f  1999, section 206, Public Law 106-102.
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parties ran smoothly before the introduction of the CFMA; thus Caiola had to 
provide further arguments to convince the court to apply the CFMA 
retrospectively (cf. Procter & Gamble219). However, the US court did recognise 
that the anti-fraud provision would have been applicable had the transactions 
occurred after the CFMA.220 In the end, Caiola won the appeal and the whole 
case was remanded to the district court. From the P&G  and Caiola case, it can 
be seen how an OTC contract might lead to the danger of being characterised as a 
regulated “security” in the US.
So far, no English case on the matter o f security and interest rate swaps (or other 
OTC transactions) has arisen. Nevertheless, it may be argued that an English 
court would agree with the judgment o f Procter & Gamble because an interest 
rate swap is not a share, a bond, a government bond, a typical instrument creating 
or acknowledging indebtedness, an instrument giving entitlements to investment 
or certificates representing certain securities.221 The synthetic options in Caiola 
might be seen as options to acquire or dispose of a security or contractually based 
investment.222 However, the bottom line is that cash-settled synthetic options 
and equity swaps could be defined as contracts for differences, such that the 
FSMA 2000 is applicable irrespective of whether or not they are securities.
Thirdly, a hybrid instrument that has certain derivative features embedded into a 
traditional investment vehicle (see 2.2.2.4 above) might come within the 
definition of “security” in both the UK and US. For example, a CAT bond (see 
2.2.2.4 above) is still a bond except that its payoff is conditional upon the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of a future event. In Nikko Asset Management Co 
v UBS AG, 224 Nikko Asset Management argued that the sale of two 
credit-linked notes225 violated US securities laws; but it is a pity that the court 
dismissed the case for lack o f jurisdiction without considering its merit. How
219 925 F Supp 1270(1996).
220 295 F 3d 312, at 327 (2002).
221 See RAO 2001, articles 76-80 .
222 RAO 2001, article 83.
223 RAO 2001, article 85.
224 3 03 F Supp 2d 456 (2004).
225 A credit-linked note is a security (usually with fixed incom e) with an embedded credit 
derivative. Thus, the payoff o f  the note is linked to another person’s credit. See generally. Das, 
supra  note 114, at 801 et seq.
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to deal with hybrid instruments is a question for securities regulators to think 
about in the future. Whether the issuer o f a hybrid instrument should comply 
with the same registration, authorisation, disclosure, and reporting rules as 
issuers of more conventional securities is an issue that this thesis would not 
pursue further.
Lastly, although the name of a product might include the word “security”, this
does not mean that it should be treated like a conventional security (e.g. shares or
226bonds). For example, in Morgan Stanley UK Group v Puglisi Cosentino, the 
product was called a “principal exchange rate linked security” but it was held to 
be a contract for differences under UK law and thus the rules of the Security 
Association would apply (see also 2.3.3 above).
In sum, classifying derivatives as financing instruments could have serious legal 
implications if  there are any special rules restraining entry into financing 
agreements. A variation on the standard structure of a swap might actually look 
like a loan. In contrast, an OTC derivative instrument might not be defined as a 
typical security in the market, but certain hybrid instruments might raise the 
possibilities of applying rules about securities.
2.5 Insurance
Another question that might have serious legal implications is whether derivative 
instruments, if used for hedging purposes, are any different from insurance. 
Both the regulatory and contract law aspects of insurance law should be taken 
into account with respect to derivative transactions.
On the regulatory side, if a contract is an insurance contract, a person selling the
->27contract to customers will be regulated as an insurance company (“insurer”).'
->->o
An institution may be subject to penalties if  it conducts insurance business"
226 [1998] CLC 481.
227 In the FSA Handbook, the term “insurer” is defined as “a firm with permission to effect or 
carry out contracts o f  insurance” (other than a UK insurance special purpose vehicle). FSA  
Handbook, Glossary.
“ 8 In the FSA Handbook, “insurance business” is defined as “the business o f  effecting or 
carrying out contracts o f  insurance”. FSA Handbook, Glossary
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without obtaining required licence from the local regulator.229 An insurance
230policy issued by an unauthorised insurer is unenforceable in the UK. 
Moreover, an institution should comply with insurance regulations if  it is 
conducting insurance business. Financial regulations usually impose different
231prudential requirements on different types of financial institutions. A 
non-insurance company might incur significant costs in order to comply with the 
prudential requirements for insurance companies. However, in the UK, if an 
authorised person carries on a regulated activity otherwise than in accordance 
with the permission granted, the person is said to be taken to have contravened a 
requirement imposed by the FSA. However, such contravention does not 
make that person guilty of an offence or render a transaction void or 
unenforceable.232 Thus, the legal consequences o f selling illegal insurance 
would vary depending on whether the person is already an authorised person.
On the private law side, being an insurance contract might invite the application 
of the special rules in the law o f insurance contract, such as utmost good faith, 
duty to disclose, etc. These rules not only define the rights and obligations o f the 
parties to an insurance policy. They may also influence the validity of a 
transaction, e.g. the violation o f the duty of utmost good faith (see 5.3.1 below).
Three major issues flow from characterising a derivative instrument as insurance: 
first, whether a seller of derivative instruments should be regulated as an insurer; 
secondly, whether a derivative instrument should be limited to the function of 
indemnity; and thirdly, whether a derivative instrument should be seen as another 
type o f contract uberrimae fidei. All three issues are linked to the key question 
regarding the meaning of “insurance” . The first and part o f the second issue will 
be addressed in this chapter. The third question will be dealt with in section 5.3. 
Issues related to indemnity will also be discussed in section 4.4.2 below.
229 See FSMA 2000, section 23.
230 See FSMA 2000, section 26.
231 For example, the FSA Handbook provides different prudential source books for banks, 
insurance business, building societies, and friendly societies. This reflects the nature o f  business 
o f different types o f  financial institutions.
232 See FSMA 2000, section 20.
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2.5.1 D efinition o f Insurance
A natural starting point is the definition of “insurance” in law. Although often 
used in statutes,233 in England, the definition of insurance is largely decided by 
case law.234 In Prudential Insurance Company v Commissioners o f Inland 
Revenue235, Channell J described three basic elements to a contract of insurance: 
(1) the assured will become entitled to something on the occurrence o f some 
event; (2) the event must be one which involves some element of uncertainty; and 
(3) the assured must have an insurable interest in the subject matter o f the 
contract.236237
In the FSA Handbook, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) summarises that 
the Prudential Insurance case
“treats as insurance any enforceable contract under which a ‘provider’ 
undertakes: (1) in consideration of one or more payments; (2) to pay 
money or provide a corresponding benefit (including in some cases 
services to be paid for by the provider) to a ‘recipient’; (3) in response to a 
defined event the occurrence of which is uncertain (either as to when it will 
occur or as to whether it will occur at all) and adverse to the interests of the 
recipient.”238
The application of the above definition to derivatives varies from product to 
product. There are certain points that we might develop from the definition of 
insurance.
233 For example, Appropriation Act 2004, Finance Act 2004, Proceeds o f  Crime Act 2002, 
Enterprise Act 2002, Capital A llow ance Act 2001, Finance Services and Markets Act 2000, 
Welfare Reform and Pension Act 1999, etc.
234 Although imperfect, there is a statutory definition with regard to marine insurance. Section 1 
o f  the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that “ [a] contract o f  marine insurance is a contract 
whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby 
agreed, against marine losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure”. This 
definition does not provide us with a full comprehension o f  insurance.
235 [1904] 2 KB 658, at 663-665.
"'6 See also M edical Defence Union Ltd  v D epartm ent o f  Trade [1980] Ch 82, at 89-90.
237 In the US, the definition o f  insurance varies from state to state. For N ew  York law, see N ew  
York CLS Insurance § 1101. For Illinois law, see generally Illinois Jurisprudence, Insurance § 
1 : 1 .
238 FSA Handbook, PERG 6.3.4.
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First, some types of derivatives (such as commodity forward contracts and 
interest rate swaps) lack the payment o f a premium. Thus, one is not, at least on 
the face of it, paying a sum to buy protection from the counterparty through a 
forward contract or an interest rate swap, though the purpose of such a transaction 
might be to hedge. In contrast, contracts like credit default swaps (see 2.22.3  
above), under which a sum of money is paid in return for a payment obligation 
triggered by a certain credit event or movement in the market, might not greatly 
differ.239 Therefore, if we insist on the “premium” element, many derivative 
instruments will be excluded from the definition of “insurance”.
Secondly, the meaning o f an adverse event is open to argument. The focus 
naturally falls on an occurrence or non-occurrence of something: thus, the default 
(or insolvency) o f a person might be seen as an event, as might a natural disaster. 
However, it is arguable whether market fluctuations could be counted as an 
“event”. For some derivative instruments (e.g. interest rate swaps) it may be 
argued that final payment is decided upon the netting of two payments from two 
parties (e.g. the floating rate payment and the fixed rate payment) rather than 
upon market movements.240 Thus, the requirement of an adverse event might be 
evaded. On the other hand, the FSA also recognises that a contract is less likely 
to be insurance if the underlying risk carries the possibility of either profit or 
loss.241 If we pursue this line of analysis, market fluctuations might not be seen 
as an insurable event as the assumption of risk could result in either profit or loss, 
depending on market movements.
Thirdly, the insurable interest test is another key element. Further discussion on 
the insurable interest test and derivative instruments will take place below in 
section 4.4.2. At this stage, it should be noted that insurable interest in a life 
policy is strongly linked to the moral hazards that might not be visible in most 
derivative transactions. Insurable interest in property insurance is linked to 
wagering and the nature of indemnity. In addition, as will be argued in Chapter 
4, it is not impossible for a party to a derivative instrument to have an interest in
239 See generally. Hudson, supra  note 24, at 6-09.
240 Id.
241 FSA Handbook, PERG 6.6.8(2).
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the subject matter o f the transaction that may be defined as insurable interest. In 
this instance, still further arguments would be needed to distinguish derivative 
transaction from insurance.
Fourthly, the Financial Services and Markets Act (Regulated Activities) Order 
2001 (RAO 2001) provides a list of contracts of general insurance to which 
reference may be made particularly in relation to “credit”, “suretyship” and 
“miscellaneous financial loss” . First, the class o f “credit” is defined as 
“[cjontracts o f insurance against risks of loss to the persons insured arising from 
the insolvency of debtors of theirs or from the failure (otherwise than through 
insolvency) o f debtors o f theirs to pay their debts when due.”242 Secondly, the 
class of “suretyship” is defined as “ [c]ontracts of insurance against the risks of 
loss to the persons insured arising from their having to perform contracts of 
guarantee entered into by them.”243 Fidelity bonds or performance bonds 
might also be defined as insurance under certain conditions.244 Thirdly, the 
term “miscellaneous financial loss” is quite broad, including but not limited to 
risk o f loss to the persons insured attributable to interruptions of the carrying on 
of business or to incurring unforeseen expenses.245
One common denominator in the definitions in the RAO 2001 is the “risk of 
loss” . The fact that the payment obligation of a derivative instrument need not 
be triggered by “loss” marks an important difference between an insurance 
contract and a derivative transaction.246 Sometimes market participants do not 
even suffer any “loss” from a legal point of view, yet they may still demand 
payment. Thus, we might argue that derivative instruments are not used to
->47
indemnify a party’s actual lo ss / Therefore, derivative instruments are not 
akin to insurance if they are not used to indemnify the real losses of a party. 
As we will also see later, this seems to be the prevailing opinion in the UK and 
US.
242 SI 2001/554, Schedule 1, paragraphs 14. See infra Appendix 1 for a full reprint o f  these 
paragraphs.
“43 RAO 2001, Schedule 1, paragraph 15.
244 See RAO 2001, Schedule 1, paragraph 15(2).
245 See RAO 2001, Schedule 1, paragraph 16.
246 See Edwards, “The Law o f  Credit Derivatives” (2004) JBL 617, at 647-649.
247 We will have a more thorough analysis on loss and indemnity in infra 4 .4.2.2.
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However, it is easy to ignore the fact that it is the law that reduces property 
insurance to those contracts indemnifying the real losses of an assured. 
Without the insurable interest test and the restriction o f indemnity, the insurance 
market might not be as it is today. Thus, a deeper question flowing from 
arguments about “loss” is whether we should limit derivative instruments to 
those that indemnify losses. In addition, it is easy to ignore the fact that life 
assurance is still a contract o f insurance, but a contract of contingency.248 
Thus, arguments about loss and indemnity contrast property insurance and 
derivatives, but they do not provide a complete answer if we add life assurance 
to the mix. We will discuss this point further in section 4.4.2.
From a practitioner’s point o f view, it is probably enough to argue that the 
definition o f insurance and the nature of indemnity might be enough to 
distinguish property insurance from derivative instruments. However, whether 
the latter are defined as insurance or not, it is still an open question whether a 
seller of derivative instruments should be regulated and whether derivative 
instruments should be limited to indemnity or could be seen as another form of 
contract uberrimae f id e i249
In generally, the FSA takes the definition o f insurance as in common law.250 If a 
contract falls outside the description in common law, it is unlikely to be regarded 
as “insurance” for regulatory purposes.251 However, the FSA also extends the 
meaning o f “contract of insurance” to fidelity bonds and similar contracts of 
guarantee.252 Thus, it is not appropriate to assume that the FSA would only 
regulate those contracts that are commonly regarded as “insurance”. On the
248 See supra  note 45.
249 See infra 5.3 for further discussion on this issue.
250 FSA Handbook, PERG 6.3.4.
251 FSA Handbook, PERG 6.5.1.
252 FSA Handbook, PERG 6.3.2. One question which might arise is whether credit derivatives 
are “similar contracts o f  guarantee”. It is not quite clear whether the term means contracts o f  
guarantee within the legal definition which have the same effect as the instruments listed in the 
same paragraph (such as a performance bond) or whether it means contracts that have the same 
effect as a guarantee even if  they have different legal characteristics. Thus, there is a certain 
degree o f  legal uncertainties. See James, The Law o f  Derivatives, at 35 (LLP, 1999).
Whatever the term “similar contracts o f  guarantee” means, the RAO 2001 makes it clear that 
these contracts might become “suretyship” only when they are not effected incidentally to som e 
other business carried out by the person effecting them, and when they are effected in return for 
the payment o f  one o f  more premiums. See RAO 2001, Schedule 1, paragraph 15(2).
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other hand, if it is not clear whether a contract could be defined as insurance in 
common law, “the FSA will interpret and apply the common law in the context 
of and in a way that is consistent with the purpose of the [FSMA 2000] as 
expressed in the FSA’s statutory objectives.” The FSA will decide on the 
facts and merits of each case and put more weight on the substance rather than 
the form of a contract.254
In the following sections, we will continue to introduce certain existing 
arguments about three types of derivative instruments that are similar to 
insurance policies in certain regards: weather derivatives, credit derivatives, and 
longevity products. We will then return to the regulation of insurance business 
in the end.
2.5.2 Weather Derivatives
In general, weather derivatives are derivative instruments in which the payoff is 
based on a climatic variable, such as average temperature or snowfall during a 
specified period of time (see 2.2.2.3 above). Weather derivatives provide 
protection against weather or climatic conditions, which makes them in a way 
similar to insurance policies against weather or natural disasters.
The Insurance Department of New York has determined that weather derivatives 
do not constitute insurance contracts since the terms of the instrument do not 
provide that, in addition to or as part o f a triggering event, payment to the 
purchaser is dependent on that party suffering a loss.255 Thus, the insurance 
regulator in New York does not see weather derivatives as part o f the insurance 
business. But whether the seller should be regulated as other types of 
institutions (e.g. a bank) is not within New York insurance regulator’s 
jurisdiction.
In contrast, in England, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) takes another 
route by defining a weather derivative as a “contract for differences” rather than
253 FSA Handbook, PERG 6.5.3.
254 FSA Handbook, PERG 6.4.3 and 6.5.4.
~55 Insurance Department, Opinions o f  General Counsel, Opinion Number 00— 02— 05. See 
< http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2000/rg000205.htm > (visited on 7 December 2006).
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insurance.256 Thus, we may assume that the FSA also does not see weather 
derivatives as “insurance” and that a seller of weather derivatives would not be 
regulated as an insurer.
The approach taken by the FSA is sensible and it also reflects the flexibility of 
the UK financial regulation. However, in a jurisdiction where there is no such 
comprehensive regulatory scheme as the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA 2000), how to distinguish weather derivatives and insurance may 
still be a real legal question. The New York insurance regulator’s decision to 
distinguish weather derivatives from insurance based on the fact that payment 
of a weather derivative does not depend on the suffering of a loss is reasonable. 
However, there is still a possibility that an end-user of a weather derivative 
instrument does suffer some losses or the intention of entering into a weather 
derivative transaction is indeed to indemnify the loss suffered. It then relates 
to the question: why do we limit insurance to indemnifying a real loss? We 
will further consider this issue in Chapter 4 (see 4.4.2).
2.5.3 Credit Default Swap
What raises most discussion regarding insurance and derivative instruments is 
the credit derivative. As there are several types of credit derivatives, we will 
focus on credit default swaps (CDS— see 2.2.2.3) in this section.
So far the English court has not issued any judgment on credit default swaps 
and insurance. An opinion was given, by Robin Potts QC in 1997 to the 
ISDA, that credit derivatives were not structured to provide an indemnity for
257loss and thus they did not fall within the then Insurance Companies Act 1982. 
However, the FSA seems to have reservations regarding this opinion. The 
FSA notes that a credit event may be defined in a way that the event is 
impossible to occur without a party suffering a loss and that it is not clear that
256 See FSA Handbook, Glossary.
257 See Henderson, supra  note 43, at 12.11; FSA D iscussion Paper, Cross-sector Risk Transfers, 
at Annex B (May 2002); downloadable from <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dpl 1 .pdf> 
(visited on 11 February 2008).
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only contracts that respond to actual loss can be contracts o f insurance.258 The 
FSA also notes that the boundary between insurance and credit derivatives is 
becoming unclear as insurance companies effectively underwrite credit insurance 
on the same terms as a credit default swap.259
On the other side of the Atlantic, a US judge has observed that
“[c]redit default swaps are a method by which one party (the protection
buyer) transfers risk to another party (the protection seller)  CDS
agreements are thus significantly different from insurance contracts. As 
amicus [provided by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association] 
correctly points out, they ‘do not, and are not meant to, indemnify the 
buyer o f protection against loss. Rather, CDS contracts allow parties to 
'hedge' risk by buying and selling risks at different prices and with varying 
degrees of correlation.” ’260.
A definition of “credit default swap” was also added to the New York insurance 
law in 2004. To quote in full:
’’‘Credit default swap’ means an agreement referencing the credit 
derivative definitions published from time to time by the International 
Swap and Derivatives Association, Inc. or otherwise acceptable to the 
superintendent, pursuant to which a party agrees to compensate another 
party in the event of a payment default by, insolvency of, or other adverse 
credit event in respect of, an issuer of a specified security or other 
obligation; provided that such agreement does not constitute an insurance 
contract and the making o f such credit default swap does not constitute the 
doing o f an insurance business. ”261 (Emphasis added)
Therefore, the prevailing view in New York seems to be that a CDS is, in
principle, not an insurance contract because it is not used to indemnify a party 
against actual losses. Nevertheless, New York law does not rule out the 
possibility that a CDS might still be regulated as an insurance contract provided
258 FSA Discussion Paper, id.
259 See FSA Discussion Paper, id., at 3.116.
260 Aon Financial Products, Inc v Societe G enerate , 476 F 3d 90, at 96 (2007). See supra  note 
164 for more details o f  this case.
261 NY CLS Insurance 6901(j-l).
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that a CDS fits the definition o f insurance. However, at least the New York 
law makes it clear that a CDS and an insurance contract are not synonymous.262
In a recent article, Schwartz, an American author, argues that a CDS is, in 
general, different from insurance. He argues from two levels: the contract 
level and the market level.263 On the contract level, Schwartz analyzes the 
issue by comparing the parties who may enter into the contract; the property to 
which the contract may extend; the extent to which the purchaser may transfer the 
contract; the sort of event that warrants a claim under the contract; how the 
contract measures recovery; and how the parties settle their contracts.264
As to “who” may enter into the CDS market, Schwartz contends that currently 
only a limited class o f “eligible” market participants (which only include 
institutional investors) may buy or sell CDS without being regulated by either 
the Securities Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission so that a CDS contract is different from an insurance policy.265 
As for property, Schwartz argues that there is no insurable interest aspect for 
CDS instruments and no moral hazard issue in the CDS market.266 Schwartz 
further contends that a CDS is far less concerned with the personal identity o f a 
protection buyer (c f  an insured) and is more liquid if the buyer wishes to
? f\ltransfer his interests in a CDS instrument. He also notes that there is no 
provable loss needed to trigger payment under a CDS and that the measure of 
recovery o f a CDS does not depend on the real loss suffered.268 In the end, 
Schwartz argues that the use o f cross-payment netting and the possibility o f 
physical settlement make a CDS different from the insurance m odel.269 
Therefore, Schwartz argues that a CDS is different from insurance on the 
contract level.
262 Schwartz, “Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a 
Theory o f  Demarcation” (2007) 12 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 167, at 183.
263 Id., at 188.
264 Id., at 189 et seq.
265 Id-, at 189.
266 Id., at 190-191.
267 Id-, at 191-192.
268 Id-, at 192-194.
269 Id-, at 191-196.
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On the market level, Schwartz distinguishes a CDS from insurance based on 
three factors: first, no risk class (but a credit spread) created in the CDS market; 
secondly, the existence o f credit indices to allow for price discovery by both 
protection buyers and sellers; and thirdly, the limited class of market 
participants.270 In conclusion, Schwartz argues that a CDS is better seen as a 
capital market instrument rather than insurance.
This thesis agrees with Schwartz’s observations that a CDS is different from 
conventional insurance policies, and that there are certain fundamental 
differences between traditional insurance and CDS in the market. Currently, 
CDS are much less personalised than traditional insurance policies and more 
liquid in terms o f trading. This provides a basis for seeing CDS as different 
from traditional insurance policies.
However, whether these differences are enough to justify CDS instruments from 
being treated like insurance in law is not fully answered in the article. First, 
Schwartz seems to accept certain doctrines in insurance law (such as indemnity 
or insurable interest) as they are. However, he does not elaborate on the 
reasons why there are special rules for insurance policies and whether CDS 
might share similar problems. In fact, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, CDS 
might also produce moral hazard issues, contrary to what Schwartz suggests.271 
Secondly, as far as Schwartz’s arguments goes, the differences between CDS 
and insurance are not absolute. It is granted that CDS, in general, are more 
liquid, less personalised, and not necessarily about the real losses suffered by a 
protection buyer. Nevertheless, there are CDS transactions which are never 
transferred to a third party, more personalised or tailor-made and/or about 
compensating real losses incurred by a protection buyer. Thus, the question is 
whether it is enough to completely separate the class of transactions that we 
label as “credit default swap” from insurance based on these differences for 
most CDS transactions. Or, as the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners in the US once suggested in a draft white paper, credit
270 Id., at 196 et seq.
271 See id., at 191. See infra 5.3 for further discussion on the information issue.
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protection sellers are involved in accepting risk transfers for a fee (which may 
be deemed as nothing more than an insurance premium) and the mere likelihood 
of some catastrophe caused by derivatives posing as insurance is a reason
272enough for an insurance regulator to step in. Schwartz seems to adopt the 
former view.
In sum, this thesis agrees with most o f Schwartz’s arguments that there are 
differences between CDS and conventional insurance policies. However, this 
thesis reserves the opinion about the arguments that these differences are 
enough to distinguish CDS from insurance as a matter o f law. To resolve 
whether a CDS should be considered insurance, we should also consider the 
underlying rationale behind insurance regulations and insurance contract law. 
This is how this thesis would approach issues relating to insurance and credit 
derivatives. Certain arguments relating to insurance regulation will be 
introduced later in this chapter (see 2.5.5 below). Issues relating to speculation 
and information will be considered in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
2.5.4 Longevity Products
So far we have assumed that derivative instruments have nothing to do with the 
life or death of human beings. In fact, new derivative instruments have 
developed to address the so-called “longevity risk” (or “mortality risk”), that is 
the gradual lengthening of human lives. The ever-increasing life expectancies 
might be the achievement of a well-developed modem society: however, it has 
certain monetary effects for some market participants. For example, pension 
funds have to pay more if, on average, pensioners live longer. In contrast, life 
insurers are at the more positive end because they might not have to pay 
(depending on the terms o f a policy) until the assured’s death. Based on the 
changes in life expectancy, a swap could be made between a pension fund and a 
life insurer.273
272 Schwartz, supra  note 262, at 187.
273 Das jokingly calls it a “death swap”. See Das supra  note 121, at 108-110. Derivative 
instruments based on longevity might also be structured as an option or a hybrid instrument.
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It is still in the early stages of developing a matured market for longevity risk. 
After all, an immediate drop in life expectancy in the developing world is not 
expected unless there is a World War III or a deadly world-wide pandemic. 
However, the existence of the longevity market gives food for thought with 
regard to insurance and derivatives. A longevity instrument might not be seen 
as a life assurance policy as long as a derivative instrument is based on the 
longevity or mortality rates o f human beings as a whole (in a specific country or 
area). Nevertheless, it is not just pure imagination to conjecture that two people 
might enter into a swap based on the life expectancy of a specific person (or a 
class of people). As the population in a society ages, there will be an increased 
burden on younger people to support the pension system and, at the very least, 
their own family members. There could be considerable monetary expenses, if 
we take into account the necessary costs of medical care for the elderly. Thus, it 
is not hard to imagine that one may use a derivative technique to reach the same 
financial goal that is intended by the buying of a life policy or annuity.
However, this possibility might also raise certain concerns about moral hazards. 
The more specific the person or group of persons, the more likely that that person 
or persons is exposed to potential danger. Arguments about “loss” would lose 
their charm if that concerned life policies. This scenario might be purely only 
imaginary: however, the purpose o f this section is to demonstrate that derivative 
instruments might share some grounds with life insurance and that it is not 
impossible for the regulation o f life assurance to provide a basis to regulate 
certain longevity products in the future.
2.5.5 Regulation o f Insurance Business
If the regulation o f insurable business is our primary concern, we should ask 
ourselves why we regulate insurance business. Are insurers regulated only 
because they sell insurance policies? Are they regulated because they collect 
premiums from the general public and there is a genuine issue about protecting 
assureds from default by or the insolvency of an insurer? Or are they regulated 
because of the role they play in the financial market? This angle gives us
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something to think about in addition to the definition of insurance and/or the 
range o f insurance products that can be sold under current regulations. The 
regulatory objectives of the FSMA 2000274 should be the guide when we 
consider whether a contract should be considered as insurance for regulatory
275purposes.
With this view in mind, the initial question that should be asked is whether a 
seller o f derivative instruments should be regulated, assuming that the seller 
carries on dealing in derivative instruments as business. Then we may consider 
what type of institution the seller should be compared to for the purpose of 
regulation. Perhaps they could be regulated as a bank, or an insurer, or perhaps 
it might be better to have a separate class of “derivative business” .
We will not elaborate this point any further. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, 
this thesis would not provide a full regulatory analysis of the derivatives market. 
However, if we accept the above argument, then banks or other regulated 
non-insurance financial institutions should not be treated as insurers,276 unless 
we can identify the need for a separate set o f regulations. Indeed, banks are 
major players in the derivatives market, though they may establish specialised 
subsidiaries to deal with derivatives business (see 4.4.3.3 below). However, 
according to a recent report, certain insurance companies also have a significant 
role in the credit derivatives market.277 If a seller o f derivative instruments is 
already a regulated insurer, there is no need to argue any further about the seller’s 
status as an insurer. If a seller is neither a bank nor an insurer, then it opens the 
door for further argument.
274 The regulatory objectives o f  the FSMA 2000 are maintaining market confidence, promoting 
public awareness, securing protection o f  consumers, and reducing financial crimes. See FSMA  
2000, sections 3 to 6.
275 See FSA Handbook, PERG 6.5.3.
“7A See also Financial Law Panel, Credit Derivatives: the Regulatory Treatment: A Guidance 
Notice (Financial Law Panel, 1997); Henderson, supra  note 43, at 12.11.
277 Fitch Ratings, CDx Survey— Market Volum es Continue Growing w hile N ew  Concerns 
Emerging, downloadable from <http://www.fitchratings.com/> (visited on 10 August 2007). See 
also FSA Discussion Paper, Cross-sector Risk Transfers (May 2002); downloadable from 
< http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dpl l.p d f> (visited on 11 February 2008).
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Hudson contends that “the most effective argument against derivatives being 
construed as being insurance contracts is that there is simply no intention to 
provide straightforward insurance”.278 Hudson further argues that
“[m]uch may depend on whether or not the parties’ underlying intention is 
speculation -  which would not constitute insurance compensating any 
loss ... [M]uch will depend upon whether the courts take a literal 
interpretation o f the existing law or whether the courts take a purposive 
interpretation o f that law by reference to the parties’ underlying
279commercial objectives.”
This thesis agrees in part. We agree that much depends on how the court looks 
at a specific transaction and whether the court takes a literal interpretation of 
relevant laws. In essence, it depends on whether the court is willing to restrict 
the application of insurance law to those instruments that we traditionally see as 
“insurance” (or within insurance business), and to leave those instruments that 
we generally label as derivatives outside the reach of insurance law.
However, the present thesis is not predisposed to use speculation as a concept to 
separate insurance and derivative instruments. Speculation was (and probably 
still is) a problem for insurance contracts. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the 
insurable interest test and the requirements for indemnity are more or less 
intended to eliminate gaming or wagering through insurance policies (see 4.4.2 
below). The extent to which speculation by way of derivative instruments 
should be allowed is still an open issue.
2.5.6 Summary
In short, the question whether a derivative can be regarded as an insurance 
contract creates a substantial risk for contractual parties. As the market 
develops and more complicated products are launched, the problem will persist 
and eventually it might be decided on a case-by-case or product-by-product basis. 
If used for hedging purposes, both traditional insurance policies and derivative 
instruments serve the purpose o f managing risk exposure, but they use different
278 Hudson, supra  note 24, at 6 -12 .
279 Id.
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techniques to reach their goals. The approach taken here regarding insurance is 
not merely to focus on the current definition of insurance but to explore further 
the reasons why insurance is special in law. This approach provides a better 
overview of the whole financial and risk management market. We may 
summarise the position taken in this thesis in the following points.
First, we recognise that most derivative instruments do not look resemble 
conventional insurance policies that indemnify the real losses suffered by an 
assured (<cf. property insurance) or that compensate the assured for early death (cf. 
life insurance) or longer life {cf. annuity). However, there are also certain types 
o f derivative instruments (particularly credit default swaps) that may look like 
insurance policies from certain perspectives.
Secondly, one common argument is that payments under derivative instruments 
do not normally depend on the occurrence or non-occurrence o f “loss” . This 
thesis agrees that, if we accept the indemnity nature of property insurance, loss 
is a useful criterion for distinguishing insurance and derivative instruments— a 
criterion which is also accepted by New York insurance regulators and the 
Second Circuit court. However, we should be aware that it is less clearly 
understood why insurance is limited to indemnity and whether modem derivative 
instruments should be reduced to those indemnifying the economic loss o f a 
market participant.
Thirdly, on the matter o f insurance regulation, this thesis takes the position that it 
is better to rethink the reasons behind the regulation o f insurance business. In 
short, the questions are: whether sellers of derivative instruments need to be 
regulated, and how to regulate them. This angle would provide a more complete 
analysis than merely emphasising the indemnity nature o f property insurance and 
the definition of “insurance”. After all, insurers are not regulated merely 
because insurance is a contract o f indemnity.
Lastly, by comparison with insurance business, the private law aspect of 
insurance law in relation to derivative instruments has been far less researched. 
Apparently, the easiest way to avoid the application of insurance contract law is
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to argue that a derivative instrument cannot be defined as “insurance”. This is 
reflected along the line of arguments about indemnification of “loss” and 
derivatives, and also in the fact that both the regulatory and private law aspects of 
insurance law hinge upon the definition of “insurance”. Whether the definition 
of “insurance” should be identical for both insurance regulation and insurance 
contract law is a question that should be left to insurance lawyers. In fact, under 
the FSMA 2000 the notion of contract of insurance also includes certain 
instruments (e.g. performance bonds) that might not be seen as insurance if not 
conducted by an insurer.280 However, this does not hide the fact that derivative 
transactions may involve a certain degree of speculation and asymmetric 
information. This thesis will further pursue these issues in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.6 Conclusion
In the discussion above, we first described the meaning of risk and various types 
of risks: including price risk, credit risk, hazards, liquidity risk, and operational 
risk, etc. Over the years, several contractually based instruments, such as 
security interests, guarantees, and insurance, etc., have been created to combat 
risks. However, such traditional hedging methods no longer satisfy the market. 
As the use of derivatives grows, “risks” are being identified and traded 
specifically in the over-the-counter market or in the exchange market. From the 
early development of grain futures to the innovation o f swap agreements since 
the 1970s, derivatives can provide more protection than other existing legal 
instruments. As financial innovation has speeded up in recent decades, 
derivatives transactions have become more and more complicated. To some 
extent, risks are treated like goods, sold and purchased by market participants. 
In short, risk has become the subject matter of trading.
However, the development of derivatives is still based on existing legal concepts. 
Derivative instruments might be classified within the confines of a single existing 
area of law so that regulatory rules or certain private law doctrines might be 
applicable to derivative instruments. This creates a substantial legal risk for
280 See RAO 2001, article 3.
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market participants using derivative instruments. In this chapter, we introduced 
the local authority cases and discussed the complexity of legal issues when a 
derivative instrument is rendered void. We also discuss whether derivative 
instruments might be seen as a financing instrument and whether they are 
insurance. It was argued that, in principle, derivative instruments are not 
security, financing agreements or property insurance policies. However, 
variations to more typical types of derivatives might increase the likelihood that 
an instrument be deemed a financial tool or insurance policy.
In the next two chapters, we will take another look at derivative instruments from 
the perspectives of commercial sale o f goods, gambling and insurance contract 
law. In Chapter 3, we will examine the transition from commercial sales to 
notional trading in an exchange market, in order to explore the potential risk 
involved in classifying derivatives as regulated “futures” contracts. Chapter 4 
will move on to the speculative end of business and examine contracts settled by 
cash, using the development o f gambling and insurance laws as a mirror to reflect 
the current development of derivatives trading.
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Chapter 3 From Physical to Notional — 
Commodity Trading
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus on the contractual arrangements and market structure that 
have transformed a physical trading market into a notional market.1 Hedging 
market risks by fixing future delivery prices is a strategy used by merchants all 
over the world from time immemorial.2 However, not until the middle o f the 
19th century was a modem organised exchange established, forming the 
foundation of contemporary futures transactions. Even now, some futures 
contracts may still allow physical delivery, though most market participants are 
uninterested in the physical goods themselves.3 Commodities futures provide a 
link between real sales and notional sales.
It is generally accepted that organised exchanges are regulated by financial 
regulation (see 3.1.2 below). Nevertheless, it is less clear whether an 
off-exchange commodity contract comes within the regulatory definition of 
“futures” . This creates legal risk for commodity traders who buy and sell
1 In this chapter, “physical trading” or “real sale” refers to commodity contracts o f  sale with the 
intention to make delivery. In contrast, “notional trading” or “notional sale” refers to contracts 
disguised in the form o f  sale o f  goods but not intended for delivery.
“ Similar strategies were used in ancient Greece and for tulip sales in Holland in the Middle Ages. 
See Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives, at 2-01 (4th ed., Sweet & M axwell, 2006). It is 
also reported that similar trading took place in around 2000 BC in the Bahrein Islands and in 
China. See Markham, The History o f  Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regulation, at 3 
(Praeger, 1987); Hou, “Derivatives and Dialectics: The Evolution o f  Chinese Futures Market” 
(1997) 72 N Y U  L Rev 175, at 175-176. See also Romano, “A Thumbnail Sketch o f  Derivative 
Securities and Their Regulation” (1996) 55 Md L Rev 1, at 8. Japan’s rice exchange in the 17th 
century has been described as the first organised exchange in the world. See Turner & Suzuki, 
“Japan Plans to Resurrect Rice Futures Market” Financial Times (9 December 2005).
3 In 1971, it was reported that approximately 99% o f  wheat futures traded in the CBOT were 
liquidated before delivery. Cargill, Inc v Hardin, 452 F 2d 1154, at 1157 (1971).
commodities for future delivery. As will be argued below, the contractual 
structure o f exchange trading is the key to understanding the purpose of futures 
regulation and to avoid legal risk arising from certain off-exchange regulation. 
The following sections will first introduce the legal risk associated with notional 
sales and the scope of current UK and US “futures” regulations. The contractual 
structure of exchange trading will then be deconstructed in order to see why 
“futures” are regulated. Then, we will examine certain types of contracts that 
raise some issues relating to regulated futures contract. Finally, we will try to 
answer one question: what constitutes a “futures” contract as a matter of law? 
For simplicity of discussion, “cash market” and “spot market” mean a market 
where merchants make real sales, as opposed to the futures market.
3.1.1 True Sales or N otional Sales: from CR Sugar
Although derivative instruments seem to be a far cry from the cash market, in 
certain situations whether or not a contract is a true sale o f goods does have legal 
implications. First, at the private law level, we have to consider the application of 
sale of goods law. For example, one particular concern in the US is whether the 
Statute of Frauds requirement in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) for “[a] 
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $5,000 or more” is applicable.4 
Since derivatives trading can be carried out over the phone, the lack of proper 
documentation at the time of trading might endanger the enforceability o f a 
transaction.5 One might further inquire as to the meaning of “goods” in sale of 
goods laws.6 For example, certain deliverable credit default swaps might fall 
under sale o f goods laws if the concept of “goods” were to include bonds, as 
might be the case in some continental European legal systems.
Secondly, whether a contract is intended as a true physical sale or a notional sale 
settled by cash raises more serious regulatory concerns. The risk is best
4 UCC Article 2-201. See also Bhala, “A Pragmatic Strategy for the Scope o f  Sales Law, the 
Statute o f  Frauds, and the Global Currency Bazaar” (1994) 72 Denv UL Rev 1.
5 See Hudson, supra  note 2, at 3 -1 7  et seq. (absence o f  documentation). If trading is simply  
done over the telephone, it could also raise questions as to whether the terms o f  the standard form 
o f the ISDA agreement could be incorporated into the contract. See C redit Suisse Financial 
Products v Societe Generate d'Enterprises [1997] CLC 168.
6 See section 61(1) o f  Sale o f  Goods Act 1979. For the US law, see UCC Article 2-105(1).
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illustrated by an English case. In CR Sugar Trading Ltd v China National Sugar 
and Alcohol Group Corp,1 the claimant (CR) was a sugar trader based in the UK. 
CR purchased a series of put options written by CSW, a Chinese company, so 
that CR could sell quantities of raw sugar to CSW upon exercise of the options. 
As Steel J found out, the purpose of the options trading was to generate profit for 
both CR and CSW, and not to deliver sugar.8 CSW was able to earn premiums 
on the options. In contrast, the existence of the options allowed CR’s New Y ork 
affiliate to open hedging positions on the New York futures market.9 Most o f 
the options were not exercised or were simply rolled over for a new period. 
However, on one occasion when CR did exercise two o f these put options, CSW 
refused to draw a letter of credit and purchase the sugar. CR duly brought a 
claim to arbitration against CSW.
One of CSW’s lines of defence was that CR was an unauthorized investment 
business in violation of the Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA 1986), with the 
result that the put options in dispute were unenforceable. Both the arbitral 
tribunal and the English court held that, since both CR and CSW did not really 
consume or put the sugar into service, the options were not made for commercial 
purposes but for investment purposes. In short, CR could not enforce the put 
options because the options were not considered as true sales but as investments. 
To see why CR lost its case, one must bear in mind current UK law on the 
meaning of “futures” 10. We will juxtapose the US law for purposes of 
comparison.
3.1.2 Regulatory Background
As it is quite common to see commercial contracts with a delivery date sometime 
in the future, the distinction between regulated “futures” contracts and
7 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 279.
8 Id , at 281.
9 ]d., at 280.
10 The law applicable to the CR Sugar case was the FSA 1986. However, a large part o f  the 
regulatory texts regarding the meaning o f  option and futures are the same as those under the 
current Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSM A 2000). The follow ing discussion is 
based on the FSMA 2000. Relevant texts in the FSA 1986 are reproduced in Appendix 1 o f  this 
thesis.
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unregulated commercial contracts for future delivery represents the difficulty in 
distinguishing regulated futures contracts on the one hand from purely 
commercial sale of goods. An unavoidable result is that some forward contracts 
or options to enter into a future sale might fall under futures regulation, which 
poses a threat to market participants. To save space here, the relevant statutes 
are reprinted in Appendices 1 (UK law) and 2 (US law).
3.1.2.1 UK Law
In the UK, “futures” are a kind of regulated investment. The term “futures” is 
defined as “rights under a contract for the sale of a commodity or property o f any 
other description under which delivery is to be made at a future date and at a price 
agreed on when the contract is made”.11 A price is deemed to be agreed on 
when the contract is made, even if the price refers to the futures market.12 The 
Regulatory Activities Order 2001 (RAO 2001) refines this definition by 
excluding “rights under any contract which is made for commercial and not 
investment purposes” .13 The RAO 2001 further provides several guidelines to 
determine whether a commodity contract with a fixed price and a future delivery 
date is for commercial or for investment purposes.
First, a “contract is to be regarded as made for investment purposes if it is made 
or traded on a recognised investment exchange”.14 In contrast, when a contract 
is not traded on a “recognised investment exchange”,15 it is to be
“regarded as made for commercial purposes if under the terms o f the 
contract delivery is to be made within seven days, unless it can be shown 
that there existed an understanding that (notwithstanding the express terms 
of the contract) delivery would not be made within seven days.” 6
11 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulatory Activities) Order 2001, SI 2001/544  
(RAO 2001), article 84(1). We should be aware that the definition in paragraph 18 o f  the 
Schedule 2 o f  FSMA 2000 does not require that the price be agreed on when the contract is made.
12 See RAO 2001, article 84(8).
13 Id-, article 84(2).
14 Id-, article 84(3).
15 See FSMA 2000, section 285 et seq.
16 RAO 2001, article 84(4).
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Secondly, the main difficulty occurs where a contract is neither traded in a 
recognised exchange nor deemed to exist for commercial purposes, either 
because delivery is not required within seven days or no existing understanding 
can be proved. Thus, the RAO 2001 provides certain “indications” for use in 
such eventualities. On the one hand, a contract might be made for commercial 
purposes if one party is the producer of the commodity or if one uses it in his 
business or if the seller intends to make delivery (or the buyer intends to accept 
delivery).17 It is also an indication that a contract is made for commercial 
purposes if the terms of the contract are tailor-made by parties for that particular 
trade and “not by reference (or not solely by reference) to regularly published 
prices, to standard lots or delivery dates or to standard terms”.18 In contrast, it is 
an indication that a contract is made for investment purposes if it is expressed to 
be as traded on an investment exchange, if the performance o f the contract is 
ensured by an investment exchange or a clearing house, or if there are 
arrangements for the payment or provision of margin.19
Several lines of reason led Steel J to the conclusion that CR was trading sugar 
options for investment purposes in CR Sugar Trading Ltd v China National 
Sugar and Alcohol Group Corp20, which is the only case in UK law on the 
definition of “futures”. First, both parties recognised that delivery was not 
especially desirable.21 Secondly, Steel J held that “the verb ‘to use’ connotes 
the process of putting into service or consuming material”, which neither party 
was doing at that moment. Thirdly, Steel J rejected CR’s submission that “once 
the option is exercised, it is replaced by the sale agreements”, from which 
premise the intention to make delivery could be inferred;22 furthermore Steel J 
held that the time to determine the intention of the parties was when the contract 
(i.e. the options) was made.23
17 Id., article 84(5).
18 Id., article 84(6).
19 Id., article 84(7).
20 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 279.
21 Id., at 281-283 .
22 Id., at 284.
23 Id.
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The CR Sugar case was rather interesting and might have a serious effect on the 
commodity market. As Henderson observes, “[i]t is not at all clear how far up 
(or dow n...) the distribution chain one must be before one is a user”.24 CSW, 
the Chinese company, was the only beneficiary of the CR Sugar judgment as it 
earned premiums from CR and had no obligation under English law to take 
delivery o f the sugar. It is not known if CR tried to reclaim the premiums from
9 SCSW. If it did, CR might have had to go to China to recover its money. CR 
probably did not have this scenario in mind when it first entered into options 
trading with CSW. We will revisit to the CR Sugar case at the end of this 
chapter.
3.1.2.2 US Law
In the US, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) provides that it should be 
unlawful for any person to enter into “a contract for the purchase or sale of a 
commodity for future delivery” unless “such transaction is conducted on or [is] 
subject to the rules of a board o f trade which has been designated or registered by 
the [CFTC] as a contract market” and is “executed or consummated by or through 
a contract market” . 26 The term “board of trade” means “any organized 
exchange or other trading facility.”27
The definition of “commodity” includes a lengthy list of agricultural products 
and the general phrase “all other goods and articles ... and all services, rights, and
interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt
28in”. Sugar, although not clearly listed, was held to be a commodity under the 
CEA.29 A contract for the sale of precious metals, or crude or natural gas, has 
also been held to be within the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading
24 Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives, at 12.19 (LexisN exis Butterworths, 2003).
“5 Cf. local authority cases discussed in supra  2.3.1.
26 7 USCA 6.
27 7 USCA la(2).
28 7 USCA la(4).
-9 P oplar Grove Planting &Refining Co v Bache H alsey Stuart, Inc, 465 F Supp 585 (1979).
93
Commission (CFTC).30 Nevertheless, retail contracts for foreign currency
traded off exchanges are excluded from the CEA.31
More legal problems are raised by the so-called “cash forward” exception. 
The CEA provides that “[t]he term ‘future delivery’ does not include any 
sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery” .32 The 
main purpose of this exception was “to meet a particular need such as that 
of a farmer to sell part o f next season's harvest at a set price to a grain 
elevator or miller. These cash forward contracts guarantee the farmer a 
buyer for his crop and provide the buyer with an assured price. Most 
important, both parties to the contracts deal in and contemplate future 
delivery of the actual grain.”33
The application of the cash forward exception is not as straightforward as the 
statutory texts might suggest. In CFTC v Co Petro Marketing Group34, the 
leading authority for the interpretation o f cash forward exception, Co Petro 
offered and sold to customers contracts for the future purchase of petroleum 
products. Under their agreement,
“the customer (1) appointed Co Petro as his agent to purchase a specified 
quantity and type of fuel at a fixed price for delivery at an agreed future 
date, and (2) paid a deposit based upon a fixed percentage of the purchase 
price. Co Petro, however, did not require its customer to take delivery of 
the fuel. Instead, at a later specified date the customer could appoint Co 
Petro to sell the fuel on his behalf. If the cash price had risen in the interim, 
Co Petro was to (1) remit the difference between the original purchase 
price and the subsequent sale price, and (2) refund any remaining deposit. 
If the cash price had decreased, Co Petro was to (1) deduct from the 
deposit the difference between the purchase price and the subsequent sale 
price, and (2) remit the balance of the deposit to the customer. A liquidated 
damages clause provided that in no event would the customer lose more 
than 95% of his initial deposit.”35
30 See for example, CFTC  v Co Petro M arketing Group, 680 F 2d 573 (1982); CFTC  v PIE Inc, 
853 F 2d 721 (1988).
31 See 7 USCA 2(c). There were disputes regarding whether off-exchange options for sale o f  
foreign currency were within the jurisdiction o f  the CFTC. In Dunn v CFTC, 519 US 465 
(1997), the US Supreme Court held that off-exchange options to foreign currency were outside 
the CEA. However, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act o f  2002 revised the CEA and 
retail future delivery foreign exchange transactions are currently regulated by the CFTC. See 
also CFTC  v Zelender, 373 F 3d 861 (2004).
32 7 USCA 1 a( 19).
33 CFTC  v Co Petro M arketing G roup, 680 F 2d 573, at 577-578  (1982).
34 680 F 2d 573 (1982).
35 ]d., at 576.
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Co Petro’s contracts are very much like exchange-traded futures except that Co 
Petro is not an organised exchange and customers may not trade contracts with 
each other.36 The CFTC brought an injunctive action to stop Co Petro from 
selling such products and Co Petro argued that their contracts fell within the cash 
forward exception. On the matter o f whether the contracts sold by Co Petro 
were contracts of a commodity for future delivery, the court held that “no 
bright-line definition or list o f characterizing elements is determinative. The 
transaction must be viewed as a whole with a critical eye toward its underlying 
purpose”.37 The court did compare Co Petro’s contracts with exchange-traded 
futures, as Co Petro argued that it was not an organised exchange. 
Nevertheless, the court cited the broad definition of “board of trade” and decided 
that “[t]he contracts here represent speculative ventures in commodity futures
38which were marketed to those for whom delivery was not an expectation”.
As to the cash forward exception, the court held that “[t]here is nothing in the 
legislative history surrounding cash forward contracts to suggest that Congress 
intended the exclusion to encompass agreements for the future delivery of 
commodities sold merely for purposes of such speculation.”39 Thus, the court 
concluded
“[w]e hold, therefore, that this exclusion is unavailable to contracts o f sale 
for commodities which are sold merely for speculative purposes and which 
are not predicated upon the expectation that delivery of the actual 
commodity by the seller to the original contracting buyer will occur in the 
future.”40
In the end, Co Petro was held to violate the CEA.
The Co Petro case represents a situation where an off-exchange contract might be 
seen as a regulatory “futures” contract. The Co Petro case is relatively easy to 
tackle as no clause in the contract required delivery and the structure of
36 In fact, Co Petro did apply to the CFTC but failed to acquire a license as a designated contract 
market. Id., at 581.
37 Id., at 581. This is later referred to as the “totality o f  circumstances” test. See infra 3.3.1.
38 ]d-
39 Id., at 579.
40 Id.
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transactions was quite similar to exchange trading. 41 It would be too 
cumbersome to have a full account of case laws on the interpretation of the 
language of the CEA after Co Petro. Some of the arguments involved will be 
introduced below when we discuss certain special types of transactions (see 3.3. 
below). At this stage, it should be noted that the intention o f parties to deliver 
under a contract is an important criterion for determining whether the cash 
forward exception applies to this contract.
3.1.3 Issues for Commodity Traders
It is necessary to clarify the usage of the terms “futures” and “forward” under 
both UK and US law. In general, market participants use “futures” to refer to 
exchange-traded contracts and “forward” to indicate contracts for future delivery 
of an organised exchange (see 2.2.2.1 below). However, both UK and US law 
use the term “futures” to describe contracts for the sale of a commodity for future 
delivery at prices fixed when the contract is made. The term “forward” is not 
used in the RAO 2001. Instead, the RAO 2001 uses “investment purpose” and 
“commercial purpose” to separate regulated “futures” from unregulated ones. 
In contrast, the term “forward” is used as an exception to the meaning of 
“futures” under US law.
It is important to note that the risk of a contract being regulated as a futures 
contract is not something that can be contracted out. Under the RAO 2001,
“[a] contract ... is to be regarded as made for commercial purposes if 
under the terms of the contract delivery is to be made within seven days, 
unless it can be shown that there existed an understanding that 
(notwithstanding the express terms of the contract) delivery would not be 
made within seven days.”42
Thus, even if parties have inserted a fixed delivery term, a contract might still be 
seen as a regulated “futures” contract if it can be proved that the parties have had 
other thoughts on the matter. Under US law, a court would review the totality of
41 The contractual structure o f  exchange trading will be introduced in infra 3.2.
42 RAO 2001, article 84(4).
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circumstances rather than relying on the delivery terms stated in the contract in 
order to determine whether the transaction is a futures contract.
The UK and US regulations raise two questions: “What are ‘futures’ in the eyes 
o f the law?” and “why do we regulate ‘futures’?” UK law provides certain 
guidelines for deciding whether a future delivery contract is for commercial 
purpose or for investment purpose. What is not fully explained in the CR 
Sugar43 judgment is the reason for regulating future delivery contracts for 
investment purposes. Organised exchanges are undoubtedly the focus of 
regulation (see 3.2.4 below). Nevertheless, as this discussion will show, most 
legal uncertainties from the legal meaning o f “futures” fall on off-exchange 
commodity contracts. If we accept that commodity exchanges and individual 
commercial sales represent the two poles of commodity trading, what remains to 
be decided is the boundary between regulated “futures” contracts and 
unregulated commercial future delivery contracts. As neither CR nor CSW was 
a bank or a typical financial institution, it is interesting to ask how far the FSMA 
2000 could interfere with trading business between two non-financial 
institutions. This is a question that will be borne in mind throughout the present 
chapter.
It is worth noting that the meaning of “futures” need not be the same in both the 
UK and the US. As will be indicated later, each country might have its own 
policy concerns. The FSMA 2000 is more flexible, such that a transaction not 
classified as “futures” might still be seen as a contract for differences if it allows 
cash settlement.44 In contrast, US law does not have such luxury. However, 
both UK and US law are comparable in the case of contracts requiring physical 
delivery. In the following sections, we will first introduce the contractual 
structure of exchange trading in order to identify factors that distinguish 
exchange trading from other transactions and reasons why exchange trading 
should be regulated; then we will consider several cases in the UK and in the US
43 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep 279.
44 RAO 2001, article 85.
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concerning off-exchange commodity trading contracts and the boundary between 
regulated and unregulated contracts.
3.2 Contractual Structure of Exchange 
Trading
The futures market is highly standardised. It is easy to assume that exchange 
trading is based on rules and to ignore the fact that major international futures 
exchanges are still private institutions (like companies or mutual associations) 
and that exchange trading is still largely based on contracts. It is also through 
contracts that exchange or clearing rules become binding. This section will first 
briefly introduce how a futures exchange45 and the clearing system operate. 
Then the focus will shift to the contractual structure of futures trading and to how 
a contractual position can be settled either by entering into a contrary trade or by 
making delivery.
3.2.1 Trading Systems
Traditionally, the trading of futures is conducted in a physical space. The 
trading floor is usually in the shape of an octagonal or polygonal ring with steps 
leading off to the “pits” which traders occupy.46 There are usually large screens 
to show current market prices, weather conditions, and information from relevant
. . 47markets (e.g. the securities market, currency market, cash market). When a 
trader wants to trade a certain number of contracts, he stands in his pit and calls 
out to other traders with the help of hand signals to communicate trading 
information (the number o f contracts and the prices at which he is willing to 
trade). From this practice comes the name “open outcry”.48
45 The meaning o f  “exchange” is not free from question. See Lee, What Is An Exchange?: The 
Automation, Management, and Regulation o f  Financial Markets (OUP, 2000). In this thesis, we 
focus on current established exchanges, and thus avoid the question whether a trading system  
may be defined as an exchange.
46 Chicago Board o f  Trade, Commodity Trading Manual, at 31 (Glen Lake Publishing, 1997).
47 Id.
48 The film Rogue Trader (1999), based on the infamous Nick Leeson story and the collapse o f  
Barings Bank, is a good big-screen illustration o f  how open outcry works.
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Once one trader has found another who is willing to deal with him at an agreed 
price, the deal is submitted to the exchange and the new price shown on the big 
screen in the trading floor so that all traders are up to date with the new market 
price. Price information is also disseminated to clients via brokers and sent to 
outside information vendors via the exchange.49 The new transaction is then 
reported to the clearing system for final settlement. Under the open outcry 
system, the trading floor effectively becomes a place for discovering prices.
Not everybody can enter the trading floor and start trading. The number of 
traders is limited by membership (often requiring a substantial membership 
fee).50 In general, there are three types of floor traders at a futures exchange. 
First, some floor traders are employed by a commission house or a broker to fill 
the orders of its clients. They simply represent the commission house or the 
broker. The second type is often called “independents”— self-employed traders 
filling outside orders for other brokers, financial institutions, or commercial 
entities. The third type, “locals”, trade on their own account.51 In legal 
terminology, a trader who executes orders for other persons is called a “broker” 
in England and a “floor broker” in the US; while one who executes orders on his 
own account is generally called a “local” in the UK and a “floor trader” in the 
US.52
In the Internet era, electronic trading seems to have become an unstoppable 
trend.53 In an electronic trading system, traders must acquire and install 
licensed software on their computers. Using the Internet, traders can connect to 
the electronic trading platform and submit an order, and even cancel or modify it
49 Supra note 46, at 33.
50 For example, the Chicago Board o f  Trade (CBOT) stipulates detailed rules regarding 
membership applications, fees, transfer o f  membership, etc. See CBOT Rule Chapter 2. In fact, 
a “seat” in the CBOT is such a valuable asset that there exists a market for it. The latest prices 
for a seat in the CBOT can be found at
<http://www.cbot.eom/cbot/pub/page/0,3181,935,00.htm l> (visited on 16 Oct 2006). See also 
CME Rule, chapter 1.
51 Supra note 46, at 34.
52 See FSA Handbook, Glossary; and 7 USCA 1 a( 16) and 1 a( 17).
53 For example, the LIFFE CONNECT system o f  the London International Financial Futures 
Exchange (LIFFE); e-cbot o f  the CBOT; and the GLOBEX o f  the CME. The ICE Futures 
(former International Petroleum Exchange), the London Metal Exchange (LME), and the N ew  
York Mercantile Exchange (NYM EX) also embrace electronic trading platform.
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before execution (subject to exchange rules).54 The system then matches one 
order with another in order to determine whether the order should be executed 
(i.e. matched in whole or in part by another trader). Like the open outcry 
system, once an order is matched with another order, it then enters the clearing 
process.
The existence of the clearing system is one distinguishing characteristic of 
exchange trading. A clearing services provider (“clearing house”) can be an 
independent institution or a body affiliated with the exchange itself. For 
example, the London Clearing House (LCH) is separate from its exchange 
clients, such as the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE), 
the London Metal Exchange (LME), and the London Stock Exchange (LSE); but 
the Eurex Clearing AG, the clearing house for the Eurex in Europe, is the 
exchange’s subsidiary.55 An exchange may also use the clearing services o f a 
rival exchange. For example, from April 2003, all trading conducted at the 
Chicago Board o f Trade (CBOT) is cleared through the clearing services of the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).56
Only members (“clearing members”) have a direct relationship with the clearing 
house. Thus, if a trader is both an exchange member and a clearing member, he 
can enter into a trade in the exchange and clear through the clearing system on his 
own account. In contrast, if an exchange member is not a clearing member, he 
must enter into a “clearing agreement” with a clearing member, and all his trades 
must be cleared through that clearing member in the clearing system. All 
exchange trades must enter into the clearing system, and no trade can be 
committed by an exchange member without being a clearing member or having a 
clearing agreement.57
54 See GLOBEX Brochure, at 10
<http://www.cme.com/files/GLOBEX% 20brochure% 20final.pdf> (visited on 16 Oct 2006).
55 See <http://www.eurexchange.com/about/corporate_structure_en.html> (visited on 3 
December 2006).
56 See < http://cbot.eom /cbot/pub/page/0.3181.1150,00.html> (visited on 4 December 2006).
The CME then merged with the CBOT in 2007 to form the largest financial futures exchange 
group in the world.
57 In the LIFFE, parties to this clearing agreement include the non-clearing member, the clearing 
member, the exchange (LIFFE), and the London Clearing House. See LIFFE Rules, Book 2, 
section 3.3 & section 4.11.1, and the LCH Procedures section 2A.3.2. In the CBOT, a
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One important function of the clearing house is to ensure the performance o f all
58contracts by stepping into the contractual relationship between the two parties. 
Another function is to calculate the net number of contracts (called “positions”) 
held by each trader (or clearing member) in order to determine the amount of 
collateral (called “margin”) that traders must maintain. As will be explained 
below, this structure helps minimise the credit risk involved. These issues will 
be discussed in more detail later.
3.2.2 Contractual Structure
3.2.2.1 Introduction
Before any further discussion, it should be made clear that all relevant parties in 
the futures market are contractually bound before entering into any trade. 
Exchange members are bound by their membership agreements and exchange 
rules.59 Clearing members are bound by their membership agreements and 
clearing rules. A non-clearing member must have a clearing agreement with a 
clearing member. An outside investor must have a brokerage agreement with 
his broker. Thus, before any order is submitted, all relevant market participants 
are bound by certain contractual arrangements, and without these contracts they 
cannot trade in the exchange.
On the basis of the above description, we can assess how futures contracts are 
concluded and how they pass through the clearing process. To help answer 
these questions, we will examine two cases in order to compare and contrast 
different exchanges. In Case 1, A and B are both members of the exchange and 
the clearing house associated with that exchange. A would like to buy 1,000 
contracts and B would like to sell 1,000 contracts for the same type o f futures. 
In Case 2, private investors E and F would like to invest in the futures market (it
non-clearing member must have a clearing agreement with a clearing member, who becom es the 
“primary clearing member” for that non-member. The existence o f  a primary clearing member 
is the pre-condition to trading by non-members. See CBOT Rule 207.01. See also NYM EX  
Rules 2.21 & 6.11.
58 See LIFFE Rules, Book 2, section 4.11.
59 Exchanges frequently bind all relevant participants to their exchange rules rather than solely  
exchange members. For example, see CBOT Rule 205.00.
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is assumed they invest in the same type of contract due to mature in the same 
month). E instructs his broker C to place an order in the market to buy 100 
contracts and F  instructs his broker D  to sell 100 contracts. Neither C nor D  is a 
member of the clearing house, so each has a clearing agreement with a clearing 
member (.A and B respectively). Cases 1 and 2 are illustrated in Charts 3-1 and 
3-2, respectively:
Chart 3-1
Clearing House
A B
Exchange
(a) Clearing Membership
(b) Exchange Membership
(c) Exchange Contract
Chart 3-2
Clearing House
A
(d) | 1(d)
E C D F
(c)
Exchange
(a) Clearing Membership: (b) Exchange Membership: (c) Exchange Contract;
(d) Clearing Agreement: (e) Brokerage Agreement.
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3.2.2.2 Form ation o f a Position
One difficulty with exchange trading arises from the fact that trading is 
conducted among multiple traders in the ring or on the electronic platform. If  all 
transactions between any two original traders who make a transaction in the pit 
(or whose orders are matched by the electronic system) were enforced, it would 
be difficult for traders to perform and to liquidate open contracts because there 
might be hundreds of combinations between any two given exchange members 
(depending on the total number of members). The clearing system cannot 
operate smoothly without first reducing the number of contractual parties. In 
addition, the contractual structure has to be carefully designed to ensure that 
contractual obligations can be transferred from the exchange to the clearing 
system without raising any legal problem.
The following sections focus on rules and practice at the LIFFE and the CBOT. 
It should be borne in mind that this thesis does not suggest that the LIFFE is 
representative o f UK exchanges, or that the CBOT is the typical American 
model. Rather, they are chosen to illustrate different structures and because 
grain futures are traded on both exchanges. The rules and practices of other 
major exchanges will also be mentioned briefly.
3.2.2.2.1 LIFFE
Do Cases 1 and 2 create a new contract? In Case 1 above, A and B agree upon 
the number of contracts and the price on the trading floor. The LIFFE rules have 
dealt with the formation issue, stating that the “[v]alid acceptance of a valid bid 
or offer shall make a [transaction] between the members whose traders made the 
bid or offer and the acceptance” .60 In the present case, 1,000 futures contracts 
(“exchange contracts”) are made between A and B. Once this transaction has 
been recorded and reported, it will be transferred to the LCH, who will then step 
into the contractual relationship governing this transaction. Thus, the original 
contractual relationship will be “novated” and become two contractual
60 LIFFE Rules, Book 1, section 5304/1.
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relationships (between A and the LCH, and between B and the LCH).61 The 
process is illustrated in Chart 3-3 below.
Chart 3-3
Clearing House
(seller) (buyer)
A ....
(buyer)
B
( 1) (seller)
Exchange
* The original exchange contract (1) will be novated into two identical 
contracts (2), where the clearing house acts as the seller against A (the buyer) 
and as the buyer against B (the seller).
Case 2 is more complicated. Once C and D  execute their clients’ orders (£”s 
and F ’s orders respectively), an exchange contract will exist between C and D  (as 
brokers) similar to that between A and B above. Because C and D  are not 
clearing members, they must clear through A and B, who are clearing members 
and with whom they have a clearing agreement.62 After the exchange 
transaction is sent to the clearing house and confirmed by the relevant clearing 
members (A and B in this case), according to the LIFFE Rules, a contract (called 
a “parallel contract”) will arise between the clearing members and the 
non-clearing members (i.e. between A and C and between B and D). This 
contract has terms identical to those o f the original exchange contract (called the 
“original contract”) . 63 The parallel contract also discharges the clearing
61 Rules o f  the LIFFE and the LCH explicitly use the term “novation”. See LIFFE Rules, Book 
2, sections 4.11.1 & 4.12.4; LCH General Regulations, Regulation 3. Its meaning will be 
discussed in infra 3 .2 .2 .23 .
62 See LIFFE Rules, Book 2, section 4.11.1.
63 Under the parallel contract, the clearing member (A) w ill stand in the place o f  the opposite 
party (D) against the non-clearing member (C). See LIFFE Rules, Book 2, section 4.12.1.
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members A and B from their “responsibility o f guarantee and indemnity” for £”s 
and F 's performance.64 Furthermore, simultaneously with the creation of the 
parallel contract, another contract (called a “related contract”) with terms 
identical to those of the original contract will arise between the two clearing 
members A and B.65 According to the LIFFE rules, the original contract will be 
discharged by novation through the parallel and related contracts.66 Finally, the 
LCH will step into the relationship between A and B, as in Case 1 (see Chart 3-4 
below).
Chart 3-4
Clearing 1 louse
(buyer)
E -------------  C   D-------F
(buyer) (5) (I) (5) (seller)
Exchange
* Tine original exchange contract ( 11 will be novated into a series o f identical contracts betw een 
different parties. First, a parallel contract (2) will arise between the clearing member and the 
exchange member Secondly, a related contract (3) will arise betw een the two clearing members. 
Then, the clearing house will intervene so that the related contract is novated into two contracts (4). 
The relationship between the client and an exchange member is determined by their brokerage or 
agency agreement (5).
Therefore, at the LIFFE, a simple exchange contract between two traders (in Case 
2, C and D) will automatically be transformed into a series of identical contracts 
between non-clearing members and the clearing members, between two clearing 
members, and eventually between clearing members and the clearing house. In 
addition, it should be noted that, under LIFFE’s rules, all exchange members are
64 LIFFE Rules, Book 2, sections 4.11 & 4.12.4.
65 Under the related contract, A w ill stand in place o f  C, and B in place o f  D. See LIFFE Rules, 
Book 2, section 4.12.2 and 4.12.3.
66 LIFFE Rules, Book 2, section 4.12.4.
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deemed to act as principals, whether they trade for themselves or for third 
parties.67 Thus, in Case 2, even if C and D  execute orders to E and F, for the 
exchange contract, C and D  are the contractual parties. The relationships 
between E and C and between F  and D  are determined by the respective 
brokerage agreements.
3 .2 2 .2.2 CBOT
The contractual structure of trading and clearing at the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) is similar, but differs slightly from the LIFFE model. With respect to 
Case 1, the situation is very much the same. Once the trade has been registered 
with the clearing house, the latter will step into the relationship between A and B. 
Thus, one contract becomes two contracts.68
In Case 2, under US federal law, C and D are each considered a “futures 
commission merchant” (FCM), which is generally defined as a person (legal or 
natural) who solicits and accepts orders from a third party and who receives 
money or property as margin or security.69 An FCM trades in his own name and
70becomes liable as principal between himself and the other party. Thus, when 
C and D  make trades on behalf E and F, they trade under their own names rather 
than those of their clients. However, since C and D  are not clearing members, 
they must acquire authority from their clearing members (A and B respectively) 
to conduct trading. According to CBOT rules, in this situation “[s]uch [clearing 
member] shall guarantee and assume complete responsibility for all trades and 
orders executed or directed to be executed by such non-clearing member” .71 (See 
Chart 3-5 below)
67 LIFFE Rules, Book 2, section 4.10.3.
68 CBOT Rule 704; CME Rule 804.
69 7 USCA la(20). In contrast, an “introducing broker” is a person who solicits and accepts 
orders from a third party but who does not receive money or property as margin or security. 7 
USCA la(23).
70 CBOT Rule 400.00.
71 CBOT Rule 207.01(a).
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Chart 3-5
Clearing House
(seller) (buyer)
A B
( 1)
E ---------------
(buyer) (5)
C D  F
(5) (seller)
Exchange
* In the CBOT. a non-clearing member can conduct trading provided that it acquires the authority 
(1) from its primary clearing members(A & B). Trading (2) is done by C and D. but the exchange 
contract (3) exists directly between the clearing members (A and B). Then the clearing house will 
intervene and novate the exchange contract into two contracts (4). The relationship between clients 
and exchange members is determined by their respective brokerage agreements (5).
Once a trade is agreed upon and registered with the clearing house, the clearing 
house becomes the principal who is liable to C and D  (as A ’s and B’s customers) 
and to whom C and D  are liable.72 However, this trade may be offset against 
other trades by the clearing members (i.e. A and B).73 The last rule is quite 
confusing as it is not clear whether the clearing house has a direct contractual 
relationship with C and D. However, the CBOT does not really change the role 
of clearing members but clarifies the relationship between a clearing member and 
a non-clearing member. The same rule further provides that
“if the trade is not offset and the Clearing Member being a seller, tenders a 
delivery notice to the Clearing Services Provider, the Clearing Member to 
whom such delivery is assigned shall thereupon be substituted as buyer in 
lieu of the Clearing Services Provider”.74
The reverse holds in the event that the clearing member is a buyer. The same 
rule also states that “if the trade is offset, the Clearing Services Provider shall be
72 CBOT Rule 706.00; CME Rule 804.
73 CBOT Rules 705 & 706, and CME Rules 804 & 806.
74 CBOT Rule 706, items (c) & (d).
107
discharged, and the Clearing Member itself shall be substituted for the Clearing 
Services Provider as principal.”75 It continues:
“[u]pon such substitution, each clearing member [should] be deemed to 
have bought the contracts from or sold the contracts to the Clearing 
House, ..., and the Clearing House [should] have all the rights and be 
subject to all the liabilities of such member with respect to such 
transaction.”76
Thus, if delivery is made following clearing rules, the CBOT discharges the 
clearing house and makes a clearing member party to the futures contract against 
a non-clearing member. A buyer-clearing member should in turn pass the 
delivery to the non-clearing member. In essence, the CBOT creates a 
contractual relationship between the non-clearing member and the clearing 
member if delivery is made so that deliveries can be transferred from clearing 
members to non-members or to the original buyers. The structures of the LIFFE 
and the CBOT, though different, yield the same conclusion.
3.2.2.2.3 Certain Formation Issues
As the above description shows, a contractual relationship must exist between 
relevant parties before a trade is submitted, and the rules of the exchange and the 
clearing house largely formulate the legal relationships under which trading can 
be conducted. A few issues on the formation of futures contracts are addressed 
in the following paragraphs.
First, is a new contract made when two traders agree on the price and the amount 
o f the quantities? At the LIFFE, every futures product has its own standard 
contract.77 Once an agreement has been reached (or orders matched by the 
electronic system), a new contract is made between the two traders. In contrast, 
at the CBOT, terms governing each exchange contract are incorporated in the
75 Id., item (e).
76 CME Rule 804.
77 Each futures contract at the LIFFE has a numerated standard contract. For example, the 
Wheat Futures Contract is listed as Exchange Contract No. 405 and the Cocoa Futures Contract is 
Exchange Contract No. 401. At the LIFFE, the standard contract for each futures product 
comprises proper terms and conditions, from prices, quantity and quality to settlement, governing 
law and dispute resolution.
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exchange rulebook.78 However, while the CBOT plays down the concept of 
individual “exchange contract”, exchange rules explicitly use the words “futures 
or options contract” 79, which clearly indicates that an individual exchange 
contract is made in the first instance because it is the source of obligations in each 
individual transaction.
Secondly, a more interesting question is how the exchange trading system can 
“guarantee” the performance o f exchange trading contracts. The goal is to allow 
a clearing house to step into the original trading contracts so that it can effectively 
“guarantee” (in a literal sense) the performance of all contracts. Exchange and 
clearing rules should be read carefully. When the term “guarantee” is used in 
exchange rules, it might not mean the same as when it is used in an independent 
contract of guarantee made by the clearing house.
In the LIFFE/LCH system, the term “novation” is used to describe such a 
“stepping into” process. The exact legal meaning of “novation” is not always
on
clear. Nevertheless, we may assume that the term “novation” used in LIFFE 
and LCH rules has the same meaning as “novation” used in common law; so the 
clearing house steps into the trader’s shoes and eventually become the ultimate 
contractual party (in relation to each responsible clearing member).81
In contrast, the CBOT/CME system uses a more obscure term “substitution” 
instead o f “novation”. In practice, “substitution” in the LIFFE/LCH system 
might not be any different from “novation” in the LIFFE/LCH system. After 
all, the goal o f such substitution is to allow the clearing house to become one of
78 The complete list can be seen at <http://www.cbot.eom /cbot/pub/page/0,3181,931,00.html> 
(visited on 17 Oct 2006).
79 For example, see CBOT Rule 704.00 (Substitution).
80 In English law, novation seem s to mean a new contract between the original contractual parties 
and a third party. Since a new contract is formed, consideration is required. See Aktion 
M aritim e Corporation o f  Liberia  v S K asm as & Brothers Ltd (The Aktion) [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
283; R asbora Ltd vJC L  M arine L td  [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 645; Customs and Excise 
Comm issioners v Diners Club Ltd  [1989] 1 WLR 1196. However, in theory, novation might 
also be seen as a combination o f  assignment o f  rights and assumption o f  liability by a third party 
such that no new contract is needed.
81 See also Goode, Legal Problems o f  Credit and Security, at 7-18 (3rd ed., Sweet & M axwell, 
2003).
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the contractual parties to a trading contract. However, whether such substitution 
is legally equivalent to “novation” is not crystal clear.
Thirdly, can the formation o f a futures contract be analysed in terms of offer and 
acceptance? In the open outcry system, since a transaction is initiated by a pit 
trader using voice and hand gestures, the exchange of gestures or shouting could 
be analysed by identifying one message as an offer and another as acceptance. 
In contrast, if the trading is done electronically, there is no such physical presence 
or connection. Since two parties are matched by computer, it is difficult to say 
which order is the offer and which one is the acceptance. The LIFFE rules state 
that “ [i]n the case of [LIFFE CONNECT], the matching of a valid bid with a valid 
offer by the Trading Host shall constitute the valid acceptance of a valid bid or 
offer for the purposes of this Rule” .82 What matters is whether an order is 
matched rather than whether it is an offer or an acceptance. Under standard 
practice, the question of offer and acceptance does not have much practical 
significance.83
Fourthly, at what point is the contract deemed to have been made? Although it 
may appear that a contract has emerged when two traders reach an agreement in 
the pit, we must examine the whole trading process. In an open outcry system, 
once two traders commit to a trade, both must send the exchange a message (in 
paper or electronically) with the details of the transaction. The exchange 
matches the messages to confirm the trade before submitting it to the clearing 
house. Thus, we may ask whether the contract is made in the pit or when the 
trade is registered with the exchange, and whether or not the contract is valid and
82 LIFFE Rules, Book 1, section 5304/2. The LIFFE Trading Procedures also state that “an 
acceptance is defined as the matching o f  a buy order and sell order in the Central Order Book”. 
LIFFE Trading Procedures, section 3.2.2(c).
83 However, whether a trading order is an offer or acceptance might have significant effect if  a 
trader wishes to withdraw his order before it is matched. This problem has been addressed by 
exchange rules. For example, the LIFFE rules provide that “[ojrders held in the Central Order 
Book can be withdrawn, individually or as a block, or edited by the relevant Responsible Person 
or under his authority.” LIFFE Trading Procedures, sections 3.2.7 & 3.2.8. The CBOT rules 
also provide that “[i]n pit and electronic trading, any bid or offer may be withdrawn at any time 
before acceptance, but while outstanding, all or any part o f  any bid or offer is subject to 
immediate acceptance by any trader. No bid or offer shall be specified for acceptance by a 
particular trader. The price at which a trade is executed shall be binding, unless such trade is 
cancelled by Exchange officials in accordance with Exchange rules.” CBOT Rule 523.
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enforceable before entering the clearing process. An exchange would provide
84rules to deal with issues of confirmation and registration issues. Thus, the 
questions of when the contract is made and when the exchange becomes valid 
and enforceable should depend on interpretation of exchange rules, which should 
make it clear how the exchange plans to resolve unconfirmed transactions or 
mistakes in confirmation messages.
Fifthly, who are the contractual parties? At the LIFFE, taking Case 2 as an 
example, a contractual relationship would first exist between the two traders (C 
and D ); then another between the clearing house and the clearing member (e.g. 
A); a further contract between the clearing member and the exchange member 
(e.g. A and C); and the last between the exchange member and his client (e.g. C 
and E). In contrast, the CBOT takes a different approach. A non-clearing 
member’s authority to trade originates from his primary clearing member. Any 
trade conducted by a non-clearing member is credited directly to the clearing 
member’s account. Thus, in Case 2, even if there is an actual agreement 
between C and D, at first it is A and B who are contractual parties, followed by 
clearing house substitution.
Sixthly, since the futures market is so standardised, the “exchange contract” is 
virtually a minimum unit of trading. Market participants cannot split a contract, 
but they can combine several “contracts” in a single trade, and the underlying 
commodities are substituted by the number of contracts traded. For example, if 
a trader places a single order to trade 10 com futures contracts for June delivery at 
the LIFFE, how many contracts are thus created— a single contract or 10 
contracts?
Although it is somewhat contrived, it is more convenient and appropriate to treat 
each “contract” separately, no matter how many “contracts” are traded in a single 
transaction. The first reason for this is that an order (e.g. to trade 10 contracts) 
need not necessarily be fully matched at one time with one counterparty. 
Among the 10 contracts, 2 may be matched by one trader and the other 8 matched
84 For example, at the CBOT, a member must confirm with the opposing trader within 15 minutes 
after each execution o f  a transaction. See CBOT Rule 350.07.
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case the parties’ intention would be to take each individual contract as the basic 
unit of trading.
Lastly, does a new contract arise between a broker (e.g. Q  and his client (e.g. E) 
if an order is executed? Exchange rules and clearing rules do not go so far as to 
determine the broker-client relationship. There is no doubt that a broker should 
pass deliveries to and collect margins from his client (see 3.2.3.1 below). 
However, whether a new contract is created out of an executed trading order is 
determined by the brokerage agreements.
3.2.3 Performance
Once a contract has been formed, the next stage is performance. What makes 
the futures market different from other markets is that it allows a trader to 
liquidate his existing contract by entering into a contrary transaction. Thus, al 
the end of the trading, only net positions (called “open contracts”, “open 
positions”, or “open interests”) will lead to delivery (if the underlying contracl 
requires delivery). In this part, we will explain how futures contracts can be 
liquidated and how delivery can be made.
3,2.3.1 M argin
Before describing how liquidation of futures contracts works, it is necessary to 
have some understanding of the use of margin in futures exchanges. Margin, 
like collateral, is not only a mechanism for clearing houses to control the credit 
risk of market participants ' but also a way to unify the terms (including prices) 
of each individual exchange contract.
8> The LCH defines it as “ security  for the perfo rm ance by such [m ]em ber o f  its obligations to the 
C learing  H ouse". LCH  R egu lation  12(a). The C B O T  describes it as “ indem nity against 
liability". C B O T  Rule 430 .00 . T he C M E  literally  calls them  “security  deposit” and
1 1 2
Non-clearing members must now maintain a margin account with a clearing
member, while clearing members must keep an account with the clearing house,
and clients must maintain an account with their brokers. When making a trade,
the trader must pay a certain amount of cash or collateral into the account
86  • •(generally called “initial margin’’) to guarantee performance. In addition, by 
using the so-called “mark-to-market” strategy on a daily basis, the clearing house 
adjusts the amount in the margin account to reflect daily profits or losses on 
futures contracts.87 If a trader suffers a loss, it is directly reflected in the margin 
account; if he gains, the margin amount will increase. If the money in the 
margin account drops below a certain level, the trader must inject more money 
(called a “maintenance margin”) into the account; otherwise his positions will be 
liquidated. In turn, a broker-trader should require his client to pay into the
oo
margin account in order to maintain his position.
For example, the initial margin for com futures in the CBOT is US$1,013 per 
contract, and US$750 is the maintenance margin.89 Let us assume a buyer 
makes a long com futures contract at the CBOT at $5 per bushel.90 He must first 
pay $1,013 into his margin account as the initial margin for this long position. 
On the next day, if the market price rises to $5.01 per bushel, he gains $0.01 per 
bushel on this contract, and his margin account will be credited with $50 (from 
$1,013 to $1,063).91 In contrast, if the price falls to $4.98 per bushel on the 
second day, his margin account will be debited with the $ 100 loss (from $ 1,013 to
“performance bond”. CME Rule, chapter 8. On several occasions in the early days o f  the 
CBOT, when farmers transported the grains to Chicago for delivery, traders simply refused to 
accept them because the market turned bad. It caused great chaos in trading, and soon prompted 
the CBOT to step in to maintain the market. The response was the invention o f  the margin 
requirement. Supra note 46, at 5-6. See also Ezickson, Kremer and Samant, “Exposure 
Management: Key Issues Affecting Energy Exchange Credit Risk Policy and Procedures” (2007) 
22(7) JIBFL 393.
86 For example, see LCH General Regulations, Regulation 12.
87 LIFFE Rules Book 2, section 3.27; CBOT Rule 430.00 et seq.
88 LIFFE Rules Book 2, section 3.27.2; CBOT Rules 430.00 & 431.00; NYM EX Rule 4.01; CME 
Rules 816 & 820.
89 This is assuming application o f  the speculative rate. See
<http://www.cbot.eom /cbot/pub/page/0,3181,2142,00.htm l#la> (visited on 17 Oct 2006).
90 The size o f  a com  futures contract in the CBOT is 5,000 bushels per contract, and the price is 
ticked at % cent. See < http://ww w.cbot.eom /cbot/pub/cont_detail/l,3206,1213+14389,00.html> 
(visited on 17 Oct 2006).
91 [(1 cent)*(5000 bushels)].
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$953). In this situation, since the margin is still above the maintenance level, he 
need not do anything. However, if  the price drops further to $4.90 per bushel, 
the margin amount will be marked to $513 and the buyer must pay an additional 
$237 or more to restore the margin to $750 or more.
The rate of margin is determined by the clearing house,92 sometimes under the 
supervision o f the financial regulator.93 With the help o f the margin and the 
intervention of the clearing house, credit risk is greatly reduced because, if a 
trader cannot afford to fulfil the “margin call”, he will be forced out of the market 
directly. On the other hand, because of the liquidation of contradictory futures 
positions, a trader only has to maintain the margin at the level of his net positions 
at the end of each trading day (see 3.2.3.2 below). Thus, in the end, futures 
trading is like leverage; a trader only needs to pay a certain amount of money to 
enter the game; and unless he wants to make or take delivery, he can use limited 
funds to make big profits.
Clearing houses would prefer the margin to be paid with something having higher 
liquidity that can be turned into cash as soon as possible. At the LCH, 
acceptable forms o f collateral include cash, bank guarantees, government 
securities, certificates of deposit, and a certain range of equities.94 Because of 
the credit risk involved, the LCH limits the range of currencies, government 
securities, and equities to those issued by certain institutions.95 This is similar to 
other exchanges.96 If the margin is paid in a foreign currency or in securities, 
the clearing house faces the risk of depreciation of the value of that currency or 
those securities. If  the value drops below a certain level, the clearing member or 
the investor will be called upon to restore the margin.97
92 For example, the margin rate in the CBOT is published online. See 
<http://www.cbot.com /cbot/pub/page/0,3181,1041,00.htm l> (visited on 17 Oct 2006).
93 For example, see SEC Rule 15 c 3 -1 .17  CFR 240.15 c3 -1.
94 See <http://www.lch.com/risk_and margining/collateral.asp> (visited on 17 Oct 2006).
95 Id-
96 For example, see CBOT Rule 431.02; NYM EX Rules 4.01.
97 For example, see LCH Regulation 12(J); NYM EX Rules 4.01(C).
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3.2.3.2 Liquidation o f Futures Contracts
Two types of futures contract may be distinguished: one with an obligation for 
delivery and the other with cash settlement only. The present chapter is 
concerned with the former type as the open contract can lead to physical 
delivery.98 The latter type, settled in cash, is basically a contract for differences 
traded on exchanges. The liquidation process is the same for both types.99
In practice, if a trader has 100 contracts to buy a commodity in a certain delivery 
month (long positions), a new trading selling 50 contracts of the same description 
(short positions) will cancel out the same number of existing long positions and 
only 50 long contracts will be left open if no other transactions are conducted. 
On the face of it, the “contract” is the basic unit and the process is comparable to 
a monetary set-off. However, as each exchange contract might have a different 
contract price, the matter is not as simple as two contracts cancelling each other 
out and leaving the price to be settled. On the one hand, there could be problems 
with the requirement of “mutuality” .100 On the other, even if  the two contractual 
payment obligations can be set off against each other, delivery and other 
obligations under exchange contracts cannot be offset because they are not 
monetary debts.101 Thus, we should examine more carefully how liquidation is 
accomplished in law.
At the LIFFE, all clearing members must keep accounts with the clearing house 
(the LCH), which includes a position account and a financial account (for margin 
purposes). Clients of the clearing member (non-clearing members or 
non-members) should maintain an account with the clearing member, and so
98 For example, at the CBOT open wheat futures contracts must be settled by delivery (or by the 
EFP). See CBOT Rule 1009.01. At the LIFFE and the LCH, clearing members with open 
wheat futures contracts at the end o f  the last trading day are obliged to make or take delivery.
See LCH Procedures 5.1.
99 Liquidation is also often called “close-out”, “netting”, or “settlement”.
100 Cf. British Eagle International Airlines Ltd  v Compagnie Nationale A ir France [1975] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 43.
101 In Stooke v Taylor, Cockbum CJ stated that “[b]y the Statutes o f  Set-off this plea is available 
only where the claims on both sides are in respect o f  liquidated debts, or money demands which  
can be readily and without difficulty ascertained.” (1880) 5 QBD 569, at 575. See also Derham, 
The Law o f  Set-Off, at sections 2.14 et seq. & 3.02 (3rd ed., OUP, 2003); Insolvency Rules 1986, 
section 4.90.
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customers of non-clearing members should do likewise.102 At the LCH, the 
liquidation of an open position is done electronically in the position account. If 
a clearing member is both a buyer and a seller for a certain number of contracts, 
the net difference is logged: for example, if a trader sells 3 contracts and buys 2 
contracts, only 1 net short contract is shown on the net account.103 On the other 
hand, if the account is a gross account, the above trades will be registered on a 
gross basis (i.e. 3 short contracts and 2 long contracts), but the clearing member 
can settle his positions by manually making an entry into the electronic clearing 
system. Thus, the result is that with position accounts, only net positions are 
presented as open contracts.104
The approach taken by the LCH requires more careful analysis. Basically, 
under the LCH regulations, an open contract requires daily settlement and the 
LCH will mark to the market, calculate the required margin, and enter into a 
settlement contract (based on the daily settlement price at the end of that trading 
day) with the clearing member (see 3.2.4.1 below). At the end of each day, 
every open contract is put through the daily settlement process, and all open 
contracts must have the same settlement price, regardless of the times and prices 
at which trades are carried out. Thus, since all contracts are deemed to have the 
same terms at the end of each day (after the settlement contracts), contrary 
contract positions can be netted. The settlement process is done before the 
netting of the positions. Contracts that have not been netted remain open 
contracts.105
The CBOT takes a different, simpler approach. Between a clearing member and 
the clearing house, where the clearing member buys and sells the same futures or 
options contract for the same delivery, the purchases and sales will be “offset to
LCH Procedures 2A.5.
103 LCH Procedures 2A .5.2.2.1.
104 LCH Procedures 2A .5.2.2.
105 LCH General Regulations, Regulation 15.
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the extent of their equality”.106 Between a futures commission merchant and its 
clients, the situation is the same.107
3.2.3.3 Delivery
It is easy to ignore the fact that one may acquire or make delivery o f commodities 
by trading in a commodity exchange. If a futures position is not liquidated 
before the cessation of trading of a futures contract, and if the contract requires 
physical delivery, it will enter into the physical delivery process, including 
transfer of the underlying goods and payment of prices. Following the clearing 
process, the clearing house operates as middleman to arrange delivery and 
payment (hereinafter referred to as “standard delivery”). Apart from traditional 
documentary delivery, the delivery can also be made electronically. A more 
popular method than standard delivery is to exchange the open contract with a 
physical spot contract (called the exchange-for-physical, EFP). A variation on 
the EFP is the exchange-for-swap (EFS). The following sections will describe 
the process of standard delivery in some leading exchanges and clearing houses 
and the EFP and EFS operations.
3.2.3.3.1 Standard Delivery
The standard delivery procedure is detailed in the futures contract, the exchange 
rules, or the clearing rules. The delivery procedure should reflect the nature of 
the commodity. Thus, the delivery processes for grains, petroleum, and 
securities are different. The flexibility of delivery procedures influences how 
traders use the futures market to conduct physical trading.108
First, the novation or substitution o f an exchange contract means the clearing 
house needs to match a seller and a buyer so as to transfer the commodities from 
the seller to the buyer. At the LIFFE, the LCH acts as an intermediary. Take 
wheat futures as an example. The standard delivery process at the LIFFE is
106 CBOT Rule 705.00. However, under the CME rules, contrary positions are not 
automatically offset one against the other unless position change data has been submitted to the 
CME. CME rules 806 & 811.
107 CBOT Rule 465.02.
108 The flexibility o f  delivery rules might also influence how easily a trader might manipulate the 
market. Romano, supra note 2, at 31.
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initiated by a seller who, intending to make delivery, should send a delivery 
notice along with clean wheat warrants to the clearing house during the tender 
days (i.e. in the last trading month for the contract). In turn, the clearing house 
will pass the delivery notice, which includes the number of contracts the seller is 
willing to deliver, on to the buyer.109 When trading is closed, the exchange 
publishes a settlement price, and on settlement day110 the clearing house will 
make the wheat warrants available to the buyer, debit the account o f the buyer, 
and credit that of the seller to complete the payment.111
The LCH remains the buyer (with respect to the original seller) and the seller 
(with respect to the original buyer), and it transfers the tender or required 
documents from seller to buyer. The LCH then instructs the buyer where to 
make payment and the seller where to make delivery. Both seller and buyer 
must follow these instructions. However, the LCH remains the contractual 
counterparty to the buyer and seller, even if the physical commodities do not pass 
through the hands of the LCH.112
At the CBOT, standard delivery is similar. The process is also initiated by the 
seller’s notice to the clearing house to indicate his intention to make delivery.
113The clearing house then assigns the notice to the buyer receiving the delivery. 
The seller should have acquired the products and all necessary documents by the 
day of tender, and the buyer should make payment in same day funds. The 
buyer is then entitled to receive the documents representing the title and/or 
possession o f the goods.114 It should be noted that the CME rules require a 
clearing member to liquidate open contracts before the end of trading if a 
customer is unwilling to make delivery or unable to provide evidence of 
delivery.115 The same rules also are used for the West Texas Intermediate
109 See LIFFE Exchange Contract No.405 (Wheat Futures Contract) Administrative Procedures, 
item 5.
110 “Settlement Day” is defined as the seventh day after the Tender Day or the last day o f the 
Delivery Month. Id., Administrative Procedures, item 8(d).
111 See generally, LIFFE Exchange Contract N o.405 (Wheat Futures Contract) Administrative 
Procedures.
112 See LCH General Regulations, Regulations 2, 19, 19A, 20, and 21.
113 See CBOT Rule 1047.01 & 1049.02, CME Rule 713.
114 CME Rule 713.
1,5 CME Rule 716.
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Midland Crude Oil Futures (WTI) at the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX).116 At the NYMEX, the buyer has to give a notice of intention to 
accept delivery and the seller has to give a notice of intention to make delivery; 
the clearing house then matches the notices and determines where the buyer can 
claim the oil. After the clearing house matches the notices and passes copies of 
them to the buyer and seller, the buyer must contact the seller for delivery 
instructions.117
While the standard delivery process seems to maintain the structure of 
documentary trade, delivery can also be made electronically. At the LIFFE or 
the CBOT, delivery of commodities is carried out by transfer of warrants or 
warehouse receipts issued by warehouses or grain storekeepers. The buyer who 
receives the warrants or receipts can claim the corresponding amount of 
commodities from the warehouse or keeper. In the case of oil or gas trading,
commodities can only be claimed at certain oil or gas stations. The NYMEX
118requires the seller to give the buyer a pipeline ticket to claim the oil or gas.
On the other hand, the LME and the LCH have developed an electronic system 
called the “Sword”, where warrants can be lodged in a depository and transferred 
electronically between persons with an account in the depository.119
Secondly, upon delivery of goods, the buyer has to make payment. At both the 
LIFFE and the CBOT, the final payment price is determined by the exchange.120 
Basically, the settlement price is the price on the last trading day and is also the 
invoice price.121 The price is usually quoted in FOB term s.122 Once the 
clearing house transfers to the buyer the invoice it received from the seller, the 
buyer must pay the seller directly (both the buyer and the seller are clearing
116 NYMEX Rule 9.19.
117 NYMEX Rule 505.15.
118 NYMEX Rules 505.16 (for WTI crude oil futures).
119 LME Rules Part 10. See also < http://www.lme.com/what_sword.asp> (visited on 4 
December 2006).
120 CME Rule 813. At LIFFE, the final “exchange delivery settlement price” (EDSP) is 
published by the exchange. LIFFE, Exchange Contract No. 405, clause 6 (Wheat Futures 
Contract).
121 CBOT Rule 1049.03. See also NYMEX Rule 505.15(D) (for the WTI crude oil futures).
122 CBOT Rule 1049.03; NYMEX Rule 505.14.
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members).123 Because of the daily adjustment of the margin account (see 
3.2.3.1 above), the final settlement price does not change the contractual price 
when the buyer or the seller creates the futures position. For a buyer, if  the 
settlement price is higher than the contract price, his profit is shown in the margin 
account and he suffers no loss on account of higher invoice price. In contrast, if 
the settlement price is lower, the buyer’s loss is already reflected in the margin, 
even though he pays less for the invoice,124 and vice versa for the seller.
Thirdly, the title of the underlying commodities has to be transferred. In grain 
sales, the title is transferred when the seller assigns the warehouse receipt or the 
warrant issued by the warehouse or the grain storekeeper. For precious metals, 
the procedure is similar.125 To secure the quality and quantity of underlying 
commodities, all exchanges and clearing houses establish qualifications for 
warehouses. Only qualified warehouses are allowed to issue a recognised 
warrant or receipt and to make delivery.126 The exchange also establishes
127specific rules about sampling and inspection.
For oil or natural gas, the situation is a little different. As crude oil is liquid and 
natural gas is invisible, neither can be shipped like grain or metal. Because the 
oil can be transferred by pipelines, delivery and title transfer of WTI oil futures 
traded in the NYMEX occur when the seller’s outgoing pipeline is connected to 
the buyer’s pipeline or storage facilities. In practice, the buyer can either elect 
to “pump over” by pumping the oil from the seller’s facility into his own facility 
or to take in-line or in-tank transfer. In the latter case, the buyer receives the
123 CBOT Rule 1049.04; CME Rule 713.E; LCH General Regulations, Regulation 21. In the 
NYMEX, the situation is the same. See NYMEX Rule 505.17.
124 Subject to clearing rules, the buyer’s margin could set o ff the amount o f payment due in the 
invoice so that the buyer only needs to pay the net prices (invoice price minus the amount in the 
margin account).
125 For example, for gold futures in the NYMEX, the gold is transferred by warehouse receipt 
issued by a licensed depository. See NYMEX Rule 113.12. For metals traded in the LME, see 
LME Rules Part 6 (Special Contract Rules for Metals). It should be noted that section 20A of  
the Sale o f Goods Act 1979 allows unascertained parts o f a specific bulk to be transferred so that 
the commodities can be transferred and delivered lawfully even if  the commodities being 
delivered are not ascertained yet or form only parts of a specific bulk when an exchange contract 
is made.
126 For example, see CBOT Rule 1081 et seq. \ LME Rules Part 4, item 7.
127 CBOT Rules 1036.00 -  1038.02. LIFFE Exchange Contract No 405 (Wheat Futures Contract), 
Administration Procedures, item 10.
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title for oil, which is stored in a specified facility without being physically 
moved.128 Risk of loss is transferred when the oil or natural gas passes through 
the inter-connecting point.129 An in-line or in-tank transfer is rather similar to 
transfers of grains or metals. It should be noted that the Brent Crude Oil futures 
traded in the ICE Futures are in principle not deliverable, owing to the oil’s 
offshore production and difficulties in designing a contract specification in line 
with the size of an oil tanker.130
Electricity too is a special kind of commodity because it cannot really be defined 
as “property”. The transmission of electricity is similar to that o f oil or gas but 
is greatly limited by facilities. For example, COB electricity futures contracts 
could be delivered only at the point(s) of interconnection on the boundary line 
between the states of California and Oregon.131
Fourthly, the place of delivery, which depends on the product and the exchange, 
must be determined. For some products, delivery location is limited by the 
exchange itself. For example, delivery of CBOT com futures is limited to 
certain places near Chicago or in the M idwest.132 For other products, the 
delivery point might be limited by the nature of the underlying asset. For 
example, WTI crude oil can only be produced in the Southern US, and delivery 
points are limited to places within the State of Texas.133 LIFFE feed wheat 
futures require the origin of the wheat to be the EU and the list o f grain 
storekeepers to date does not include any outside the U K.134
In contrast, the delivery of some commodities is not restricted by geographical 
boundaries. For example, NYMEX gold futures and LME silver futures in the 
LME allow gold and silver bars from anywhere in the world. By specifying the 
grades and the qualities o f the underlying metals, and by supervising qualified
128 NYMEX Rule 505.14.
129 NYMEX Rule 505.14 (WTI Crude oil) and Rule 220.10 (Natural Gas Futures).
130 Oil Trading Manual, section 8.1, p5 (Woodhead, 1995).
131 NYMEX Rules 400.02 & 400.12. “COB” stands for “California Oregon Border”.
132 CBOT Rule C l041.01.
133 NYMEX Rule 505.14.
134 The list can be found in
<http://www.euronext.eom/editorial/wide/0,5371,1732 20315216l,00.html> (visited on 4 
December 2006).
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warehouses or depositories, the exchange and the clearing house can confirm that 
the quality and quantity of the underlying metals satisfy the specifications o f the 
contract (any deviation from which might endanger the credibility of trading).
135Indeed, warehouses approved by the LME are scattered around the world. 
The same is true of a number of agricultural products. For example, the 
warehouse keepers qualified by the LIFFE for coffee and cocoa are located in 
many European cities outside the UK, and delivery may take place in other 
countries.136
Lastly, if a futures contract ends in physical delivery, it should be accessible by 
sale of goods laws. Can a futures contract therefore be called a “contract of 
sale” in the first instance?137 Most participants in the commodities futures 
market do not intend to make or take delivery; thus it is difficult to say the seller 
really “agrees to transfer” the commodities. On the other hand, if the contract 
requires an open contract to make delivery, the “contract” itself still requires the 
party to deliver unless the contract is liquidated before the end of trading. 
However, since most futures contracts are liquidated before delivery, and as most 
traders have no intention to make or take delivery, it might not be appropriate to
138define all contracts as “contracts of sale”.
139A more practical question is: when does a contract of sale turn into a “sale”? 
The answer to this question depends on the exact wording of exchange and 
clearing rules. A sale should be deemed to take place when goods are 
transferred from the seller to the buyer. There is no sale if the futures position is 
cleared before delivery. Eventually, as mentioned above, commodities may be 
transferred on paper by transferring warehouse receipts or similar documents, or 
when the title is transferred. Thus, the “sale” should be said to have taken place
135 The list can be found in < http://www.lme.com/what_warehouses_approved.asp> (visited on 
28 November 2006).
136 The list can be found in
< http://www.euronext.eom/editorial/wide/0,5371,1732 203152161,00.html> (visited on 4 
December 2006).
137 Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 2(l).In the US, see UCC Article 2-106(1).
138 Cf. CR Sugar Trading Ltd  v China National Sugar and A lcohol Group Corp [2003] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 279, where two exercised put options were held to be for investment purposes. See supra 
3.1.1 for further details o f this case.
139 Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 2(4). In the US, see UCC Article 2-106(1).
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when the document is delivered. On the other hand, who are the parties to the 
“sale” contract? If the documents are delivered from the seller to the clearing 
house, which in turn assigns the documents to the buyer, the sale seems to take 
place between the seller and the clearing house and between the clearing house 
and the buyer, rather than directly between the buyer and the seller.
3.2.3.3.2 Exchange-for-Physical
Apart from standard delivery, so-called “exchange for physical” (EFP)140 is 
becoming more popular in cases where the trader does not want to take delivery 
following standard procedures. An EFP is the exchange of a futures position for 
physical delivery. For example, the buyer has an open long futures contract, and 
the seller has a short position as well as physical goods. Under an EFP 
agreement, the buyer will take delivery directly from the seller and at the same 
time transfer his open long position to the seller. The newly acquired long 
position will cancel out the short position held by the seller, and the seller will 
profit (or lose) from the price difference between the long and short positions. 
On the other hand, the buyer receives the delivery of the commodities and clears 
his open position through the EFP. Depending on the relevant futures positions 
a party holds, an EFP can also be used to increase an investor’s open interests.141 
Because the settlement price for the EFP and the volume of exchange are 
negotiated by the two parties, the EFP can give both a vehicle to adjust their 
levels of exposure in the spot market and futures market trading.142
EFP transactions give traders flexibility as they can deviate from the 
specifications o f a futures contract when performing an EFP.143 The delivered 
commodities need not be o f the same type, of the same quality, or of the same 
quantity as the futures contracts. Thus, two investors who hold futures positions 
in May wheat futures delivered in Chicago may conduct an EFP transaction to
140 Also called “exchange against actuals’’, “exchange of spot”, and “exchange versus cash”.
141 See <http://www.cme.com/trading/prd/ag/res/exchange3329.html> (visited on 17 Oct 2006).
142 Id. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange provides on its website some examples o f how the EFP 
works. See <http://www.cme.com/trading/prd/ag/res/elpexample3334.html> (visited on 17 Oct 
2006).
143 See supra note 141. See also Das, Derivative Products & Pricing, at 46-47 (3rd ed., rev edn., 
John Wiley & Sons, 2006).
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make a contract to deliver wheat in Kansas City or to exchange for cotton 
delivery. This flexibility may partly explain why in many markets the EFP is 
more popular than standard delivery.144
However, because the EFP is an off-exchange transaction between two or more 
parties concerning futures positions made in the exchange/clearing house, 
exchanges and clearing houses all want to keep EFP transactions under control, 
and EFP operations also require settlement in the clearing system.145 Thus, all 
exchanges and clearing houses require EFP parties to register with the clearing 
house and keep the transaction on record. For example, at the CBOT a seller of 
the spot commodities must be the buyer of futures positions in an EFP.146 The 
NYMEX also provide detailed rules on the timing for registration of an EFP deal, 
on who can enter into an EFP, and on relevant procedures.147 The Eurex even 
provides OTC trading facilities for EFPs.148
Since an EFP is done off exchange and a futures position needs to be cleared 
through a clearing member, the documentation for an EFP must be carefully 
designed to ensure the cooperation of all concerned parties and to determine the 
obligation existing between them. The standard form published by the 
London-based Futures and Options Association (FOA) thus adopts a two-part 
structure: 1) the transaction between a trader and a dealer on behalf o f its 
customer (trader version); and 2) the transaction between the dealer and the 
customer with both acting as principal (customer version).149 Both versions 
specify that the customer’s clearing broker is a necessary party to the agreement.
The last question about the EFP we will consider is at what time a sale occurs. 
Like standard delivery, a sale happens when commodities are delivered from 
commodity seller to commodity buyer. However, whether the EFP can be
144 See Oil Trading Manual, supra  note 130, at section 8.3.
145 See L1FFE Trading Procedures, section 4.4; CBOT Rule 331.06 -  331.08; CME Rule 538; 
NYMEX Rule 6.21.
146 CBOT Rule 331.08.
147 For example, NYMEX Rule 6.21.
148 See <http://www.eurexchange.com/trading/market_model/wholesale_en.html> (visited on 4 
December 2006).
149 FOA’s EFP Transactions Agreement can be downloaded from 
<http://www.foa.co.uk/documentation/EFP/index.jsp> (visited on 17 Oct 2006).
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treated as a contract of sale is another matter. Apparently, an EFP is not a 
contract to transfer goods for monetary consideration. The consideration is a 
“contract” (a futures position). Whatever the nature o f the EFP agreement, a 
sale will eventually take place when the commodity seller transfers the goods to 
the commodity buyer.150
A variation of the EFP is the “exchange-for-swap” (EFS). An EFS agreement is 
an exchange of futures positions for a swap contract (instead of a sale).151 It is 
usually used where the futures and the swap are to a certain degree correlated 
such that the futures positions can become a hedge against exposure in a swap
152agreement (e.g. German bund futures in exchange for interest rate swap). 
Although an EFS can well be used for commodity swaps, it is necessary to 
understand that an EFS does not lead to physical delivery as an EFP does.
3.2.4 Lessons from Exchange Trading
In the above discussion, it was found that in the LIFFE/LCH and CBOT/CME 
structures, exchange contracts— agreements between traders in the trading pit or 
matched by an electronic system— remain the basis of futures trading. The 
contractual structure plays an important role in making the futures market as it is 
seen today.
Among all, exchange trading has certain key features. First, an exchange 
contract is highly standardised such that price is the only element subject to 
negotiation. Secondly, through a series of novation, exchange contracts are 
transformed into contracts between clearing houses and clearing members. 
Thirdly, with the help o f the mark-to-market strategy and the use of margin, each 
exchange contract should eventually have the same price term at the end of a 
trading day so that opposite contractual positions can cancel each other out 
smoothly.
150 Thus, if an EFP agreement is eventually in default, the sale o f goods law applies. See Apex 
O il Co v Belcher Co o f  New York, Inc, 855 F 2d 997 (1988).
151 The NYMEX also has special rules for EFS transactions. See NYMEX Rule 6.21 A.
152 See <http://www.eurexchange.com/trading/market_model/wholesale/efs_en.html> (visited 
on 4 December 2006).
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Fourthly, the “contract” itself virtually becomes the basic unit o f trading in a 
futures exchange. Although the exchange contract may still appear in the form 
of a proper contract, it no longer dominates the managing o f risk allocation and 
the rights and obligations o f parties. Instead, rights and obligations regarding 
payment, delivery and other matters devolve to exchange/clearing membership 
agreements and rules. Lastly, even though the futures market is now largely for 
notional trading, we found that the futures market is still capable o f making 
delivery, should an exchange contract so require.
Given the high daily trading volume in major commodity exchanges around the 
world, it is intriguing how rarely a futures contract incites legal disputes. With 
careful management, major futures exchanges have seldom run into serious 
troubles during the past half century. However, the futures market does have 
certain legal implications that cannot be ignored.
First, the futures market serves an important price discovery function. Since all 
the terms of a futures contract except prices are standardised, the futures market 
has effectively become a place for discovering market prices. On the one hand, 
futures prices provide an indication of possible future prices to those who might 
need to know so that they can plan necessary risk management transactions in 
advance. On the other hand, futures prices are frequently used as an important 
price reference for spot market or over-the-counter transactions as the futures 
market provides a relatively open and transparent platform for market 
participants from different levels to compete for better prices.153
Thus, the integrity o f this price discovery function is an essential issue. The 
abuse of the futures market clearly raises regulatory concerns; and such abuse 
may occur in several ways. Market manipulation or speculation might distort 
market prices so as to send wrong signals to market participants. The wrong 
market prices might influence not only market players but also the welfare of 
consumers, whose lives depend on the price level of major commodities (such as
153 A trader’s constant arbitraging between the spot market and the futures market and his use of 
all available information to trade in the futures market would move spot and futures prices in a 
similar direction such that the futures market becomes an important price reference to the relevant 
spot market trading. See, Romano, supra  note 2, at 13-15.
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oil). In addition, over-speculation in the futures market has plagued the US 
market ever since the creation of the CBOT in the mid-19th century.154 Even 
with the margin system and the intervention of clearing houses, a speculator still 
faces full financial obligation to perform each exchange contract that is not 
liquidated before the end o f trading. This is where large default may occur and 
the credibility of clearing houses may be challenged.
Secondly, when defaults have occurred, they often happened in a spectacular 
fashion and involved a significant degree of market manipulation. One such 
story is that of the infamous Maine potato default in 1976, the result o f a 
large-scale market manipulation scheme. According to Leist v Simplot155, the 
scandal involved two groups of traders. The first group (short group), led by 
Simplot (S), attempted to depress the potato market by selling a lot of potato 
futures (so that they could buy potatoes at a lower price and resell them later at a 
higher price). Discovering S’s scheme, the second group (long group) not only 
bought a lot of potato futures but also tried to control potato supply in the spot 
market. Neither group would give in. It was reported that
“[a]t the end o f trading on May 7 [1976], the short conspirators controlled 
1893 open short positions. The long conspirators controlled 911 open long 
positions. There [were] usually only approximately 200 open contracts at 
the end of trading on the May potato future.” 156
Since the long group virtually controlled most of the potato supply available for 
delivery, the outcome was the
“much publicized default in May 1976 of Maine potato futures contracts, 
when the sellers of almost 1,000 contracts failed to deliver approximately 
50,000,000 pounds o f potatoes, resulting in the largest default in the 
history of commodities futures trading in this country.” 57
154 See generally. Markham, The History o f Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regulation 
(Praeger, 1987).
155 638 F 2d 283 (1980).
156 ]d., at 290.
157 N ational Super Spuds, Inc v N ew York M ercantile Exchange, 470 F Supp 1256, at 1258 
(1979).
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Mr. Leist, the plaintiff in the case, was an unfortunate trader, who was 
anticipating an upturn in the potato market but was caught in the duel between the 
short and long groups. Naturally, lawsuits followed. Leist and other people 
who suffered a similar fate brought actions to claim damages against the New 
York Mercantile Exchange, brokers, and other people who had initiated the 
manipulative schemes based on the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The key 
issue was whether the violation of the CEA (as a federal statute) might imply a 
private cause of action,158 an issue which will not be explored here since it is 
outside the scope of this thesis. Fortunately for Leist, the majority of the Second 
Circuit court held for him.
We could learn from the Maine potato default the lesson that the exchange 
market is not free from default and that market manipulation is a concern to both 
market participants and regulators. Apart from typical squeezing or cornering 
of the market,159 one might dispatch false reports to the general public, hoping 
that such false information might lead market prices in one’s favour.160 In 
addition, arguably one might also use inside knowledge on a certain matter to 
gain profits or to avoid losses before that piece of information becomes available 
to the general public. Manipulation in the commodities market is an area of its 
own and this thesis will not enter into the details of the meaning of manipulation 
and how to address manipulation, but certain issues of insider dealing will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to information disclosure for risk trading.161
Thirdly, there are concerns about the capability of exchanges and clearing houses 
to control over-speculation and market manipulation. In light of the trading and
158 See, National Super Spuds, Inc v New York M ercantile Exchange, 470 F Supp 1256, at 1258 
(1979); National Super Spuds, Inc v New York M ercantile Exchange, 660 F 2d 9 (1981); Leist v 
Simplot, 638 F 2d 283 (1980).
159 See Perdue, “Manipulation o f Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense’’ (1987) 56 Fordham 
L Rev 345; Freidman, “Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market 
Manipulation” (1990) 89 Mich L Rev 30; Bianco, “The Mechanics o f Futures Trading: 
Speculation and Manipulation” (1977) 6 Hofstra L Rev 27. Squeezing or cornering the market, 
like the scheme in the Maine potato default, might also raise some competition law arguments, as 
the plaintiffs did in National Super Spuds, Inc v New York M ercantile Exchange, 470 F Supp 
1256(1979).
160 See for example, CFTC  v Foley, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 70437; CFTC v Atha, 420 F Supp 2d 
1373 (2006); CFTC v Erskine, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 26319.
161 The issue o f insider dealing in commodity trading will be discussed in infra 5.5.2.2.
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clearing structure discussed above, exchanges and clearing houses are obviously 
the focal point for maintaining the trading market. Whether an exchange or a 
clearing house is capable of supervising the trading market is apparently an issue 
of concern for regulators. On the other hand, when an exchange does intervene 
to stop a large default or a manipulative scheme, the exchange might still get into 
legal troubles.162 Whether a financial regulator should intervene more or rely 
on the self-regulatory powers o f exchanges and clearing houses is a topic that will 
not be elaborated upon here.163
Fourthly, a more serious concern arises when a relevant party in futures trading 
becomes insolvent. Although the margin system and the financial requirements 
for membership may reduce the chance of going insolvent due to trade losses in 
the futures market, it is not impossible that a clearing member or an exchange 
member become insolvent because of his other business activities. Regulators 
and clearing houses might worry about the contagious effect o f financial trouble. 
The contractual ties between market participants might turn insolvency into a 
snowball. To prevent such situations, all exchanges and clearing houses have 
rules to deal with the bankruptcy or insolvency of their members.164 A clearing 
house may also impose rules to limit its liability and prevent unexpected 
losses.165 It should be noted that in some countries there is a special insolvency 
procedure for exchange trading. For example, in the UK, Part VII of the 
Companies Act 1989 provides special rules to safeguard the operation o f certain 
financial markets with respect to the insolvency of members; the US Bankruptcy 
Code does the same.166 However, there is still some danger that a clearing
162 For example, see Zimmerman v Chicago B oard o f  Trade, 360 F 3d 612 (2004). In this case, a 
trader unsuccessfully challenged CBOT’s order to stop trading because o f concerns on market 
manipulation.
163 See Zuffrey and Tschanz-Norton, Regulation of Trading Systems on Financial Markets 
(Kluwer Law International, 1997); Lee, What Is An Exchange? The Automation, Management, 
and Regulation of Financial Markets (OUP, 2000); Pirrong, “The Self-Regulation of 
Commodity Exchanges: The Case o f Market Manipulation” (1995) 38 J Law & Econ 141; 
Keaveny, “In Defense of Market Self-Regulation: An Analysis o f the History o f Futures 
Regulation and the Trend toward Demutualization” (2005) 70 Brooklyn L Rev 1419.
164 For example, see CBOT Rules 270.00 et seq.\ NYMEX Rules 10.
165 For example, see LCH Regulation 22.
166 11 USCA 555 & 556.
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house itself may become insolvent. This may be why clearing houses are 
supervised by financial regulators.
Fifthly, futures exchanges and clearing houses have less control over market 
participants who are not members o f the exchange but who trade through a broker 
with membership in the exchange. This raises further legal implications about 
legal relationship between brokers and their clients.
Lastly and most closely related to the discussion that will occupy the rest o f this 
chapter, there are certain legal issues involving the use of futures prices or 
exchange-like features in spot market transactions. Given modem futures 
regulations, the use of futures techniques in spot market trades might invite 
regulatory intervention in the name o f futures regulation (see 3.1 above). This 
would then lead to the question of why off-exchange transactions are regulated as 
“futures”, a question that will be the theme of the next part of this chapter.
3.3 Off-exchange Commodity Contracts
The above discussion illustrated how a futures exchange facilitates trading and 
how it becomes a powerful playground for hedging and speculating price risk. 
Then, it may be wondered whether it is possible to apply the features of exchange 
trading to an off-exchange transaction. Contractual parties might prefer to 
hedge with a spot contract instead of using the futures market. Nevertheless, 
certain trade practices and contractual terms also increase the chance that a spot 
market contract would be considered a “futures” contract in law. The following 
sections will examine case laws relating to certain types of contract or clauses 
that help to redress price risk and liquidity risk in order to see how English and 
American judges perceive these off-exchange commodity contracts and the legal 
meaning of “futures” .
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3.3.1 Hedge-to-arrive Contracts
So-called “hedge-to-arrive” contracts (HTA) represent an interesting angle from 
which to observe how an off-exchange trading contract might look like an 
exchange-traded futures contract. Grain farmers have a strong interest in 
managing the fluctuation of grain prices, so several contractual arrangements 
have been developed in the grain market in order to reduce risks from seasonal 
variations in commodity prices.167 HTAs might be traced back to a popular type 
of forward contract in the 19th century called “to arrive” contracts, which were 
contracts to purchase goods upon arrival.168 The trading of the “to arrive” 
contract later became more standardised and gave birth to the first organised 
exchange in the world, the Chicago Board of Trade.169
In the words of a judge, an HTA contract is a transaction by which
“a grain producer agrees to deliver at an unspecified time a predetermined 
quantity and grade of grain. The price of the grain is determined by 
reference to a futures contract price established by the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT), plus or minus a variable component referred to as the 
“basis” . Basis is the difference between the price of the designated 
futures contract and the cash price for that commodity.... The basis remains 
unfixed, or ‘floating’, until the farmer elects to fix the basis at which point 
the grain will be delivered. Under an HTA, a farmer has at least two sale 
options on his crop: he can deliver grain under the HTA, or he can defer 
delivery on (i.e. ‘roll’) the contract if he thinks he can get a better price in
170the cash-grain market.”
The above definition covers several types of HTA transactions. The basic type 
(or so-called “non-roll”) is where the contract price is determined by the futures
,67 See 1996 CFTC Ltr 145, at 5-6.
168 Romano, supra note 2, at 7. The “to arrive” contract originated from Europe. See also 
Morgan, Merchants o f Grain, at 59 (Penguin, 1980); Markham, The History o f Commodity 
Futures Trading and Its Regulation, at 3 (Praeger, 1987); Clark, “Genealogy and Genetics o f 
"Contract o f Sale o f a Commodity for Future Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act 
Symposium: Regulation o f Commodity Futures Trading” (1978) 27 Emory LJ 1175, at 1180.
169 See generally. Commodity Trading Manual, supra  note 46, at 4 et seq.\ Markham, id., at 3-4. 
See also <http://www.cbot.eom/cbot/pub/paee/0.3181,942.OO.html> (visited on 18 Oct 2006).
170 Asa-Brandt, Inc v A D M  Investor Services, Inc, 344 F 3d 738, at 741-742 (2003), citing Grain  
Land Coop v K ar Kim Farms, Inc, 199 F 3d 983, at 987 (1999).
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market plus or minus the “basis” and with a fixed future delivery date.171 The 
futures price is fixed at first, but the basis can be determined later. A contrary 
type of HTA is called a “basis contract”, in which the basis is fixed at the 
beginning but the futures price level can be chosen later.
Subject to the contract, the time that determines the contract price in an HTA is 
usually up to the seller-farmer. Thus, the seller should investigate and predict 
the movements of the spot market prices and the futures market so as to maximise 
his profits. The buyer (usually grain elevators) then purchases futures contracts 
in the CBOT. Therefore, the price mechanism in a basic HTA is simply a 
method for setting the contract price.172 In effect, it defers the determination o f 
the price to a later stage.
173What makes HTAs more intriguing is the “rolling” clause. In the case of 
some HTAs, the contracts provide that the seller may defer delivery to a later date 
if the price in the cash market on the original delivery date is higher than the HTA 
contract price. This means that the seller can avoid virtual losses (from an HTA 
deal) by selling the grain in the spot market and delaying the delivery. There is 
no problem with this if the seller-farmer has enough grain to make two deliveries. 
In practice, it is very uncertain.
To understand the problem, one should bear in mind that grain is a seasonal 
product. Subject to contractual terms, rolling can defer delivery to later in the 
same year (for example, from August to September), to the next production year 
(e.g. from August 2009 to August 2010), or even to several years later. The 
farmer might not have enough grain to make delivery either later in the same year 
or in the next year, in which case he might have to buy grain on the cash market to 
meet his delivery obligations. Then, the farmer is again exposed to price risk in 
the delivery stage. Thus, an HTA is rather a speculative vehicle for farmers.174 
Since a buyer-elevator usually uses the CBOT to hedge against risks from HTAs,
171 The meaning of “basis” has been introduced in supra 2 .2 2 .2 .
172 Iavarone, “Understanding the Hedge-to-Arrive Controversy” (1997) 2 Drake J Agric L 371, at 
374.
173 HTAs with a rolling clause are sometimes called “flex”. See Grain Land Coop  v K ar Kim 
Farm, Inc, 199 F 3d 983, at 987 (1999).
174 See general. Iavarone, supra note 172.
132
the rolling process means that grain elevators must close their existing open 
interests and acquire new hedges in the futures market.
Problems arose quickly after the historically high price in 1995, which led 
farmers to roll over their HTAs.175 While farmers seemed to gain from the high 
spot prices, grain elevators suffered huge losses because they had to liquidate 
their short futures positions in the CBOT at very disadvantageous prices, which 
had a huge impact on the agricultural economy.176 Disputes soon broke out and 
one important legal issue was whether HTAs were regulated “futures 
contracts”.177
If we examine carefully the price clause for an HTA, we may find that the HTA is 
actually similar to the long or short hedge strategy and the “basis” trading 
introduced in section 2 2 2 .2  above. Under a basic HTA, a farmer uses the 
futures price in the CBOT as a benchmark price and may choose the “basis” later. 
This may lead to the same result as launching a short hedge strategy using the 
CBOT market, except that with an HTA the farmer does not need to set foot on 
the exchange floor. The rigidity of specifications for futures contracts at the 
CBOT might make exchange trading less flexible and more costly for grain 
farmers. The HTAs provide an alternative for farmers to hedge against price 
fluctuation by reference to CBOT prices but without actually trading at the 
exchange. While buyer-elevators purchase futures contracts in the futures 
market to hedge their exposure from HTA transactions, the buyer-elevators are in 
fact the farmer’s agents, hedging on his behalf in the futures market. 178 
Therefore, some argue that HTAs are effectively a vehicle for speculation rather
179than real sales.
The rolling function and price determination regime makes HTAs similar to 
off-exchange futures contracts; thus there have been disputes as to whether these
175 Grain Land Coop, supra  note 173, at 987-988.
176 See generally. Cole, “Hedge-to-arrive Contracts: the Second Chapter of the Farm Crisis” 1 
Drake J Agric L 243 (1996).
177 In 1996, upon inquiries by market participants, the CFTC issued a letter explaining the 
CFTC’s opinion on the matter. However, the CFTC was reluctant to make a final decision and 
preferred to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis. See 1996 CFTC Ltr 145.
178 See Iavarone, supra note 172.
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contracts are illegal and thus void. A series of HTA cases arose in the American 
Midwest, and the courts generally recognised HTAs as "cash forward contracts" 
rather than futures contracts.180 The basic theory is that both parties have the 
intention of making delivery when the contract is made.
In Nagel v ADM Investor Services, 7«c,181 Judge Posner adopted the “totality of 
the circumstances” test first proposed in Co Petro (introduced in 3.1.2.2 above), 
and proposed a few factors for consideration:
“(1) The contract specifies idiosyncratic terms regarding place o f delivery, 
quantity, or other terms, and so is not fungible with other contracts for the 
sale of the commodity, as securities are fungible....
(2) The contract is between industry participants, such as farmers and grain 
merchants, rather than arbitrageurs and other speculators who are 
interested in transacting in contracts rather than in the actual commodities.
(3) Delivery cannot be deferred forever, because the contract requires the
182farmer to pay an additional charge every time he rolls the hedge.”
O f course, the application of the above test varies contract by contract, and thus it 
would be difficult to conclude that all HTAs are or are not regulated futures 
contracts without examining carefully the contractual terms of each 
transaction.183 Assuming a fixed delivery date and obligation, a basic HTA 
seems no different from other contract for sale of grain except that the price term 
is more flexible.
In contrast, the rolling clause adds some liquidity to the basic HTA, as a farmer 
might sell his grain in the cash market if the spot price is more favourable. The 
US court seemed ready to conclude that rolling HTAs fell within the cash
1 R4forward exception as long as delivery obligation might not be deferred forever.
On the other hand, cash forwards or not, HTAs still use complicated financing
180 See Asa-Brandt, Inc v A D M  Investor Services, Inc, 344 F 3d 738 (2003); N agel v A D M  
Investor Services, Inc, 217 F 3d 436 (2000); Lachmund v ADM  Investor Service, Inc, 191 F 3d 
777 (1999); Grain Land Coop  v K ar Kim Farm, 199 F 3d 983 (1999); Andersons, Inc v Horton 
Farms, Inc, 166 F 3d 308 (1998); Oeltjenbrun  v CSA Investor Inc, 3 F Supp 2d 1024 (1998).
181 217 F 3d 436 (2000).
182 Id., at 441.
183 Id-
184 In addition, it cannot be ignored that HTAs were largely used by farmers and grain merchants 
rather than by speculators as in Co Petro.
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techniques, and there is a question of whether farmers understand the nature of 
the market and the potential impact of signing an HTA agreement (particularly a 
rolling one). This led to further disputes regarding the liability of a financing
185company when promoting an HTA to farmers or grain merchants.
In the end, the possible outcome of applying UK law to the HTA cases should be 
considered. First, HTAs, basic or rolling, should satisfy the definition o f a
futures contract with delivery to be made at a future date and a predetermined
186method to decide sale prices by reference to the exchange market. The next 
issue is whether HTAs are for commercial purposes or for investment purposes. 
HTAs cannot be regarded as being for investment purposes because they are not 
traded on organised exchanges.187 Nor could one presume that they are for 
commercial purposes, as delivery would most likely not be made within seven
1 RRdays. Unlike CR Sugar, farmers who enter into HTAs are actually gram 
producers, and grain merchants and millers who generally use grain for their own 
business. In addition, HTAs do require delivery, even rolling HTAs. 
Therefore, we may conclude that HTAs are more likely to be seen as futures 
contracts for commercial purposes and might not be regulated under the FSMA 
2000 .
3.3.2 Chain of Sales: Circle or Book-out Clauses
Without the establishment of a clearing house, it is still possible for merchants to 
clear their transaction based on bilateral agreements. In practice, it is not 
uncommon that a seller in a transaction becomes a buyer of the same amount of 
the same goods in another deal, possibly leading to a chain of sales. This 
situation is best explained by Tradax Export SA v Carapelli SpA.189 In this case, 
the following circle was found:
185 See Asa-Brandt. Inc v A D M  Investor Services, Inc, 344 F 3d 738 (2003).
186 RAO 2001, article 84(1) & (8).
187 Id., article 84(3).
188 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep 279.
189 [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 157.
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Seller Buyer Contract price
Rocco Siat $163perm .t.
Siat Carapelli $172perm .t.
Carapelli Tradax $235 per m.t.
Tradax Rocco $140 per m.t.
Some standard forms contain a clause to deal with situations like the above. A 
“circle clause” can be found on the GAFTA forms and FOSFA forms concerning 
grain sales. According to this clause,
“[w]here Sellers re-purchase from their Buyers or from any subsequent 
Buyer the same goods or part thereof, a circle shall be considered to exist 
as regards the particular goods so re-purchased. ... [In this situation,] “if 
the goods are not appropriated, or, having been appropriated documents 
are not presented, invoices based on the mean contract quantity shall be 
settled by all Buyers and their Sellers in the circle by payment by all 
Buyers to their Sellers o f the excess of the Sellers' invoice amount over the 
lowest invoice amount in the circle.” 190
In Tradax, a circle was discovered and Tradax sent telex messages to the other 
parties in the circle to propose settlement. In this circle, the lowest invoice price 
was $140 per m.t. (from Tradax to Rocco). Therefore, the result o f the circle 
was:
Rocco to Tradax 
Tradax to Carapelli 
Carapelli to Siat 
Siat to Rocco
The net payment was:
190 For example, GAFTA Contract No. 100 (Contract for Shipment of feeding stuffs in Bulk Tale 
Quale-CIF Terms), clause 29; FOSFA Contract No 53 (Contract for Vegetable and Marine Oil 
(in bulk) FOB Terms), clause 25.
$0 per m.t.
$95 per m.t. ($235-$ 140) 
$32 per m.t. ($172-$ 140) 
$23 per m.t. ($163-$ 140)
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Tradax pays to Siat $9 per m.t. $172-$ 163 = $32-$23
Tradax pays to Carapelli $63 per $235— $172 = $95—$32
m.t.
Tradax pays to Rocco $23 per m.t. $ 163-$ 140
Net loss for Tradax: $95 ($235-$ 140)
In Tradax, the issue was whether an embargo, imposed by the US government 
after the circle was found, would influence the amount that Tradax had to pay. 
The court held for Tradax to reduce payment owing to the embargo. The rest of 
the case and details of the judgement have no bearing on this thesis and will 
therefore not be addressed here.
Similar terms appear in the 15-day Brent crude oil market.191 The 15-day Brent 
crude oil contract usually contains a “book-out” provision which works like the 
circle clause mentioned above. The difference in the 15-day Brent market is 
that the relevant parties have to reach a “book-out” agreement to determine a 
“base price” as the basis to calculate their respective payment obligations among 
parties.192 As a judge observed, “[o]n the choice of a base price depended not 
only the amount payable on a book-out under each of the contracts in the [chain], 
but also whether it was the buyer or the seller who would in fact make the 
appropriate payment.” 193
Therefore, one question arises: if all parties have agreed on every important term 
except the base price, and all parties orally agree to solve the circle without any 
physical delivery within the circle, can the court determine the “base price” for 
the parties? In Voest Alpine Intertrading GmbH v Chevron International Oil Co
191 The off-exchange Brent crude oil contract can be divided into two categories: the “dated” 
contract and the “ 15-day” contract. In the dated contract, the delivery date is specified in the 
contract. In contrast, the “15-day” contract has no specific delivery date but allows the seller to 
give notice to nominate the delivery date 15 days prior to the intended delivery day (thereby 
giving rise to the name “ 15-day Brent”). See Oil Trading Manual, supra note 130, section 4.2, p 
2-3; CFTC Statutory Interpretation, 55 Fed Reg 39188 (1990).
192 Oil Trading Manual, id., at section 12.3.
193 Voest Alpine Intertrading GmbH  v Chevron International O il Co Ltd  [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
547, at 558.
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Ltd]94, the parties agreed upon a number of important terms except the base price 
for the book-out agreement. The defendant claimed that the original 15-day 
contracts had been reinstated after failure to reach a book-out agreement. In 
contrast, the claimant claimed that an agreement had been reached and the 
minimum price in the circle should be employed to calculate the settlement 
payment. The court treated the oral agreement as incomplete, and the court 
implied a reasonable price as the base price by interpreting the intentions of the 
parties.195 The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that “the original 
contracts were merely suspended, with the consequence that they would, in 
default of an agreement as to a base price, be revived in a subsequent month”.196
The weakness of using a contractual term to deal with a multi-party situation may 
be seen in both Tradax and Voest. Settlement of multi-party obligations 
requires at least one party to initiate the process (like Tradax’s telex) and relies on 
the cooperation of the others. The crucial question is whether a new settlement 
agreement must be reached so as to effectuate the resolution (as in the 15-day 
Brent market) or whether the notice alone may effectuate the settlement. If a 
new agreement is not required, what happens if one party in the circle fails to 
cooperate? Can other parties sue him for cooperation? It may be argued that a 
multi-party contract is formed among relevant parties in the case of the circle 
clause under the GAFTA form, given that the circle clause also requires buyers 
and sellers to give every assistance to ascertain the circle. However, if no such 
multi-party contract is found, the enforceability and operation of the clause might 
be limited by the doctrine of privity, which would be problematic if the party 
failing to cooperate were also the one obliged by the circle clause to make 
payment.
If a new agreement is required, the problem becomes one of the formation of 
contract. If this approach is followed, what are the essential elements o f this 
new agreement? It is apparent that the settlement price is the key factor (like the 
base price in Voest). However, in Voest the court held that a consensus to
194 [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 547.
195 Id-, at 558-559 & 562.
196 Id., at 560.
138
resolve the existing circle is enough to form a contract. The GAFTA form 
makes it easier by using the lowest contractual price in the circle as the 
benchmark price on the basis of which to calculate related payments. The circle 
clause also covers situations where one party becomes insolvent or is liquidated.
Nevertheless, even if the settlement or book-out looks efficient to the relevant 
parties, it is not always desirable. For example, a player in the Brent market 
who intends to arbitrage between the dated contracts and 15-day contracts might 
find his scheme breaks down if the 15-day contract is booked out.197 This may 
explain why similar clauses do not exist in many other trade rules or standard 
forms.
With the help of the book-out clauses, the 15-day market provides an example of 
how spot market trades can evolve into an exchange-like contract market and 
become a harbour for hedging or speculation. In a market with a limited 
number of participants, it may not be difficult to spot a chain of sales and so to 
initiate a book-out. Thus, the result o f a book-out or circle clause might turn an 
ordinary sale into an exchange-like notional transaction, which enhances the 
chance for treating the contract as a regulated futures contract.
In Transnor (Bermuda), Ltd v BP North America Petroleum, Inc,m  Transnor 
purchased some North Sea crude oil from BP on the basis of a 15-day Brent 
contract.199 However, after realising that the oil price dropped after the contract 
was made, Transnor refused to take delivery and subsequently sued BP for 
violation o f US anti-trust law by conspiring with other companies to depress oil 
price and o f the CEA by manipulating the market. The anti-trust claim is not our 
concern here, so we will focus on the CEA claim below.
Transnor’s CEA action raised a question whether a 15-day Brent contract (with a 
book-out clause) was a regulated futures contract under US law. Naturally, BP 
argued that the 15-day Brent contract was a “cash forward”, rather than a 
“futures” contract. The District Court judge acknowledged that
197 Oil Trading Manual, supra note 130, section 12.3, pp. 5 -6 .
198 738 F Supp 1472 (1990).
199 See supra note 191 for explanation o f the two popular types o f Brent contracts.
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“ 15-day Brent contracts may represent binding commitments to buy or sell 
physical oil. The real question, however, is whether the transactions are 
more like bargains for the purchase and sale o f crude oil than speculative 
transactions tacitly expected to end by means other than delivery.”200
Applying the Co Petro decision,201 the court drew the conclusion that “[t]he high 
levels of speculation and performance without delivery, as well as the relatively
standardized contracts, distinguish the 15-day Brent transactions from the
202forward contracts contemplated by the drafters of the [CEA].”
In addition, the judge found that “‘only a minority o f transactions in the Brent 
market result in delivery.’ ...The customary use of offsetting and booking out 
strongly suggests that physical delivery was not contemplated by the parties.” 
The judge also took note of the fact that the 15-day Brent contract enjoyed a high 
degree of standardisation o f terms and that there existed investment or brokerage 
houses for Brent trading.204 The judge further found that “[w]hile there is no 
contractual entitlement to satisfy Brent obligations by means other than delivery, 
the likelihood of avoiding delivery has enabled participants to develop what is 
essentially a ‘paper’ market for speculative or hedging purposes rather than one 
for physical transfer.”205
So the court did not find any difficulty in judging that, under the CEA, 15-day 
Brent contracts were “futures” contracts. As the judge stated, “[t]he volume of 
contracts traded and the high standardization of the contracts demonstrate the 
essential investment character of the 15-day Brent market. ‘With an eye toward 
[their] underlying purpose,’ the Court concludes that Transnor's 15-day Brent 
transactions constitute futures contracts.”206
^  738 F Supp 1472, at 1491-1492 (1990).
201 680 F 2d 573 (1982).
202 Id., at 1491.
203 M-, at 1492, quoting Securities and Investments Board, Consultative Document on the Future 
Regulation of the Oil Markets, at 2 (February 1988).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id., at 1493.
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Given the size and importance of the Brent crude oil market, the Transnor 
decision might worry many oil traders. Soon after the Transnor decision, to 
clarify the issue, the CFTC issued a statutory interpretation, which drew the 
conclusion that
. a party to contracts of this type may individually negotiate cancellation 
agreements, commonly known as ‘book-outs,’ ‘close-outs’ or ‘by-passes,’ 
with other parties in a chain, circle or loop in a distribution chain and 
which may result in a cash payment-of-differences between the parties 
involved. It is noteworthy that while such agreements may extinguish a 
party’s delivery obligation, they are separate, individually negotiated, new 
agreements, there is no obligation or arrangement to enter into such 
agreements, they are not provided for by the terms of the contracts as 
initially entered into, and any party that is in a position in a distribution 
chain that provides for the opportunity to book-out with another party or 
parties in the chain is nevertheless entitled to require delivery of the 
commodity to be made through it, as required under the contracts.
Under these circumstances, the Commission is of the view that 
transactions of this type which are entered into between commercial 
participants in connection with their business, which create specific 
delivery obligations that impose substantial economic risks of a 
commercial nature to these participants, but which may involve, in certain 
circumstances, string or chain deliveries of the type described above, are 
within the scope of the ... exclusion from the Commission’s regulatory 
jurisdiction.”20
Two points in the CFTC’s conclusion may be noted. First, if the book-out is 
reached by an individually negotiated agreement rather than by a pre-determined 
method of settlement in an existing contract (as in Voest Alpine208 discussed 
above), this is an indication that the relevant 15-day Brent trading contracts are 
for real commercial purposes rather than for speculation. Secondly, it seems 
that, if a 15-day Brent contract were made between commercial parties in 
connection with their business, this transaction would also fall beyond the 
jurisdiction of the CFTC.
There is no UK authority on the regulatory issue of the circle or book-out clause. 
Whether a contract is made for investment purposes or for commercial purposes 
depends on the interpretation of the RAO 2001 (see 3.1.2.1 above). Applying
2°7 c p t c  statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed Reg 39188.
208 [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 547.
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the analysis in CR Sugar209, it might be supposed that an English court would 
reach the same conclusion as that drawn by the CFTC, if  the book-out is reached 
by individually negotiated terms210 and parties actually produce or use Brent oil 
in their business.211 In contrast, if  the circle or book-out clauses are used as a 
means to conduct notional trading without any real intention to take or accept 
delivery of the underlying commodities, this might raise further regulatory 
concerns regarding notional trading. However, the intention of all relevant 
parties must be examined in order to reach a firm conclusion. It would increase 
the difficulty to argue that contracts with circle or book-out clauses should be 
regulated “futures” if  one or more parties to a chain of sale intend the trade to 
result in a physical exchange o f goods.
3.3.3 Contradictory Transactions Between Same 
Two Parties
Two contractual parties might insert a term in their contract(s) to initiate a 
book-out process to settle two or more transactions between them in cash. In 
this way, a customer might buy and sell commodities with the same seller without 
even possessing the commodities. The Co Petro case212, introduced in section
3.1.2.2 above, is a typical example. Two other American cases are worth 
mentioning.
In MG Refining & Marketing, Inc v Knight Enterprises, Inc,2n the contract sold 
by MG Refining & Marketing (MG) to its customers (regarding gasoline or 
heating oil forward contracts) contained a “blow out” provision,
“which allowed the [c]ustomers to cash out their contracts and terminate 
any remaining delivery requirements in the event o f a ‘price spike’ — i.e. if 
the price of petroleum futures on the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) rose higher than a level stated in the contracts.”214
209 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 279.
210 See RAO 2001, article 84(6).
211 See RAO 2001, article 84(5).
212 680 F 2d 573 (1982).
213 25 F Supp 2d 175 (1998).
214 Id-, at 177.
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In this case, two types of contract were involved. One was called “ratables”.215 
The other was called “flexies” or “45-day”, under which the buyer (customer) 
nominates the lifting day 45 days in advance.216 While many customers took 
delivery on ratables, no delivery was made under the 45-day contract, although 
delivery was required.217
The lawsuit arose in an unusual way. The CFTC had started to investigate 
MG’s 45-day contracts and decided that they were illegal and therefore void.218 
MG then duly notified its customers that the 45-day contract was illegal. 
However, a few months later, the oil prices in the NYMEX rose above the fixed 
price stipulated in the 45-day contracts and every customer “wrote in to MG and 
asked to exercise their contractual rights to cash out all o f their flexies” . 219 
When MG refused to cash out, customers sued MG for breach of contract, and 
MG counter-claimed that the 45-day contracts were illegal for violation of the 
CEA. Thus, the court was forced to decide whether the 45-day contracts were a 
cash forward or a regulated futures contract. While motions for summary 
judgment from both sides did not convince the judge, the court left this issue to 
trial because the purpose of the contract (speculative or for delivery) was not 
clear.220
In another case, In re Bybee22\  Bybee conducted silver trading with A-Mark, 
partly on his own account and partly for his customers. Two forms of 
transactions took place between Bybee and A-Mark. The first was an 
immediate delivery sale; and the court found that, in 98% of cases, this type of 
transaction led to physical delivery. The second type, called “deferred delivery 
sale”, was more troublesome as Bybee and his customers did not have to take 
delivery on deferred delivery sales. Instead, they could make a down payment 
to A-Mark (with the balance secured by a lien on the undelivered metals) and
215 For a ratable contract, month deliveries were required on a ratable basis. The court did not 
give any more details as to how delivery was made on “ratable” basis. Id., at 177.
16 M-, at 177-178. This distinction is similar to the Dated Brent and 15-day Brent. See also
Cary O il Co, Inc v M G Refining & Marketing, Inc, 230 F Supp 2d 439 (2002).
217 25 F Supp 2d 175, at 177 (1998).
2,8 Id., at 178.
219 Id-
220 Id., at 183 et seq.
221 945 F 2d 309 (1991).
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store the metal at A-Mark for up to two years. After a fall in silver prices, 
Bybee could not meet A-Mark’s margin call and had to liquidate his trading with 
A-Mark at a loss. Failing to make up his shortfall via commodities trading, 
Bybee filed for bankruptcy protection. The trustee-in-bankruptcy then sought to 
rescind Bybee’s transactions with A-Mark on the ground that they were 
off-exchange futures contracts and in violation of the CEA. The issue was 
whether their transactions fell within the cash forward exception.
Applying Co Petro and the CFTC’s interpretation, the court first 
recognised that A-Mark represented that the metal contracts could be settled by 
offsetting contracts and held that the contracts in question were “futures” 
contracts.224 Secondly, as to the cash forward, the court focused on the 
enforceability o f the delivery obligation between Bybee and A-Mark and decided 
that “both A-Mark and Bybee had the legal obligation to make or take delivery 
upon demand of the other” .225 Thus, the contracts in question were held to fall 
within the cash forward exception.
These two cases represent a situation where a transaction between the same two 
parties might be settled with another contradictory transaction. If the same 
disputes were to face UK courts, UK judges might conduct a similar line of 
analysis by examining the parties’ intention to make delivery.226 In the MG 
Refining case, it is arguable that UK courts would also focus on the true nature of 
the trading scheme provided by MG. If the 45-day contract is used mainly for 
speculating rather than delivery o f oil, it is quite likely that the 45-day contract 
would be held to be for investment rather than commercial purposes.
The two parties in Bybee did not really offset contradictory transactions and settle 
by cash (except when Bybee was unable to meet its margin call). Bybee or its 
clients might not hold the metals in person, but they might claim delivery of the 
metals if they so wanted. Thus, Bybee actually made profits from trading
222 680 F 2d 573 (1992).
223 See supra note 207.
224 945 F 2d 309 (1991), at 313.
225 ]d., at 315.
226 See RAO 2001, article 84(5)(b).
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metals without putting metals into service or using them for consumption. This 
makes Bybee comparable to the CR Sugar case in England. In the end, it 
depends on whether the FSMA 2000 intends to regulate metal traders who have 
no interests in using metals into service or in manufacturing, but only in buying 
and selling metals for profits.
3.3.4 The Boundary of Futures Regulation: W hen 
Physical Sales M eet N otional Transactions
3.3.4.1 Objectives o f Futures Regulation
Having introduced hedge-to-arrive contracts (incorporating futures prices into a 
spot market trade and roll-over trades), circle or book-out clauses used to resolve 
a chain of sale (multi-party settlement of contracts), and book-outs between the 
same two parties (a bilateral trading scheme), what can we learn from the above 
discussion? On each occasion, the US court had to decide whether the contract 
in question was a regulated futures contract under the CEA and whether the 
contract was a cash forward contract for deferred delivery. UK courts and the 
FSA might face similar questions. In essence, this is about what kind of future 
delivery contracts should be regulated as “futures”. The policy concerns may 
vary country by country; thus, there is no need to assume that UK law should be 
interpreted in a way consistent with US law, or vice versa. However, could we 
develop a theory to rationalise futures regulation in the UK and the US? Such a 
theory would help to identify policy considerations and reduce legal uncertainties 
for commodity traders. To produce a theory like this, we must understand why 
we regulate off-exchange commodity forward contracts.
The regulatory objectives o f the FSMA 2000 are to maintain confidence in the 
financial system, to raise public awareness of the financial system, to secure the 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers, and to reduce financial crimes.227 
The “financial system” includes financial markets and exchanges, regulated
227 FSMA 2000, sections 3-6.
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228activities, and other activities connected with financial markets and exchanges. 
Thus, the FSMA 2000 has a strong interest in regulating the “financial market”, 
broadly speaking, which includes organised exchanges and the off-exchange 
market.
The regulatory objectives should be used as a guideline when interpreting related 
rules under the FSMA 2000. The distinction between commercial and 
investment purposes (see 3.1.2.1 above) also shows that the FSMA 2000 would 
govern future delivery contracts that are used as investments rather than for other 
commercial activities. However, the terms “investment” and “commercial” are 
both tricky words that are not mutually exclusive of each other. Since the 
indications given in the RAO 2001 are only guidelines rather than a checklist, 
having a proper understanding of what investment is might help us to interpret 
the FSMA 2000 and related rules in a correct way.
On the other hand, the implementation of the CEA in the US shows a strong 
desire to prevent market speculation. The promulgation of the CEA and its 
predecessors was a result of excessive speculation and price manipulation.229 
Thus, whether a contract may become a tool of speculation is an important 
criterion for US courts.230
Moreover, as was argued above, the structure of futures exchanges justifies the 
introduction of regulation owing to the price discovery function and the 
vulnerability of being open to abuse by speculators and market manipulators. 
However, this does not mean that off-exchange trading contracts have no 
implications for spot prices. There might be no centralised price bidding 
system, but the “invisible hand” still operates outside organised exchanges. It is 
not impossible to operate a market manipulation scheme in the spot commodity 
market. As a matter o f law, the question is whether one should employ financial 
regulation to address the issue or rely on general competition law to deal with 
potentially abusive behaviour in the market.
228 FSMA 2000, section 3(2).
229 See CFTC  v Co Petro M arketing Group, 680 F 2d 573, at 577 (1982). See also Markham, 
The History of Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regulation (Praeger, 1987).
230 See Co Petro, id.
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Having observed various types of transactions, one could draw a continuum: at 
the one end are contracts of sale of goods whose delivery is made immediately; at 
the other end, futures exchanges provide facilities for multi-party trading and are 
now largely used for notional transactions. Between the two extremes, it is 
unavoidable that market participants have to buy or sell something that is 
delivered in the future. The temporal gap between the conclusion o f the contract 
and delivery leaves some room for contractual parties to manoeuvre. Thus, 
parties might twist price terms (as in HTAs) or allow parties to roll delivery over 
to a later stage (e.g. rolling HTAs), to resolve a chain of sale (e.g. 15-day Brent 
contracts), or to settle multiple transactions between two or among several 
parties. On this basis, we will proceed to search for defining factors that 
distinguish regulated future delivery contracts from unregulated ones.
3.3.4.2 Delivery as the D efin ing Factor?
From CR Sugar and US case laws introduced above, one may find that an 
obligation to make and accept delivery is an important factor when determining 
whether a contract is for commercial purposes or is a cash forward contract. 
Indeed, at the commercial end, the delivery of goods is the best illustration of a 
true “sale”.231 Making and taking delivery is apparently evidence that a contract 
is for commercial purposes.232 However, this thesis will argue that delivery 
should not be used as the only defining factor to distinguish unregulated 
commercial contracts from regulated futures contracts.
First, for a contract for future delivery, whether or not delivery is made is known 
only in hindsight. No problem arises if delivery has been made and accepted. 
However, in most cases, one may only examine the parties’ intention to see 
whether they really want the commodities to be delivered. But determining a 
party’s intention is not an easy task; for example, delivery might be rolled over 
several times (e.g. rolling HTAs; see 3.3.1 above), or a party might not even take 
physical control of the commodities, though he might demand to have physical
231 One American commentator seemed to emphasize that only a real sale could trigger the cash 
forward exception. See Norris, Davidson and May, “Hedge to Arrive Contracts and the 
Commodity Exchange Act: A Textual Alternative” (1999) 47 Drake L Rev 319.
232 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 2(4). In the US, see UCC Article 2-106(1).
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possession (e.g. Bybee233). Arguments resorting to parties’ intentions would 
eventually have to depend on evidence, in the absence of a clear proof that neither 
party has any intention o f making or taking delivery (e.g. in CR Sugar, see 3.1.1 
above). Different judges might reach different conclusions. The Ninth Circuit 
Court was more generous in Bybee, but the District Court in New York was more 
stringent in Transnor. Relying on the intention to deliver is hardly satisfactory 
as there is no clear defining line and there might be legal uncertainties for 
commodity traders.
Secondly, another argument is that one may also make or take delivery through 
exchange trading, a primary target o f futures regulation (see section 3.2.3.3 
above). As Judge Easterbrook observed in CFTC v Zelender.
“[e]very commodity futures contract traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
calls for delivery. Every trader has the right to hold the contract through 
expiration and to deliver or receive the cash commodity. Financial futures, 
by contrast, are cash settled and do not entail ‘delivery’ to any participant. 
Using ‘delivery’ to differentiate between forward and futures contracts 
yields indeterminacy, because it treats as the dividing line something the 
two forms of contract have in common for commodities and that both 
forms lack for financial futures.”234
Thus, it is not proper to rely on delivery or the intention to deliver as the sole 
standard for distinguishing unregulated commercial contracts from regulated 
futures, when a contract requires physical delivery.
Thirdly, as Judge Easterbrook also observed, there is a difference between 
financial assets (e.g. stock) and commodities (e.g. crude oil). In general, it may 
be assumed that one is making an investment when one buys a share in a 
company. It does not change the fact that a transaction is for investment 
purposes even if a stock is delivered. In contrast, a commodity transaction 
might be for commercial purposes (e.g. for further manufacture) or for 
investment purposes. For example, it is deemed a commercial activity if  a 
person buys ten gold ingots and uses the gold to produce golden rings for further
945 F 2d 309 (1991).
234 3 73 F 3d 861, at 865 (2004).
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sale in the market. In contrast, a person buys ten gold ingots, stores them in his 
house, and expects to sell them if  the gold price moves to a good position. 
Literally, this is still an investment, but whether this kind o f activity requires 
regulation is a question that regulators should consider. Delivery might be one 
important criterion, but it does not really provide a clear line between commerce 
and investment.
Fourthly, it is inappropriate to assume that non-delivery (or the lack of intention 
to make delivery) makes a transaction regulated “futures”. If  one accepts that 
delivery (of the intention to make delivery) of an off-exchange commodity 
contract makes a transaction commercial, it immediately follows that 
non-commercial transactions (i.e. for investment purpose under UK law) do not 
require delivery. It would be a logical error to assume that non-delivery (or the 
lack of intention to make delivery) makes a transaction non-commercial, as a 
seller might not make delivery for several reasons: he might simply want to 
breach the contract, or he might be excused for non-delivery for other legal 
reasons (e.g. frustration). Nevertheless, these situations are not seen as signs 
that such a contract would be a regulated “futures” contract. Thus, the defining 
line must derive from other factors.
Lastly, we are currently focusing on individual contracts to determine whether 
parties have made delivery or have the intention to do so. However, we usually 
take into account several transactions between (or among) parties before 
determining whether relevant contracts for delivery are legally “futures”. In 
short, contracts between parties become “futures” through consideration of the 
whole trading scheme rather than individual contracts. In CR Sugar, Co Petro, 
MG Refining, and Bybee, multiple transactions took place between the same two 
parties. In Transnor, the US court analysed the general usage of 15-day Brent 
contracts in the spot oil market.235 Focusing on how contracts of the same type 
are performed enables judges to observe how transactions are conducted overall 
(including delivery and non-delivery) before making a decision.
235 However, in Transnor, only one transaction took place between the two parties. It is 
apparently more difficult to judge the nature o f  a whole trading scheme if  there is only one 
transaction between parties.
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In short, delivery or the intention to make or take delivery is a sign that a 
transaction is for commercial purposes. However, delivery and the intention to 
make delivery should not be the defining factors for distinguishing regulated 
“futures” contracts and unregulated commercial contracts.
3.3.4.3 Reference from E xchange Trading
The focus will now be on exchange trading. We may recall some key 
characteristics of the exchange market discussed above (section 3.2.4): 1) the 
standardisation of contractual terms; 2) public bidding to set prices; 3) 
multi-party trading structure and intervention by clearing houses; 4) margin and 
mark-to-market approaches; and 5) off-setting transactions. Each characteristic 
will be examined in turn.
First, it might be supposed that a commodity exchange must have standardised 
contracts. However, this only leads to the conclusion that a lack o f standardised 
contracts bars a trading scheme from also being an exchange. In addition, it is 
odd to argue that standardisation of contract alone is the basis of futures 
regulation. Otherwise every transaction with standard documentation provided 
by trade associations might become futures contracts. In other words, the 
presence of standardised terms might be an indication that a trading scheme is a 
futures exchange, but it does not help to decide whether an off-exchange contract 
should be a regulated “futures” contract as a matter of law.
Secondly, public bidding of prices is a trademark of the exchange market. 
However, it may also be argued that public bidding of prices is an indication that 
a trading scheme is like a futures exchange. Again, we might ask a question: 
whether public bidding o f prices is the major factor that leads to exchange 
regulation? There are plenty o f public bidding or auction systems in the world 
to allow buyers and sellers to make transactions; however, not all of them are 
regulated as exchanges. (EBay, the most well-known online auction platform, is 
probably the best example.) This does not mean that public bidding o f prices 
might not attract regulation, as maintaining the integrity of market prices is 
apparently an important job for every government. The argument is simply
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that a trading scheme might not be an exchange without a public bidding of 
prices. But this does not answer the question whether off-exchange trading 
contracts should be regulated.
Thirdly, the intervention of a clearing house is one important characteristic of 
exchange trading. Under UK law, it is also an indication that a contract is for 
investment purposes if “performance of the contract is ensured by an investment 
exchange or a clearing house”.236 Two arguments may be taken against using 
the clearing house as a defining factor for regulated future delivery contracts. 
On the one hand, it is not impossible that delivery is intended to take place via a 
clearing house; thus, one might reach one’s commercial goals (e.g. acquiring 
metals) via a clearing house ,237 On the other hand, if we accept that exchange 
trading must have an accompanying clearing house, it follows that a trading 
scheme cannot be an exchange without a clearing house. A transaction might 
easily be deemed as a regulated futures contract if it is cleared through a 
clearing house, despite the fact that the transaction is conducted off an 
organised exchange.238 Nevertheless, when an off-exchange transaction does 
not pass through a clearing house, the argument emphasizing the intervention of 
a clearing house loses its force. In short, the existence of a clearing house 
might be a contributing factor, but it does not directly provide an answer to 
whether an off-exchange contract should be regulated.
Fourthly, the margin and mark-to-market strategy is not exclusive to exchange 
trading, as the same approach might be used for off-exchange commodity trading 
contracts239 and even spread betting contracts.240 After all, margin is collateral, 
and parties are free to make collateral agreements to meet specific needs.
This leaves one crucial characteristic of future exchanges: the possibility to offset 
contrary trades. Offsetting contrary transactions makes the whole trading
236 RAO 2001, article 84(7)(b).
237 For example, through the Sword system developed by the LCH and the LME, a metal trader 
might have good access to storage o f  metals around the world if  OTC clearing for metal contracts 
is allowed. See supra 3 .2 .3 .3 .I.
238 See RAO 2001, article 84(7)(b).
239 For example, see In re Bybee, 945 F 2d 309, at 313 (1991).
240 See Spreadex Ltd  v Battu [2005] EWCA Civ 855.
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scheme notional, and notional transactions facilitate speculation. By cancelling 
out trading contracts, the contract itself becomes a unit o f trade and might then be 
turned into a means to conduct risk trading. In essence, notional transactions 
trade “in the contract” while physical transactions trade “in the commodity” .241 
It is in cases of the former type that financial regulators have an interest to 
intervene.
Thus, this thesis argues that the boundary of commodity futures regulation lies at 
the turning point between notional sales and physical sales. The key factor is 
whether a trading scheme provides the possibility to offset contrary trades. The 
contractual parties’ lack o f intention to make delivery is an indication that 
relevant transactions are conducted on a notional basis. The standardisation of 
contracts, public bidding of prices, the intervention of clearing houses and the use 
of margin and/or mark-to-market strategy are all contributing factors to help to 
identify whether a trading scheme is notional.
Co Petro242 provides a typical example because the trading scheme is largely 
notional (see 3.1.2.2 above). In contrast, we believe that the HTAs, though 
using complicated price terms, were still largely used by farmers and grain 
merchants to trade grain; thus, the US courts were right to leave the HTAs outside 
the reach of the CFTC.
The Transnor243 judgment might require further thought (see 3.3.2 above). It 
cannot be denied that some people might use the same 15-day Brent contract to 
earn oil price differences. However, book-outs under 15-day Brent contracts 
normally require two or more parties (such as in Voest Alpine244; see 3.3.3 
above). It may be argued that whether a 15-day Brent contract is notional or 
physical should be determined on a factual basis, rather than on how most market 
participants use the contract. If all relevant parties in a circle intend to abuse the 
circle or book-out clause as a means to conduct off-exchange trading, this opens 
the door for the contracts to be regulated as “futures” . In contrast, if  the circle or
241 These are terms used by Judge Easterbrook in CFTC  v Zelender, 373 F 3d 861, at 867 (2004).
242 680 F 2d 573 (1982).
243 7 3 8 F Supp 1472 (1990).
244 [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 547.
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book-out clause is used only for the purpose of shortening a circle, there seems to 
be no reason to regulate such commercial activities through financial regulation.
The Bybee case provides another challenge (see 3.3.3 above). The “deferred 
delivery sale” allowed Bybee to take advantage of future price movement of 
precious metals with a down payment (thus resembling leverage). Bybee did 
not really take possession of the metals, and the court even found that A-Mark 
implicitly represented that it would provide for offsetting contracts. 245 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court emphasized the delivery obligation laid 
down in their contracts. It may be argued that the US court was rather too 
lenient towards Bybee. According to the notional transactions theory proposed 
above, the Bybee/A-Mark transactions look more notional than physical. 
However, this is not all bad news for commodity traders. Compared with CR 
Sugar, the Ninth Circuit Court was generous towards them.
3.3 A A  Investm ent and Com m odity Traders: A Review  o f  
CR Sugar
Finally, this discussion returns to the CR Sugar case, 246 which raised the 
essential question of how far the FSMA 2000 wants to regulate commodity 
traders who buy and sell commodities as principals without actually putting the 
commodities into manufacturing or other services. Should transactions made by 
these traders be seen as investments or as commercial activities? These 
questions are not fully answered by the CR Sugar judgment. Three points 
deserve attention.
First, we may consider the meaning o f “investment” in this context. Common 
sense suggests that one may make an investment simply by buying and holding a 
commodity (e.g. gold) or a property (e.g. real estate). However, for the most 
part, investment consists in an investor placing some money as a stake in 
exchange for future monetary return. Thus, the physical/notional theory may 
also help clarify the distinction between futures for commercial purposes and for
245 945 F 2d 309, at 313 (1991).
246 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep 279.
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investment purposes under FSMA 2000. (Perhaps one day the FSA will be 
interested in regulating real estate agents or those who buy and resell 
commodities as their main business, though so far we have seen no such move to 
expand the FSA’s jurisdiction to transactions that are traditionally seen as being 
more commercial than financial.) From this perspective, CR Sugar should be 
immune from the FSMA 2000.
Juxtaposing the European perspective for comparison shows that the Directive on 
Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) actually exempts from regulation 
“persons whose main business consists of dealing on [their] own account in 
commodities and/or commodity derivatives44.247 Assuming that CR’s main 
business is dealing in sugar on its own account, the put options with CSW might 
be enforced under the MiFID.
Secondly, CR’s trading of sugar options might not be a regulated activity, 
provided that the options were used for risk management purposes and that CR’s
248main business consisted mainly o f activities other than regulated activities. It 
is not quite clear whether CR purchased the options to hedge its other business or, 
as Steel J implied, simply to create trading positions to support CR’s futures 
trading in New York. However, it is impossible to say whether Steel J would 
have exempted CR from the application of the Financial Services Act 1986249 as 
CR did not make arguments from this perspective.
Thirdly, the CR Sugar case was more challenging than other US cases because it 
involved put options rather than a straightforward future delivery contract. This 
raises the question whether we should examine the purpose of the “options” or 
the purposes of the underlying forward transaction. Steel J seemed to adopt the 
former approach. However, a literal reading of the RAO 2001 might suggest 
that an option is a regulated investment if it is an option to acquire another 
investment.250 Thus, only options to acquire futures contracts for investment 
purposes should be regulated investments. If this construction is correct, the
247 Directive 2004/39/EC, article 2.1(k).
248 RAO 2001, article 19.
249 See supra note 10 for the explanation o f  the applicable law in the CR Sugar case.
250 See RAO 2001, article 83.
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focus should be on the purpose o f an option’s underlying future delivery contract 
rather than the option itself.
Overall, this thesis supports Steel J ’s holding that the time to determine the 
intention and purpose of an option is the time when both parties enter into the 
transaction rather than when the option is exercised, as this could make the 
application of law less uncertain. But a subtler issue is to ascertain the essential 
characteristic of a commodity option. The main difficulty in identifying the real 
intention behind commodity options comes from the fact that there is always a 
chance that an option will not be exercised (otherwise there would be no point in 
buying an option rather than entering into a straight future delivery contract). 
Thus, there is always a certain degree of speculation in any option trading. 
However, there is no doubt that an option might also be used for commercial 
(rather than investment) purposes.
On the other hand, an option is subject to be exercised one day; otherwise there 
would be no point in CR continuing to pay premiums for these options. Steel J 
found out that CR and CSW had no intention to deliver, and the main purpose of 
these options was to allow them to make a profit.251 However, how exactly the 
parties made a profit from the options was not fully explained. Another critical
9 S9fact is that the put options were deeply out of money when they were written, 
and thus it seems that the parties did not really expect the exercise of the options 
in the first place. This fact strengthens an argument that the main purpose of 
these put options was to create fictitious trading positions to allow CR to conduct 
futures trading in New York. Therefore, the whole trading scheme between CR 
and CSW looks more like sham transactions. This provides a further angle to 
examine the put options in the CR Sugar case: should the options in question be 
regulated because they were investments or should they be regulated because 
they were merely sham transactions? In the latter case, it is arguable whether 
the FSA has an interest in regulating them in the UK.
251 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep 279, at 281.
252 Id-, at 180.
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In sum, CR Sugar is a difficult case, but this does not mean that the CR Sugar 
judgment is wrong. CR Sugar sits on the boundary between physical trading 
and notional trading. The options were not clearly notional as they were not 
settled by cash and there were no contradictory trades. In contrast, they were 
not clearly physical as no intention to deliver was found, and the only request for 
delivery was rejected by CSW. In the end, this may come down to the FSA 
clarifying the scope of regulated commodity options and whether commodity 
traders come within its jurisdiction, especially after the implementation o f the 
MiFID from 1 November 2007.253
3.4 Conclusion: the Future Ahead
In this chapter, we have illustrated how hedging contracts are developed in 
commodities sales through standardised trading. By the clearing house 
stepping into every transaction (helped by numerous novations or substitutions), 
along with the margin requirement (and the mark-to-market approach), credit 
risk is greatly reduced and traders have more flexibility to acquire new contracts 
or to sell existing contract positions. Thus, exchanges have effectively been 
transformed from physical trading markets into notional markets, where the 
“contract” is the unit o f trade instead o f the underlying commodities. In short, 
exchange trading has moved from real sales to a battleground for “differences” .
253 The MiFID considers options, futures, swaps, forwards and any other derivative contracts 
relating to comm odities as financial instruments if  they are not for commercial purposes. See 
Directive 2004/39/EC, Annex 1, section C(7). The Commission Regulation (EC) 1287/2006  
(MiFID Regulation) further provides certain characteristics to determine whether an instrument is 
an “other derivative instrument” under section C(7) o f  Annex 1 o f  the MiFID and to decide 
whether a commodity contract is for commercial purposes. The statutory language is rather 
complex and all details would not be repeated here. To summarise, a commodity transaction is 
deemed not for commercial purpose i f  it is subject to rules o f  an exchange (or is expressly stated 
to be equivalent to a contract traded on an exchange), is cleared by a clearing house, or is 
standardised so that the price, the lot, the delivery date and other terms are determined principally 
by reference to regularly published prices, standard lots, or standard delivery dates. See MiFID  
Regulation, article 38.
If w e apply MiFID and MiFID Regulation to the CR Sugar case, w e may find that the put options 
in question are most likely not a spot contract; however, they are also not clearly considered “not 
for commercial purpose” if  w e apply article 38 o f  MiFID regulation. It may still be an open 
question whether the put options in CR Sugar should be considered as for commercial purposes 
(because they do not fall within the criteria listed in article 38(1)) or may still be considered not 
for commercial purpose ( if  article 38(1) does not represent a complete list o f  characteristics).
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Nevertheless, financial regulations also use the term “futures” to cover 
exchange-traded commodity contracts and some off-exchange commodity 
transactions. To make current UK and US law more rational, it is proposed that 
the boundary of futures regulation be taken to lie on the point of transition from 
physical sales to notional sales. Under the FSMA 2000, physical sales are 
carried out for commercial purposes whereas notional sales are carried out for 
investment. Although there is no easy way to clarify the grey area where 
trading contracts might incorporate certain derivative techniques (e.g. prices 
referring to futures prices, roll-over terms, and book-out clauses), keeping in 
mind the distinction between notional and physical transactions might help in 
drawing more consistent conclusions on a variety of commodity transactions.
Lastly, the discussion in this chapter might be relevant in other new markets. 
For example, the trading o f bandwidth, property, and in particular carbon 
emissions might follow the route of agricultural or energy products. At one 
point, carbon emissions trading might enter a stage where market participants 
buy or sell emissions quotas notionally to hedge or to speculate. The discussion 
presented in this thesis might one day be applied to tackle new problems that 
develop from the new markets.
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Chapter 4 Notional Transactions, 
Speculation and Gambling
In this chapter, we will focus on whether cash-settled derivative instruments 
(“notional transactions”) are any different from gambling. The term “gambling” 
(or betting, wagering, etc.) can be used in different ways. On the one hand, it 
may narrowly mean a specific transactional structure (such as bookmaking, pool 
betting, lottery, etc.) that we will call a “traditional gambling instrument” in this 
chapter. On the other hand, it can broadly refer to transactions intended to make 
a windfall from the occurrence, non-occurrence or the outcome of a future event.
The term “gambling” easily attracts criticism and controversy. However, as we 
will explain below, one significant difficulty of tackling issues relating to 
gambling is to define the term “gambling” (or other associated terms such as 
wagering or betting). This often results in a chicken-egg problem: we would 
like to argue that an instrument is, or is not, a kind of gambling, but at the same 
time we cannot define what gambling is or is not.
In this chapter, we will attempt to explore not only whether derivative 
instruments are gambling under English law but also examine the underlying 
rationale behind modem gambling laws to see why gambling is treated 
differently and how market speculation could be controlled. We will argue that 
notional transactions, if  used for speculative purposes, are not much different 
from gambling in nature, or to use a more civil law term, whether or not notional 
derivative instruments are aleatory contracts. Then, the question is whether we 
should treat these instruments like traditional gambling instruments. We will 
examine certain legal and academic arguments developed under English law and 
American law. In the end, we will attempt to establish a platform that may host
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different policy considerations on the matter of gambling and notional 
transactions in different countries. For simplicity, this chapter will focus on 
OTC derivative instruments rather than exchange-traded and hybrid products.1
4.1 Introduction
The question as to whether risk trading instruments constitute gambling may 
have significant legal implications. First, gambling frequently invites negative 
legal consequences. As will be explained below, a gambling contract may be 
unenforceable and a punter might even be penalised for gambling (see section 4.2 
below). Secondly, market speculation can sometimes trigger financial 
regulations,2 if we accept that speculation is not greatly different from gambling 
(see section 4.4.1 below). In law, the best way to approach the issue is on the 
basis of judicial judgments. Thus, in the following sections, we will first 
examine the Morgan Grenfell case in the UK. Then we will comment on the 
judgment and elaborate on the need to for further arguments.
4.1.1 The M organ Grenfell case
The UK court provides us with the most modem judgment on the matter of 
gambling and notional transactions. In Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd v Welwyn 
Hatfield District Council, the defendant (Islington council) raised the question 
as to whether an interest rate swap was unenforceable as a type of wagering or 
gaming contract.
The case involved back-to-back interest rate swaps (see section 2.2.2.3 below). 
The first swap was between Morgan Grenfell (MG) and the Welwyn council, as 
the fixed rate payer and floating rate payer, respectively. The terms the second 
swap were almost identical, except that Welwyn council was the fixed rate 
payer and Islington council was the floating rate payer. In the aftermath of the 
local authorities cases (see section 2.3.1 above), Welwyn council sued Islington
1 See supra  2.2.2.1 for the distinction between exchange-traded, OTC and hybrid instruments.
2 For example, one o f  the principal objectives o f  the US Commodity Exchange Act is to prevent 
excessive market speculation and manipulation. See supra  3.3.4.1.
3 [1995] 1 All ER 1.
159
council to recover the money it had paid on the ground o f restitution. The 
Islington council counter-claimed that the interest rate swap was unenforceable 
as a wagering or gaming contract. Another issue was, if  the interest rate swap 
between Welwyn council and Islington council was wagering, whether or not 
section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 was excluded by section 63 of the Financial 
Services Act 1986.4
It is necessary to have some understanding of the law in effect at that time. 
Before the Gambling Act 2005, section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 provided 
that“[a]ll contracts or agreements, by way o f gaming or wagering, [were] null and 
void”.5 The purpose of this section was to prevent the winner (of a bet) from 
suing the loser for the prize, so as to frustrate gaming.6
The matter then centred on the meaning of “by way of gaming or wagering”. 
The classic definition o f “gaming or wagering” was given by Hawkins J in Carlill 
v Carbolic Smoke Ball:
“a wagering contract is one by which two persons, professing to hold 
opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually 
agree that, dependent upon the determination of that event, one shall win 
from the other, and that other shall pay or hand over to him, a sum of 
money or other stake; neither of the contracting parties having any other 
interest in that contract than the sum or stake he will so win or lose, there 
being no other real consideration for the making of such contract by either 
of the parties. It is essential to a wagering contract that each party may 
under it either win or lose, whether he will win or lose being dependent on 
the issue of the event, and, therefore, remaining uncertain until that issue is
4 Before the Gambling Act 2005, section 412 o f  the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000  
(FSMA 2000) also excluded the application o f  section 18 o f  the Gaming Act 1845. Flowever, 
section 334 o f  the Gambling Act 2005 has repealed section 18 o f  the Gaming Act 1845 and the 
relevant part in section 412 o f  the FSMA 2000.
5 A similar statute can be traced back to as early as 1710. Section 1 o f  the Gaming Act 1710 
rendered void a security given for money, etc, won by gaming or betting or for repayment o f  
money lent for gaming. Section 334 o f  the Gamble Act 2005 repealed both section 18 o f  the 
1845 Act and section 1 o f  the 1710 Act.
6 In Hawkins J’s words, the purpose o f  section 18 “was not to render illegal wagers which up to 
that time had been lawful, but simply to make the law no longer available for their enforcement, 
leaving the parties to pay them or not as their sense o f  honour might dictate”. R ead  v Anderson  
(1882) 10 QBD 100, at 104. See also Mier, Regulating Commercial Gambling: Past, Present, 
and Future, at 237-238  (OUP, 2004).
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known. If either of the parties may win but cannot lose, or may lose but 
cannot win, it is not a wagering contract.”7
For a contract to be a wager, one party must be the winner and the other the 
loser.8 The basic test for determining whether a contract constitutes gaming or 
wagering was to look at the intentions of the relevant parties. The court would 
look into the substance of a transaction rather than “the mere words in which it is 
expressed”.9 Both parties must have intended the transaction to be gaming or 
wagering. 10 In Lord Hanworth’s words,“[i]t may be more accurate to say that if 
there is no other purpose in the contract than that of gaming or wagering, it is 
void— the interest of the parties [is] evidence of the purpose for which it is 
entered into”.11
On this basis, Hobhouse J analysed the contracts in Morgan Grenfell. First, 
Hobhouse J opined that interest rate swap contracts were contracts “which may or 
may not be wagering contracts”, in contrast to certain contracts that were “by 
their very character gaming or wagering contracts, such as a bet upon what horse 
[would] win a particular race” .12 Hobhouse J then recognised that
“[interest rate swaps] have at least potentially, a speculative character 
deriving from the fact that the obligations of the floating rate payer are to 
be ascertained by reference to a fluctuating market rate that may be higher 
or lower than the fixed rate at any given time. Such a contract is capable 
of being entered into by two parties with the purpose of wagering upon 
future interest rates.13
7 [1892] 2 QB 484, at 490-491. This definition is not com pletely correct in certain aspects. For 
example, people could wager not only on future uncertainties but also on past events. See James, 
Law o f  Derivatives, at 23 (LLP, 1999).
8 Tote Investors L td  v Smoker [1968] 1 QB 509, at 516 (per Lord Denning).
9 Earl o f  Ellesmere v W allace [ 1929] 2 Ch 1, at 25; Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd  v Welwyn H atfield  
D istrict Council [1995] 1 A ll ER 1, at 7.
10 See C arlill v C arbolic Smoke Ball Co [1892] 2 QB 484; Thacker v H ardy (1878) 4 QBD
685 \Universal Stock Exchange, L td  v Strachan  [ 1896] AC 166; City Index L td v Leslie [ 1992] QB 
98; Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd  v Welwyn H atfield D istrict Council [1995] 1 All ER 1. For New  
York and Illinois law, see also People  v Posner, 7 NE 2d 93 (1937); Salzman  v Boeing , 35 NE 2d 
536(1941).
11 Earl o f  Ellesmere v Wallace [1929] 2 Ch 1, at 25 (per Lord Hanworth).
12 [1995] 1 All ER 1, at 7
13 Id., at 7 -8 .
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On the other hand, Hobhouse J also recognised that interest rate swaps might also 
be used as a commercial tool.14 He held that
“[i]n the context of interest rate swap contracts entered into by parties or 
institutions involved in the capital market and the making or receiving of 
loans, the normal inference [would] be that the contracts are not gaming or 
wagering but [were] commercial or financial transactions to which the law 
[would], in the absence o f some other consideration, give full recognition 
and effect.” 15
Then, Hobhouse J proceeded to examine the interests and objectives o f both 
councils. As to Islington, the judge held that the council had not entered into the 
transaction for the purpose o f wagering. It was found that
“the purpose, and the effect, was to incur a revenue liability spread over a 
period of ten years in exchange for an advance payment to be made at the 
time of entering into the contract which could be treated by Islington as a 
revenue receipt. ... It was not the purpose or motive of Islington to 
speculate or to seek profits by speculating. Any such profit or loss would 
be coincidental to the main purpose ... This speculative element was 
involved in the transaction solely because of the contractual mechanism 
which Islington were using to obtain, in their revenue account, loans from 
the later years to the first year.” 16
In contrast, Welwyn was central to the structure of the back-to-back swaps. In 
effect, Welwyn’s obligation in this transactional structure was limited, and it 
could earn an “assured element o f profit” by interposing itself between Islington 
and M G .17 Thus, Hobhouse J found that Welwyn did not enter into any 
speculation in this transaction. To quote the judge’s words,
“Welwyn wholly insulated itself from any speculative risk. Whatever the 
movement in interest rates, their element of profit would remain the same 
and they would not be exposed to any loss. The insolvency risk was 
commercially negligible and Welwyn did not expect or foresee any legal 
risk. The purpose and interest of Welwyn was to realise a non-speculative
14 Id., at 8 -9 , quoting H azell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 
AC 1, at 23-24 (per Lord Templeman).
15 Id-, at 10.
16 Id-
17 Ld., at 11. In fact, the W elwyn received an outright profit o f  £210,000 at the commencement 
o f  the swaps. Id., at 4.
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profit and was in no way directed to or concerned with gaming or
18wagering.
Therefore, “[i]n the present case the relevant transactions are prima facie  of a 
commercial and financial character. The purpose and interest o f Welwyn in 
entering into those transactions confirms that they were not wagering 
transactions”.19 In sum, both Islington and Welwyn entered into the interest rate 
swap transactions with commercial purposes, and thus the transaction was not 
considered to be a wager.
Hobhouse J argued that even if  the interest rate swaps had been wagers, the 
transactions would have fallen within the ambit of the Financial Services Act 
1986.20 Islington also argued that the swap was not entered into “by way of 
business”. Hobhouse J took a broad view of the term “business”, which “clearly 
should not be given a technical construction but rather one which conforms to 
what in ordinary parlance would be described as a business transaction, as 
opposed to something personal or casual.”21 Thus, Islington’s swap agreements 
were held to be within the ambit o f business activities.
4.1.2 Comments on M organ Grenfell
The Morgan Grenfell case seems to provide a practical resolution of the danger 
that a derivative instrument might be characterised as a gaming or wagering 
contract under English law. Hobhouse J ’s conclusion is largely justified; 
however, a few points about this judgment may merit further consideration.
First, the starting point o f Hobhouse J ’s judgment is the assumption that some 
contracts are intrinsically gaming or wagering (e.g. bookmaking), while some 
contracts are not necessarily so (thus requiring an examination of the intentions 
of the parties). However, the judgment does not make it clear as to what are the 
contracts that are “by character” gaming or wagering.
If we broaden our research, we may find that gaming or wagering is just one type 
of a broadly defined category of “gambling”. In fact, Hobhouse J also uses 
terms such as “betting” and “bookmaking” in the Morgan Grenfell judgment. 
Indeed, certain instruments are commonly seen as “gambling” : bookmaking, 
pool betting, and lotteries are the best examples (see section 4.2.1 below). 
However, it is less clear for some instruments (e.g. spread betting; see section
4.2.1 below). As Lord Wilberforce observed,
“[i]t is impossible to frame accurate definitions which can cover every 
such variety; attempts to do so may indeed be counter-productive, since 
each added precision merely provides an incentive to devise a variant 
which eludes it. So the legislation contains a number of expressions 
which are not, or not precisely, defined: bet, wager, lottery, gaming, are 
examples of this.”22
Hobhouse J ’s observation that certain instruments are by character gaming or 
wagering, though highly plausible, fails to leave clear guidelines on what is a 
wagering (or broadly speaking, gambling) contract. As James comments, 
Hobhouse J does not “offer any real guidance as to what the features of a contract
■J T
are that make it a wagering transaction.”
Secondly, in Morgan Grenfell, Hobhouse J held that the relevant transactions 
were “prima facie” o f a commercial and financial character.24 This 
assumption could be traced to the basis of modem contract law. Under the 
principle of freedom of contract, two parties should have the liberty to make their 
own contract unless it is contrary to public policy or statute. This analytical 
structure should also be applicable to risk trading. Instead o f jumping directly to 
gambling laws, the starting point should be to assume that a transaction is, in 
principle, legal and enforceable.
In contrast, English law seems to start by defining what is not wagering rather 
than by confining the application of gambling laws to those cases defined as 
wagering. This relates to the previous point that wagering is hard to define.
22 Seay v E astw ood  [1976] 3 A ll ER 153, at 155.
23 James, The Law o f  Derivatives, at 26 (LLP, 1999).
24 [1995] 1 All ER 1, at 9 & 11.
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English law minimises the drawback o f this approach by holding that a party does 
not enter into a transaction by way of wagering if  he has any other purpose than 
pure speculation.25 However, this approach cannot deal with the basic question: 
what is wagering (or gambling or speculation) and what are the basic concerns 
that underlie the law dealing with wagering (or gambling or speculation)?
Thirdly, the Morgan Grenfell case dealt with a situation where a contract might 
become unenforceable if  it was characterised as wagering. Two points may be 
developed from this. On the one hand, the UK law has changed since the 
Morgan Grenfell judgment. Under the Gambling Act 2005, social and 
non-commercial gambling is now legalised and section 18 of the Gaming Act 
1845 has been abolished.26 The term “wagering” is no longer in use. The 
regulatory scheme is no longer that o f 1995. Rather than centring on whether 
the instrument is enforceable, the issue we now face is whether a firm selling 
derivative instruments should be considered a gambling business (see section 
4.2.2.1).
On the other hand, bookmakers were already regulated by the Betting, Gaming 
and Lotteries Act 1963 before the Gambling Act 2005 came into force. Thus, 
using bookmaking as a direct comparison with unenforceable wagering may not 
be appropriate because there are different concerns behind the unenforceability 
rule and the licensing scheme for bookmaking. A better overview of financial 
and gambling regulation as a whole is necessary if  we are to understand the 
rationale behind gambling and speculation.
Fourthly, we noted that Hobhouse J seemed not to distinguish “speculation” from 
“wagering”. However, since market speculation might serve an important 
market function, one might argue that market speculation is different from 
wagering. Even if  a notional transaction is purely for speculation, should it be 
regulated as gambling or as a financial instrument? This aspect of notional
25 James comments that “[t]he only answer at the moment is that the judiciary have been unable 
define what it is that makes a transaction wagering, but presumably feel that they can recognise a 
wagering contract when they see one. It might com e down to the ability to identify a purpose in 
entering into, or a benefit from, the transaction beyond purely the profit that the transaction might 
bring.” James, supra  note 23, at 25.
26 Gambling Act 2005, section 334.
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transactions was not fully considered in the Morgan Grenfell judgment. We will 
examine this point later (see section 4.4.1 below).
27Fifthly, the statutory exemption o f gambling laws is not unique to the UK.
In the US, both the Commodities Exchange Act and securities regulations 
exempt regulated contracts from state bucket shop or gambling laws.28 The 
main purpose o f this exemption was to remove legal uncertainties.29 Two 
legal implications could arise from this. On the one hand, for derivative 
instruments in the UK and the US, the focus could shift to whether or not a 
contract is a regulated transaction, which might imply there is no need to use 
gambling laws to control speculation as long as a contract is within the reach of 
financial regulator.30 On the other hand, it might mean that a derivative 
transaction, if outside the reach o f financial regulation (e.g. not by way of 
business), is no different from gambling and thus might be regulated as a 
gambling contract. We will develop these two lines of analysis later (see 
section 4.4.3 below). A contrasting approach would be to inquire whether 
gambling contracts might simply be regulated as contracts for differences 
(assuming that gambling contracts are settled in cash).31
In essence, Hobhouse J seemed to assume that certain instruments were by all 
means wagering. However, as we will argue below, traditional gambling 
instruments might also be used to hedge risks, or for other business purposes. 
Perhaps it is better to assume that the sole intention o f placing a bet on a horse is
27 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSM A 2000), section 412 (repealed by 
Gambling Act 2005, section 334).
28 7 USCA 16(e)(2); see also 15 U SC A  78bb(a) (the Securities Exchange Act o f  1934).
29 [1995] 1 All ER f a t  13.
30 See for example, City Index L td  v Leslie  [1992] QB 98 (spread betting and contract for 
differences).
31 Cf. City Index Ltd v Leslie [1992] QB 98. In this case, Mr. Leslie conducted spread betting 
with City Index (which was both licensed as a bookmaker and an authorised person to conduct 
investment business) and suffered som e losses. While City Index sued Leslie for the money  
owed, Leslie counterclaimed that the transactions between parties were void under the then 
section 18 o f  Gaming Act 1845. The issue then was whether the transactions were contract for 
differences under the Financial Services Act 1986 so that the application o f  the Gaming Act
1845 would be exempted. In the end, the court took a literal reading o f  relevant statutory texts 
that the term “secure a profit” sim ply meant obtaining (rather than protecting) a profit, and held 
that the spread betting contracts between parties fell within the category o f  “contract for 
differences”.
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to wager, rather than to assume that a bet on a horse is by character wagering (see
4.4.1 below).
Although, in the wake o f the Morgan Grenfell case and the introduction o f the 
Gambling Act 2005, the following discussion may seem more academic than of 
any practical value, there are several reasons why it will be beneficial to have a 
more thorough examination o f gambling and notional transactions. First, 
gambling is still prohibited in many countries. A transaction might be lawful 
and enforceable in the UK, but legal uncertainties remain in other jurisdictions. 
An underlying rationale for identifying different policy concerns and academic 
arguments is still useful.
Secondly, in the future more and more derivative instruments will be developed 
to enable market participants to speculate on the market. In a way, gambling 
and notional speculative derivative instruments are all contracts to trade risks. 
After all, both traditional gambling instruments and notional derivative 
instruments hinge upon the outcome o f a future uncertainty. It is necessary to 
have an overview of the whole financial and gambling regulation to devise a 
best regulatory solution.
In the following sections, we will start by looking at traditional gambling 
instruments to see the types and legal consequences o f what is generally seen as 
gambling. Then we will explain why gambling receives negative legal 
treatment, and argue that market speculation actually shares many of 
gambling’s evils. We will further examine certain conceptual arguments that 
distinguish gambling and derivatives/hedging/speculation. We will also 
consider whether it is feasible to borrow the insurable interest test from 
insurance law and apply it to notional derivative transactions. Finally, we will 
attempt to establish an analytical structure for the use of notional transactions in 
different contexts to resolve the application of gambling laws to risk trading 
contracts.
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4.2 Types o f Gambling and their Legal 
Consequences
4.2.1 Types o f Gambling
Wagering (sometimes simply called “betting”) is the most basic type of 
gambling, by which one party bets on the occurrence of an event and the other 
bets on its non-occurrence. People can wager not only on future events but also 
on things that have happened in the past.32 In addition, people can also gamble 
by playing a game, which is generally called “gaming”. The game could be 
poker, dice, roulette etc., or even a sport. The outcome of the game might 
depend entirely on luck, or it might also partly rely on the skills of the players.
A variation of wagering is fixed-odds betting with a bookmaker. As with 
wagering, fixed-odds betting requires two parties: a punter and a bookmaker. 
The bookmaker publishes odds at which a punter may place a bet. Although 
largely used in sports betting, fixed-odds betting can apply to almost any event, 
as long as there is a market for bookmaking. While a bookmaker is usually a 
professional betting company, two non-professional individuals can also arrange 
fixed-odds betting. This would be the same as a bilateral “wagering” contract, 
except that the payoff under a fixed-odds betting scheme is not equal for both 
sides.
In the betting world, a “betting exchange” has now emerged to enable 
bookmakers and punters to “exchange” odds. For example, through “Betfair”, 
one of the most successful betting exchanges, a punter can either “back” or “lay” 
a bet. Backing odds is just the normal process of bookmaking, with the 
exception that a punter has a list of odds to choose from instead of a single one 
fixed by the bookmaker. For each “odds”, the Betfair shows the maximum 
amount that the punter can bet (i.e. to match another punter who provides the 
odds).
32 See Gambling Act 2005, section 9.
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On the other hand, if  a punter wants to bet on odds that are not currently provided 
by other punters (or on a larger amount), he can “lay” odds and wait for another 
punter to back. For example, if  the current odds on England winning the World 
Cup 2010 are 9, 8.8, or 8.6, each available at 5,000 pounds and a punter wishes to 
bet 10,000 pounds at 9.2, this will be shown on the “lay” side. Any punter who 
wishes to back the 9.2 odds with 10,000 pounds can place his bet on the exchange 
(i.e. backing). The punter laying a bet is actually functioning like a bookmaker. 
If the layer loses the bet (say on 10,000 pounds), he has to pay 92,000 pounds to 
the backer(s). In contrast, if the layer wins, he earns 10,000 pounds from the 
backer(s).
Apart from wagering or bookmaking on the financial market, spread betting and 
so-called “bucket shop” transactions are typical examples of betting on the 
financial market. Spread betting allows a gambler to bet on an index, whatever 
the index is about.33 As the name suggests, a spread betting company will offer 
a “spread”, a range on the index at which a gambler can buy or sell. To use an 
example given by Rix LJ:
“[I]f the Dow Jones index is, say, at 10,000, one can ‘buy’ or ‘self the 
market at a spread around the index of, for the sake o f example, 10 points 
either way, 9990 to 10010. If  one buys, one is betting that the market will 
rise above 10010. If  one sells, one is betting that the market will fall 
below 9990. If one buys and the market rises, one stands to gain £1 for 
every point that the index exceeds 10010. If  one sells and the market falls, 
one stands to gain £1 for every point that the index drops below 9990. If, 
however, one calls the market wrong, then one will stand to lose £1 for 
every point that the index exceeds the spread point in the wrong direction. 
Thus if one sells at 10,000 with a sell spread point at 9990, one will make 
£1 for every point the market falls below 9990 and lose £1 for every point 
the market rises above 9990. Until the bet or ‘trade’ is closed, the gains 
and losses are merely ‘running’ gains or losses. They are real enough, but 
constantly changing with every change in the index, and have not yet been 
fixed. Closing the bet will fix the position, win or lose. Unlike a classic bet, 
the customer can of course lose more than his stake. Indeed, on the 
example given, o f a sale spread point o f 9990 when the market is at 10,000, 
if the market does not move an inch, the customer will lose £10 for every
33 Spread betting is similar to betting by contract o f  differences (CFD). One commentator 
distinguishes spread betting from a CFD on the ground that spread betting has a fixed expiry date 
but CFDs do not. See A li, “Cyberderivatives: The Regulation o f  Online Trading in Equity 
Bets” (2006) 37 U Tol L Rev 439, at 446.
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£1 staked. Nor, again unlike a classic bet, are his winnings fixed at the 
outset by an agreement on odds. In theory winnings based on rising 
markets are infinite (in practice o f course they are not) and losses based on 
falling markets are limited only in so far as they cannot exceed the 
consequences of a fall in the index to zero.”34
The same structure can also apply to sports betting, with the index originating 
from a sports event (e.g. the number o f runs in a cricket test) rather than from 
financial markets.35
Gambling can also involve multiple parties. In pool betting, each participant 
puts some money into a pool and the winners share all or part o f the pool 
money.36 Profits depend not only on the outcome of the bet but also on the 
number of winners. For example, assume that 50 punters each put £10 into a 
pool to bet on a horse race, and after deductions for costs, £480 remains in the 
pool. If only 10 punters pick the winning horse, each winner will earn £48 (£38 
net gain). In contrast, if  30 people bet on the winner, the share will be reduced to 
£16 per person (i.e. only £6 net gain). Thus, pool betting is like gamblers betting 
with each other, which makes it difficult to analyse as a wager.37 Pool betting on 
horse or dog races is called a “totalisator”.
To some extent, lotteries are similar to pool betting. In general, a participant 
must pay an amount of money as a stake and the distribution of prizes depends 
purely on chance. In more academic terms, a lottery can be either passive or 
active (i.e. if a player has an active role in drawing lots), and either exhausted 
(there must be at least one winner) or non-exhausted (there may be no winner).38
There are many other ways to gamble, such as gambling machines (e.g. slot 
machines) and bingo games. Casinos are more controversial. Casinos are 
different not only because they are places where people gather to gamble, but also
34 Spreadex L td  v Battu [2005] EW CA Civ 855, at 1 {per  Rix LJ).
35 Sometimes a spread betting company might use som e formula (e.g. each comer or free kick  
representing certain number o f  points) to convert straight statistics (e.g. the number o f  comers in 
a football match) into a spread/index.
36 In France and in N ew  York, pool betting is called a “pari mutuel”, which means “betting 
among ourselves”. Monkcom, Smith & M onkcom ’s Law o f  Betting, Gaming, and Lotteries, at 
A 0.09 note 1 (2nd ed., Butterworths, 2001).
37 Monkcom, id., at A 0 .11.
38 Mier, supra note 6, at 127-128.
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because casino operators act as banks for provide gambling games, receiving 
money from customers and paying cash to customers if  they decide to cash in 
their stakes.39
4.2.2 Regulatory A spect o f Gambling
Before we introduce the current UK and US gambling laws, we should note that a 
variety o f legal consequences attach to gambling or related conduct, ranging from 
civil unenforceability to criminal punishment. Some parts of gambling 
businesses might be regulated under a licensing scheme rather than being under a 
blanket prohibition. The regulation o f gambling business provides us with 
another dimension for considering speculative notional transactions.
4.2.2.1 UK Law
The Gambling Act 2005 marked a dramatic turn in the history of UK gambling 
laws.40 Under the Act, “gambling” generally refers to three categories of 
transaction: gaming, betting, and participating in a lottery.41 Gaming is defined 
as “playing a game o f chance for a prize”.42 Betting means making or accepting 
a bet on the outcome o f a race, competition, the likelihood of anything occurring 
or non-occurring, or whether anything is or is not true.43 As to the enforceability 
of a gambling contract, the 2005 Act provides that “[t]he fact that a contract 
relates to gambling shall not prevent its enforcement”, and abolishes section 18 
of the 1845 Act.44 However, the Act also stipulates that this provision should
39 The Gambling Act 2005 provides that a casino is a place for people to participate in one or 
more casino games, which are defined as games o f  chance that are not “equal chance gaming”. 
Gaming is “equal chance gam ing” if  “it does not involve playing or staking against a bank” and 
the chances are equally favourable to all participants. See Gambling Act 2005, sections 7 & 8.
40 For the development o f  the UK law and a general explanation o f  the new regime, see generally 
Light, “The Gambling Act 2005: Regulatory Containment and Market Control” (2007) 70(4) 
MLR 626.
41 Gambling Act 2005, section 3.
42 Id., section 6.
43 Id., section 9. Section 16 determines which type applies when a transaction falls within both 
section 6 (gaming) and section 9 (betting).
44 Gambling Act 2005, section 335(1).
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not disrupt the application o f the common law if  the contract is found to be 
unlawful for other reasons.45
Fixed-odds betting and bookmakers are currently regulated in the UK. Under 
the Gambling Act 2005, from 1 September 2007 a person who provides facilities 
for fixed-odds betting must apply for a licence from the Gambling Commission. 
Failure to do so also constitutes a criminal offence.46 Those who want to 
promote pool betting and lotteries should also apply for a licence from the 
Gambling Commission. 47 The new Gambling Act 2005 recognises the 
existence of betting exchanges and regulates them as “betting intermediaries”.48 
Casinos are also regulated.49
The regulation of spread betting is more complicated. Before the 2005 Act, 
spreading betting companies also held a bookmaker’s permits. The Gambling 
Act 2005 eliminates this dual regulatory structure and the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) is now the only regulator for spread betting, in accordance with 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000).50 In fact, the 
Gambling Act 2005 does not really define “spread betting”. Instead, the 
Gambling Act 2005 excludes from the meaning of “betting” transactions that fall 
within the scope of the FSMA 2000.51 Therefore, if  a transaction is a regulated 
activity, that transaction is not treated as betting under the Gambling Act 2005.
4.2.2.2 US Law
In the US, the law varies state by state. In this section, we will briefly introduce 
gambling laws in the States o f New York and Illinois, home o f the two biggest 
financial centres (New York City and Chicago respectively) in the US. The
45 Gambling Act 2005, section 335(2).
46 Gambling Act 2005, section 33.
47 Gambling Act 2005, section 33 (pool betting), and Part 11 and Schedule 11 (for lotteries). See 
also Gambling Act 2005, Part 10 (gam bling machines); Gambling Act 2005, section 19 (bingo).
48 Gambling Act 2005, section 13.
49 See Gambling Act 2005, sections 7, 90, 168, 174-175 & Schedule 9.
50 Gambling Act 2005, section 10(1). However, even i f  a transaction is not considered as a
regulated activity under the FSM A 2000, the Gambling Act 2005 might still apply. See section 
10(2). See also City Index L td  v Leslie  [1992] QB 98; City Index L td  v Stevenson 2001 WL 
1612618
51 Gambling Act 2005, section 10(1).
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Constitution of the State o f New York provides that “no lottery or the sale of 
lottery tickets, pool-selling, book-making, or any other kind of gambling ... shall 
hereafter be authorized or allowed within this state” .52 The New York penal 
code states the following:
“A person engages in ‘gambling’ when he stakes or risks something of 
value upon the outcome o f a contest of chance or a future contingent event 
not under his control or influence, upon an agreement or understanding 
that he will receive something of value in the event of a certain 
outcome”.53
Promoting gambling is a crim e.54 New York law also provides that “[a]ll 
wagers, bets or stakes, made to depend upon any race, or upon any gaming by lot 
or chance, or upon any lot, chance, casualty, or unknown or contingent event 
whatever, shall be unlawful.”55
In contrast, the State of Illinois’s criminal code has a general prohibition against 
gambling. Playing “a game o f chance or skill for money or other value” and 
“[making] a wager upon the result o f any game, contest, or any political 
nomination, appointment or election” are both forms of illegal gambling, as is 
bookmaking.56 Gambling contracts were also rendered null and void in Illinois 
law.57 In both states, gambling may be allowed within a limited scope, usually 
under a licensing scheme.58
Betting on the financial markets is frequently called a “bucket shop” transaction 
in the US. Although the definition o f “bucket shop” might vary from state to
52 NY Constitution, Article 1, section 9(1).
53 N Y  CLS Penal 225.00(2).
54 NY CLS Penal 225.05 and 225.10.
55 NY CLS Gen Oblig 5-401. The winner o f  a wager cannot recover the money from the loser. 
See Bamman v Erickson, 41 NE 2d 920 (1942).
56 720 ILCS 5 /28-1(a). In Illinois law, a person engages in bookmaking when he receives or 
accepts more than 5 bets or wagers o f  w hich the size exceeds $2,000. 720 ILCS 5 /28 -1.1(d). 
See also People v Dugan, 485 NE 2d 315 (1985). The limit on the number o f  participants and the 
$2,000 dollars requirement is in line with federal criminal statutes against illegal gambling 
businesses. See 18 USCA 1955.
57 720 ILCS 5/28-7.
58 For example, Illinois has the Bingo Licenses and Tax Act, the Illinois Lottery Law, and the 
Raffles Act, etc. to allow certain bingo, lotteries or games to be immune from the criminal 
sanctions on gambling. See 720 ILCS 5/28-1. In N ew  York, see N Y  CLS Racing & Wagering 
102 et seq.
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state, in general it means an off-exchange transaction to buy or sell a commodity 
or stock that is settled in cash rather than physical delivery. New York law 
defines a “bucket shop” as “any building, or any room, apartment, booth, office 
or store therein or any other place where any contract prohibited by this article is 
made or offered to be made”.59 As this definition suggests, the bucket shop 
originates in off-exchange booths or shops that provided punters with a place to 
bet on the financial market. These bets used public market quotations published 
by an exchange as a benchmark, and bucket shops allowed punters to bet in the 
form of off-exchange futures contracts. In Illinois, a person who makes such a 
cash-settled contract commits the crime of gambling unless he satisfies the state 
law registration requirement.60 New York law also makes sales not involving a 
bona fide purchase a felony.61 Apparently, the anti-bucket shop laws are broad 
enough to have an impact on the legitimate financial market. The US Congress 
has exempted contracts falling within the ambit of the Commodity Exchange Act 
(CEA) from state bucket shop laws.62
In New York, a lottery must be operated by the State government and pari mutuel 
betting is allowed only on certain horse races. Otherwise, it is unlawful.63 In 
Illinois, setting up and promoting a lottery and selling pools constitute the crime 
of “gambling”. 64 However, lottery, pool betting or bingo games might be 
allowed in a limited scope.65
In sum, there are several types of gambling, including wagering, gaming, pools, 
lotteries and the use of machines; each type has varying legal consequences. 
Gambling itself can be a crime, as in Illinois. Even if  gambling attracts only
59 NY CLS Gen Bus 351 -d (2005). The phrase “this article” refers to Article 23 o f  the General 
Business Law (o f N ew  York), the title o f  w hich is “Bucket Shops”.
60 720 ILCS 5 /28 -1(a)(4).
61 NY CLS Gen Bus 351.
62 7 USCA 16(e)(2); see also 15 U SC A  78bb(a) (the Securities Exchange Act o f  1934).
63 NY Const Article 1, 9(1); N Y  CLS Gen Oblig 5-401. See also Shillitani v Valentine, 71 NE 
2d 450(1945).
64 720 ILCS 5/28-1 (a)(6)-(9).
65 See 20 ILCS 1605/1 e tseq . There is another Raffles Act. See 230 ILCS 15/0.0 (20051 etseq .: 
Illinois Horse Racing Act o f  1975, 230 ILCS 5/1; the Bingo License and Tax Act, 230 ILCS 25/1 
et seq. In N ew  York, see NY Const Article 1, 9(2).
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civil unenforceability, some activities related to gambling can be penalised. In 
addition, the UK Gambling Act 2005 has created a new age of gambling law by 
putting gambling transactions (especially commercial gambling) under a 
licensing regime rather than a straightforward prohibition. It might be an 
innovation for such a broad licensing scheme to cover the whole gambling 
industry, but licences were already in use in both the UK and the US. It is a 
matter of degree of control. The lack of consensus in dealing with “gambling” 
as a whole will influence where notional transactions should fall in the existing 
legal concepts.
4.3 Evils of Gambling and Speculation
It is necessary to understand why gambling is prohibited or regulated. To fully 
analyse the relationship between notional derivative instruments and gambling, 
we have to discuss not only definitional issues but also public policy implications 
behind gambling laws. It is easy to take the evils of gambling for granted. 
Gambling does not attract opposition merely because some people take a chance 
and make a windfall; there must be other reasons supporting anti-gambling laws. 
In fact, contracts relating to gambling were valid and enforceable in England until 
the Gaming Act 1710, which made security given for money won by gaming (or 
repayment of loan lent for gaming) void. Indeed, gambling has existed for 
centuries. Several pieces o f legislation have been introduced in the UK to 
address various aspects o f gambling problems, and the Gambling Act 2005 
marked another milestone in the development of gambling policy.66
66 To name a few others, past legislation includes the Gaming Act 1710, the Gaming Act 1845, 
the Betting Act 1853, the Street Betting Act 1853, the Gaming Act 1892, the Street Betting Act 
1906, the Ready M oney Football Betting Act 1920, the Racecourse Betting Act 1928, the Betting 
and Lotteries Act 1934, the Pool Betting Act 1954, the Small Lotteries and Gaming Act 1956, the 
Betting and Gaming A ct 1960, the Betting Levy Act 1961, the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 
1963, the Gaming Act 1968, the Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976, the Betting and Gaming 
Duties Act 1981, the Gaming (B ingo) Act 1985, and the National Lottery Act 1993. During the 
past 60 years, at least two Royal Com m issions (in 1949-1951 and in 1976-1978) were formed to 
investigate gambling in the UK in addition to a Home Office report in mid-1970s. This thesis 
will not recount the full history o f  the development o f  gambling laws in the UK.
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The most intuitive response to gambling is based on moral judgm ent.67 
Gambling could be described as an opportunistic and non-productive behaviour 
that may be linked to greed, waste o f money and laziness as opposed to virtues
z o
such as thrift and diligence. In New York, the penal law places gambling in 
the category of “offenses against public health and morals”.69 While we need 
not seek to justify or disapprove o f these underlying moral values, we should 
recognise that they may be open to debate in any given society at a specific time. 
It is also highly unlikely that a single moral value would be applied universally.
Apart from general moral theory, one primary concern with gambling is its 
association with crime. Whether gamblers deserve criminal penalties is another 
matter. Moreover, there is a serious concern that gambling can lead to other
70crimes or, to a lesser extent, a breach o f a person’s fiduciary or other duties. 
One of the licensing objectives o f the Gambling Act 2005 is to “[prevent] 
gambling from being a source o f crime or disorder, being associated with crime 
or disorder or being used to support crime”.71
It is true that gambling has a long courtship with other kinds of crime and 
criminal organisations. The Illinois statute clearly recognises “the close 
relationship between professional gambling and other organized crime” in its
72prohibition of “syndicated gambling” (in short, professional gambling). 
However, whether gambling really leads to more crimes requires more empirical 
study. It has been argued that gamblers can quickly accumulate debts and the 
pressure for money can lead them to committing crimes (e.g. embezzlement) in 
order to procure more money to continue gambling or repay gambling debts,
67 See Hurt, ’’Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet 
Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox” (2006) 86 BU L Rev 371, at 395; Pickens, “O f Bookies 
and Brokers: Are Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does It Even Matter?” (2006) 14 
Geo Mason L Rev 227, at 242; Mier, supra  note 6, at 5 & 8.
68 Aranson & Miller, “Economic A spects o f  Public Gaming” (1980) 12 Conn L Rev 822, at 835.
One may even argue that gambling may have regressive effect on a person’s income, particularly 
when one is poor. Aranson & Miller, at 836 et seq.
69 See NY CLS Penal 225.00 et seq.
70 See for example, in Charter p ic  v C ity Index Ltd  [2006] EWHC 2508, when a director stole the
company’s properties to compensate for his own gambling debt.
71 Gambling Act 2005, section 1(a).
72 720 ILCS 5/28-1.1 (a). See also Cornish, Gambling: A R eview  o f  the Literature, at 74 -75  
(HMSO, 1978); Aranson & Miller, supra  note 68, at 847 et seq.
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which may justify the civil unenforceability of gambling contracts or security 
associated with gambling.73 However, if  gambling debts are not enforceable by 
courts, it is not surprising that a creditor might adopt illegal measures to collect 
his debt. Arguably this policy might increase the chance of crimes being 
committed.
In 1951, a Royal Commission concluded that “[w]e do not doubt that there is not 
uncommonly a connection to be found between dishonesty and excessive 
gambling in persons o f a generally dissolute character, but we should not regard 
this as evidence that gambling is, in itself, a cause of crime.”74 This is a rather 
interesting statement, using double negatives to express its concern, yet 
producing no convincing evidence. Nevertheless, the link between gambling 
and other crimes still appeared to be a major worry for the UK government when 
it drafted the later Gambling Act 2005.75
Public order is another consideration for the government. The use of the term 
“disorder” alongside “crime” in the Gambling Act 2005 indicates that the 
“disorder” in section 1 refers to more than criminal conduct. A disorder may 
derive from the impact of gambling on surrounding persons, or it may originate 
from gambling in public places. While gambling for leisure in private homes 
may be free from sanction, gambling in public places is obviously a target of the 
gambling laws.76 A significant part o f gambling regulation or prohibition is 
meant to control gambling premises.77
Excessive gambling also attracts much attention as some people become addicted 
to gambling as others do to drugs or alcohol. In turn, the addiction can have a 
derivative impact on the gambler’s family or environment.78 This situation is
73 See Cornish, id., at 6 6 -71 .
74 Report o f  the Royal Com m ission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming, 1949-1951 (Cmd 8190, 
HMSO), at 52; quoted from Cornish, supra  note 72, at 68.
75 See Gambling Act 2005, section 1(a).
76 For example, the Street Betting A ct 1853, the Street Betting Act 1906, and the Betting. Gaming, 
and Lotteries Act 1963, section 8.
77 For example, the Gambling A ct 2005, section 37 and Part 8.
78 For example, it has been reported that President Truman once grumbled about his father’s 
having cancelled his son’s childhood piano classes because he had lost a lot o f  money speculating 
on grain trading. See Markham, The History o f  Commodity Futures Trading and Its 
Regulationat, at 6 (Praeger, 1987).
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not helped by the fact that commercial gambling businesses may try to induce 
people to continue gambling. The vulnerability of youngsters and children also 
raises serious concerns: one o f the licensing objectives of the Gambling Act 2005 
is to “[protect] children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or 
exploited by gambling.”79 A more interesting question is to what extent we 
should protect companies from “gambling”. Company managers might also be 
lured by potential profit to over-speculate when making decisions. A company 
might be as vulnerable as a natural person.
The evils of gambling are not limited to the punter himself or those people around 
him. Gambling may also bring disrepute to the game itself. “Cheating” is the 
most basic form. It may endanger the integrity of a sport when a punter bribes a 
player or manager to fix the result o f a sporting event.80 Ensuring a fair and
o  1
open game is one o f the licensing objectives of the Gambling Act 2005. It is 
also interesting to compare the position in gambling law with that in insurance or 
securities law. In insurance law, several doctrines (such as good faith, 
indemnity, and insurable interest) have been developed to combat the possibility 
of “moral hazard”.82 In securities law, there are comprehensive laws on insider 
trading and market manipulation.83 We will discuss these issues in more detail 
in the next chapter.
After illustrating several o f the evils o f gambling, we must ponder whether 
gambling has any positive value. Gambling is now a global business; indeed, it 
is a big moneymaking machine.84 For example, lotteries have a long history as
79 Gambling Act 2005, section 1(c).
80 An infamous example is the “Black S ox” scandal involving the Chicago White Sox team in
1919 in the US. An ex-player used his connections and money to bribe eight players to “fix” the 
result o f  the World Series that year. A  com plex web o f  financing surrounded the conspiracy so 
that the “fix” could hardly be kept secret. Eventually, the eight players were indicted.
81 Gambling Act 2005, section 1(b).
82 In the context o f  insurance, moral hazards mean behaviour on the part o f  the insured to change 
or increase probability o f  loss (or the size o f  it) after a policy is issued. See Cooter & Ulen, Law 
and Economics, at 50 (3rd ed., A ddison-W esley, 2000).
83 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, section 118; see also Rule 10b-5 o f  the 
Securities and Exchange C om m ission in the US.
84 Even two decades ago, gam bling w as already big business. See Cornish, supra  note 72, 
Chapter 3. The Rothschild Royal C om m ission also discovered that the annual turnover o f  the 
whole gambling business in Britain w as in excess o f  £ 8,000 million at the end o f  1970s. 
Rothschild, “The Royal Com m ission on Gambling” (1983) 26 (5) American Behavioral Scientist
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fund-raising tools, and the U K’s National Lottery has raised a substantial amount 
of money for the arts.85 Sometimes a government operates a lottery to finance a 
war or other public activities.86 Similarly, in the US, casinos are sometimes 
allowed in order to boost the local economy (e.g. Las Vegas in Nevada) or to 
support minority groups (e.g. casinos operated by Native Americans in 
California). Moreover, gambling can be a type of leisure activity. It may not 
be possible to translate the emotional value of gambling into monetary terms, but . 
it is valuable in a utilitarian sense.87 This does not mean that gambling, if  used 
in such positive way, suddenly becomes a morally good thing. However, if we 
look at the big picture, the gambling business and a certain degree of speculation 
might produce more good than bad for a society.
It is necessary to note that market speculation (and, to a certain extent,
88investment) might share similar problems with traditional gambling. First, 
speculation on the market can quickly bankrupt a person or a business (e.g. the 
Barings Bank scandal).89 Given that derivative instruments are inherently risky 
(see section 2.2.2.5 above), it is not a remote possibility that the user of derivative 
instrument might easily accumulate huge debt that could lead to insolvency or a 
similar kind of derivative effect on other related persons (e.g. the shareholders of 
a company). Moreover, a person might speculate excessively in the financial 
market (like excessive gambling), and this monetary effect could then lead to 
proprietary crimes. It is not inconceivable that a person may use derivative 
instruments to commit white-collar crime (e.g. insider dealing; see section 5.5
569, at 569. It is also estimated that the national gambling turnover in the UK was about 20  
billion pounds in 1995. Miers, “Regulation and Public Interest: Commercial Gambling and 
National Lottery” (1996) 59 (4) MLR 489.
85 According to its w ebsite, the National Lottery has so far raised 18 billion pounds for causes 
such as art, sport, heritage, etc. See
<http://www.national-lottery.co.Uk/player/p/goodcauses/fundraising.do> (visited on 20 October 
2006).
86 For example, in 1612a  public lottery w as promoted to finance the colonisation o f  Virginia. 
See Mier, supra  note 6, at 130.
87 Some argue that gambling is a kind o f  consumer goods that can create utility (but which might 
not be quantified in monetary terms). See Aranson & Miller, supra  68, at 835. See also Hurt, 
supra  note 67, at 379 et seq.
88 It w ill be discussed later whether market speculation can be distinguished from gambling 
because w ill be discussed later. See infra 4.4.1.
89 See Pickens, supra  note 67, at 249 et seq.
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below). A more serious result o f excessive speculation is the so-called 
“systemic risk” that may jeopardise the health of the financial market.90
Secondly, speculation (or over-speculation) on the market may distort market 
prices (see also section 3.3.4.1 above). This issue is not remote from notions of 
fairness with respect to games, which may explain why market speculation is not 
always welcome in the financial market. The history of the US Commodity 
Exchange Act also reflects a bias against market speculation.91
Thirdly, whether market speculation merits moral condemnation depends on 
one’s point o f view. Hidden behind all the jargon and numbers might lie market 
participants’ greed for profit; even worse, market speculation is largely a rich 
men’s game that makes the rich even richer. Market speculation is no less worth 
being condemned on moral ground than gambling with traditional gambling 
instruments, at least from a poor m an’s view.
In contrast, while gambling attracts much criticism, judges seem to take
92“hedging” as a legitimate commercial purpose. And risk reduction might be 
seen as a morally good thing.93 The long history o f insurance law suggests that 
minimising the impact o f loss originating from a future event is acceptable. 
Perhaps what many people dislike most is the opportunistic nature o f typical 
“gambling” conduct. Thus, if  a transaction does not fall into this traditional trap, 
it is vindicated. While traditional gambling conduct does not produce goods or
90 To quote Hudson’s words, system ic risk “is the risk that i f  one sufficiently large market 
participant were to go into insolvency that would have the effect o f  putting sufficient pressure on 
other market participants to whom  the insolvent party owed m oney that those other market 
participants would similarly go into insolvency, with a further effect on yet more market 
participants with whom that second tier o f  insolvent entities had dealings.” Hudson, Law on 
Financial Derivatives, at 13-02 (4th ed., Sweet & M axwell, 2006).
91 See Stout, “W hy the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market 
for OTC Derivatives” (1999) 48 Duke LJ 701, at 721 et seq.
92 In City Index L td  v Leslie  [1992] QB 98, Leggatt LJ stated that “'[ajlthough before the [1986] 
Act came into force, contracts for differences were void, other contracts which are superficially 
similar were not. These were contracts entered into for a commercial purpose, such as hedging. 
Such contracts may result in no more than the payment o f  a difference. But because they were 
made for a commercial purpose, they are not void as wagering contracts.” At 112. For N ew  
York law, see also H olberg  v W estchester R acing Association, 53 N YS 2d 490 (1945).
93 Rescher, “Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory o f  Risk Evaluation and 
Management”, at 162 e t seq. (University Press o f  America, 1983).
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services for exchange (and is thus non-productive), hedging and insurance, by 
contrast, does help to reduce the risk exposure of a person.94
From the above discussion, we may conclude that gambling and market 
speculation by way of modem risk trading or investment instruments might lead 
to similar problems. It would be naive to assume that gambling is always bad 
and market speculation is always good. Even gambling may be justified in certain 
circumstances (though not necessarily made invulnerable to moral critique). In 
contrast, speculation, the existence of which might be necessary for a sound 
financial market, requires further consideration. Thus, what matters is 
identifying potential problems and forming a consistent line of policy behind 
laws relating to different (but possibly similar) instruments. This thesis will 
pursue the analysis on this basis.
4.4 Distinction from Gambling Contracts: An 
Analytical Structure
The need to justify or to distinguish a certain transaction from gambling comes 
from the fact that a gambling contract may be unenforceable or a person 
operating a gambling business may be penalised or regulated. In the following 
sections, we will first provide certain conceptual arguments to distinguish 
gambling from other transactions. We will also make reference to insurance 
contract law to see whether it is possible to extend the insurable interest test to 
notional risk trading contracts. Furthermore, we will consider the identity of 
contractual parties and discuss what we should do to speculative transactions in 
different contexts.
4.4.1 Certain Conceptual Arguments
It is interesting to start with certain conceptual arguments to separate gambling 
contracts from derivatives, hedging or speculation. The purpose of this section
94 However, the economic efficiency and social value o f  derivatives to society may still open to 
academic debate. See Huang, “A Normative Analysis o f  N ew  Financially Engineered 
Derivatives” (2000) 73 S Cal L Rev 471; Stout, supra  note 91.
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is to examine these arguments to help us to understand the nature o f both 
gambling and notional instruments. We will argue that derivative instruments, 
if used for speculation, are indeed a form of gambling by nature.
First, a straightforward argument is that derivative instruments are used for 
hedging, but that gambling is purely speculative. An interesting correspondence 
in the Financial Times may serve as an example. On May 2006, the Lex column 
of the Financial Times introduced its readers to the “variance swap”, a product 
for measuring the volatility o f m arkets.95 The journalist stated that “[a] 
prolonged period o f calm has encouraged hedge funds to bet that equity volatility 
would remain low.”96 Interestingly, a few days later, a finance professor from 
the US wrote a letter to the Financial Times and stated that “Lex’s lucid 
explanation o f the mechanics of variance swaps was slightly marred by the word 
‘bet’”, continuing
“[vjariance swaps serve a valuable role for many market participants; they 
are not just esoteric instruments o f speculation. Hedge funds find it harder 
to make money in calm markets. Hence, their selling variance swaps is not 
so much a bet on markets remaining calm as (most appropriately) a hedge 
against this.”97
This correspondence reflects that the term “betting” has been stigmatised. It is 
granted that a variance swap might be used to hedge against the volatility (or lack 
of volatility) o f the market. However, the correspondence ignores the fact that 
the same transaction could also be used for pure speculation (i.e. a bet on the 
volatility of the market). In short, a notional transaction might be used for 
hedging or other legitimate purposes, but the nature o f cash settlement also 
means it may become a purely speculative vehicle. Several UK judges have also 
accepted that an interest rate swap could be used for commercial purposes as well
95 A variance swap is based on the magnitude o f  the volatility o f  market prices or indices. Both 
parties agree upon a strike level o f  volatility (in the form o f  percentage points) and the pay-off 
under the variance swap is determined by the differences between the square o f  the strike level 
and the square o f  the actual level o f  volatility in the settlement period, based on a notional amount. 
See Das, Structured Products V olum e 1: Exotic Options; Interest Rates & Currency, at 483-484  
(3rd ed., rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006).
96 “Lex: Volatility” Financial Tim es (24 May 2006).
97 “Letter to the Editor: These Swaps More a Hedge than a Bet” Financial Times (29 May 2006).
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go
as for speculative purposes. It is not wise to emphasize the hedging function 
o f the transaction while overlooking the speculative application o f an instrument.
Secondly, if we confine the discussion to hedging transactions, we can try to 
distinguish the subject matter o f hedging and traditional gambling instruments. 
“Hedging” is usually linked with “risk” , while “gambling” is frequently 
described as playing a “game o f chance”. One may further argue that an 
uncertainty in a game of chance causes no harm, while in a hedging transaction a 
person is exposed to potential loss if the risk is realised."
Whatever the words may suggest, risks and games of chance both involve 
uncertainties. It is because o f the uncertainty of future events that people can 
gamble to make m oney.100 The literal meaning o f “chance” provides no further 
guidance; in fact, the “chance” (or possibility) that market price will move up or 
down is exactly what we describe as a “price risk” . Indeed, like hedging risks, 
most gambling deals with future uncertainties. If we adopt this view, taking a 
market risk and playing a game o f chance are the same ideas under different 
descriptions.
It is true that the outcome o f some games (e.g. a lottery) depends purely on luck. 
For these games or gambling instruments, a punter intentionally exposes himself 
to an extra risk that should, in theory, be beyond anyone’s control. However, the 
payoff o f a gambling instrument could be due to the result o f an external factor. 
The uncertainty o f a bucket shop transaction based on the FTSE 100 Index is the 
same as that o f a derivative instrument (e.g. an option) on the FTSE 100 index.
Moreover, it is not true that sports cannot lead to harm beyond an emotional level. 
The owner o f a horse might have some incentive to compensate for his loss
98 See H azell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 1, at 23-25
(p er  Lord Templeman); M organ G renfell & Co Ltd  v Welwyn H atfield  D istrict Council [1995] 1 
All ER 1, at 7-8 (per  Hobhouse J); W estdeutsche Landesbank G irozentrale v Islington London  
Borough Council [ 1996] AC 669, at 680 (per  Lord Goff).
99 Aranson & Miller, supra  note 68, at 834 (citing King, Gambling and Organized Crime, at 17 
(1969)).
100 W hile it is not usual that people w ill hedge a loss from a past event, one extra dim ension o f  
gambling is that people can actually gamble on past events. It is arguable whether an 
uninformed party can place a hedge even i f  a risk has crystallised or a peril is sure to have com e 
into existence. However, gambling and hedging can by no means be distinguished merely on the 
possibility o f  dealing with past uncertainties.
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should the horse not win a race. Thus, a horse owner might actually “hedge” his 
potential loss (e.g. future value o f breeding) by placing bets with a bookmaker. 
A punter who places a bet on a sporting event may also hedge his bet simply by 
making a contrary bet.101 Thus, it is not convincing to argue that the uncertainty 
(or risk) o f a traditional gambling transaction can cause no other harm.
Thirdly, another discernible difference between hedging and gambling is that by 
hedging, a person is exchanging uncertainty in return for certainty, while by 
gambling a punter actively and intentionally increases his own risk o f loss. This 
description probably applies to certain types o f behaviour, but it does not provide 
a defining line for the notional transaction, especially since notional transactions 
could be used for pure speculation other than hedging. In addition, hedging is 
itself frequently a risky transaction (see section 2.2.2.5 above). One may have to 
take extra risks in order to hedge another transaction; by exporting an uncertainty, 
another uncertainty might take its place.
Fourthly, another theory distinguishes “speculation” from “gambling” .102 The 
reason is that speculation can help to make the market while gambling cannot.103 
Indeed, there must be at least two parties to make a transaction, and it might be 
costly for a hedger to find another hedger to meet his demands.104 Speculators 
might fill in the role and make the m arket.105 This theory particularly applies to 
the financial or commodity markets. 106 However, with the help of betting
101 A bookmaker who receives bets from punters can place a bet in a betting exchange or with 
another bookmaker (a hedging bet) so as to shift his risk exposure from the punters’ bets to the 
other party. This situation is som ewhat similar to the reinsurance market or back-to-back swaps. 
See Mier, supra  note 6, at 6, note 23.
102 We should be aware that som e commentators prefer to use “speculation” as an umbrella term 
to cover gambling, market speculation and other speculative behaviours. For example, see Stout, 
supra  note 91; Hurt, supra  note 67.
103 Mier, supra  note 6, at 6-7.
104 See Clark, “Genealogy and G enetics o f  "Contract o f  Sale o f  a Commodity for Future 
Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange A ct” (1978) 27 Emory LJ 1175, at 1205-1208; 1 lazen, 
“Disparate Regulatory Schem es for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives 
Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance” (2005) 24 Ann Rev Banking & Fin L 375, at 436; Bianco, 
“The M echanics o f  Futures Trading: Speculation and Manipulation” (1977) 6 Hofstra L Rev 27, 
at 30 et seq.
105 See Das, Derivative Products & Pricing, at 654 et seq  (3rd ed., rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 
2006).
106 Aranson and Miller distinguish insurance, speculation and gambling as the three forms o f  
activities with explicit assessm ent o f  risk. They seem  to compare “speculation” with the kind o f
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exchanges, a bookmaker can also hedge his own risk or make the odds market by 
betting with another bookmaker.107 Arguably, a bookmaker in this situation acts 
like a market maker in the betting market in this situation; he can provide a bridge 
between two punters.
Moreover, speculation, though necessary in the market, may be prohibited 
beyond a certain limit. 108 Speculation on the market might also raise concerns 
about distortion o f market prices.109 Thus, it is not convincing to distinguish 
speculators and gamblers in their market-making function; after all, speculation 
in the market and gambling on financial markets are both opportunistic 
transactions that profit from market fluctuation. How much speculation is 
tolerable requires deeper analysis.110
In sum, any attempt to conceptually distinguish gambling and notional derivative 
transactions might succeed in some aspects but must fail in others— an 
unavoidable result given the variety o f types o f gambling and the uncertainty 
surrounding what gambling really means. Thus, we may come to the conclusion 
that both traditional gambling instruments and derivative instruments are capable 
of being used to make speculative profits, and thus they are aleatory in nature.
As the above discussion indicates, a better distinction between traditional 
gambling instruments and notional transactions might depend on the relationship 
between the stakeholder and the potential loss. It is gambling if a punter who 
has no relationship with the horse decides to make a profit on horse racing 
betting. It might be “hedging” if the owner of the horse decides to “insure” his 
potential loss (e.g. the drop o f value of the horse) should the investment on the 
horse be in vain. Both o f the above transactions depend on the occurrence or 
non-occurrence o f an event (the horse’s winning the race).
risk-taking activities in the futures market. Apparently, the meaning o f  “speculation” is more 
limited if  w e confine it to the futures market. Supra  note 68, at 831, 833-835 .
107 See supra  note 101.
108 For example, the Commodity Exchange Act prohibits trading or positions in excess o f  limits 
fixed by the CFTC. 7 USCA 6a.
109 Stout, supra  note 91. See also supra  3.2.4.
110 See generally. Stout, supra  note 91.
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Perhaps it is better to argue that we see some instruments as “gambling” in 
accordance with how the general public perceives certain types o f behaviour and 
how a party uses a particular transactional structure to achieve his goals. We 
cannot easily categorise a transaction merely by its name, its structure, or the 
source o f the uncertainties involved. We must examine the purpose o f the 
transaction, the intention o f the parties and/or the proprietary links to distinguish 
“gambling” from other purposes, rather than relying on one single “description” 
of a certain class o f activities.
4.4.2 Reference from Insurance Law: Insurable 
Interest
The development o f insurance law provides us with a useful guide. Wagering 
continues to be a major concern in the discussion o f insurable interest.111 If the 
insurable interest test could be taken as a way to identify policies for real 
insurance, it might provide a lesson on how to distinguish legitimate notional 
transactions from gambling. There is a lengthy list of cases regarding insurable 
interest that this thesis cannot recount in full detail. However, we should be 
aware that an English court has already argued that “insurable interest should 
bear as nearly as possible the same meaning for all categories o f insurance.112 In 
Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co o f Canada,113 Waller J provided a rather novel 
way o f categorising insurable interests.114 Waller J reorganised previous cases 
into four groups. Group (1) contains cases where the court has defined the 
subject matter as an item o f property and the insurance is to recover the value of 
that property.115 Group (2) includes cases where the court has defined the
111 The term “wager” or “wagering” was once used frequently in cases relating to insurable 
interests. For example, see Wilson v Jones (1867) 2 Ex 139, at 147; Moran, Gallow ay  & Co  v 
Uzielli [1905] 2 KB 555, at 563; O ’K ane v Jones (The "Martin P ”) [2004] 1 L loyd’s Rep 389, at 
417; Feasey  v Sun Life A ssurance Co o f  Canada  [2004] CLC 237. However, w e should be 
aware that it is wrong to assume that life insurance policies are wagering or gaming contracts.
See Feasey v Sun Life A ssurance Co o f  Canada  2003 WL 21353304, at 5 3 -5 9  {per  W aller LJ). Cf. 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 4.
112 F easev v Sun Life Assurance Co o f C anada  2003 WL 21353304, at 174 (per  Ward LJ).
113 2003 WL 21353304; [2004] CLC 237.
114 See Birds, "Insurable Interest -  Oxthodox and Unoxthodox Approaches” (2006) JBL 224, at 
229.
115 F easey  v Sun Life A ssurance Co o f  Canada  2003 WL 21353304, at 80 (per  Waller J).
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subject matter as a particular life o f a particular person and the insurance is to 
recover a sum on the death o f that person.116 Group (3) contains cases where the 
subject matter is an adventure and not merely a particular item o f property.117 
Group (4) includes policies in which the court recognised interests that are not
1 j o
even strictly pecuniary.
On this basis, we will proceed to our discussion. Upon first impression, 
derivative instruments are mostly related to insurance concerning property. 
However, as we have indicated in Chapter 2 (see 2.5.4 above), it is not impossible 
that derivative techniques might be applied to contracts about human lives. 
Thus, in the following two sections, we will arbitrarily discuss the issue o f 
gambling and insurable interest in life assurance (i.e. Group (2) above) and in 
property insurance (Group (1) and (3) above).119
4.4.2.1 G am bling and Life A ssurance
The preamble o f the Life Assurance Act 1774 clearly states that “[wjhereas it 
hath been found by experience that the making insurances on lives or other events 
wherein the assured shall have no interest hath introduced a mischievous kind of 
gaming.” 120 It has been commented that “[t]he paramount purpose o f the 1774 
Act was to stamp out gambling hidden by a notional insurance.” 121 Section 1 
of the Act further states that
“no insurance shall be made by any person ... on the life or lives of any 
person or persons, ... wherein the person or persons for whose use, benefit, 
or on whose account such policy or policies shall be made, shall have no 
interest, or by way o f gaming or wagering.”
116 ]d., at 82.
117 Id., at 87.
118 Id., at 90.
119 The reader should bear in mind that the distinction in this thesis between life assurance and 
property insurance is based on the general perception o f  the insurance market and made for the 
convenience o f  discussion. This thesis does not argue that an insurance policy must be either life 
assurance or property insurance. Som etim es, whether an insurance policy is a life policy might 
be called into question. See for exam ple Fuji Finance Inc v Aetna Life Insurance Co Ltd [ 1997] 
Ch 173.
120 Preamble o f  the Life Assurance A ct 1774.
1-1 Merkin, “Gambling by Insurance: A  Study o f  the Life Assurance Act 1774” (1980) 9 
A nglo-A m  L Rev 331, at 331.
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Two points are worth discussion. First, life insurance contracts might be used as 
a form o f wagering. The same is also true for non-life insurance, as it has been 
observed that “insurance is a contract upon speculation.” 122 Since payment 
under an insurance policy depends on the occurrence or non-occurrence o f a 
future event, there is no doubt that insurance has a certain aleatory character like 
traditional gambling instruments.
Secondly, a careful reading o f section 1 o f the Life Assurance Act 1774 might 
suggest that whether a life policy is intended as wagering and whether there is an 
insurable interest in the policy are two different questions.123 In Feasey v Sun 
Life Assurance Co o f  Canada, 124 the court returned to the meaning of 
“wagering” and section 1 o f the 1774 Act. It was held that, even though a life 
policy was not one o f indemnity, it did not remove the need to show insurable 
interest; and thus, the critical question was whether the person buying insurance 
had any interest in the life o f the assured rather than whether a policy was a 
wagering contract.125 Whether such an interest is enough to disrupt speculation 
on human lives is another matter. There might be some cases where a person 
could benefit from the imperfect insurable interest test and still speculate on a 
person’s life or death.126
Let us consider the reasons why we distinguish gambling from insurance 
policies. Moral hazard is apparently of relevance. Since an insurance policy 
hinges upon a future event, an assured might make a profit from the insurer’s lack 
of knowledge or control. In the case of a life insurance policy, where the life or 
death o f a person is in stake, such a danger might be too insupportable, so 
requiring the person who buys a policy to have a certain relationship with the 
assured might to a certain extent reduce such danger. As was mentioned in 
Chapter 2, most derivatives have nothing to do with the life or death o f a person.
122 C arter  v Boehm  (1766) 3 Burr 1905.
123 In fact, wagering or gaming contracts were still enforceable at the time when the 1774 Act 
came into force.
124 2003 WL 21353304.
125 Id., at 59 (per  Waller LJ) and at 151 (per  Ward LJ; citing C arlill v C arbolic Smoke B all Co 
[1892] 2 QB 484, at 491 (per Hawkins J) and D albv  v The India and London Life A ssurance Co 
0  854) 15 CB 365, at 388 (per Parke B)).
126 See generally Merkin, supra  note 121.
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Thus, the moral hazard concerns for life insurance policies are not currently 
relevant to derivative instruments. However, developing a derivative instrument 
that links profit to the pattern o f human life and death is not unimaginable (see 
section 2.5.4 above). As long as derivative techniques are applied to the general 
life expectancies in a country (or region), such derivative instruments might not 
face the moral hazard concerns o f a life insurance policy. However, if one day 
the same technique is applied to the life or death of a more specific individual or 
small group o f persons, it might be the time to consider the insurable interest test 
o f life insurance, because people might start to speculate on other person’s lives.
4.4.2.2 Insurable Interest in  Property Insurance
Since notional transactions deal largely with monetary loss, it is natural to 
compare them with property insurance. However, one o f the problems in 
property insurance relates to the indemnity o f property insurance.127 We will 
examine some issues relating to information and moral hazards in the next 
chapter. For the present time, we will focus on the question o f gambling and 
notional transactions.
What is an insurable interest? Section 5(2) o f the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
provides that
“a person is interested ... where he stands in any legal or equitable relation
to ... any insurable property at risk therein, in consequence o f which he
may benefit by the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be
prejudiced by its loss, or damage thereto, or by the detention thereof, or
1may incur liability in respect thereof.” "
In short, an insurable interest might be seen as an “insurable relationship”.129
In determining whether a person can insure against loss to a property, the most 
direct connection is the ownership, either legal or equitable. This constitutes the
127 See supra  Chapter 2, note 45.
128 See also Life Assurance Act 1774, section 1. A life policy without insurable interest is null 
and void.
129 See Harnett & Thorton, “Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-econom ic Re-evaluation o f  A 
Legal Concept” (1948) 48 Colum L Rev 1162; Clarke, Policies and Perceptions o f  Insurance: An 
Introduction to Insurance Law, at 20 (Clarendon, 1997).
189
so-called “legal interest” analysis, adopted by Lord Eldon in Lucena v 
Craufurd]3° and affirmed by Macaura v Northern Assurance Co L tdn] as the 
English authority. Under the legal interest test, the insured must be either the 
legal or equitable owner o f the insured property. This test is not shared by other 
common law jurisdictions where a broader test than merely legal or equitable 
ownership is adopted.132
On the other hand, there is the so-called “factual expectancy” test, which was first 
proposed by Lawrence J in Lucena:
“To be interested in the preservation o f a thing, is to be so circumstanced 
with respect to it as to have benefit from its existence, prejudice from its 
destruction. The property o f a thing and the interest devisable from it may 
be very different: o f the first the price is generally the measure, but by 
interest in a thing every benefit and advantage arising out of or depending 
on such thing, may be considered as being comprehended.” 133
The result is that an assured needs only a commercially reasonable expectation to 
have a valid insurance policy, even though he is not an owner of that property. 
The difference in the shareholder’s case in insuring the company’s asset is 
apparent.134 Some English judges have been more willing to adopt a broader 
insurable interest analysis than in Macaura but so far the strict legal interest test 
still stands firm as precedent.135
We could then consider whether it is possible to extend a similar line of analysis 
to notional transactions. As we will argue below, there is no particular reason to 
restrict notional transactions, if used for hedging purposes, to the function of 
indemnity. The term “hedging” covers a far wider scope o f activities than mere
130 (1806) 2 Bos & PNR 269.
13' [1925] AC 619.
132 See generally. Lowry & Rawlings, “Re-thinking Insurable Interest” in Worthington (ed.), 
Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, at 347 -3 5 4  (Hart, 2003).
133 (1806) 2 Bos & PNR 269, at 3 0 2 -3 .
Ij4 Cf. M acaura  v Northern A ssurance Co L td  [1925] AC 619 and Constitution Insurance 
C om pany o f  Canada  v K osm opoulos  (1987) 34 DLR (4th) 208.
135 For example. Sharp  v Sphere D rake Insurance p ic  (The "M oonacre ”)  [1992] 2 L loyd’s Rep 
501 (sole shareholder has insurable interest in the yacht bought by the company). See generally, 
Lowry & Rawlings, supra  note 132, at 354 -360 .
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loss indemnification. These differences may mark the difficulties of applying 
the insurable interest test to other notional contracts.
We have to start with the legal interest test. The application seems natural 
because a transaction is very likely to be for hedging purposes if a person is the 
owner o f a property. For example, a farmer might plan to hedge the price o f the 
grain he grows on his farm. However, very frequently a person requiring a 
hedge does not own the property at all, especially when he wants to hedge against 
movement o f the market or economy. Furthermore, hedging is frequently not 
about damage to a specific property but the value o f something (in the form of 
market prices). If  we expect a hedger to be the legal or equitable owner o f a 
property, most o f the current derivatives market would simply wither away. 
Thus, the legal interest analysis is too narrow to suit the world o f hedging.
The factual expectancy test seems to be a better fit. A person requires a hedge 
because he expects potential loss from unrealised risks to his business. A 
pension fund, which has all 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA), has full incentives to hedge its portfolio by trading DJIA forwards. This 
“expectation” o f loss justifies seeking hedging transactions. It is probably true 
to say that modem hedging is built upon expectations o f future market 
movements or some such events.
Nevertheless, by comparison, we also find that the “factual expectancy” in 
property insurance is constructed on certain kinds o f proprietary interest, if not as 
formal as legal or equitable ownership.136 Thus, in a property insurance policy 
we can examine the expectation o f the insured based on his interest in a certain 
property, project or contractual relationship.137 In contrast, the same basis might 
not be applicable to modem hedging with notional transactions. While buying 
or selling futures for grain in the current season seems to fit reasonably well into
136 For example, in Wilson v Jones  (1867) 2 Ex 139, the question was whether a shareholder could 
buy a policy to insure the trans-Atlantic cables owned by the company. Cf. the landmark 
Canadian case o f  Constitution Insurance C om pany o f  Canada  v K osm opoulos (1987) 34 DLR 
(4th) 208.
137 For example, Tomlinson (H auliers) L td  v Hepburn  [1966] AC 451 (cigarettes in a warehouse 
and the carrier); Petrofina (UK) L td  v M agnaload Ltd  [1984] QB 127 (subcontractor in a building 
project); M ark Row lands L td  v Berni Inns L td [ 1986] QB 211 (tenant un-named by the policy and 
building insurance).
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the factual expectancy test, hedging next season’s grain (or even the following 
season’s), which might not have been seeded yet, looks more dubious. Virtually 
anything can be justified if the “factual expectancy” is drawn too broadly. This 
is not to say that some kind of “expectation” is not reasonable in application to 
non-insurance hedging contracts, as the expectation of a hedger is a key issue in 
determining whether a contract is intended for hedging. However, we should 
not ignore the underlying differences between a property insurance policy and its 
influence on formatting the factual expectancy test.
What is more revealing is the indemnifying nature o f property insurance. A 
property insurance policy is used to indemnify the loss suffered by the insured if 
the insurance event occurs. If  there is no loss, the insurer is under no obligation 
to pay; thus, the meaning o f “loss” comes to the fore. The most straightforward 
meaning o f “loss” is damage to property. However, damage can take a variety 
o f forms. It may mean the cost o f restoring a property to its original 
condition.138 It may also mean a drop in value of the damaged property.139 
Loss o f profit or economic loss can be claimed in the law o f torts under certain 
conditions.140 Price differences might be compensated if  a buyer has to “cover” 
in the market or a seller has to resell in the market after a breach.141 In addition, 
a party might claim for damage for psychiatric illness provided that certain 
conditions are m et.142 In insurance law, “loss” may not go as far as emotional 
damage, but may contain damage, expenses and loss o f profit.143
In contrast, “loss” in notional transaction is different in certain regards. First, 
the so-called credit derivative comes closest to insurance or event-caused “loss” . 
144 In a typical credit default swap (CDS), if the reference event occurs, the
138 See Bacon v C ooper (M etals) L td  [1982] 1 All ER 397.
139 The relationship between the costs to repair and the differences in value is not alw ays an easy  
one. See Ruxley E lectronics and  Construction L td  v Forsyth  [1996] AC 344.
140 See H edley Byrne & Co L td  v H eller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465.
141 Sale o f  Goods Act 1979, sections 50 & 51.
142 For example. P age  v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155; White v C h ief C onstable of South Yorkshire 
[1999] 2 AC 455.
143 For example, in Wilson v Jones (1867) 2 Ex 139, it was held that the policy was to insure 
against the profits to be derived from the success o f  the adventure (o f  laying trans-Atlantic 
cables).
144 There has been som e argument about whether a credit event in a credit derivative instrument 
should be material so as to deteriorate the credit o f  the reference entity. See D eutsche Bank AG  v
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risk-buyer has to pay for the loss in value o f the reference obligation (e.g. a 
corporate bond) or simply to take delivery from the risk-seller on the par value 
(see section 2.2.2.3 above). This is similar to insurance because the liability o f 
one party hinges upon the happening o f an event. However, what differentiates 
a CDS from a credit insurance policy, a contract for guarantee or a security 
interest is that payment in a typical CDS refers to the differences between the par 
value and the market price o f the reference obligation (e.g. the face value o f a 
bond and its current market price) rather than the unpaid obligation o f the 
principal debtor. Therefore, the concept of “loss” is still the key to determining 
whether a CDS can be defined as an insurance contract (see also section 2.5.3 
above). (The difference is made clearer if we take a basket CDS into account 
rather than a “single name” C D S.143)
Secondly, in the hedging world, “loss” frequently means mere price differences. 
“Loss” might be visual because it exists only on paper. For example, a 
shareholder might find his overall investment shrinking if  the shares in his 
portfolio drop in value because o f lower share prices; these price differences can 
be counted as a “loss” on paper or for accounting or tax purposes. However, as 
long as the shareholder still holds the shares, the “loss” is not realised, and the 
book loss might later become a gain if  the share price moves up again. To take 
another example, a buyer who purchases Brent crude oil in August 2005 in the 
spot market might find the price is much more expensive than 6 months earlier (if 
he could have bought them on February 2005). This is a loss in the sense that the 
buyer has made a bad decision as to the timing of his purchase, but it is not close 
to any legal meaning o f “loss” as described above.
ANZ Banking Group Ltd  2000 WL 1151384; Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives, at 6.15  
(L exisN exis Butterworths, 2003). However, so far, this discussion has remained on issues o f  
documentation. It has not been discussed whether a credit event that does not lead to credit 
deterioration would render a CDS unenforceable.
145 A single-nam e CDS means that there is only one type o f  reference obligation (e.g. a specific  
type o f  bond issued by the General Motors). In contrast, there are multiple reference obligations 
in a basket (or portfolio) CDS. If one reference obligation is in default, it is enough to trigger the 
payment process o f  a basket CDS. Thus, it can help to hedge risks not only for one company but 
also for the risk exposure o f  an industry or the overall portfolio o f  an investor. See also 
explanation in D eutsche Bank A G  v A m bac C redit Products, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 45322.
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In sum, the insurable interest test in property has been developed in the special 
context o f insurance, whereas a policy is described as a contract of indemnity and 
an established insurer acts as a risk-buyer. This context cannot be applied to 
other hedging contracts. The factual expectation test, though broader than the 
legal interest test, still refers to damage to property. Modem hedging practice is 
apparently wider than mere property damage and refers to broader economic 
losses. The simple purpose test should work better with more flexibility in the 
case o f derivatives, if, as described above, notional hedging contracts and 
gambling differ mainly in the purpose of the transaction rather than in the 
structure o f the contractual obligation.
4.4.3 An Analytical Structure
As stated in Chapters 1 and 2, this thesis approaches derivative instruments as 
contracts to trade risks. Thus, we may place traditional gambling instruments 
and notional transactions on a continuum. At the one end, there are certain 
instruments whose payoff depends purely on luck (e.g. lottery) and form the core 
o f what we generally call “gambling”. At the other end, there are certain 
instruments which may also involve a certain degree of speculation but which are 
largely seen as commercial instruments (e.g. investment in the stock market). In 
between, some transactions are generally labelled as “gambling” (e.g. 
bookmaking) and are usually controlled by gambling law, while others may have 
“betting” in name but are regulated as “investment” (e.g. financial spread betting 
in the UK— see 4.2.2.1 above).
If a transactional structure is an indication of whether a transaction may be seen 
as gambling, the purposes o f contracting parties create another dimension. 
Some contracts may be used both for commercial and for speculative purposes; 
whether they should be seen as gambling or investment depends on the parties’ 
intention and interests. However, as we have argued above, a typical gambling 
contract may well be used as a hedge (see section 4.4.1 above). Therefore, it is 
not convincing to argue that traditional gambling instruments can only be used 
for pure speculation.
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Instead, we explain Hobhouse J ’s observation that certain instruments (e.g. 
bookmaking) are by character betting (or wagering) transactions by arguing that 
the law assumes that bookmaking (and other typical gambling transactions, such 
as lottery or pool betting) is used for pure speculation.146 Therefore, we do not 
need to challenge a punter’s real purpose; nor do we need to consider whether a 
bookmaker is actually doing business by accepting bets (and is thus acting for 
commercial purposes).
We have argued that both notional transactions and traditional gambling 
instruments are aleatory in nature (see section 4.4.1 above), since they both hinge 
upon something that is in theory not within the control o f either party.147 The 
next issue, then, is how we should deal with these types of behaviour as a matter 
o f public policy. Under the Gambling Act 2005, gambling for charitable
148purposes may be allowed. Lottery schemes have been used for finance 
purposes in the past (see section 4.3 above). Being of speculative or aleatory 
nature does not necessarily make a transaction void or unenforceable. If  we take 
into consideration the regulation o f gambling (bookmaking, casinos, etc.), there 
is more to consider than mere civil unenforceability.
In addition, as at least two parties are needed to make a transaction, the identity of 
the parties in a transaction definitely influences how we approach a particular 
transaction and the public policy concerns behind the scene. For purposes of 
discussion, we may suppose that notional transactions can happen in the 
following four ways: 1) between two financial institutions; 2) between a financial 
institution and a customer (who is not a financial institution, but may be a 
company or a natural person); 3) between a non-financial institution (who carries 
on notional transactions as business) and a customer; and 4) between two private 
parties (who may be either company or natural persons but who do not carry on
146 For Hobhouse J’s observation, see M organ Grenfell & Co Ltd  v Welwyn H atfield  D istrict 
Council [1995] 1 All ER 1, at 11.
147 This also means that problems may arise when the occurrence or non-occurrence o f  an event is 
within the control o f  (or, to a lesser extent, is known to) one party o f  a transaction. We will 
develop this point further in Chapter 5.
148 Gambling Act 2005, sections 15, 33, 37 & Part 14. For Illinois, see, 720 ILCS 5/28-1 (b); 230  
ILCS 20/1 et seq. (Charitable Games Act). For N ew  York, see NY CLS Const Art 1, section 9.
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notional trading as business). Financial institutions, non-financial businesses 
and private persons can act as speculators or hedgers (or both) in transactions.
4.4.3.1 B etw een  F inancial Institutions
Financial institutions, which are supervised by national financial regulators, are 
probably the most vigorous players in the derivatives market. In principle, a 
financial institution is regulated in the first instance, being bound by certain 
prudential requirements such that any transaction carried out by that institution 
must be taken into account in determining the net risk exposure o f its capital.149 
The purpose o f prudential rules is to protect investors or customers of a financial 
institution in case o f default or insolvency.
Under these circumstances, a different approach is required to the question 
whether a notional transaction between two financial institutions, either for 
speculation or for other commercial purposes, should be considered as 
“gambling” . Apparently less moral concern is involved in enforcing speculative 
transactions between two financial institutions; there is no additional need to 
protect minors, and there is less direct impact on natural persons or their families. 
Risk associated with these highly risky notional transactions should in theory be 
kept in check by prudential requirements or other kinds o f financial regulation. 
This does not mean that financial regulation is perfect and can cope with any 
problem that may arise from risky notional transactions.150 What we propose 
here is that it might be better to leave the evils caused by these speculative 
notional transactions to financial regulators rather than using anti-gambling laws 
to complicate the matter. In this regard, the statutory exemption provided by the 
FSMA 2000 in the U K 151 and by the Commodity Exchange Act in the U S 152 is 
sensible.
149 See FSA Handbook, Prudential Standards. The FSA provides several sourcebooks for 
different types o f  financial institutions.
150 For example, see M atthews, “Capital Adequacy, Netting, and D erivatives” (1995) 2 Stan JL 
Bus & Fin 167; Hall, “Basel II: Panacea or a M issed Opportunity?” (2006) 7(1/2) JBR 106.
151 FSM A 2000, section 412 (repealed by Gam bling Act 2005, section 334).
152 7 U SCA  16(e)(2) & 15 USCA 78bb.
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So far, we have assumed that the meaning of the term “financial institution” is 
clear. In fact, the kind o f “institution” that is regulated by a broadly defined 
“financial regulation” is subject to national laws. The traditional three pillars of 
financial markets— banks, security houses and insurance companies— are still 
the major three types o f players. Pension funds, or any kind o f collective 
investment schemes, represent another group o f financial institutions. We can 
safely assume that these institutions lie well within the ranks what we are usually 
referred to as “financial institutions”, and their regulations are therefore 
“financial regulations” . However, some new types o f investment vehicles, such 
as hedge funds or financial betting companies, might create new taxonomical 
problems. The statement that a financial institution is governed by financial 
regulation, as we claimed above, is rather rough and ready. We still need to 
examine the content o f legislation and the nature o f an institution in order to 
determine whether we should use financial regulation as a proxy for addressing 
potential gambling/speculation problems.
4.4.3.2 B etw een  T w o Private Persons
If a notional transaction occurs without involving any financial institution, the 
question whether it constitutes gambling becomes more serious. We will start 
with the situation where a notional transaction is carried out between two 
unregulated private persons on an occasional basis. Then we will consider the 
situation where two business entities enter into a transaction purely for 
speculative purposes.
If we accept that the raison d ’etre o f the purpose test is to distinguish gambling 
from other legitimate transactions, gambling laws should intervene only when 
both parties intend to speculate. In such cases, the question is on how far the 
policy o f a specific jurisdiction controls gambling or speculation between private 
parties. If private gambling (or non-commercial gambling) is allowed, 153 
discussing whether a notional transaction is gambling may be unnecessary. 
Thus, it would be lawful for two individuals in the UK to use movement of
153 E.g. see Gambling Act 2005, Part 14 and Schedule 15.
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LIBO R154 to make a series o f bets, structured as an interest rate swap; in 
contrast, if  gambling is itself unenforceable or even penalised (as in Illinois and 
New York), then a pure speculative transaction might be rendered unenforceable.
This problem extends to cases where we have two companies (not financial 
institutions) who enter into a speculative transaction. Then the questions 
becomes whether a company can gamble. Three points may be made. First, if 
a company specialises solely in making speculative transactions, it opens the 
door for financial regulation, since speculation frequently means earning price 
differences with notional transactions or with contradictory trades, such that it 
might be seen to be carrying on an investment business.
Secondly, a bet made by two companies might not be exempted from gambling 
regulation in the UK. There are two prongs. On the one hand, under the 
Gambling Act 2005 a bet made between two companies is classed neither as 
private gambling nor as non-commercial gambling except in cases where no 
party to the transaction has entered it in the course of business. In the latter case, 
it would open the door for the company to be regulated as a gambling business.155 
On the other hand, the Gambling Act 2005 does not apply if the betting-like 
transaction is within the ambit o f the FSMA 2000.156 However, the company 
also runs the risk o f becoming an investment business.
Perhaps an easier way to get out o f the trouble created by statutory interpretation 
is to employ the intention or purpose test developed by case law regarding 
wagering (albeit, technically speaking, the term wagering is no longer used in the 
2005 Act— see 4.1.1 above). It is not entirely clear whether future UK courts 
will continue to use the same test for the construction o f “betting” as under the 
Gambling Act 2005. However, it would be beneficial to exclude from the 
application o f the Gambling Act 2005 notional transactions some part o f which
154 The term “LIBOR” stands as “London Inter-bank Offered Rate”.
155 Gambling Act 2005, section 302 & Schedule 15. We should be aware that in Morgan  
G renfell & Co Ltd  v Welwvn H atfield  D istrict Council [1995] 1 All ER 1, Hobhouse J took a 
broad view  o f  the meaning o f  “business” under the Financial Services Act 1986. Id., at 12-13. 
So far, there is no particular reason to suggest that the “course o f  business” should be given a 
technical meaning. Thus, a com pany’s making a bet is probably enough to establish that the 
company is conducting commercial gambling.
156 Gambling Act 2005, section 10.
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has a more legitimate purpose (e.g. hedging financial risks) other than pure 
speculation. After all, the Gambling Act 2005 targets certain gambling 
activities rather than the full range o f aleatory contracts.
Thirdly, further research into company law might help to explain how far a 
business entity should be allowed to pursue speculative goals. After all, 
business activities often involve a certain degree o f speculation. As Bramwell 
LJ observed,
“[i]t may be a sad thing that there should be gambling upon the Stock 
Exchange, but that is not the point which we have to consider; and I am not 
sure that it is a disadvantage that there should be a market where 
speculation may go on, for it is owing to a market o f that kind that we now 
have so many railways and other useful undertakings.” 157
Surely a company (or a business entity) exists to make money. However, the 
means that the company may employ to make money is still at issue. A 
company’s investing in the stock market is probably universally acceptable. But 
whether it is permissible for companies to make money by laying bets with a 
bookmaker is less clear (even assuming that bookmaking is legal). Whether a 
company’s notional transactions, used purely for speculative purposes, should tilt 
toward investment or gambling remains to be seen. Thus, in the
inter-relationship between investment, hedging, gambling and speculation there 
remains something to be thought through.
4.4.3.3 B etw een  A Specialist Firm and A Client
Different problems would arise when a transaction takes place between a 
customer and a firm that specialises in dealing notional transactions. On the one 
hand, the ability to honour future obligations raises some concerns, especially 
when a firm deals with many different customers at the same time. On the other, 
if a firm makes certain types o f transactions, this also raises more concerns about 
consumer and investor protection. (Insurance companies and insurance 
regulations provide a good comparison.) Some investor protection issues will
157 Thacker v H ardy, (1878) 4 Q BD  685. at 692-693.
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be discussed in the next chapter. Here, we will focus on the question of whether 
transactions between a business and a customer should be considered gambling.
The nature of the firm partly influences how we perceive a notional transaction. 
First, some banks (e.g. the Bankers Trust158) specialise in derivative transactions, 
and as banks are already subject to banking regulation, there seems no need to 
treat a notional transaction as gambling in order to protect the health o f the bank 
and to protect customers. On the other hand, the prudential rules and conduct of 
business rules might have to be updated to reflect the development o f markets 
and the increasing number o f products. Arguably, however, banking regulation 
is sufficient to address potential speculative trading by regulated banks. Even if 
public policy dictates prohibiting a certain type o f notional transaction to prevent 
excessive speculation, the question remains whether it is better to address these 
issues in banking regulation rather than general gambling laws.159
Secondly, some banks decide to establish subsidiary companies (often called 
“derivative product companies”, D PC s160) specialising in derivative transactions. 
A number o f insurers or reinsurers also establish derivative products 
operations. 161 Whether these DPCs are legally “banks” (or insurance 
companies) is best left to the banking (or insurance) regulator to decide, although 
a DPC might also be regulated as a non-bank financial institution. In the UK, 
although the FSMA 2000 has a flexible concept o f “contract for differences” 
which covers most o f the notional contracts we mentioned above, it has not yet 
been fully tested in court. In the US, this matter depends on whether a contract 
falls within the scope o f the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) or the concept of 
“security” .162 Many OTC derivatives are exempt from the application of the
158 The Bankers Trust has now been acquired by the Deutsche Bank.
159 Some US commentators have noticed the similarity between investments, insurance, 
gambling and derivative instruments and propose a more harmonised approach to revise current 
regulatory programmes. See Hurt, supra  note 67; Hazen, supra  note 104.
160 One o f  the main purposes o f  establishing a DPC is to control a bank’s exposure to credit risk 
from derivatives trading. Das, Risk M anagement, at 339 et sea. (3rd ed. rev edn, John W iley & 
Sons, 2006).
161 For example, A1G has set up A1G Financial Products Corp to specialise in derivative 
business. See Das, Structured Products V olum e 2: Equity; Commodity; Credit & N ew  Markets, 
at 1183 (3rd ed. rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006).
162 7 USCA la  & 6 (Commodity Exchange Act); 15 USCA 77b(a)(l) (security).
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CEA and/or securities laws if they take place between two financial institutions 
or between business entities.163 However, a contract might not escape federal 
regulation if  it is between a business and a client. Bank regulators have a clear 
interest in controlling a bank’s use o f DPCs to conduct derivatives trading.164 
Whether it is better to create a new regulatory regime for DPCs under current 
financial regulation, or even to regulate them under gambling regulations, is 
another issue that is open for further discussion.
Thirdly, it is certainly possible for non-financial firms to specialise in notional 
transactions. How the public perceives this kind of firm may partly depend on 
how it promotes its business. If a firm promotes its business as “hedging” or 
emphasises its financial nature, people may be more inclined to look for financial 
regulations. If, on the other hand, a transaction is promoted as betting, it looks 
more like a professional betting company (as in City Index Ltd v Leslie165). In 
the UK, a spread betting firm is currently being regulated under the FSMA 2000 
rather than the Gambling Act 2005.166 This is an indication that UK law prefers 
to regulate financial betting companies under the umbrella o f financial 
regulation. However, in other jurisdictions lacking a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme like the FSMA 2000, there is the possibility that a spread betting 
company might be regulated like a bookmaker (or directly prohibited). This is a 
policy decision that requires an overview o f the whole regulatory structure of the 
financial and gambling market.
Fourthly, we also have to consider the situation where a client intends to 
speculate rather than to hedge. We cannot rule out the possibility that both the 
client and the business intend the transaction to be speculative (or, in other words, 
gambling in nature). If the intention or purpose test should be adopted as argued
163 See sections 4 0 3 -4 0 5  o f  the Com m odity Futures Modernization Act o f  2000, Public Law 
106-554 (2000), and section 206 o f  the G ram m -Leach-Billey Act (1999) (identified banking 
product).
4 For example, the FSA Handbook provides rules regarding how to calculate capital and risk 
exposure for prudential purposes when a bank trades derivative instruments or uses special 
purposes vehicles to attract capital. See FSA Handbook, B1PRU 7. A bank also has to calculate 
its capital adequacy on a consolidated group basis. See FSA Handbook, B1PRU 8. See also FSA  
Handbook, 1NSPRU 3.2 for uses o f  derivatives by insurance companies.
165 [1992] QB 98.
166 Supra  4 .2.2.1.
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above, and if a client is intent upon gambling rather than hedging, we have to turn 
to the business’s side to determine the enforceability o f a notional contract. The 
common law solution is based on the purpose of a transaction and can only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Again, whether it is better to rely on 
common law to disrupt pure speculative transactions or whether we need to 
upgrade to a regulatory and licensing scheme to address the issue might be a 
direction for future research.
In the above discussion, we categorically distinguish transactions between two 
financial institutions, between two private parties, and between a specialised firm 
and a client. In fact, it is not always easy to label market participants in such a 
way. A financial institution may lack expertise in some aspects of hedging and 
thus may look like a client to the other specialist financial institutions. A 
transaction may also be carried out between two private parties but arranged by a 
bank.167 We have to consider the structure o f the risk trading market in order to 
designate a proper legal regime to curb speculation, either by way o f civil 
enforceability/illegality or through a licensing scheme. Using common law or 
regulation to impose a duty on special firms might be another option. We will 
develop some o f these issues in the next chapter.
In short, traditionally we have seen wagering, gaming, fixed-odds betting, pool 
betting etc. as falling within the ambit of gambling laws. It is now the turn o f 
some more modem transactions to face the challenge. The whole regulatory 
structure has to be examined to determine whether it is better to leave regulated 
financial institutions to deal with notional transactions; whether it is better to 
identify specialist firms for gambling licences independent of financial 
regulation; and whether it is proper to disrupt all notional transactions falling 
outside the financial services industry.
167 As in M organ Grenfell & Co Ltd  v Welwyn H atfield D istrict Council [1995] 1 A ll ER 1. See 
supra  4 .1.1.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focus on whether notional transactions are any different from 
gambling. Following the Morgan Grenfell judgment, we identify several 
instruments that we generally call “gambling” and which raise certain problems 
that invite the intervention o f gambling laws. We recognise that notional 
transactions could be used for pure speculation, and speculation might raise 
similar problems to gambling.
In has been argued that traditional gambling instruments and notional derivative 
transactions are all aleatory in nature; in a way, they are all contracts to trade 
future uncertainties. Traditional gambling instruments and derivative 
transactions refer to certain types o f transactional structure. However, whether a 
specific type o f transactional structure is used for pure speculation or for other, 
more legitimate purposes depends on the intention of one or both parties. As a 
matter o f law, we might assume that traditional gambling instruments are used 
purely for speculation. However, the law is less clear about newly developed 
speculative instruments in the world o f derivatives.
The next question is how we should consider gambling and speculation. As 
there might be a variety o f policy concerns in different jurisdictions, we have 
designed an analytical structure capable o f hosting different types of speculators 
and market participants. In light o f the modem development of financial and 
gambling regulation, the whole regulatory structure relating to gambling and 
market speculation should be considered as a whole. We argue that if 
speculation by notional transactions occurs only between two financial 
institutions, it might be better to leave financial regulators to worry about 
speculation. In contrast, when speculation occurs between two private persons, 
what is important is whether the gambling laws of the relevant country allow 
private gambling.
A more intriguing issue is where two business entities enter into notional 
transactions purely for speculation. Further arguments might be developed in 
company law to sort out the use or misuse o f speculative instruments in pursuit o f
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certain goals. In the end, if a notional transaction occurs between a specialist 
firm and a client, this raises more regulatory concerns over customer protection. 
This thesis takes the position that financial regulation is not the only source o f 
reference; as a matter of public policy, we should also take gambling regulation 
into account. This requires further regulatory assessment on the overall costs 
and benefits of regulating a certain type o f business, on the basis o f different 
regulatory schemes.
204
Chapter 5 Information and Risk Trading
In the previous two chapters, we illustrated how risks can be traded via 
standardised trading and how hedging can be conducted through physically 
deliverable contracts and cash-settled notional transactions. In this chapter, we 
will turn to another fundamental problem of risk trading— information and 
uncertainty.
Risk trading relies heavily on information and there is a range o f disclosure and 
non-disclosure rules in different legal fields. The insider dealing rule also 
provides another angle from which to approach potential information problems in 
risk trading. In light of certain disclosure rules in laws relating to securities 
and insurance, we might further inquire whether derivative instruments are 
another type o f contract uberrimae fidei or whether the disclosure rule attaching 
to securities could be extended to apply to derivative transactions. From this 
perspective, the information problem might influence the nature o f derivative 
instruments and might raise further regulatory issues.
In this chapter, we will examine whether disclosure rules in securities regulation 
and insurance law are applicable to derivative instruments on the basis o f the 
general non-disclosure rule in common law. We will argue that neither the 
securities nor insurance disclosure rules are completely suitable for the 
derivatives market. It is arguable whether we need to create a special rule for 
risk trading contracts and an analysis o f market manipulation might provide a 
better basis for accessing potential information problems in the risk trading 
market.
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5.1 Information Problems in Risk Trading
5.1.1 Information and Trading
Information problems can best be illustrated by an old American case, Laidlaw v 
Organ, 1 a case about a tobacco sale in New Orleans in the early 19th century. 
During that time, New Orleans was under blockade by the British Navy during 
the war o f 1812 and the price of tobacco would have been higher had the 
blockade been lifted. When the Treaty o f Ghent was signed and the news spread 
through Britain and Washington, people in New Orleans were still ignorant o f 
this fact. Before the news reached other traders in New Orleans, the 
defendant-buyer somehow learnt the news from another person who was with the 
British fleet at the time. The buyer then entered into a sale agreement with the 
claimant and some tobacco was delivered. Soon after, news o f the peace treaty 
was circulated and the claimant-seller felt he had been cheated, so he brought a 
lawsuit to stop the buyer from disposing o f the tobacco that had been delivered 
and refused to make delivery of the rest. The issue was whether the buyer 
should have disclosed this important information to the seller and whether, upon 
inquiry by the seller, the buyer could keep silent on the issue. Unfortunately for 
Laidlaw, the US Supreme Court refused to impose a duty o f disclosure on Organ.
Although Laidlaw was in the context of a physical sale, the same scenario could 
appear in the hedging or speculative contracts that we discussed in previous 
chapters. Had the contract between Laidlaw and Organ required delivery of 
tobacco three months after the conclusion of the contract, it would have become 
an information problem for a forward contract. On the other hand, gambling 
could shed some light on the speculative aspect o f risk trading contracts, for if 
both parties in Laidlaw had wagered on the level o f tobacco prices in the 
following month instead o f concluding an immediate physical sale, the 
withholding of information by Mr. Organ might have constituted fraud or 
cheating.
1 15 US 178(1817) .
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Since trading risk deals with future uncertainties, proper evaluation of the risk 
exposure relies heavily on all sorts o f information. An uncertainty is uncertain 
because one does not really know when and how it might strike. Possible impact 
from future risk can be better accessed if one has better knowledge and 
information. One source o f information is past events or the past performance o f 
a market (e.g. the past price cycle for new crops). Another is traders’ knowledge 
(e.g. the prospects o f the oil market based on current information) or advice given 
by another person, the reliability of whose advice would be determined by his 
expertise. A more interesting source of information is the occurrence o f a 
current or future event that might have an impact on the market. Indeed, any 
political or corporate event might have some impact on the market; tobacco 
prices in Laidlaw are a good illustration of this.
However, since acquiring and distributing information incurs costs and since the 
information itself might be valuable enough to prohibit it from being free 
flowing, there could be an information gap between someone who holds the 
information and someone else who has not been informed. In Laidlaw, Laidlaw 
did not learn the news of the Ghent Treaty because it took time for this 
information to arrive in New Orleans.2 A lack of information o f this kind could 
create problems before or after a contract is made. With the help of modem 
telecommunication, the Internet, and the multi-media, situations similar to 
Laidlaw are less likely to occur again because information can be transmitted 
around the world much more quickly and at a lower cost than in 1812. However, 
even a few minutes difference might be enough to earn a fortune for a trader. 
Information dissemination is still an issue that has to be considered, especially
2 Another interesting story is how a banker called Nathan Rothschild earned huge profits by 
having advance information about the outcom e o f  the Battle o f  Waterloo before other traders 
learnt the news. See Karlgaard, “W inning -  It’s All About Information” Forbes (24 October 
2005)
<http://www.forbes.com/2005/10/20/karlgaard-rich-inform ation comm 05_cz_rk_1024karlgaar 
d.html> (visited on 23 October 2006). See also A vgouleas, The M echanics and Regulation o f  
Market Abuse, at 122 (OUP, 2005).
3 Dan Morgan has depicted how a trader picked up the most up-to-date new s from all around the 
world, including listening to the English version o f  Radio M oscow  in the hope o f  getting a tip 
about Russian grain, and how a trader recovered a loss by delaying publishing news regarding a 
new big transaction. See Morgan, Merchants o f  Grain, at 282-286 (Penguin, 1980).
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when we consider the fact that not every trader possesses equal tools and 
expertise in the risk trading market.
Laidlaw is a typical example of a pre-contractual disclosure issue. If 
non-disclosure pertains after the conclusion o f a contract, it might become a 
so-called “moral hazard” problem. In this chapter, we will focus on information 
issues in a pre-contractual context. Against this backdrop, we might find that 
information creates problems in various ways. For example, the following 
situations might happen:
(1) One party provides false information to the other party with regard to a 
fact;
(2) One party makes his prediction and this prediction turns out to be 
inaccurate;
(3) One party conceals some information from the other party when the 
other makes an inquiry;
(4) A person is not asked for key information by the other party, and 
chooses not to disclose (or hides) it;
(5) One party is either the generator o f a price-influencing event or a close 
insider to that event.
In this chapter, we will focus on what Professor Treitel has called “ ’pure’ 
non-disclosure”.4 In principle, then, we will deal with issues (3) to (5) rather 
than going into detail over cases o f deceit or misrepresentation except where 
relevant.
It should be noted that the importance o f information is not exclusive to risk 
trading contracts but is relevant to all kinds o f transactions. Information is 
crucial in ascertaining the real value o f a property (e.g. the health o f pigs on sale5 
or the unknown quality o f a stone6). Information is also important for service or 
employment contracts (e.g. a criminal record in the case o f a security guard). 
There is no doubt that the law regarding fraud, misrepresentation and mistake 
plays a role in shaping the relationship between parties. We recognise that
4 Professor Treitel uses the term “pure non-disclosure” to describe the situation where 
non-disclosure does not give rise to misrepresentation, negligence, or deceit. See Treitel, The 
Law o f  Contract, at 436 (12th ed. by Peel, Sweet & M axwell, 2007).
5 W ard v H obbs (1877) 3 QBD 150.
6 W ood  v Boynton , 25 NW  42 (1885).
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information is essential for risk trading, but this does not necessarily mean that 
risk trading requires a different disclosure rule from other commercial contracts. 
Thus, in the present chapter, we will first discuss the current common law rules 
with regard to pre-contractual information disclosure and the limits o f the laws 
regarding deceit and misrepresentation, and we will further examine some special 
categories where there is a duty o f disclosure that may be applied to risk trading 
contracts.
5.1.2 Current Laws on Pre-contractual D isclosure
If one party’s lack o f information causes some problems, forcing the other party 
to disclose the information (by avoiding the contract, providing compensation or 
using other remedies) seems to be the most direct way to address the issue. 
However, in general, there is no pre-contractual duty of disclosure in common 
law.7 “Let the buyer beware” (caveat emptor) is thus the general principle.
On the other hand, there also exist several exceptions to the general 
non-disclosure rule. The first exception is the so-called contract o f utmost good 
faith (contract uberrimae fidei), o f which insurance is the most typical example.8 
To observe the utmost good faith “the assured must disclose to the insurer, before 
the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is known to the 
assured”.9 If the assured fails to disclose, the insurer could avoid the contract.10
Secondly, a person might have to disclose information if he has a special 
relationship with the counterparty. Where there is a relationship o f trust 
between parties, there may be a duty of disclosure; for example, pre-contractual 
disclosure might be required to a certain degree for a partnership agreement11 or 
a contract to marry or separate.12 A stronger form o f trust and confidence would
7 In K eates v C adogan , it was held that the landlord did not have to d isclose the condition o f  the
flat to potential tenants. (1851) 1 0 C B 5 9 1 . See also Bell v L ever Brother, L td  [ 1932] AC 161
(p er  Lord Atkin); Laidlaw  v Organ, 15 US 178 (1817).
8 Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 17.
9 Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 18.
10 Id.
11 See Conlon  v Simms [2006] 2 A ll ER 1024.
u Bower et al.. Law Relating to A ctionable Non-disclosure, at sections 1.05, 10.01 et seq. &
11.01 et seq. (Butterworths, 1990).
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create what we call a fiduciary relationship. However, we should be aware that a 
fiduciary duty does not automatically imply a duty o f disclosure. We have to 
carefully analyse the extent of fiduciary duty in different contexts before 
concluding whether a party has to disclose certain information before a contract 
is made (see section 5.4.2 below).
Thirdly, disclosure is frequently required by statute. For example, a company 
wishing to list its shares on a stock exchange has to disclose certain information 
to investors in the listing particulars or prospectus (see also 5.2 below).13 We 
should be aware that while the Financial Services Authority (FSA) imposes a 
duty on issuers o f financial instruments traded on regulated markets (i.e. 
exchanges) to disclose inside inform ation14, this duty o f disclosure is not 
extended to all traders on the financial market (notably OTC derivative traders). 
We will have further discussion o f insider dealing in section 5.5.
Fourthly, the need to disclose information may derive from tort law. A person 
might have to disclose to avoid fraud or misrepresentation, particularly when 
there is a continuous representation. 15 It is not surprising that several 
non-disclosure cases refer to “fraud”. 16 Arguably, a person might have to 
disclose certain information to avoid liability under the tort of negligence if a 
duty o f care is established. However, we should note that liability in tort law 
does not necessarily mean a duty to disclose to the counterparty. In addition, a 
person must avoid misrepresentation, but this would not be translated into a duty 
to disclose unless the non-disclosure itself is deemed a misrepresentation.
In principle, one is not liable for one’s silence unless such silence might establish 
fraud or misrepresentation.17 Thus, one might escape liability if one merely
13 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, section 80.
14 See FSA Handbook, DTR 2.
15 The definition o f  "fraud” or deceit could be found in Derry’ v Peek  (1889) 14 App Cas 337, at 
374 (per  Lord Herschell). For continuous misrepresentation, see With v O'Flanagan  [1936] Ch 
575; Spice G irls L td  v A prilia  W orld Services £ F [2 0 0 2 ]  EWCA Civ 15. See also Restatement 
o f  Contracts 2d, section 161. Cf. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC), 
Articles 6 & 7.
16 For example. Lord M ansfield’s remarks on insurance disclosure, see infra note 59 & 60; and 
Mr. Justice Blackburn’s analysis on insider dealing, see infra 5.5.1 and note 122.
17 Blackburn J states that “a mere abstinence from disabusing the purchaser o f  that [mistaken] 
impression is not fraud or deceit”. Smith v Hughes (1 8 7 1 )6  QB 597, at 607. See also Ward v
210
chooses not to disclose information to the other party rather than disclosing 
wrong information, which increases the difficulty o f using the concepts of deceit 
or misrepresentation to deal with the situation in Laidlaw. Things could become 
more complicated if the other party inquires about knowledge on a certain matter 
and the first party does not answer properly. We should note that other aspects 
o f private law have evolved to address some o f the issues regarding silence. For 
example, product liability and product safety regulations also force a 
manufacturer to disclose certain information to consumers.18
It is important to note that there is a limited class o f duty o f disclosure in New 
York. Under New York law,
“[i]n business negotiations, an affirmative duty to disclose material 
information may arise from the need to complete or clarify one party's 
partial or ambiguous statement ... or from a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship between the parties... Such a duty may also arise ... where: (1) 
one party has superior knowledge of certain information; (2) that 
information is not readily available to the other party; and (3) the first party 
knows that the second party is acting on the basis o f mistaken 
knowledge.” 19
This duty o f disclosure has often arisen in the context of fraud and 
misrepresentation.20
In short, what could be perceived as “fraud” by the general public might not 
translate directly into the tort of deceit or misrepresentation. The tort o f deceit 
and the law o f misrepresentation could well apply where one makes a wrong 
statement with regard to a fact; likewise, spreading false information in the 
financial market is usually prohibited.21 However, their application is limited
H obbs (1877) 3 QBD 150; With v O  ’Flanagan  [1936] Ch 575; HIH C asualty and G eneral 
Insurance Ltd  v Chase M anhattan Bank [2001] 2 L loyd’s Rep 483, at 494 {per  Rix LJ).
18 Consumer Protection Act 1987, sections 2 & 11.
19 Banque Arahe et Internationale d'Investissem ent v M aryland N ational Bank, 57 F 3d 146, at 
155 (1995). See also Young K eith , 492 N Y S 2d 489 (1985). We should also notice that som e 
American courts did im pose a duty to disclose defects o f  a house if  the seller knows o f  a defect 
that w ould materially affect the value o f  the house. See Johnson  v D avis, 449 So 2d 344 
(1985); Soloman  v B irger, A l l  NE 2d 137 (1985).
20 In both Banque Arabe, id., and Young, id., this duty was discussed in the context o f  fraud.
21 For example, see CFTC v Atha, 420 F Supp 2d 1373 (2006); CFTC v Erskine, 2006 US Dist 
LEXIS 26319; CFTC  v Foley, 2006 US D ist LEXIS 70437.
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where a statement is merely an opinion and might not be “false” in the strict 
sense. The broader meaning o f “fraud” might be more of rhetorical than o f any 
real use. We have to recognise the limited scope o f the common law remedies 
for deceit and misrepresentation with respect to information problems, 
particularly when they involve pure non-disclosure of certain information.
5.1.3 Theories o f D isclosure or N on-D isclosure
It is difficult to provide a comprehensive theory that incorporates all the 
disclosure and non-disclosure positions in law. Where there is no previous 
contractual relationship between the same two parties, a duty o f disclosure cannot 
be based on the contract itself. As Judge Posner observed, “[a] general duty of 
disclosure would turn every bargaining relationship into a fiduciary one”, “" 
which is not desirable as a matter of law. On the other hand, the laws o f tort, 
deceit, and misrepresentation operate as a restraint on the common law 
non-disclosure rule. When a non-disclosure is seen as a wrong in the eyes of 
law, it has to be corrected. But it is the area between fraud/misrepresentation 
and the common law non-disclosure rule that invites problems.
We have noted at least two levels o f discussion regarding disclosure of 
information. On the one hand, there are debates on pre-contractual disclosure 
issues for each individual contract, particularly in the context of sales and 
insurance, where the discussion focuses on the private law impact of 
non-disclosure. On the other, there are many arguments on the rights and 
wrongs o f mandatory disclosure rules in the securities market (see section 5.2 
below). Interestingly, these discussions show some similarities. Using a kind 
of shorthand, we might call concerns about a single transaction the “micro level” 
and those about the market the “macro level” .
First, fairness is a key concern at both micro and macro levels. To some eyes 
non-disclosure is simply not “fair”, though why it is not fair might require further 
explanation. For example, if  a private seller knows very well that his house is 
infested with termites but chooses not to say so clearly, it is fair to say that most
22 F ederal D eposit Insurance Corp  v WR G race & Co, 877 F 2d 614, at 619 (1989).
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buyers would feel they have been treated unfairly, if not fraudulently, by the 
seller’s concealment in this circumstance.23 The duty o f utmost good faith in 
insurance law might also embrace the idea o f unfairness (see section 5.3.2 below) 
and similar lines o f thinking could also be found in the context of insider dealing 
(see 5.5.1 below).
However, whether a conduct should be considered “unfair” to the point of 
affecting a concluded transaction is certainly subject to disagreement, so this is 
where we should be cautious about making a fairness argument, as the standard 
for unfairness is open to challenge.24 Inequality o f bargaining power might also 
influence how we perceive “fairness” in a certain case; the same act (of 
non-disclosure) might be deemed acceptable practice between two business 
entities, but our conclusion might be different if it concerns a transaction between 
a business and a customer. In short, we do recognise that some disclosure rules 
might have moral underpinnings, but it is not easy to form a complete ethical 
theory as guidance for each issue of disclosure.
Secondly, economists provide certain arguments for the view that a person 
should not be forced to disclose information which has higher productive value, 
so as to encourage people to invest in discovering this information. In contrast, 
withholding information that would produce no further social value (e.g. a person 
withholding information acquired by eavesdropping on other people’s 
conversations) may only induce more opportunistic behaviour.25 A few 
academic debates use similar but subtly different language on this issue.26 In a 
recent article, Eisenberg argued that a seller should disclose in any event but a 
buyer may be free from this duty if the information is more than
23 See for example. H ill v Jones, 725 P 2d 1115 (1986); O bde v Schlem eyer, 353 P 2d 672 (1960).
24 See generally. Strudler, “Moral Com plexity in the Law o f  N ondisclosure” (1997) 45 UCLA L 
Rev 337.
23 See generally. Eisenberg, “Disclosure in Contract Law” (2003) 91 C alif L Rev 1645.
26 For example, Kronman distinguishes information acquired casually and information obtained 
intentionally and requires the former to be disclosed but not the latter. See Kronman, “Mistake, 
Disclosure, Information, and the Law o f  Contracts” (1978) 7 J Legal Stud 1, at 13. Cooter & 
Ulen distinguish productive information (that could be used to produce wealth) and redistributive 
information (which only redistributes wealth) and requires the holder o f  the latter type to disclose. 
Cooter & Ulen, Law and Econom ics, at 273 (3rd ed., Addison-W esley, 2000). See also 
Hirshleifer, “The Private and Social Value o f  Information and the Reward to Inventive A ctivity” 
(1971) 61 Am Econ Rev 561.
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foreknowledge,27 if it is not acquired through improper means, or if  there is a 
relationship o f trust and confidence between parties.28 We do not intend to enter 
into these debates in the present thesis. Nevertheless, we should be aware that 
holding material information in the pre-contractual stage would have certain 
economic effect on contractual parties and society.29
Thirdly, as there are some concerns with the integrity o f “prices” or the market, 
economic analysis has a stronger appeal at the macro level, particularly in the 
securities market.30 Presumably, in an efficient market, the current market price 
should reflect all the information available in the market. Several finance 
theories explore the relationship between market information and the market 
prices o f securities (so-called “market efficiency”).31 No matter how quickly 
information percolates into the market, it is beyond doubt that information does 
in fact influence the market and in turn investors. Thus, if a piece of material 
information is not disclosed to the market in time, this might mean traders buy or 
sell at the “wrong” price, in the sense that the price does not reflect the true 
market value. Thus, economic theories lay the foundation for the modem 
securities mandatory disclosure rule. However, we should be aware that there 
are other theories arguing against the mandatory disclosure regime in securities 
law.32
Economic and moral arguments may not be mutually exclusive. While it seems 
natural to focus on the price issues on the securities market, we should also note 
that information might also influence market prices outside organised securities
27 The concept o f  “foreknow ledge” was first introduced by Hirshleifer in 1971 in contrast to the 
concept o f  “discovery”. Foreknowledge means knowledge that w ill be evident to all in due time, 
which means som ething that w ill be autonom ously revealed. In contrast, discovery is to 
recognise som ething that possibly already exists, though it is hidden from view. See Hirshleifer, 
Id.
28 See generally Eisenberg, supra  note 25, at 1687.
29 See also Fried, Contract as Promise, at 7 7 -8 5  (Harvard University Press, 1981); DeMott, “Do 
You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties o f  Disclosure in Business Transactions” (1994)
19 Del J Corp L 65.
30 The wrongful price theory might concur with “artificial price” arguments in defining market 
manipulation. Theories relating to non-disclosure and market manipulation might be connected  
in cases regarding insider dealing, which w e w ill discuss in infra section 5.5.
31 For discussion on the so-called efficient capital market hypothesis, see generally. A vgouleas, 
supra  note 2, at 44 et seq.
32 Id., at 179-183.
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exchanges (e.g. in Laidlaw). It is not clear how far the wrongful price theory can 
be applied to non-securities markets or non-standardised markets. To some 
extent, it requires further empirical research to justify market efficiency and to 
build a link between a piece o f information and prices in specific spot or futures 
markets. In contrast, where economic arguments seem to be dominant in the 
securities market, there is still a certain line o f moral arguments that attempt to 
justify the use o f some mandatory disclosure rules in the securities market, 
particularly regarding insider dealing (see section 5.5.1 below). With regard to 
risk trading contracts, it is important to be aware of different concerns rather than 
relying on a single school o f thought.
5.1.4 Summary
In this part, we determined that information is important to hedging and 
speculation as the evaluation o f future risks depends heavily on information and 
expertise; thus, this opens the door for people to gain profit from their 
information advantage. The general rule in common law is that one does not 
have to disclose information before a contract is made, except in certain 
exceptional situations. In addition, we also find that the laws o f deceit and 
misrepresentation have a limited application to the silence of a trader in a 
pre-contractual context. Since information problems appear in every kind of 
contract, there is no reason to create a different rule in the legal structure merely 
because evaluation of risks requires a lot of information. The approach taken in 
this chapter is to fit risk trading contracts into the general common law structure. 
The laws o f deceit and misrepresentation could apply if  all elements are satisfied. 
What we are concerned with is whether one party has to disclose information to 
another party before concluding a contract in the context of risk trading. In the 
following sections, we will try to fit risk trading contracts into certain exceptions 
to the general non-disclosure rule and decide whether derivative instruments 
naturally come under these exceptions.
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5.2 Mandatory Disclosure in the Securities 
Market: Comparison with Futures Exchange 
and Securitised Products
Before turning to the private law side o f disclosure discussion, it would benefit 
this discussion first to look at the mandatory disclosure rules in the securities 
market. It is natural to draw a comparison between the futures market and the 
securities market, since futures contracts are also traded in organised exchanges, 
like many listed securities. While it is instructive to note the role o f the 
securities disclosure rule and the insider dealing rule in maintaining the market, 
we should not ignore the differences between securities and futures contracts that 
might lead to various legal implications.
Two aspects of securities disclosure impinge upon the issuer of a stock or a bond. 
On the one hand, the issuer o f a security must provide some information in the 
prospectus when first issuing or listing the securities in the market for investors to 
subscribe.33 This is disclosure in the so-called “primary market” . On the 
other hand, the issuer is subject to a continuous duty o f disclosure after the initial 
public offering, periodically having to disclose the operation of business and 
relevant accounting documents. Depending on statutory wording, key 
information that may have an impact on the market prices of the securities should 
also be disclosed promptly to the public.34 This is disclosure in the “secondary 
market” . In addition, the insider dealing rule also supplements the general 
securities disclosure rule such that an “insider” may not exploit information for 
his own benefit before the information is published through the proper channels. 
The exact scope o f securities disclosure rules depends on statutory wording and 
thus varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The same may also be said for the 
insider dealing rule.
33 For UK law, see FSMA 2000, sections 80-82; for US law, see 15 USCA 77j.
34 See generally FSA Flandbook, D isclosure Rules and Transparency Rules (DTR); for US law, 
see SEC Regulation S-B, S-K and S-X , 17 CFR parts 228, 229 and 210.
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Different legal consequences ensue from non-disclosure under securities laws, 
where non-disclosure does not render a contract void (as in insurance), but 
regulators may impose penalties for failure to disclose properly.35 The issuer or 
directors o f the issuing company might also be liable for damage suffered by 
subscribers.36 Where the disclosed information is false or misleading, there 
might be an overlap with the laws o f deceit and misrepresentation.
In addition, what is special in the securities disclosure rule is that it refers to 
general “issuance”. In the primary market, disclosure in the prospectus or listing 
particulars is prior to each individual subscription, but non-disclosure does not 
necessarily give the subscriber the right to set aside his subscription. In the 
secondary market, the issuer should disclose information to the market regularly 
or when necessary. Unlike in insurance, the securities disclosure rule does not 
refer to any specific transaction in the secondary market. A stockholder might 
sell his shares to another buyer without disclosing anything, unless he is under a 
duty to disclose or if he is prohibited from using his informational advantage. 
The insider dealing rule refers to individual transactions in the market made by 
“insiders” (see section 5.5.1 below). As with securities mandatory disclosure, 
the insider dealing rule does not avoid a contract, but imposes penalties or orders
T 7
disgorgement o f profits as remedies.
The mandatory securities disclosure rule exists partly because of the nature of 
securities (a stock, a bond or other investment contracts as defined by statutes), 
whose price depends on the value and performance of the issuing company. The 
value o f a share in a company is determined by many factors, including the 
operation o f the company, its sales figures, the financial management o f its 
account, and the prospects o f the issuing company. The price of a corporate 
bond is influenced by the creditworthiness of the issuing company which is also 
affected by the issuer’s performance in its own business. The value of a unit
35 FSMA 2000, section 91.
36 FSMA 2000, section 90. See also Re South o f  England N atural Gas and Petroleum Co, L td  
[1911] 1 Ch 573. P er  Swinfen Eady J, ” [i]n my opinion the allottee is not entitled to rescind his 
contract because o f  any breach o f  the statutory requirements, which extend to such 
comparatively unimportant matters as the names and addresses o f  the com pany’s auditors. His 
remedy is against the directors and other persons responsible for the prospectus.” At 577.
3 See FSM A 2000, section 382 et seq. (restitution orders).
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trust is basically decided by the portfolio value of the investment instruments 
held by the trust. Given that any positive or negative information could 
influence the market price— the value for holders of the securities— it is argued
"5 o
that the issuer should promptly provide correct information to the market. 
Thus, requiring the issuer to disclose information to the market is a way both to 
maintain the market and to ensure the efficiency of the market price.
In contrast, this concern is less important in a futures exchange. On the one 
hand, a futures price represents the market’s expectation o f the future (or, to some 
extent, traders’ expectations). A futures market is not, like the securities market, 
a spot market, so it is relevant to ask how far a futures price might be comparable 
to its corresponding spot price. The gold price for a December 2006 delivery 
contract in April 2006 is the m arket’s expectation of the value of gold in 
December 2006 at the time o f April 2006 and of course this is different from spot 
market gold sales prices in April 2006, which represent the current market value 
o f the same amount o f gold if  one wants to take immediate delivery.39 
Moreover, a “true” futures price might not be easy to establish in any event.40 
Why would we need the futures market if we could already establish future price 
with a good degree of accuracy? So we can only wait for the future to prove 
whether or not the futures price at a certain point of time in the past was correct. 
Thus, we have to be careful when applying the analysis developed in the spot 
securities market to the futures market.
On the other hand, it is also probably not practical to impose a general duty of 
disclosure on every futures trader. A general mandatory disclosure system in 
the commodities market would mean that, if a farmer traded in the futures 
market, he would have to disclose information whenever he produced the crops 
for sale (c f  the primary securities market) or make periodical statements about
See generally. A vgouleas, supra  note 2.
39 For the relationship between spot prices and corresponding futures prices, see Chapter 3, 
section 3.3.2.3, particularly Mustill J’s remark in G ebruder M etebnann GmbH & Co K G  v NBR 
(London) L td  [1984] 1 L loyd’s Rep 614, at 623-624.
40 The “artificial price” argument might have important implication in establishing market 
manipulation. However, this “artificial price” approach has also been heavily criticised as it is 
difficult to prove an “artificial” price. See Fishel & Ross, “Should the Law Prohibit 
‘M anipulation’ in Financial Markets?” (1991) Harv L Rev 503; Perdue, “Manipulation o f  Futures 
Markets: Redefining the O ffense” (1987) 56 Fordham L Rev 345.
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the conditions o f his crops whenever a specific futures contract remained open 
for trading (c f  secondary securities market). It is not impossible to establish this 
kind o f regime, but it would be costly to maintain such a system. We should be 
aware that the basis o f the securities disclosure rule is built on the basis that an 
issuer has to apply for authorisation from, or register with, the financial regulator 
before issuing or listing securities. The same does not usually apply in the 
commodity futures market.
We could also examine the issue from another angle. As a US judge has argued, 
the securities market was established for the formation of capital and the futures 
market for hedging.41 It is normal that a lender attempts to acquire certain 
information about the borrower in order to ensure the return on his investment or 
to secure future repayment and yet no duty of disclosure is imposed in the case of 
loan agreements. Raising funds by way o f issuing securities to the general 
public raises further concerns about investor protection because the general 
public might not be able to obtain useful information when making investments 
(compared with specialised lending banks giving loans or mortgages).42 In 
contrast, futures contracts have no such pedigree to justify a pre-issuance and 
continuous disclosure rule.
If we follow this line of analysis, there might be good reason to apply the 
securities disclosure rule to those securitised hedging instruments as they may be 
seen as “securities” . A catastrophe bond (see section 2.2.2.4 above) is still a 
bond, although the repayment o f the bond is conditional upon the non-occurrence 
o f the catastrophic events defined in the indenture. Securitised instruments are 
not issued like a straight corporate bond as they are usually structured through a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV).43 Nevertheless, similar concerns might arise 
with respect to these hybrid instruments and, thus, one might argue that hybrid
41 Chicago M ercantile Exchange v SEC , 883 F 2d 537, at 543 (1989)(/?er Judge Easterbrook).
4‘ In contrast, the US securities law exempts an issuer from the obligation to register his 
transaction if  it does not involve any public offering. 15 USCA 77d.
43 See Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives, Chapter 8 (L exisN exis Butterworths, 2003); Das, 
Structured Products Volume 2: Equity; Commodity; Credit & N ew  Markets, chapter 12 (3rd ed., 
rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006); Benjamin, “Synthetic, Insurance and Hedge Fund 
Securitisations” (2005) 20(7) JIBLR 354; Zhang, “Trends and Developm ents in Cross-Border 
Securitisation, Part 1: Legal Structures and A nalysis” (2000) 15(7) BUB & FL 269; Fuller & 
Ranero, “Collateralised Debt O bligations” (2005) 20(9) JIBFL 343.
219
instruments should be regulated as securities. Whether they should be treated as 
traditional securities (e.g. corporate shares) or be regulated by special rules is 
another matter.44
In sum, the risk trading market is not directly comparable to the securities market. 
Although securities can be traded on or off exchanges like futures or many 
commodities, in the securities market the mandatory disclosure rule lies in the 
nature o f securities and cannot be transposed seamlessly onto exchange-traded 
contracts under discussion in this thesis.
5.3 Voidable Contracts: Risk Trading and 
Utm ost Good Faith
5.3.1 Background
Insurance and guarantee contracts provide a good comparison with risk trading 
contracts. Insurance contracts are clearly intended to cover loss from future 
risks.45 Guarantees, on the other hand, serve the purpose of ensuring the 
performance o f a debtor’s obligation.46 Interestingly, both types o f contract are 
subject to a duty o f disclosure but on different legal grounds. An insurance 
contract has long been labelled a contract uberrimae fidei 47 An assured has to 
disclose material information to the insurer to observe the duty of utmost good 
faith; otherwise the contract could be avoided.48
On the other hand, there is also a duty of disclosure for contracts of guarantee or 
suretyship. It was stated that
44 See Ciro, “Game Theory in Financial Markets Litigation” (2005) 20(7) JIBLR 315.
45 W e have briefly discussed whether derivative instruments might be defined as “insurance”. 
See supra  2.5.
46 See M oschi v Lep A ir S en ’ices L td  [ 1973] AC 331 {per Lord Diplock). We should be aware 
that a guarantee contract might also be regarded as insurance if  it satisfies the requirements for 
an insurance contract. See Seaton  v Heath [1899] 1 QB 782, at 792-793 (per  Romer J).
47 See C arter v Boehm  (1766) 3 Burr 1905; Whittingham  v Thornburgh (1690) 2 Vem  206; 23 ER 
734; Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 17. See also Pan A tlantic Insurance Co Ltd  v Pine Top 
Insurance Co Ltd  [1995] 1 AC 501; M anifest Shipping Co L td  v U ni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd  
(The S tar Sea) [2003] 1 AC 469.
48 Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 18.
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“a duty was imposed by the law upon creditors to disclose, when 
negotiating for a suretyship contract, all material facts— i.e., all facts 
which if disclosed would tend to incline a prudent proposed surety to 
decline to enter into such a contract, or would tend to persuade him to ask 
for a greater reward for it than had previously been proposed.”49
However, a contract o f guarantee is not considered a contract uberrimae fidei.so
It is necessary to explore what is meant by “utmost good faith” and why an 
insurance contract should require utmost good faith. Insurance as contracts 
uberrimae fidei can be traced back to the case of Carter v Boehm5] in the 18th 
century, where Lord Mansfield stated that “[g]ood faith forbids either party, by 
concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his
C J
ignorance o f that fact, and his believing the contrary.” While Lord 
M ansfield’s attempt to establish a general requirement o f good faith in the
53contract law failed, it nevertheless survived in insurance law. An interesting 
point to note is that Lord Mansfield only used the term “good faith”, but the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 regards insurance as a contract of “utmost good 
faith” .54
Since good faith is already a rather ambiguous concept, it is not clear what utmost 
good faith means. It has been suggested that “ [t]he connotation appears to be the 
most extensive, rather than the greatest, good faith” .55 Frequently, it is easier to 
identify conduct that is not in utmost good faith (or, more straightforwardly, is a 
case o f “bad faith”) than to illustrate the concept with a positive description. 
The most distinguishing feature o f utmost good faith is the duty to disclose
49 Ham ilton v Watson (1845) 12 C & F 109, at 118.
50 Royal Bank o f  Scotland  v E tridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, at 848 (per  Lord Scott o f  
Foscote).
51 (1766) 3 Burr 1905.
52 Id., at 1910. The same principle was applied to life assurance in 17th century in Whittingham  
v Thornburgh (1690) 2 V em  206; 23 ER 734 (cited in Eggers, Good Faith and Insurance 
Contracts, at 5, fn 41 (LLP, 2004)).
53 M anifest Shipping Co L td v U ni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The S tar Sea) [2003] 1 AC 469, at 
492 (per  Lord Hobhouse)
54 Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 17. For historical developm ent o f  the concept o f  good  
faith and utmost good faith, see Hasson, “The Doctrine o f  Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law: A 
Critical Evaluation” (1979) 32(6) MLR 615.
55 The S tar Sea , supra  note 53, at 492 (per  Lord Hobhouse).
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material information.56 However, we should note that the duty o f utmost good 
faith is more than just disclosure. Since it applies to both insurers and assureds, 
and it might thus also be used as a weapon against the insurer.57 It has been held 
that an insurer’s right to avoid a contract following non-disclosure by the assured 
is restricted by the duty of utmost good faith.58 Thus, the duty o f utmost good 
faith restrains the conduct o f both the assured and the insurer. We should take 
care in drawing the line between the duty o f disclosure and a more general duty of 
utmost good faith.
5.3.2 Foundation o f U tm ost Good Faith in 
Insurance Law
The inequality o f knowledge is behind the doctrine o f utmost good faith in 
insurance law .59 For example, a car insurer does not normally know a car 
owner’s complete driving record; nor could a health insurer normally know if the 
assured has any hidden or untold disease. Such an asymmetric spread of 
information could lead an insurer to underwrite a risk at too low a premium. 
Therefore, the insurer needs to acquire the relevant information from the assured 
in order to evaluate the proper level of risk exposure and determine the correct 
premium. However, given the direct connection between information and the 
level o f premium he will pay, the assured has some incentive not to disclose 
material information to the insurer, leaving the insurer in a disadvantageous 
position.
56 Marine Insurance Act 1906, sections 18 & 20.
57 See Lowry & Rawlings, “Insurers, Claims and the Boundaries o f  Good Faith” (2005) 68(1) 
MLR 82; Y eo. “Post-Contractual Good Faith - Change in Judicial Attitude” (2003) 66(3) MLR 
425.
58 See D rake Insurance p ic  v P roviden t Insurance p ic  [2004] QB 60 1 .
59 P er  Lord M ansfield, “[t]he special facts upon which the contingent chance is to be computed 
lie most com m only in the know ledge o f  the insured only. The underwriter trusts to his 
representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his 
knowledge to mislead the underwriter into a b elief that the circumstance does not exist, and to 
induce him to estimate the risk as if  it did not exist. ... Although the suppression should happen 
through mistake without any fraudulent intention, ... the policy is void, because the risk run is 
really different from the risk understood and intended to be run at the time o f  the agreement.” 
C arter v Boehm  (1766) 3 Burr 1905, at 1909— 1911.
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A common response is to argue that non-disclosure constitutes fraud. 60 
However, as we saw earlier, mere silence does not automatically trigger 
misrepresentation, mistake, or the tort o f deceit (see 5.1.2 above), and it is not 
always clear what sort of information need or need not be disclosed to the insurer. 
Where the insurer makes no specific inquiry, there is no specific reason why an 
assured should be liable for fraud or misrepresentation. The assured might not 
intend to defraud the insurer, so his silence is not necessarily a misrepresentation. 
The situation would be trickier if the insurer makes an inquiry but the assured 
decides to keep silent; nevertheless, such silence is not unconditionally fraud. 
Undoubtedly, an assured could still be liable for concealment of information if 
his actions satisfy the criteria for deceit and misrepresentation. However, the 
problem under consideration here is the circumstance where a concealment or 
non-disclosure does not constitute intentional deceit or misrepresentation but still 
raises questions o f bad faith or unfairness. The creation of the concept of 
“utmost good faith” could fill the gap between restrictive fraudulent laws and the 
common law non-disclosure rule.
Economic analysis could provide further support for some kind o f disclosure 
requirement on the part o f the assured. When insurers issue policies they 
calculate the premiums to reflect the true level o f risk exposure, but insurance 
companies also try to spread the risk among other assureds falling into the same 
category. Premiums are calculated not only on the basis of the specific risk 
exposure o f the assured but also on the general occurrence rate o f this same risk 
in the market (e.g. the incidence o f breast cancer among British women). Thus, 
the expected loss from non-disclosure by one assured could be transferred to 
other assureds by their being charged higher premiums than would apply in a 
general climate o f full disclosure. In addition, full disclosure o f material 
information by assureds might help to address the moral hazard issue created by 
asymmetric information.61 “Adverse selection”62 may occur when an insurer 
selects those with a good disclosure record or those relatively safe from risks as
60 Indeed, Lord M ansfield made a strong statement that “[kjeeping back such circumstance is a 
fraud”. Id.
61 Id., at 50.
62 Cooter & U len, Law and Econom ics, at 51 (3rd ed., A ddison-W esley, 2000).
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the target group for insurance rather than underwriting risks from the wider 
public. This may result in high-risk groups (usually those who need more 
protection from insurance) being excluded from enjoying the benefits o f 
insurance. However, while economic analysis may provide some explanation of 
the raison d ’etre o f the insurance disclosure rule, it does not explain why “utmost 
good faith” is required.
The same grounds could also be used to explain why a contract o f guarantee is 
not a contract uberrimae fidei. The scope o f the guarantee disclosure is rather 
limited. In Lord Campbell’s words, the criterion is:
“whether there is anything that might not naturally be expected to take 
place between the parties who are concerned in the transaction, that is, 
whether there be a contract between the debtor and the creditor, to the 
effect that his position shall be different from that which the surety might 
naturally expect; and, if  so, the surety is to see whether that is disclosed to 
him.”63
Indeed, the information problem that arises with a guarantee is not the same as 
that in insurance. The creditor (like an assured) does not necessarily have an 
advantage in acquiring credit information about the guarantor. In addition, since 
no premium is paid between guarantor and creditor, there is no further economic 
implication to protect other creditors (like assureds). This also opens the door to 
examine the debtor-guarantor relationship and issues relating to duress and undue 
influence in order to explain why guarantors choose to absorb the debtor’s credit 
risk. 64 If, as Lord Campbell suggests, a creditor should only disclose 
information that could make the guarantee or suretyship different from what he 
might naturally expect, misrepresentation or even mistake might be a better 
explanation.65
63 Hamilton  v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109, at 118-119 (per Lord Campbell), quoted in Levett 
v B arclays Bank p ic  [ 1995] 1 WLR 1260, at 1276.
64 See Royal Bank o f  Scotland  v E tridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773; B arclays Bank p ic  v O'Brien  
[1994] 1 AC 180.
65 Vaughan W illiams LJ took the v iew  that “a creditor must reveal to the surety every fact 
which under the circumstances the surety w ould expect not to exist, for the om ission to mention 
that such a_fact does exist is an implied representation that it does not”: London G eneral
Omnibus Com pany L td  v H ollow ay  [1912] 2 K.B 72, at 79.
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Moreover, in the modem era, the concept o f “utmost good faith” serves other 
purposes than merely dealing with the inequality o f knowledge. One area 
stressed by case law is the element o f “fair dealing” in a duty of utmost good 
faith.66 To some extent, the duty o f disclosure could be reconciled with the idea 
o f fair dealing as one might argue that it is unfair for the assured to conceal 
material information from the insurer.
However, it is easier to show that utmost good faith entails “fair dealing” than the 
other way round. There is always a certain degree o f “fair dealing” in every 
transaction, yet those commercial transactions are not treated as contracts of 
utmost good faith. In modem times, when insurance companies are generally 
more powerful than most assureds, it is also more difficult to base the duty of 
utmost good faith on the ground o f fair dealing and impose a heavier duty of 
disclosure on the assured, who has less bargaining power.
Lastly, requiring the assured to disclose material information is one thing, but 
determining the materiality is another. It could be linked to as an assured’s duty 
to disclose or not to conceal information when the insurer makes an inquiry. 
Given that modem insurers are generally more expert at their business than 
assureds, an insurer should, in general, have a better idea of what information is 
required. Thus, there is a trend in insurance law to impose more responsibility 
on the insurer to make inquiry rather than relying on the assured to disclose 
information.67 The development o f the duty o f disclosure in insurance law is a 
topic o f its own and we need not enter into details here. However, it is important 
to note that bargaining power and fair dealing arguments can be incorporated into 
the discussion o f the duty o f utmost good faith.
Two conclusions may be drawn from the above discussion. First, it is the 
inequality of knowledge between assured and insurer regarding insured risks that 
is behind the duty o f utmost good faith and the duty of disclosure in insurance
66 The Star Sea, supra  note 53, at 4 9 1 -4 9 5  {per  Lord Hobhouse); see also Pan Atlantic Insurance 
Co L td  v Pine Top Insurance Co L td  [1995] 1 AC 501.
67 See generally. Tarr, Disclosure and Concealment in Consumer Insurance Contracts (Cavendish, 
2002); Tarr & Tarr, “The Insured's N on-Disclosure in the Formation o f  Insurance Contracts: A 
Comparative Perspective” (2001) 50(3) ICLQ 577.
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law. The duty of utmost good faith could fill in the gap left between fraud laws 
and the common law non-disclosure rule. Secondly, the duty o f good faith has a 
modem application in addressing the inequality o f bargaining power and issues 
o f fair dealing, notably in restricting the advantages of powerful insurers. It is 
on this ground that we will proceed with our arguments for the use of utmost 
good faith in risk trading contracts.
5.3.3 Risk Trading and Utm ost Good Faith
5.3.3.1 E xchange Trading
Let us start with exchange trading contracts. As the analysis in Chapter 3 
showed, exchange-futures contracts are highly standardised such that the 
exchange contract has become the subject matter of trading instead o f the 
underlying commodity (see 3.2 above). Since exchange contracts are so 
standardised, futures trading does not involve a lot o f negotiation of terms, except 
prices and the number of contracts. There is no inquiry and no concealment as 
traders are not expected to ask or disclose anything other than the desired trading 
price and the number of contracts on the trading floor or in the computer system. 
Any disclosure, if required, should be made to the exchange rather than to the 
counterparty during trading. Thus, it would be meaningless to argue that an 
exchange contract requires utmost good faith. In contrast, since a trader must 
have a membership agreement with the exchange and a non-member must have a 
brokerage or similar agreement with an exchange member, the issue of disclosure 
in the exchange market could be analysed as a matter of post-contractual 
disclosure.
It is undeniable that we expect some form of good faith in exchange trading, 
much as we do in the cases o f other commercial contracts. Most traders hope the 
prices on the market are reliable and reflect the current state o f the market or 
expectations, so they do not want instances of market manipulation or insider 
dealing. If market manipulation and insider dealing are important concerns, we 
have to consider whether it is better to address these problems with special rules 
rather than imposing a general duty of utmost good faith on all futures trading.
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Given that there are many kinds o f futures contracts and traders in the market, a 
general duty o f utmost good faith might in turn make futures transactions 
fiduciary relationships, a situation that even the securities market has not yet 
reached.
5.3.3.2 O ver-the-Counter Trading
In relation to the over-the-counter (OTC) market, the issue of good faith could be 
examined from several perspectives. The complexity o f hedging products and 
the fast-changing environment o f the market makes it difficult to reach a single 
and definitive conclusion on all off-exchange transactions. However, until 
off-exchange hedging contracts become more consumerised, there is no need to 
use the concept o f “utmost good faith” to address the information problem. 
Instead, it is more likely that issues o f insider dealing or market manipulation will 
be introduced.
Let us examine the nature of risks and their evaluation in the case of an insurance 
contract and OTC derivative instruments. In the case of insurance, one may
Aftargue that the evaluation o f risk exposure is to a certain extent individualised. 
For example, the determination o f the correct premium level for a motor 
insurance contract depends partly on the driving record o f the driver. For health 
insurance, the insurer needs to know the health condition o f the assured in order 
to calculate how much risk he is exposed to. But this information might not be 
accessible to the insurer without the assured’s disclosure and, even with some 
kinds o f standardisation in effect, when issuing a policy the insurer still has to 
know some o f the assured’s personal information.69 Thus, there is a larger 
margin for the assured to exploit the insurer’s lack o f knowledge.
68 Schwartz, “Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a 
Theory o f  Demarcation” (2007) 12 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 167, at 191 (citing Keeton and 
W idiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines and Commercial 
Practices, at 164-72 (Practitioner’s ed. 1988))
69 It has also been argued that marine insurance still relies on individualised calculation o f  risks 
and negotiation. See Schoenbaum, “The Duty o f  Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance Law: 
A Comparative Analysis o f  American and English Law” (1998) 29 J Mar L & Com 1, at 3 -4  and 
notes 13 & 14.
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In contrast, the personal element seems to be much diluted in derivative 
instruments. For market hedging, the risk exposure comes from the fluctuation 
o f the market, which in principle should be external to the control o f any risk 
seller or risk buyer (cf. assureds and insurers, respectively). The evaluation of 
market risk does not depend on the risk seller’s special knowledge as market data 
is, in theory, open to all traders to discover. Thus, risk sellers do not necessarily 
have better knowledge than risk buyers.70 A risk buyer might even have equal 
or better access to information than a risk seller, so there is no apparent inequality 
of knowledge in the derivatives market similar to that in the insurance market.
The same could also be argued for standard credit derivatives (see 2.2.23  above). 
In a typical credit default swap (CDS), the risk seller tries to transfer to the risk 
buyer the credit risk of the bonds or other credit instruments he holds. Risk 
buyer and the risk seller probably have equal access to information concerning 
the credit risk o f the third party issuer.71 So, the basic inequality of knowledge 
issue does not necessarily arise.
However, the above analysis is based on an assumption that market or credit risks 
are foreign to both hedgers and speculators, whether they are risk buyers or 
sellers— if they have equal access to the information, there seems to be no need to 
ask one party to disclose to the other. Nevertheless, there are some 
circumstances where this assumption might be false. First, with the 
advancement of financial engineering, a derivative transaction might be designed 
so as to incorporate a party’s personal traits. For example, there exists the 
so-called “self-linked” credit derivative, where the risk seller actually sells his 
own credit risks or those o f persons connected to him (e.g. a parent company or a 
subsidiary).72 This may resemble insurance in some aspects because risk buyers 
for such credit derivative instruments might not know as much as the risk seller 
with regard to the credit risk o f the reference entity.
70 Save for the situation where the risk seller h im self generates information that could influence 
the market.
71 This is based on an assumption that both the risk buyer and the risk seller are business entities 
and are generally equal in capacity o f  making business or financial judgments.
1~ See Firth, “Self-referenced Credit Derivatives— Are They Enforceable under English Law?” 
(2006) 1(1) CMLJ 21.
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Secondly, where one person conducts a market manipulative scheme to work the 
market to his favour, to some extent, he has better knowledge o f potential market 
fluctuation than other traders (because he causes it). “Moral hazard” problems 
might also arise for credit derivative transactions, where the risk buyer 
“manufactures” a credit event in his favour.73 It has happened that a lender, 
purchasing credit default swaps to protect against the credit risk of the loans 
made to borrowers, intentionally restructured the loans to trigger the payment 
obligation o f a CDS.74 To date, credit derivatives transactions are conducted 
mainly between banks and financial or business entities. Thus, concerns about 
moral hazard might be reduced because the risk buyer is usually capable o f 
spotting potential problems and protecting himself contractually. However, as 
the design o f derivative instruments becomes more personalised, this will create 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems similar to those o f the 
insurance field.
Thirdly, where a trader is a corporate insider who has more inside knowledge 
than other traders, this creates a situation similar to insider dealing in the context 
o f securities laws. Arguably, there could be unequal accessibility to information 
(even for a short period of time). As to the hedging market, potential insider 
dealing could be solved by extending the insider dealing rule commonly seen in 
securities regulation. We will address this issue later in this chapter.
Fourthly, one day, risk trading products might become more consumerised, 
which is to say they will be sold to individual consumers rather than to more 
sophisticated business entities. The resultant inequality of bargaining power 
might imply an inequality o f information about products, the market and the 
underlying risks. Thus, one could make a further argument to support the 
imposition o f a “good faith” duty upon the stronger side. However, we should 
be aware that in a typical insurance context it is the assured (usually having less 
bargaining power) who possesses useful information, rather than the insurer (who
73 See Bezzina, “The Protection Seller's Scylla and Charybdis: Negotiating the Moral Hazard 
Straits in 1SDA -based Cash-settled Credit Default Swaps” (2005) 20(11) JIBLR 600.
74 Das, Structured Products V olum e 2: Equity; Commodity; Credit & N ew  Markets, at 743 -744  
(3rd ed., rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006).
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usually has greater bargaining power). If the risk trading market becomes more 
consumerised, it would be the product seller who had better knowledge and 
expertise rather than individual consumers. This could necessitate further duties 
on the part o f financial promoters, or raise so-called “suitability” issues (see also 
2.3.3 above).
The above discussion shows that it would be inappropriate to reject the idea o f the 
contract uberrimae fidei merely on the basis o f the argument that the risk 
evaluation o f derivative instruments is not individualised. There are indeed 
circumstances that in which information is asymmetric and moral hazard 
problems arise, as in insurance law.
However, imposing a duty o f utmost good faith is only one of the possible ways 
to deal with potential information problems. There may be some instances of 
“bad faith” trading or concealment that could damage the market and investors. 
The question we face here is how far the problem could be addressed by a duty of 
utmost good faith or a duty o f disclosure. If breaching a duty of utmost good 
faith results in a contract being avoided (as in section 17 o f the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906), the significant legal consequences and legal uncertainties involved 
might not justify the benefits accruing from such a duty. Avoiding contracts 
requiring only a single performance (like options) is relatively easy to tackle. 
However, where there are multiple performances (like an interest rate swap), 
avoiding contracts may create complicated restitution issues, like the series of 
local authority cases that arose in the UK (see 2.3.1 above), especially when the 
contract has run some time for part of its term. As OTC documentation grows 
more complicated, breaking the contractual scheme might lead to more problems 
than solutions.
In addition, several regulatory regimes already exist to deal with these issues. 
Market manipulation and insider dealing are already punishable by statutes. To
7 Ssome extent, problems may be solved contractually. We should also consider 
whether courts are better equipped to decide market manipulation and price
75 See Bezzina, supra  note.73; Edwards, “The Law o f  Credit Derivatives” (2004) JBL 617, at 
646.
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issues (if we take the good faith approach), rather than relying on regulators or 
other professionals. There is still room for development.
In sum, it is too much to argue that all OTC derivative transactions should be 
treated as kinds o f contracts o f utmost good faith. Most instruments lack the 
personal element that we have seen in the case of insurance policies. Even for 
those instruments which have some degree of personalisation and require a 
certain amount of good faith before the contract is made, it is arguable that there 
are other better ways of dealing with them than imposing a duty of utmost good 
faith and avoiding a contract for failure to honour such duties. After all, 
derivative instruments are based on contracts. If  one party believes that a certain 
type of information is important, he might simply ask the other party about it or 
insert a special term to address the issue. If no inquiry is made and no such term 
inserted, why should we not rest with: let the buyer be aware?
5.3.3.3 Guarantee and Credit D efault Swap
Lastly, let us consider the case o f applying a duty similar to a guarantee contract 
to particular credit default swaps (CDS).76 As mentioned earlier, a guarantee 
contract and a standard CDS share some similarities as they both deal with the 
credit default of a debtor, where a guarantor, as a secondary debtor, pays off the 
debts of the principal deb tor.77 In a credit default swap, a risk buyer 
compensates the loss in value, usually by way of repaying to the risk seller the 
difference between the par value o f the debt instrument (bonds or loans) and its 
current market price after default or by buying out the debt instrument from the 
risk seller. In this way, a CDS ensures that a bondholder (or the lender o f a loan) 
can reclaim back the money to which he is entitled. If a guarantor has a claim on 
avoiding his guarantee contract when the principal debt is greatly different from
7 0
what he knew, could a risk buyer in a CDS enjoy the same claim?
76 The operation o f  a credit default swap was explained in section 2.2.2.3.
77 For more thorough analysis o f  the accessory nature o f  a guarantee contract, see Steyn, 
“Guarantees: the C o-existensiveness Principle” (1974) 90 LQR 246.
78 See supra  5.3.1. Cf. A ssocia ted  Japanese Bank (International) L td  v C redit du N ord SA [ 1989] 
1 WLR 255.
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In reality, it is rather unlikely that a risk seller would agree to take on the credit 
risks o f a third party unless the instrument(s) requiring hedging were specified.79 
This would have two kinds of effects. On the one hand, since it is specified, the 
risk buyer just has to perform the contract as it is. If the risk buyer decides to 
take the credit risks associated with Bond A and if, unfortunately, Bond A is in 
default, the risk buyer should bear the fruits. It does not matter if the risk seller 
does not hold any Bond A or if he holds Bond B instead o f Bond A as stated in the 
agreement.
On the other hand, a CDS could be synthetic or purely speculative (meaning no 
loans or bonds are actually held). In the case o f a guarantee, such kinds of 
disclosure are important and necessary because the guarantor’s obligation is 
closely linked to the principal obligation. If the principal obligation differs from 
what was agreed at the beginning, the extent o f the guarantor’s secondary 
obligation changes accordingly. The same rationale regarding disclosure does 
not hold in the case of a CDS. This does not mean that a risk buyer has no claim 
if the underlying credit obligation greatly exceeds what was expected— he may 
be able to seek remedies using the doctrine of mistake or misrepresentation. It is 
simply that guarantees and CDS are not comparable in terms o f pre-contractual 
disclosure issues.
5.3.3.4 Summary
In this part, we focused on the issue o f whether risk trading contracts could be 
seen as another type of contract uberrimae fidei in which a duty of utmost good 
faith dictates a duty of disclosure. Apart from definitional issues relating to 
insurance and derivatives, we found that it would be difficult to extend the sort of 
duty of utmost good faith applied in insurance to the derivatives market. The 
inequality of knowledge that underlines the insurance disclosure rule does not
79 This would be the case o f  a CDS being used to cover credit exposure on bond or loan.
But if  a CDS structure is em ployed to address the credit risk o f  another derivative transaction (e.g. 
an interest rate swap), the CDS then becom es a “swap guarantee” or a “market risk contingent 
credit default swap”. In this situation, the credit exposure that underlies the CDS becom es more 
dynamic than that o f  a conventional CDS. See Das, Credit Derivatives: CDOs & Structured 
Credit Products, at 156-158 (3rd ed., John W iley & Sons, 2005).
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necessarily exist in the case o f other hedging instruments. We failed to find 
significant differences between derivative instruments and other commercial 
contracts, which have no utmost good faith requirement. However, we also 
noted that problems similar to those found in insurance may arise in the risk 
trading market if an instrument is linked to the risk buyer himself. More 
problems may arise as the market becomes more consumerised and 
individualised. Some of these issues could be resolved by further examination 
o f contractual parties rather than by the nature o f the contract itself.
5.4 Special Relationship
Following above analysis, we will further examine whether there is a kind of 
special relationship between parties to a derivative transaction. We will start by 
discussing the use o f contracts to control disclosure issues before a specific 
transaction is made. We will then consider whether the relationship between the 
two parties is o f a kind that could raise a fiduciary relationship such that one 
party would have to disclose to the other party certain information in order to 
observe his fiduciary duties.
5.4.1 Risk Trading and Fiduciary Relationship
Let us first determine whether risk trading contracts can automatically entail 
fiduciary duties such that one party (as a fiduciary) has to disclose material 
information to the other party before a transaction. Not every type of 
relationship is of the kind o f fiduciary in nature. In general,
“[t]he paradigm of the circumstances in which equity will find a fiduciary 
relationship is where one party, A, has assumed to act in relation to the 
property or affairs o f another, B. A, having assumed responsibility, pro
tanto, for B's affairs, is taken to have assumed certain duties in relation to
80the conduct of those affairs, including normally a duty o f care.”
Fiduciary duties usually arise in a situation where one person is required to take 
care of the interests of another person or persons and where we expect him not to
80 White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, at 271 (per  Lord Browne-W ilkinson).
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advance his own interests before those of the other party or parties.81 Three 
types o f relationships exemplifying the fiduciary relationship are the 
trustee-beneficiary relationship, principal-agent relationship, and 
director-company relationship. Trustee, agent, and corporate director have to 
serve the best interests o f the beneficiary, the principal, and the company 
respectively.
Once a fiduciary relationship is proven to obtain, fiduciary duties consist o f at 
least two aspects. On the one hand, “[t]he distinguishing obligation o f a 
fiduciary is the obligation o f loyalty”;82 thus, the fiduciary should not put himself 
in a position creating a conflict o f interest with the other party or put his own 
interests ahead o f the other party’s. On the other, a fiduciary owes a fiduciary 
duty of care to serve the benefits o f the other party, the exact scope o f which duty 
o f care depends on the relationship between the two parties. The reasonable care 
expected of a corporate director might not be the same as that expected o f the 
trustee of an estate; thus, the extent o f a fiduciary duty o f care should be decided 
on a case-by-case basis.83 However, as far as information and disclosure are 
concerned, it may be argued that to observe his duty o f care or to avoid a conflict 
o f interest the fiduciary might have to disclose certain material information to the 
other party prior to a specific transaction.84 The duty to report is also embedded 
in fiduciary relationship.85
o z
The key is still to establish a fiduciary relationship in the first instance. It 
should be noted that a bank-customer relationship is generally not considered a
81 According to Finn, “the central idea [o f fiduciary duties] is service o f  another’s interests.” 
Finn, “Fiduciary Law and the M odem  Commercial World” in McKendrick (ed.), Commercial 
Aspects o f  Trust and Fiduciary Obligations, at 9 (O UP, 1992).
82 B ristol and West Building Society v M othew  [1998] Ch 1, at 18 (per  Millett LJ).
83 P er Lord Browne-W ilkson, “[a lth ough  the extent o f  those fiduciary duties (including duties o f  
care) w ill vary from case to case, som e duties (including a duty o f  care) arise in each case.” White 
v Jones , supra  note 80, at 271.
84 See R egal (Hastings) L td  v G ulliver [1967] 2 AC 134. The FSA has made detailed rules in 
what a regulated person should do to cope with conflict o f  interest, including disclosing his 
interests to his client. See FSA Handbook, COB 7.1.
85 See Leitch v A bbott (1886) 31 ChD 374. See also Restatement o f  Law 2d, Agency, section 
381.
86 Nevertheless, to determine whether a person is fiduciary, w e might have to resort to the nature 
o f  the fiduciary duties. In Finn’s words, “ [i]t is not because a person is a ‘fiduciary’ or a 
‘confidant’ that a rule applies to him. It is because a particular rule applies to him that he is a
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fiduciary relationship but only a contractual one.87 However, it has been 
suggested that where a situation involves the trust and confidence o f one party or 
where there is an assumption o f responsibility, special relationships other than 
trust and agency might raise a fiduciary duty of care.88 The US law also takes a 
similar position.89
Despite the fact that there is no clear definition of fiduciary relationship, we could 
draw a tentative conclusion that a fiduciary relationship requires “trust and 
confidence”. From this point o f view, it is clear that derivative instruments 
alone do not generally create the kind o f relationship requiring trust and 
confidence. It is not in the nature o f these instruments to require authority, 
management, or forwarding other people’s best interests; neither does insurance 
or a sale. Thus, we could conclude that a risk trading contract does not 
automatically raise fiduciary duties. This is also the position taken by US judges 
to date.90
This thesis does not argue that a fiduciary relationship may never arise between 
any given two parties. A fiduciary relationship may be established if a trust and 
confidence relationship is proved, but this could only be decided on a 
case-by-case basis. What we argue in this section is that risk trading contracts 
alone do not necessarily entail fiduciary duties, but we do not exclude the 
possibility that fiduciary duties might arise from the two parties’ other dealings.
fiduciary or confidant fo r  its purposes."  Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, at 2 (Law Book Company, 
1977). See also B ristol and West Building Society' v M othew [ 1998] Ch 1, at 18 (per Millett LJ).
87 See generally Hudson, Law on Financial D erivatives, at 7-30 (4th ed., Sw eet & M axwell, 
2006). See also Foley' v H ill [ 1848] 2 HLC 28. In N ational W estminster Bank p ic  v Morgan  
[1985] AC 686, the court held that a bank-customer relationship was not the kind o f  ordinary 
relationship that raised the presumption o f  undue influence. At 707 (per  Lord Scarman).
88 White v Jones [ 1995] AC 207 (per  Lord Browne-W ilkinson). See also Woods v M artins Bank 
Ltd  [1959] 1 QB 55; U nited Pan-European Com m unications N V v D eutsche Bank AG  [2000] 
EWCA Civ 166.
89 See De K wiatkow ski v Bear, Stearns & Co, Inc, 306 F 3d 1293 (2002); K 3C  Inc v Bank o f  
A m erica , 2006 US App LEXIS 27437.
90 In Lehman Brothers C om m ercial C orp  v M inm etals International Non-Ferrous M etals 
Trading Co, a US judge also held that “a fiduciary duty does not arise in the normal course o f  an 
arm's-length business transaction. ... [C]ourts have held that a financial products dealer ... 
normally does not undertake a fiduciary duty when it acts as a principal in transactions with an 
institutional counterparty in w hich no trading discretion is conferred.” 179 F Supp 2d 118, at 150 
(2000).
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5.4.2 Fiduciary D uties and E xchange Brokers
Further to the above discussion, let us consider the relationship between an 
exchange broker and his client. As described in Chapter 3, traders who are not 
members o f an exchange have to go through a firm or a person who is a member 
and who will place trades for him. Usually the member trades on his own 
account, even though he is receiving orders from a customer. Therefore, 
although it may look as if the customer is trading on the futures market through a 
brokerage firm, there are, in fact, two parts to the transaction: one between the 
member firm in the exchange, and the other between the firm and the customer. 
For convenience, we may loosely call the member firm a “broker” .91 In this 
context, we may approach the information issue in several ways.
First, information could move from either side of the broker-client relationship. 
On the one hand, if the client holds material information that is unknown to the 
broker, this situation is similar to those we discussed in the previous sections. 
Since a customer could hardly be treated as a fiduciary to the broker, it would be 
difficult to require the client to disclose on the grounds o f fiduciary duties.
On the other hand, the analysis will be different if  it is the broker who holds 
material information and does not tell the client before the latter places an order. 
Since a broker deals with the customer’s orders, an agency relationship could 
obtain between them that might raise fiduciary duties.92 Even without financial 
regulation of the behaviour o f financial brokers (if they are regulated persons),93 
there are certain common law rules on the relationship between parties as to the 
handling o f orders and the movement of money or properties.94 Thus, there is 
the possibility o f raising fiduciary duties to deal with information issues in the
91 An exchange member could hire another exchange member to trade for him. A specialist 
floor trader might also conduct trades for another member firm. The relationship in these 
situations is similar to a broker-client relationship. See also supra  3.2.1 for different types o f  
market participants in the exchange market.
92 In Brandeis Brokers L td  v Black  [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 359, Toulson J upheld the decision o f  
arbitrators that Brandeis had an agency relationship (and thus fiduciary relationship) with Black, 
his client, even when Brandeis traded in the futures market as an undisclosed principal (for a 
discretionary account o f  Mr. Black). See infra 5.5.2.2 for more details o f  this judgment.
93 For example, the FSA Handbook, COB 7 provides som e rules to regulate how a broker/dealer 
should deal with a customer’s order
94 See Stafford v Conti C om m odity Services L td  [1981] 1 L loyd’s Rep 466.
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broker-client relationship. It then depends on the scope o f the duties owed by 
the broker. If a broker only handles orders for the client without giving any 
advice or being given any discretion, it is arguable whether the duty of the broker 
could include informing the client as to a piece o f material information.95 In 
contrast, if the client has authorised the broker to use his discretion when trading, 
there is a higher chance that the broker is under a duty to disclose relevant market 
information.96
Secondly, in a broker-client relationship, further bargaining power and investor 
protection concerns could arise. A client could be a sophisticated business 
entity who does not have membership in an exchange. He could also be an 
individual investor who wishes to hedge or speculate in the futures market. 
Thus, it would be false to assume that there is always unequal bargaining power 
between a broker and a client. On the other hand, the contract between a broker 
and a client could be a standardised form drawn up by the broker without any 
negotiation. Further concerns might come into play if a broker has greater 
bargaining power, which allows him to insert terms necessary to protect him
07from any information advantage.
Thirdly, it would be a different story if a broker assumed the role of an investment 
adviser rather than merely a broker. It would be even more complicated if  we 
took into account the law o f negligence and the potential duty of confidentiality 
owed by the broker, who might have to take care in drafting his contract and in 
the wording o f his advice to customers to avoid any exposure to liability.
95 In D e K wiatkow ski v Bear, Stearns & Co, Inc, 306 F 3d 1293 (2002), the US court took the 
view  that a broker for a non-discretionary account does not normally hold any fiduciary duty or 
additional duty to disclose to or advise his client.
96 Cf. Brandeis Brokers L td  v Black  [2001 ] 2 Lloyd's Rep 359.
97 A similar line o f  analysis was taken in the US law. The client’s level o f  sophistication is an 
essential factor when determining whether there is a fiduciary relationship between a broker and a 
client. See Matthews, “Derivatives, Fiduciary Obligations and Codes o f  Conduct” in 
Bettelheim, et al. (ed.), Swaps and Off-exchange Derivatives Trading: Law and Regulation (FT 
Law & Tax, 1996).
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5.5 Insider Dealing
If the above analysis shows that the mandatory disclosure system in securities 
regulations might not work well in the non-securities market, and that the duty of 
utmost good faith is not suitable for non-insurance risk trading contracts, there is 
still one type of non-disclosure that might be seen as wrong but is not addressed 
by common law remedies. Insider dealing (also called “insider trading”) has 
long attracted academic interest. The insider dealing rule does not directly 
impose a duty of disclosure; instead, the insider dealing rule prohibits an insider 
from using his information advantage before the information has been published 
in a proper manner. The rule is largely based on statute.
An insider dealing transaction is a transaction where an “insider” uses his 
privileged access to inside information to make profit on the market before this 
information is disclosed to the public. Insider dealing problems are usually 
discussed in the context of securities markets. For example, a typical case of 
insider dealing in the securities market would be if a director at Northern Rock 
sold his shares in the company ahead o f a new financial report on Northern 
Rock’s performance, being aware that the report is much worse than the market 
expected. If, in contrast, he chooses to go long or short on NASDAQ futures, he 
is still profiting from his inside knowledge but he has crossed the line into the 
derivative market.
The same thing could also happen in the commodities market. Broadly 
speaking, any information advantage could lead to some kinds of insider dealing, 
whether it is related to securities or not. If the opportunistic buyer in Laidlaw v 
Organ had been the agent o f one of the representatives signing the peace treaty, 
he would have been using insider information for his own profit. Osama Bin 
Laden could likewise have made huge profits by making currency or oil 
transactions before or after the September 11 attack (if he had found a way to 
launder his money). Or, to give a rather more cinematic example, a person 
gifted with supernatural powers over the weather (such as in the movie X-Men)
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could earn a fortune simply by buying weather futures and using his powers to
98change weather patterns to his own advantage.
Given the speculative nature o f derivative instruments and the close connection 
with current financial markets, it is no surprise that insider dealing might extend 
from the traditional securities market to futures or other derivatives markets (see
5.5.1 below). However, it is not clear how far the insider dealing rule should and 
could address potential information problems. In this part, we will examine 
potential insider dealing problems by using derivative instruments. We will 
not limit ourselves to a narrow meaning of “insider dealing” in the stock 
market. In contrast, we will explore a broader range o f circumstances wherein 
a person uses his inside knowledge unknown to other market participants to 
conduct risk trading.
5.5.1 Current Laws and Underlying Theories
Before moving on to some potential insider dealing problems in the hedging 
market, we should first understand what insider dealing means and, more 
importantly, why insider dealing is deemed wrong in the securities market. In 
the UK, insider dealing was already considered a criminal offence under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA 1993)" before the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) made it a kind o f  “market abuse”. 100 We 
should be aware that the CJA 1993 uses explicit terms like “insider” and “inside 
information” and limits criminal liability to dealings with securities, which 
include not only stock and bonds but also options, futures, and contracts for 
differences involving purchases or sales of securities.101 On the other hand, the
98 Similar things could also happen to gambling contracts. For example, a horse owner knows 
that his horse has absolutely no chance o f  winning a race, (for a reason not yet known to the public 
and which could influence the odds). Before the information is leaked, the owner could lay (or 
sell) odds in a betting exchange (see 4.2.1 above) and thus win som e money. In this horseracing 
story, the owner (as one party to a gambling transaction) knows something that is not known to 
the other party. The owner is apparently an insider and he uses his information to his advantage 
before the information becom es known to the other. The question is whether the owner has to 
disclose this information and whether, as far as our argument in this section is concerned, this is 
the kind o f  transaction that could be defined as a type o f  “cheating”.
99 Criminal Justice Act 1993, section 52 et seq.
100 FSM A 2000, section 118 et seq. See also FSA Handbook, MAR 1.3 (insider dealing).
101 Criminal Justice Act 1993, Schedule 2.
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FSMA 2000 has a broader application without specific reference to “securities” 
or “insider” .102 The FSMA 2000 makes it clear that the penalty imposed for 
market abuse does not make a transaction void or unenforceable.103 Thus, 
insider dealing behaviour does not render a transaction void. However, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) might make a restitution order where 
necessary104 and impose penalties for violators.105
In contrast, US law shows a different style. The foundation o f the modem 
insider dealing rule in the US securities regulations lies in the anti-fraud 
provision in the Securities Exchange Act o f 1934106 and the SEC Rule 10b-5107, 
which make it unlawful to employ any manipulative or deceptive device (or any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud) in contravention of SEC rules and 
regulations. Thus, the US insider dealing law has a strong reference to “fraud”, 
without explicitly using the term “insider dealing” (or “insider trading”).
A breakthrough in insider dealing law occurred in the 1960s. The rule was 
largely developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the US 
courts.108 We should be aware that violation o f the anti-provision o f the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 might grant victims private cause o f actions 
to sue for dam ages.109 A corporate director or officer might also have to 
disgorge his profits to the issuer company if  he uses inside information to make 
profit.110
102 FSM A 2000, section 118. The FSA handbook broadly refers to insider dealing o f  “qualifying
investment”, defined by the Treasury as all investments prescribed by the FSM A 2000 section 22
in recognised investment exchanges. See FSA Handbook MAR 1.3 and The Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (Prescribed Markets and Qualifying Investments) Order 2001 (SI 
2001/996), article 4 & 5.
,03 FSM A 2000, section 131.
104 FSMA 2000, section 382 et seq.
105 FSMA 2000, sections 123 & 129.
106 Securities Exchange Act o f  1934, section 10(b). 15 USCA 78j.
107 17 CFR 240 .10b-5.
108 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co, 40  SEC 907 (1961); SEC v Texas G u lf Sulfur Co, 401 F 2d 833 
(1968).
109 See Superintendent o f  Insurance o f  N ew  York v Bankers Life & C asualty Co, 404 US 6 (1971); 
Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185 (1976).
1,0 15 USCA 78p(b). This section applies to corporate directors and officers when they use 
inside information to buy securities or securities-related instruments and when profits are 
realised within 6 months. The purpose o f  this section is to prevent “unfair” use o f  information.
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Regardless o f the meaning o f “inside information”, 111 the meaning of “insider” 
appears to determine how far insider dealing rules in the securities market can 
reach. Corporate directors, managers and employees are the most usual type of 
“insider” . 112 In both the UK and the US, a tippee, who receives tips from 
corporate insiders, is also liable for insider dealing. 113 We also expect 
professionals (such as solicitors or accountants) who have access to inside 
information not to use it before it is published.114
However, there are always some difficult boundary cases. In US v Chiarella]]S, 
the court faced a situation where an employee o f a financial printer somehow 
decoded the messages as to the target companies o f takeover bids using his own 
skills. Should Mr. Chiarella be liable even though he was neither a corporate 
insider nor a professional? He did not even have a direct contractual 
relationship with the company (but only with his immediate employer).
This case raised a fundamental problem: why is insider dealing prohibited? One 
fundamental difficulty in forming the foundation for prohibition of insider 
dealing is identifying the victims. The victims o f an insider dealing scheme 
could be the company itself, shareholders, counterparties to the trading contracts, 
other outside investors, or the market in general. For each type of victim one 
might develop a theory to justify insider dealing rules. This thesis does not 
claim to specialise in insider dealing theory, but it is necessary to understand 
certain concerns about insider dealing before continuing our analysis.
First, the special relationship between parties (notably the fiduciary relationship) 
is the basis of the insider dealing rule; thus, insider dealing might be seen to be 
wrong because the insider breaches his duty.116 The drawback of this approach 
is obvious, as it cannot explain the application o f the insider dealing rule beyond
111 See Criminal Justice Act 1993, section 56. It is also frequently called non-public material 
information in US judgments.
112 Criminal Justice Act 1993 s 57(2)(a)(i). See also SEC  v Texas G u lf Sulfur Co, 401 F 2d 833 
(1968).
113 Criminal Justice Act 1993, section 57(2)(b). For US law, see D irks v SEC, 463 US 646  
(1983); C arpenter v US, 484 US 19 (1987).
114 Criminal Justice Act 1993, section 57(2)(a)(ii). For US law, see US v O 'H agan, 521 US 642 
(1997).
115 445 US 222 (1980).
116 In re Cady, Roberts & Co, 40 SEC 907 (1961).
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corporate directors and professionals (e.g. why a tippee is liable for insider 
dealing). Secondly, a wider view is that the insider misappropriates information 
that does not belong to him .117 Further development o f this line o f thinking
1 1 o
could extend to render the tippee liable. Thirdly, one may further argue that 
inside information is a kind o f protected property, such that an insider should not 
use it without the information having already been disclosed.119
Fourthly, if  we look at the bigger scale, insider dealing might have implications 
for the market. Price and market efficiency are major concerns. There are 
already plenty o f economic arguments about how quickly information can be 
reflected in the market in terms o f price and how insider dealing influences the
1 onprice o f securities. " On the other hand, there are also arguments to the
contrary, with some authors arguing that insider dealing might in fact push price
121toward a more accurate position. If  price is the major concern, it is the market 
and investors as a whole that are the victims. In contrast, it is arguable that it is 
the issuing company (whose information is exploited by the insider before being 
published) that is the victim because its information is misappropriated. But it is 
also arguable whether the company suffers any loss at all in this circumstance.
Fifthly, some commentators turn to a moral explanation o f why insider dealing is 
wrong. In Chiarella, Justice Blackmun argued that insider dealing without 
disclosure is “inherently unfair” . 122 However, justifying the “fairness” 
argument also requires much deeper analysis than a mere statement that insider 
dealing is unfair.123 The appeal of moral theories might lie in their flexibility; 
however, upon closer inspection such appeal may be found rather hollow because
117 US V O 'H agan , 521 US 642 (1997).
118 See Cohen, “Old Rule, N ew  Theory: R evising the Personal Benefit Requirement for 
Tipper/Tippee Liability under the Misappropriation Theory o f  Insider Trading” (2006) 47 BC L 
Rev 547.
119 See Krawiec, “Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin o f  the 
Realm in the Information A ge” (2001) 95 N w  UL Rev 443; Lee, “Fairness and Insider Trading” 
[2002] Colum Bus L Rev 119. See also Karmel, “The Relationship Between Mandatory 
Disclosure and Prohibitions against Insider Trading: W hy A Property Rights Theory o f  Inside 
Information Is Untenable” (1993) 59 Brooklyn L Rev 149.
120 See generally A vgouleas, supra  note 2, at 80 -85 .
1‘ 1 See Easterbrook, “Insider dealing, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production 
o f  Information” [1981] Sup Ct Rev 309, at 335.
122 445 US 222, at 248 (1980).
1-3 See Easterbrook, supra  note 121, at 323 et seq.
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we still have to justify the ethical standpoint that a particular writer takes on a 
particular situation. 124 A more straightforward argument would be that 
counterparties to such insider dealing transactions are the victims as they suffer 
directly from a lack of market sensitive information.125
In addition, one may further argue that insider dealing is wrong (or unfair) 
because other investors do not have equal access to inside information.126 This 
“equal access theory” could work in combination with other theories (e.g. fair 
dealing or property theory).127 The swing in public policy against insider 
dealing would greatly influence how we formulate and interpret the insider 
dealing rule, particularly in grey area cases like Chiarella.
From a more practical point o f view, how legislators and judges in each 
jurisdiction approach insider dealing transactions and construe the law certainly 
depends on statutory language. The US law makes strong reference to “fraud” 
because the US insider dealing rule comes from the anti-fraud provision in the 
Securities Exchange Act o f 1934.128
In contrast, there is no use o f the term “defraud” in UK law; the FSMA 2000 puts 
insider dealing under the heading o f “market abuse”, which gives clues on how to 
deal with “insider dealing”. The way the FSMA 2000 determines the legal 
consequences o f such kinds of market abuse (i.e. not avoiding a contract but 
imposing penalties or ordering restitution as remedies) suggests that the FSA 
focuses on the market as a whole rather than an individual corporation or 
counterparty. In addition, structuring insider dealing under “market abuse” has
124 See Lawson, “The Ethics o f  Insider dealing” (1988) 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 727; response by 
M acey, “Comment: Ethics, Econom ics, and Insider dealing: Ayn Rand Meets the Theory o f  the 
Firm” (1988) 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 785.
125 See Strudler & Orts, “Moral Principle in the Law o f  Insider dealing” (1999) 78 Tex L Rev 
375.
126 This rule was first adopted by a US court but later rejected. See SEC  v Texas G u lf Sulfur Co, 
401 F 2d 833 (1968).
127 See Lee, supra  note 119.
128 See 15 USCA 78j.
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the advantage o f avoiding the need to force all arguments into the mould of 
“fraud”, as in the U S.129
In the end, we should be aware that the insider dealing rule was developed in 
securities regulations to regulate the securities market. If  we move beyond the 
securities market, we may find similar concerns about price, unfairness, and even 
fraud in relation to potential insider dealing. However, there also exist certain 
difficulties, as we are faced with the intersection o f physical trading and notional 
trading and have to keep a balance between the common law non-disclosure rule 
and a more regulatory-style insider dealing rule. It is on this basis that we will 
continue our arguments.
5.5.2 Application to the Risk Trading Market
5.5.2.1 Securities-related E xchan ge Trading
The concerns arising from insider dealing in the securities market might also be 
applied in the futures, options or other securities-related products traded on 
exchanges. Insider dealing by way o f securities-related derivative instruments 
is already regulated in both the UK and the US. 130 The case for 
securities-related options is simpler: an insider can make profits by arbitraging 
the fluctuation of the option prices or between the current securities prices and 
the future option exercise prices; he may also make profits or avoid immediate 
loss by using his inside information to buy or sell single-name securities futures 
contracts (e.g. futures contracts for British Petroleum stocks).
However, making profits on the futures market is not as simple as buying and 
selling stocks or bonds in a securities exchange. Until the futures product 
matures, a trader does not really pay for the underlying assets (but only the
129 See generally. Loke, "From the Fiduciary Theory to Information Abuse: The Changing 
Fabric o f  Insider Trading Law in the UK, Australia and Singapore” (2006) 54 Am J Comp L 
123.
130 See Criminal Justice Act 1993, Schedule 2. In the US, the Securities Exchange Act has 
already included insider dealing by w ay o f  a securities-based swap agreement. See 15 USCA  
78j. "Security future”, which generally means futures o f  a single stock, have been included in 
the definition o f  "security” under the Securities and Exchange Act o f  1934 as w ell as the 
Securities Act o f  1933 after the Com m odity Futures Modernization Act o f  2000.
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margin). For example, if  we borrow the facts from SEC v Texas Gulf Sulfur
131Co , the TGF had some good news on discovering a new oil field. Before 
announcing this new discovery in a clear way, some directors traded the 
company’s stocks on the market, and the directors were held to be responsible for 
insider dealing. If any one o f these directors wanted to profit from futures 
trading using their inside information, he had to build up long futures positions 
and liquidate as soon as the information was published (assuming that the 
announcement o f such information would have led to the rise o f the TGF’s stock 
price). Since technically he did not hold any valuable assets but only a 
contractual right to buy the underlying assets at the end of trading, we could 
hardly deem him to have made a profit unless the position is liquidated. This 
shows that a futures position is a contract that expires at a certain point of time in 
the future (by triggering the process o f physical delivery or cash settlement). 
Moreover, we may also further compare the situation where the director does not 
buy company stocks but lands lying near the site o f the new oil field. Should the 
directors disclose the information to the land owner (which would presumably 
increase the property prices)? In principle, the common law non-disclosure rule 
should apply (unless the court holds otherwise).132
In addition, more difficulties arise if an insider trades indices futures (such as the 
FTSE 100 futures). In order to establish that the insider used his inside 
knowledge to earn a profit in the index futures market, we have to establish the 
connections between the sensitive information and not only the price o f the 
securities but also the movement o f the futures market. Since an index might be 
influenced by many factors other than information concerning a single company, 
the causal link between a piece of information and the index might become 
problematic.
We should then consider why insider dealing by securities-related futures should 
be regulated as under current law. If the misappropriation theory is the basis, it 
probably does not matter much whether an insider trades in the spot market or in
13' 401 F 2d 833 (1968).
132 See Fried, supra  note 29, Chapter 6.
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the securities-related futures market. After all, the insider is penalised because 
he misappropriates corporate information to gain his own profits for himself. 
Moral theories might also help to support this point. However, difficulties 
remain in determining the amount o f damages or restitution to be attributed if  an 
insider trades market index futures before a piece of material information is 
disclosed.
On the other hand, if  using inside information in the securities-related futures 
market is not desirable because it could be seen as a type o f market abuse or is a 
fraud on the market, further research is needed to establish the link between 
information and the prices o f a specific futures product in order to explain the 
potential negative impact on the market. After all, since the futures prices 
reflect expectations for the future, more has to be done to establish the future 
“price integrity” than in the spot securities market.
5.5.2.2 C om m odity T ransactions
5.5.2.2.1 Some Problems
If we expand our framework beyond securities, it will be seen that scenarios 
similar to securities insider dealing may still occur in the commodities market. 
Something akin to the Bin Laden example we gave earlier could well occur in a 
big oil company, to the directors o f such a company or any person receiving 
trading tips from these “insiders”. Information in the commodities market is as 
important as in the securities market.
There are several situations where commodity insider dealing could occur. 
First, an insider could arbitrage price differences in the spot market, in the futures 
market, or between spot and futures market prices. By comparison with the 
securities market, it is more difficult to make a fortune by arbitraging in the spot 
commodity market. Higher liquidity in the market is the key to making such a 
scheme viable. It is obviously easier to conduct commodities insider dealing on 
organised exchanges where a person can buy, sell, and liquidate transactions 
quickly and at lower costs. However, with the help of standardised 
documentation in commodities trading, and to some extent the use of clearing
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clauses (such as circle clauses), a trader may still earn price differences by way of 
spot market commodity trades (see 3.3.2 above). In addition, if, using inside 
information, a person buys a commodity (e.g. gold) and keeps it as long-term 
investment rather than arbitraging price differences within a short period o f time, 
it is arguable whether this is a kind o f insider dealing that merits punishment.
Secondly, insider dealing may occur if an insider uses inside information 
regarding the production o f a commodity to make a profit.133 For example, a 
leading agricultural company knows that the production o f August crops will not 
be good this year. Before this production information is disclosed to the market, 
either the company itself or one o f its directors uses this information to sell 
agriculture futures. In the securities market, the same scenario would constitute 
insider dealing.134 Likewise, big universal banks may acquire significant inside 
knowledge about the various aspects o f their banking business and use the 
information for speculative trading.135
Thirdly, one could use inside information for personal profit by taking a step 
ahead o f a market participant’s transactions— this is sometimes called the 
problem o f “front-running”.136 Tips could range from the market participant’s 
hedging strategies to a bulky spot (or futures) transaction and could influence 
market prices in a significant fashion. For example, knowing that part o f the 
Shell strategy is to sell Brent futures positions in bulk, an insider might sell Brent
133 Dan Morgan relates several stories about how a few dominant grain companies search 
production new s from all around the world in order to grab a business opportunity. Grain 
merchants’ operations in the futures also raise certain concerns. See Morgan, Merchants o f  
Grain, at 429 e t seq. (Penguin, 1980).
134 Cf. SE C  v Texas G u lf Sulfur Co, 401 F 2d 833 (1968).
135 There situation entails a “Chinese W all” issue. See “Frontier Justice” The Economist (21-27  
October 2006).
136 Markham distinguishes three types o f  front-running in the com m odity futures market: “(1) 
trading by third parties who are tipped on an impending block trade ("tippee" trading); (2) 
transactions in which the owner or purchaser o f  the block trade itself engages in the offsetting  
futures or options transaction as a means o f  "hedging" against price fluctuations caused by the 
block transaction ("self-front-running"); and (3) transactions where a broker with knowledge o f  
an impending customer block order trades ahead o f  that order for the broker's own profit 
("trading ahead")”. Markham, “ ’Front-running’—-Insider Dealing under the Commodity 
Exchange A ct” (1988) 38 Cath U L Rev 69, at 71. The FSA Handbook defines front 
running/pre-positioning as “a transaction for a person's own benefit, on the basis o f  and ahead o f  
an order w hich he is to carry out with or for another (in respect o f  which information concerning 
the order is inside information), which takes advantage o f  the anticipated impact o f  the order on 
the market price”. FSA Handbook M AR 1.3.3(2).
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futures before Shell does and buy back positions after Shell has sold its futures 
(assuming that Shell’s bulk trading would send futures prices down in the short 
term and no other factors were involved).
Fourthly, a more serious problem would occur if one tried to make a profit by 
creating a significant market event, which is not a remote possibility in a 
globalised society, given that the market prices for some major commodities 
(such as crude oil and currencies) are greatly influenced not only by the law of 
supply and demand but also by major economic and political events. A 
powerful trader might also com er the market to fuel up spot or futures prices so 
that he could make profit on his own speculative positions.137 This does indeed 
enter the realm o f market manipulation or market abuse rather than traders 
merely using their information to their own advantage.
Fifthly, insider dealing may well occur across different sectors, not just in a 
single market. Some big market participants might have interests in different 
products or industries, such that they are in a powerful position to use information 
acquired in one market for trading in another m arket.138 For example, a 
particularly bad crop year in the US would affect not only domestic buyers and 
sellers but also foreign spot or futures markets, as merchants might seek supplies 
from somewhere outside the US. Prices o f substitute raw materials could also 
rise if  other traders turned to other alternatives.
In addition, two markets can be inter-connected even though, superficially, they 
appear to be unrelated. For example, the com futures market has become a 
playground for many energy traders because com is increasingly being used to 
manufacture ethanol.139 The energy industry might feel the heat if com prices 
were driven too high, and prices for ethanol would be affected. A bad crop year 
might also send shockwaves through the freight market, as shipping from the US
137 For exam ple, British Petroleum was subject to investigation for manipulative trading 
practices in the US. See Grant, “B P ’s A ggressive Trading Culture Comes to Surface”
Financial Tim es (3 July 2006). See also Morgan, supra  133.
138 For example, Morgan has a lively illustration o f  the cross-industry operation o f  Cargill, one o f  
the biggest grain trading com panies in the world. See Morgan, supra  133, at 230.
139 See Morrisonin, “Com Futures Trading V olum es Reach Record” Financial Times (19 June 
2006).
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might diminish in the future and thus also affect freight rate forwards/swaps.140 
In addition, a bad crop year would certainly influence the share prices o f big 
agricultural companies (as well as the industry in general). This would again 
lead to the realm o f insider dealing in securities.
5.5.2.2.2 D iscussion
We may analyse potential insider dealing issues in the commodities market in 
two dimensions: who uses the inside information and what are the purposes of 
using such inside information.
First, from the above scenarios, we might find that potential insider dealing in the 
commodities market is not limited to corporate insiders or tippees who know 
something about the company that is not yet known to outsiders. There is a 
chance that it is the company itself using inside information rather than a 
corporate insider using the com pany’s information. This reflects the differences 
between the commodities market and the securities market. Normally, an issuer 
of securities would not buy and sell its own stocks or bonds circulated in the 
secondary market and, even if  it did buy back its stocks, there are certain rules in 
company law or securities regulation that the issuing company has to follow.141 
Buying back its own shares might also raise market manipulation concerns and 
allow regulators to intervene. " Thus, in the securities market, usually we focus 
on insider dealing o f corporate directors or other insiders.
In contrast, in the commodities market, it is open to manufacturers, producers and 
any corporate or non-corporate insider to trade at the same time. Both the source 
of information and the insiders who have access to the information could conduct
140 The maritime freight rate is subject to fluctuation much like com m odities. Thus, there has 
evolved a forward freight rate swap to allow  shippers to hedge against freight rate risk.
Examples can be seen in D am pskibsselskabet "Norden ” A/S v Andre  c£ CIE SA [2003] 1 
L loyd’s Rep 287; Erne Shipping Inc v H B C  H am burg Bulk C arriers Gm bH , 409 F Supp 2d 427  
(2006). It w as once reported that a N ew  York agent, who made a mistake w hile bidding on com  
for his client, asked his client to delay reporting the sale or booking ships for a few  hours so that 
he could manage to recover the losses he made (by his own mistake) in the futures market. This 
story show s that how' the shipping industry is closely  linked with international grain sales. See 
Morgan, supra  133, at 2 8 4 -2 8 5 .
141 See Com panies Act 2006, section 658 e t seq.
142 See generally. A vgouleas, supra  note 2, at 280 et seq.
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trading with this inside information. Where a director or any other inside 
personnel uses his inside knowledge to make personal profits, this is similar to 
insider dealing in securities; thus, we may attempt to apply the same line of 
analysis developed in securities regulation. However, where it is the generator 
of information that enters into trading using his own inside knowledge, there are 
more conflicts between the common law non-disclosure rule and the idea of 
prohibiting insider dealing in the financial market as a whole.
Secondly, the reasons for an insider dealing transaction might enter into the 
question. In the context o f risk trading contracts, one person could make an 
insider dealing transaction for the purpose o f hedging future losses as well as 
speculating on the market. I f  speculation is the sole purpose, this is more 
comparable to insider dealing in the securities market since it is closer to 
opportunistic behaviour that can be attacked on moral grounds. In contrast, 
since hedging is more or less established as a legitimate purpose (see 4.3 above), 
it is arguable that there is nothing wrong with using unpublished material 
information to avoid one’s own loss, especially when it is the company, rather 
than a director or any other corporate insider, who uses the inside information in 
trading.
We should also note that there is already a continuous duty of disclosure of 
material information to the market in securities regulation (see 5.2 above). 
Thus, it is natural to prohibit insiders from exploiting that information before it is 
published. In contrast, as regulation on commodities trading does not contain 
such a duty, why should we bother to ask people not to use his inside information 
if, in principle, they are allowed to take any information advantage? A balance 
must be made between the common law rule and the insider dealing rule imposed 
by statutes. The reasons why we perceive insider dealing as wrong will 
determine how important we find tackling insider dealing in the non-securities 
market.
As in the securities market, there are two lines o f analysis we may follow. On 
the one hand, we could follow the line o f price integrity. However, we should be 
cautious when comparing futures prices with spot market prices as there is no
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doubt that a piece o f information could influence both the physical market and 
the hedging market (Laidlaw v Organ143 is a good example). However, a 
non-disclosure o f inside information does not automatically mean that market 
prices are w rong.144 A coherent line o f analysis has to be made to fully justify a 
wrongful price theory in relation to commodity insider dealing.145
On the other hand, if  insider dealing is not wrong because of its market 
implications but because the insider uses a piece o f information that does not 
belong to him, we should consider whether the problem could be resolved in 
other ways. In a more typical insider situation, the source o f the information 
might use existing legal tools, such as fiduciary duties or confidentiality duties, to 
restrain directors, officers, employees or any contracted persons from using that 
information. Why should we launch a regulatory scheme to address the problem 
of corporate insiders using corporate information in the commodities market if 
the problem could be solved by inserting a contractual term to allow the company 
to sue for damages?
Currently, the FSA takes a fine line in distinguishing insider dealing as market 
abuse and trading with legitimate business.146 The FSA has provided some 
guidelines on whether, in using inside information, a person is pursuing 
legitimate business. To quote in full:
In the opinion of the FSA, the following factors are to be taken into 
account in determining whether or not a person's behaviour is in pursuit of 
legitimate business, and are indications that it is:
(1) the extent to which the relevant trading by the person is carried out in 
order to hedge a risk, and in particular the extent to which it neutralises and 
responds to a risk arising out o f the person's legitimate business; or
(2) whether, in the case o f a transaction on the basis of inside information 
about a client's transaction which has been executed, the reason for it being 
inside information is that information about the transaction is not, or is not 
yet, required to be published under any relevant regulatory or exchange 
obligations; or
(3) whether, if the relevant trading by that person is connected with a 
transaction entered into or to be entered into with a client (including a
143 15 US 178 (1817).
144 See also Perdue, supra  note 40, at 366 et seq.
145 See generally. A vgouleas, supra  note 2, at 108-111.
146 FSA Handbook, M AR 1.3.7.
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potential client), the trading either has no impact on the price or there has 
been adequate disclosure to that client that trading will take place and he 
has not objected to it; or
(4) the extent to which the person's behaviour was reasonable by the proper 
standards o f conduct o f the market concerned, taking into account any 
relevant regulatory or legal obligations and whether the transaction is 
executed in a way which takes into account the need for the market as a 
whole to operate fairly and efficiently.147
This explanation appears to show that the FSA is trying to reconcile the common 
law and the market abuse rule in order to define the line between lawful business 
practice and market abuse conduct. The FSA is ready to allow a true hedging 
contract to stand even if  inside information was used to make the hedging 
transaction. Insider dealing in the commodities market might be allowed if  it is 
in line with the standards o f market conduct (and thus no market “abuse”) or has 
no impact on the market (and thus no abuse of the “market”). Apparently, the 
more organised the market, the more likely that the financial regulator will 
enforce the relevant market abuse rules. However, it remains to be seen how far 
the FSA would extend the use o f the insider dealing rule to risk trading contracts 
that take place outside the banking circle or organised exchanges. If such 
contracts are not touched by regulation, they will be governed by the common 
law rule, where one party might in principle enjoy his information advantage.
If a person intentionally stages an event to work market prices to his favour, this 
is probably more like market manipulation behaviour. To address this kind of 
conduct, a more comprehensive and focused market manipulation regulation 
might be better suited than a general prohibition on insider dealing. After all, 
market manipulation looks much more like straight fraud than mere 
non-disclosure.
Moreover, there might be concerns over the integrity and openness of trading if 
major participants worked the exchange and rules to their favour. Through such 
participants’ superior knowledge o f the market, one might wonder whether
147 FSA Handbook, M AR 1.3.10.
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“outsiders” were being treated fairly in the open market.148 In this case, major 
market participants’ use o f their inside knowledge might be subject to further 
scrutiny.149 And one might further challenge the role an exchange could play in 
dealing with market manipulation or insider dealing.150 In the off-exchange 
market, a further point might be the regulatory control (if any) o f trade 
associations or non-profit organisations, which produce standard forms for the 
market.151
Lastly, certain insider dealing problems could be related to relationships among 
parties. For example, a front-running problem might occur where a broker 
trades for his own benefit before he trades for a client’s trading order. If  we 
turn to the private law side o f the issue, front-running in the context o f the 
broker-client relationship might raise the issue o f breaching fiduciary duty 
(provided that a fiduciary relationship is established in the first place).
On the one hand, one argument to support a breach o f fiduciary duty claim is 
based on the fact that a broker has to use information about his client’s order to 
make front-running transactions. Thus, it is arguable that a broker breaches his 
duty o f confidentiality by front-running. In Brandeis Brokers Ltd v Black153, 
Brandeis, the broker, was accused o f breaching his fiduciary duty to Black, his 
client, by mis-pricing and front-running. The arbitral tribunal held that it is a 
“misuse o f confidential information” if a “broker discloses to outside parties, or 
uses for its own purposes, confidential information in its possession about a 
client’s positions, transactions or intended transactions” and that
148 Once it has been described that the futures market had a “club-like atmosphere”. Markham, 
The History o f  Com m odity Futures Trading and Its Regulation, at 58 (Praeger, 1986). If this is 
the case, there could be suspicion o f  lapse o f  self-regulation by exchanges that might further 
enhance regulatory intervention.
149 See FSA Handbook, M AR 1.3, particularly the example given in MAR 1.3.21.
150 See A vgouleas, supra  note 2, at 2 2 9 -2 3 4  (OUP, 2005)
151 See Bradley, “Private International Law-making for the Financial Markets” (2005) 29 
Fordham Int'l LJ 127; D avis, “Production o f  Boilerplate: The Role o f  Nonprofits in the 
Production o f  Boilerplate” (2006) 104 Mich L Rev 1075.
152 This kind o f  practice is already prohibited by the Financial Services Authority. FSA  
Handbook, M AR 1.3.2(2) and the exam ple given in M AR 1.3.22. See also Blair & Walker (ed.), 
Financial Services Law, at 6.58 (O UP, 2006).
153 [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 359.
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“[f]ront-running would be a particular form o f misuse o f confidential 
information”. 154 Toulson J upheld the arbitral decision.
On the other hand, another argument is that a broker’s front-running moves 
market prices before his client’s order and thus puts his client in a less favourable 
place if  a broker trades ahead o f a bulky order. In an American case, Dial, the 
defendant, was accused o f committing mail fraud in violation o f a federal statute 
by trading ahead o f a client’s trading order in the Chicago Board of Trade.155 
The main issue was fraud rather than fiduciary duties. However, the Seventh 
Circuit Court also held that
“Dial, when he solicited his customers to participate in block orders, 
implicitly represented to them that he would try to get the best possible 
price. He could have gotten a better price by putting their orders in ahead 
o f the orders he placed for his own accounts and those o f his friends. In 
trading ahead o f his customers without telling them what he was doing, he 
was misleading them for his own profit, and conduct o f this type has long 
been considered fraudulent.” 156
In the end, Dial was held to have committed fraud. If  we follow the above two 
judgments, it seems that it is accepted by both the UK and US court that a 
commodity futures broker breaches his duty o f confidentiality or loyalty by 
front-running a client’s order. We may also find that misappropriation or 
fiduciary theory might become the basis for regulation against front-running by 
a commodity futures broker.
5.5.2.3 Credit Market
We now turn to potential insider dealing and OTC transactions, starting first with 
the credit market. To take an example, a person learns from the director o f a big 
company that the company might suffer a major credit default. Subsequently, 
that person (as a risk seller) chooses to enter into a CDS with a bank to insure 
against the credit risks o f that company. Soon after, the default does occur and 
the person may earn some monies even without owning the bonds o f the
154 Id., at 366.
155 US v D ial, 757 F 2d 163 (1985).
156 Id., at 168.
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company (subject to the terms o f the CDS). Even for a true hedger, such a 
manoeuvre could still earn him a lower fixed-rate for the CDS since the CDS rate 
would rise to reflect the new credit exposure after a default. Inside information 
could influence the credit market in the same way that arbitraging securities 
prices does.
Apart from the theories mentioned above, we could put forward two more 
arguments on the issue o f potential insider dealing in the credit derivative market. 
On the one hand, perhaps what we dislike most is people behaving 
opportunistically in arbitraging information advantages. When one speculates 
on the credit market, one is actually trying to make a fortune from the misery of 
an issuer or a creditor. This kind o f opportunistic conduct might easily invite 
negative remarks.
On the other hand, to use an argument similar to those used in insurance, if  a 
person takes advantage o f his prior knowledge o f certain credit issues of a third 
party and buys protection with a lower rate from a risk buyer, one could argue 
that he is not acting in good faith .157 Without additional help from regulators, 
we can only rely on the contract or common law doctrines such as fraud, 
misrepresentation or mistake. A duty o f utmost good faith followed by a duty of 
disclosure might solve the problem; however, we have found no convincing 
reason to impose a duty o f “utmost good faith” in our above analysis (see 5.3.3 
above). The market abuse approach taken by the FSMA 2000 might be a more 
flexible way o f dealing with this issue than the fraud theories developed in both 
securities regulation and commodities regulation in the US. Again, these issues 
might also be resolved through contractual terms; thus, arguably there is no need 
for the law to intervene as a party can protect him self by negotiating better 
contractual terms. In this circumstance, issues relating to bargaining power and 
the party’s ability to negotiate terms to protect himself would come to the fore.
Lastly, the credit market could be closely connected with the securities market. 
For a CDS, this partly depends on how wide a credit event is defined in each
157 See also Schwartz, “Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps,
Insurance and a Theory o f  Dem arcation” (2007) 12 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 167, at 191-192.
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credit derivative instrument. For a credit total return sw ap158, all the gains 
(including price appreciation) from the reference obligation (e.g. a corporate 
bond) are transferred from a risk seller to the risk buyer. If either party has 
inside knowledge about something that is bound to happen, they could actually 
make a profit through a total return swap, much like arbitraging in the securities 
market. The same might be argued for an equity swap (see 2.2.2.3 above). It is 
not easy to estimate the probability o f success regarding such manoeuvres in 
practice. Unless the credit event happens very rapidly and the first settlement 
date is not far off, it might not be easy for such a scheme to succeed. But 
however likely it may be, we could still recognise that an insider has a chance to 
use the growing credit market to earn private profit. He is still using corporate 
information, but he is not necessarily creating wrongful market prices (with 
regard to those securities). This might provide further challenges to financial 
regulators when the credit market boom s.159
5.5.2.4 Other O TC  T ransactions
In the end, we should consider the potential insider dealing problems raised by 
other cash-settled OTC derivative transactions. Given the variety of instruments 
and traders, it would be nearly impossible to exhaust the possibilities for using 
OTC instruments for purposes o f insider dealing. For instance, it is not 
unthinkable that the major shareholder of a company might use its insider 
knowledge o f the company’s operations to enter into an equity swap (see 2.2.2.3 
above). A company might also make a profit from having contracts for 
differences or equity swap before announcing a plan to take over another 
company whose shares underlie the contract for differences or swap.160
158 Under a total return swap, one party (A ) pays periodically to the other party (B) bond interests 
and any appreciation o f  bond prices, and B pays to A interests based on a market floating rate and 
any depreciation o f  the bond prices. See Das, Credit Derivatives: CDOs & Structured Credit 
Products (3rd ed., John W iley & Sons, 2005).
159 See B ow les & Fox, “Credit Markets and Market A buse” (2007) 22(4) J1BFL 209.
160 In 1995, Trafalgar House pic had a series o f  equity swaps (structured as contracts for 
differences) on certain regional electricity com panies before announcing a takeover for one o f  the 
electricity companies. Trafalgar House pic w as accused o f  insider dealing, but was cleared by 
the Takeover Panel. See Das, Structured Products V olum e 2: Equity; Commodity; Credit & 
N ew  Markets, at 4 2 2 -4 2 3  (3rd ed. rev edn, John W iley & Sons, 2006).
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There could be several motives for using inside information in OTC transactions. 
On the one hand, an insider might wish to take advantage o f his information and 
make a deal at a lower price— such a situation is similar to Laidlaw v Organ]6] 
except that the information advantage is applied in a different type o f trading. 
Whether an insider dealing transaction based on this motive is worth punishment 
as an abuse o f market requires further clarification by judges and regulators.
On the other hand, a person might use his information advantage to make a 
straight profit. The current FSA insider dealing rules broadly cover “dealing” in 
qualified investment related investment on the basis o f inside information. In 
one o f the examples given by the FSA, the FSA would regard a director’s spread 
bet on securities prices o f a company as insider dealing if  the director placed his 
bet on the basis o f the belief that undisclosed news about the company’s 
imminent takeover would increase the value o f his shares. If  we follow this 
example, entering into a contract for differences (e.g. interest rate swap, spread 
bets etc.) on the basis o f inside information might fall under the UK market abuse 
rule.
Again, we could see the contrast between the application o f the common law 
non-disclosure rule and the market abuse/insider dealing rule in the context of 
OTC trading. The common law rule is restrained by the scope o f insider dealing 
regulation. In other words, trading OTC derivative instruments with inside 
information might not be wrong except when it is recognised as an instance of 
market abuse.
5.5.2.5 Sum mary
In this part, we have noted that insider dealing problems might arise in the risk 
trading market. The insider dealing rule has largely been developed in the 
securities market, so where securities are involved, there should not be a problem 
in applying the securities insider dealing rule. In contrast, what concerns us here 
is insider dealing in non-securities related markets. To this end, we have found
161 15 US 178 (1817).
162 See FSA Handbook, M AR 1.3.20(1) (exam ples o f  market abuse).
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that commodities futures prices are not directly comparable with spot market 
prices, and thus price integrity arguments might be a persuasive way of extending 
the securities insider dealing rule to the commodities market. On the other hand, 
we face the difficulty o f reconciling the common law non-disclosure rule and the 
idea o f insider dealing. This is a policy decision, and Parliament or financial 
regulators should have the final say on how far a trader may enjoy advantages 
deriving from inside information. In addition, we also identified a source of 
potential problems in the credit market and noted that there might be some moral 
arguments against people speculating on other people’s credit. Lastly, where a 
person intentionally creates an event to work market prices to his favour, this is 
not merely insider dealing but a deceptive or manipulative scheme. Such kinds 
of behaviour might be called “fraud” and should be taken in hand by regulators, if 
not by courts through other common law options.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored issues o f pre-contractual disclosure for the risk 
trading contracts we introduced in Chapters 2 to 4. Risk trading contracts 
strongly rely on all sorts o f information as they deal with future uncertainties. 
Indeed, for every transaction there is a certain degree of asymmetric information. 
The problem is how the law tips the balance in different contexts. Our approach 
is to see whether risk trading contracts could fit into existing categories that 
require disclosure rather than creating a general duty o f disclosure.
In common law, there is no general duty o f disclosure before a contract is made. 
So a contractual party could take advantage o f any information of which the 
counterparty is ignorant. However, this general rule is restricted by the law of 
deceit and misrepresentation: where any non-disclosure can constitute fraud or 
misrepresentation, the information holder has to disclose to avoid further 
liability.
There also exist several exceptions to the general rule, and it is on these 
exceptions that we can draw a comparison with risk trading contracts. First, we
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have seen that mandatory disclosure in the securities market cannot be extended 
to exchange-traded futures contracts (save where securities are involved) because 
o f the nature o f securities. With regard to commodity futures, it is impractical to 
impose similar duties on those who produce the underlying commodities (cf. 
issuers o f stocks).
Secondly, there is also a duty o f disclosure structured under a wider duty of 
utmost good faith for insurance contracts. However, we find this is less 
successful in risk trading contracts. On the one hand, it lacks a uniform 
definition o f hedging, speculative or derivative instruments, such that any general 
duty could have a wider and more profound impact than intended. On the other 
hand, non-insurance risk trading contracts lack the inequality o f knowledge issue 
underlying contracts o f insurance. While the duty o f good faith could play a role 
in filling the gap between fraud and the common law non-disclosure rule in 
insurance, we cannot draw the same comparison for most risk trading contracts. 
This is not to say that there could be no moral hazard issues in the derivative 
market. However, since the current market is still limited to transactions 
between sophisticated market participants, it is less an issue because parties can 
address the problem in their contracts. Further problems may evolve in the 
future, should modem hedging or speculative contracts become more 
consumerised.
Thirdly, we have found that the prohibition o f insider dealing has some impact on 
the issue o f pre-contractual disclosure. The insider dealing rule does not really 
require traders to disclose information but prohibits them from using it. The 
insider dealing rule has already been the subject of various discussions and the 
underpinning theories o f why insider dealing is wrong can determine how far we 
should go to deal with this problem. On the one hand, we have to be careful 
when drawing comparison between futures and spot prices. It is also hard to 
provide a comprehensive theory to distinguish the general rule o f non-disclosure 
(as in Laidlaw  v Organ) from the insider dealing rule in securities regulation. 
On the other hand, we could also argue from a moral perspective against 
speculating on another person’s information. The overarching concepts of
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“market abuse” or “market fraud” might provide a better basis for addressing 
information issues in the risk trading market. Nevertheless, there remains much 
to research before reaching a more complete conclusion.
Ultimately, our question is: where does one draw the line between a more lenient 
common law approach and additional regulatory disclosure rules regarding 
information problems in risk trading contracts? This might be a question 
Parliament and regulators have to consider in the future.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
6.1 A Review o f the Contractual Nature o f  
Derivative Instrum ents
In this thesis, we examine the contractual nature o f derivative 
instruments— contracts that allow parties to buy and sell risks. Derivatives 
trading could be traced back to commodity sales, but it also resembles gambling 
and insurance in certain aspects. The use o f derivatives in the financial markets 
adds a major regulatory dimension to the market. Indeed, modem risk trading 
contracts inhabit the grey area o f several legal fields, which leads to a certain 
degree o f legal risk. The wide variety o f derivative instruments gives us several 
angles from which to conduct an analysis. What we are interested in, in this 
thesis, is to explore the contractual nature o f risk trading contracts in order to see 
whether certain established legal doctrines could, or should, be applied or 
extended to risk trading contracts, and whether certain problems should invite 
further regulatory intervention.
In Chapter 2, we illustrated various sources o f risk that market participants try to 
avoid and generally defined “risk” as future uncertainties that might cause 
monetary losses. Over time, several legal instruments (such as insurance and 
guarantees) have been created to combat risks. Derivative instruments have 
arisen not only to provide powerful tools with which to manage risks, but also to 
help to commoditise the abstract concept o f “risk” into something more tangible 
that people can buy and sell. However, risk trading can take various forms. 
Risk trading may consist o f buying and selling contradictory contracts at different 
times (e.g. commodity futures— see 3.2 above) or by settling a contract in cash by
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price differences (e.g. an interest rate swap— see 2.2.2.3). It could also take the 
form o f payment after the occurrence o f an event (e.g. a credit default swap— see
2.2.2.3) or be structured as a capital market instrument whose payoff depends on 
the occurrence or non-occurrence o f a future event (e.g. a catastrophe bond— see
2.2.2.4). Thus, derivative instruments are also exposed to the risk o f being 
recharacterised as existing legal instruments (such as sale of goods, insurance, 
gambling and securities), which might contribute to certain legal uncertainties. 
This lays the foundation o f our analysis.
With regard to securities (such as shares o f a company), this thesis recognises that 
non-securitised derivative instruments lack the character of securities, so they 
should not fall under regulations governing typical securities, including the rule 
to disclose certain information (see 5.2). On the other hand, securitised 
instruments come close to traditional capital market instruments and open the 
door to be regulated like other securities (see 2.4 and 5.2). However, we also 
found that the insider dealing rule might have a more extensive application to 
transactions that involve not only securities-related derivative instruments but 
also commodity or credit derivative transactions (see 5.5).
With regard to insurance, a close interpretation o f the definition of “insurance” 
might exclude several derivative instruments from the scope o f insurance law. 
However, certain products (particularly credit derivatives) look quite similar to 
insurance, which raises the question whether derivatives, which might serve a 
similar function to insurance policies, should be treated in law like insurance. 
This thesis aims to raise awareness o f the fact that it is necessary to consider the 
rationale behind insurance regulation and insurance contract law, rather than to 
accept these special rules in insurance law as God-given. With this view, the 
relationship between insurance and OTC derivative instruments could be 
approached from several angles.
First, we suggested that both property insurance (as contracts o f indemnity) and 
life policies (as contracts o f contingency) should both be taken into account. It 
is too limiting to restrict current derivative markets to transactions only serving 
the purpose o f indemnifying hedgers’ real losses. However, this does not
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change the fact that derivative instruments, if  used for hedging, might be used as 
a compensatory tool (see 2.5 and 4.4.2).
Secondly, if  being regulated like insurance companies is the major concern, we 
have to consider the reasons why insurance companies are regulated and to what 
extent a firm specialising in instruments serving a similar function to insurance 
should be regulated as an insurance company. Thus, we should first consider 
whether a seller o f derivative instruments should be regulated in the first place, 
and if  the answer is yes, the next question is how to regulate them. This 
argument leads to the conclusion that banks or financial institutions that are 
already regulated need not to be regulated as insurance companies. Whether 
non-bank and non-insurance firms should be regulated as insurance companies is 
another matter that could be pursued further (see 2.5 above).
Thirdly, we find no reason to see derivative instruments as another type of 
contract uberrimae fidei, even though there might be potential asymmetric 
information and moral hazard problems underlying insurance law. In contrast, 
we argue that the information issue might better be resolved in the contract (if 
parties think it is important) or by market manipulation regulation, rather than 
avoiding contracts on the grounds that a duty o f utmost good faith has not been 
honoured.
With regard to “futures” regulation, we find that commodity contracts with 
delivery obligation may not be any different from sale o f goods contracts. The 
impact o f the private law aspect o f the sale o f goods law is relatively minor, but 
the potential regulatory impact cannot be ignored. To distinguish regulated 
“futures” contracts for “investment” purposes from commercial sale of goods 
contracts, we propose a theory based on a physical/notional distinction. Thus, 
exchange-traded contracts are regulated “futures” because the whole exchange 
trading scheme has become largely notional, such that traders can buy and sell 
contradictory contracts and settle in cash. In contrast, off-exchange trading 
schemes which ultimately are settled in cash are notional transactions and should 
be regulated as “futures” under current UK and US law. In contrast, if most of 
the transactions in a trading scheme contain transactions ending in delivery, they
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are geared for physical trading and should not be regulated as investment (see
3.3.4).
With regard to gambling and cash-settled contracts without delivery obligations, 
we argue that notional derivative transactions are aleatory in nature (like 
traditional gambling instruments). Both speculative notional transactions and 
gambling are instruments intended to be used for making a profit from future 
uncertainties (see 4.4.1). Gambling and speculation might also share similar 
problems (see 4.3). Thus, the question is how to deal with gambling or 
speculation in the market. A variety o f legal consequences and policy concerns 
exist around the world; therefore, we attempted to provide an analytical structure 
that might host different considerations. First, if  two parties are already 
regulated persons (e.g. banks), we argue that the intervention of gambling laws is 
unnecessary, as it is enough to use financial regulation to control potential 
problems from excessive speculation. Secondly, it depends on the policy of a 
jurisdiction to decide whether gambling or speculation between two individuals 
or between two companies should be allowed. Thirdly, if a speculative 
transaction occurs between a specialised firm and a customer, it is up to local 
policy to decide whether it is best to regulate the firm through financial regulation 
or under gambling regulation (see 4.4.3). A consistent line o f analysis should be 
established to demarcate the respective jurisdictions o f financial regulator and 
gambling regulator.
6.2 A Derivative Contract Law?
Let us briefly summarise the question whether modem risk trading contracts 
should be treated as a new class o f contracts in the private law sphere. The 
above discussion found that derivative instruments might not fit well into any 
existing category. Some derivative instruments are simply contracts o f sale for 
future delivery, but most conclude with cash settlement. Derivatives might be 
similar to insurance, but are currently not limited by the nature of indemnity, in 
contrast to property insurance. Speculation by way of derivatives trading might 
not differ from gambling, but derivatives may well be employed for hedging or
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other commercial purposes. Gambling, as a special group o f contracts long seen 
in a negative light, has lost its distinctive character since the Gambling Act 2005. 
In addition, risk trading itself does not automatically imply the application of 
fiduciary duty or a duty o f care in tort law.
The fact that risk trading instruments appear not to fit into any existing category 
suggests that having a separate set o f “derivative contracts” might be one way of 
solving potential problems (e.g. information asymmetry, suitability, 
over-speculation etc.). Nevertheless, if  such a special branch were to exist, there 
would be no substance in a “derivatives contract law” until legislators or judges 
were willing to create new private law rules or extend current ones to encompass 
derivative instruments.
However, this does not mean that private law cannot play a role in the 
development o f the risk trading market. Like many other contracts, risk trading 
contracts remain deeply rooted in general contract law. They might further be 
analysed in the context o f arm ’s length and consumer transactions— in short, 
analysing “who uses risk trading instruments” and “what relationships hold 
between parties” . Doctrines such as fraud, misrepresentation, fiduciary duty, 
duty o f care in tort law, frustration etc. would still shape the basic contractual 
relationship between any two parties. Information problems might be resolved 
further down the line through consumer/investor protection or “cheating” in 
gambling laws. Rights and obligations under a continuous master agreement or 
brokerage agreement scheme might further provide us with several more ways of 
examining derivatives trading. Thus, we can build on existing common law 
concepts to solve potential problems. Even without regulatory intervention, 
there is still much room to develop private law concepts to deal with the trading 
o f risks.
In the end, if  treating derivative instruments as an independent category cannot 
solve every problem, does this mean that it might be better to tackle each 
subcategory o f risk trading instrument separately? We have already seen that 
futures exchanges and clearing houses are subject to financial regulation. 
Nevertheless, it is still unclear how far off-exchange trading contracts will evolve
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in both the private law system and relevant public regulation. As the market 
grows, certain products (like interest rate swaps or credit default swaps) might 
attract much more attention than other products. However, we have to bear in 
mind that any further categorisation o f the risk trading market might enhance 
legal uncertainties and increase the risk o f recharacterisation. This thesis does 
not make the bold claim that such further sub-categorisation is destined, but we 
should be aware o f further legal development under the umbrella of 
“derivatives” , as we have seen in the cases o f insurance and securities.
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Appendix 1 Selected UK Statutes
C rim inal Ju stice  A ct 1993  
Section 52
(1) An individual who has information as an insider is guilty o f insider dealing 
if, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in securities that 
are price-affected securities in relation to the information.
(2) An individual who has information as an insider is also guilty o f insider 
dealing if—
(a) he encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether or 
not that other knows it) price-affected securities in relation to the 
information, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the dealing 
would take place in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3); or
(b) he discloses the information, otherwise than in the proper performance 
o f the functions o f his employment, office or profession, to another person.
(3) The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in 
question occurs on a regulated market, or that the person dealing relies on a 
professional intermediary or is him self acting as a professional intermediary.
(4) This section has effect subject to section 53.
Financial Services and M arkets A ct 2000  
Section 19
(1) No person may carry on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom, or 
purport to do so, unless he is-
(a) an authorised person; or
(b) an exempt person.
(2) The prohibition is referred to in this Act as the general prohibition.
Section 26
(1) An agreement made by a person in the course o f carrying on a regulated 
activity in contravention o f the general prohibition is unenforceable against the 
other party.
(2) The other party is entitled to recover-
(a) any money or other property paid or transferred by him under the 
agreement; and
(b) compensation for any loss sustained by him as a result of having parted 
with it.
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(3) "Agreement" means an agreement-
(a) made after this section comes into force; and
(b) the making or performance o f which constitutes, or is part of, the 
regulated activity in question.
(4) This section does not apply if  the regulated activity is accepting 
deposits.
Section 150
(1) A contravention by an authorised person of a rule is actionable at the suit of 
a private person who suffers loss as a result o f the contravention, subject to 
the defences and other incidents applying to actions for breach o f statutory 
duty.
(2) If  rules so provide, subsection (1) does not apply to contravention o f a 
specified provision o f those rules.
(3) In prescribed cases, a contravention o f a rule which would be actionable at 
the suit o f a private person is actionable at the suit o f a person who is not a 
private person, subject to the defences and other incidents applying to 
actions for breach o f statutory duty.
(4) In subsections (1) and (3) "rule" does not include-
(a) listing rules; or
(b) a rule requiring an authorised person to have or maintain financial 
resources.
(5) "Private person" has such meaning as may be prescribed.
Section 151
(1) A person is not guilty o f  an offence by reason o f a contravention o f a rule 
made by the Authority.
(2) No such contravention makes any transaction void or unenforceable.
Schedule 2
Options
17. Options to acquire or dispose o f property.
Futures
18. Rights under a contract for the sale o f a commodity or property o f any other 
description under which delivery is to be made at a future date.
Contracts fo r  Differences
19. Rights under-
(a) a contract for differences; or
(b) any other contract the purpose or pretended purpose of which is to 
secure a profit or avoid a loss by reference to fluctuations in-
(i) the value or price o f property o f any description; or
(ii) an index or other factor designated for that purpose in the contract.
20. Rights under a contract o f  insurance, including rights under contracts falling 
within head C o f Schedule 2 to the Friendly Societies Act 1992.
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Financial Services and M arkets A ct 2000 (R egulated A ctivities) 
O rder 2001, SI 2001/544
Risk M anagement
19 (1) A person (“B”) does not carry on an activity o f the kind specified by 
article 14 by entering as principal into a transaction with another person (“C”) 
if—
(a) the transaction relates to investments of the kind specified by any o f  
articles 83 to 85 (or article 89 so far as relevant to any of those articles);
(b) neither B nor C is an individual;
(c) the sole or main purpose for which B enters into the transaction (either 
by itself or in combination with other such transactions) is that o f 
limiting the extent to which a relevant business will be affected by any 
identifiable risk arising otherwise than as a result o f the carrying on o f  
a regulated activity; and
(d) the relevant business consists mainly of activities other than—
(i) regulated activities; or
(ii) activities which would be regulated activities but for any 
exclusion made by this Part.
(2) In paragraph (1), “relevant business” means a business carried on by—
(a) B;
(b) a member o f  the same group as B; or
(c) where B and another person are, or propose to become, participators 
in a joint enterprise, that other person.
Options
83. Options to acquire or dispose o f—
(a) a security or contractually based investment (other than one o f a kind 
specified by this article);
(b) currency o f the United Kingdom or any other country or territory;
(c) palladium, platinum, gold or silver; or
(d) an option to acquire or dispose o f an investment o f the kind specified by 
this article by virtue o f paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
Futures
84.— (1) Subject to paragraph (2), rights under a contract for the sale o f a 
commodity or property o f any other description under which delivery is to be 
made at a future date and at a price agreed on when the contract is made.
(2) There are excluded from paragraph (1) rights under any contract which is 
made for commercial and not investment purposes.
(3) A contract is to be regarded as made for investment purposes if  it is made or 
traded on a recognised investment exchange, or is made otherwise than on a 
recognised investment exchange but is expressed to be as traded on such an 
exchange or on the same terms as those on which an equivalent contract would 
be made on such an exchange.
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(4) A contract not falling within paragraph (3) is to be regarded as made for 
commercial purposes if  under the terms o f the contract delivery is to be made 
within seven days, unless it can be shown that there existed an understanding 
that (notwithstanding the express terms o f the contract) delivery would not be 
made within seven days.
(5) The following are indications that a contract not falling within paragraph (3) 
or (4) is made for commercial purposes and the absence o f them is an indication 
that it is made for investment purposes—
(a) one or more o f the parties is a producer o f the commodity or other 
property, or uses it in his business;
(b) the seller delivers or intends to deliver the property or the purchaser 
takes or intends to take delivery o f it.
(6) It is an indication that a contract is made for commercial purposes that the 
prices, the lot, the delivery date or other terms are determined by the parties for 
the purposes o f the particular contract and not by reference (or not solely by 
reference) to regularly published prices, to standard lots or delivery dates or to 
standard terms.
(7) The following are indications that a contract is made for investment 
purposes—
(a) it is expressed to be as traded on an investment exchange;
(b) performance o f the contract is ensured by an investment exchange or a 
clearing house;
(c) there are arrangements for the payment or provision of margin.
(8) For the purposes o f paragraph (1), a price is to be taken to be agreed on 
when a contract is made—
(a) notwithstanding that it is left to be determined by reference to the price 
at which a contract is to be entered into on a market or exchange or could 
be entered into at a time and place specified in the contract; or
(b) in a case where the contract is expressed to be by reference to a standard 
lot and quality, notwithstanding that provision is made for a variation in 
the price to take account o f any variation in quantity or quality on 
delivery.
Contracts for differences etc.
85.— (1) Subject to paragraph (2), rights under—
(a) a contract for differences; or
(b) any other contract the purpose or pretended purpose of which is to 
secure a profit or avoid a loss by reference to fluctuations in—
(i) the value or price o f property o f any description; or
(ii) an index or other factor designated for that purpose in the contract.
(2) There are excluded from paragraph (1)—
(a) rights under a contract if  the parties intend that the profit is to be secured 
or the loss is to be avoided by one or more of the parties taking delivery of 
any property to which the contract relates;
(b) rights under a contract under which money is received by way o f deposit 
on terms that any interest or other return to be paid on the sum deposited 
will be calculated by reference to fluctuations in an index or other factor;
(c) rights under any contract under which—
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(i) money is received by the Director o f Savings as deposits or otherwise 
in connection with the business o f the National Savings Bank; or
(ii) money is raised under the National Loans Act 1968 under the 
auspices o f the Director o f Savings or treated as so raised by virtue of 
section 11(3) o f the National Debt Act 1972;
(d) rights under a qualifying contract o f insurance.
Schedule 1 
Credit
14. Contracts o f insurance against risks o f loss to the persons insured arising 
from the insolvency o f debtors o f theirs or from the failure (otherwise than 
through insolvency) o f debtors o f theirs to pay their debts when due.
Suretyship
15.— (1) Contracts o f insurance against the risks o f loss to the persons insured 
arising from their having to perform contracts o f guarantee entered into by 
them.
(2) Fidelity bonds, performance bonds, administration bonds, bail bonds or 
customs bonds or similar contracts o f guarantee, where these are—
(a) effected or carried out by a person not carrying on a banking business;
(b) not effected merely incidentally to some other business carried on by the 
person effecting them; and
(c) effected in return for the payment o f one or more premiums.
Miscellaneous financial loss
16. Contracts o f insurance against any of the following risks, namely—
(a) risks o f  loss to the persons insured attributable to interruptions o f the 
carrying on o f business carried on by them or to reduction of the scope 
o f business so carried on;
(b) risks o f loss to the persons insured attributable to their incurring 
unforeseen expense (other than loss such as is covered by contracts 
falling within paragraph 18);
(c) risks which do not fall within sub-paragraph (a) or (b) and which are not 
o f a kind such that contracts o f insurance against them fall within any 
other provision o f this Schedule.
Financial Services A ct 1986  
Section 5
(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, any agreement to which this subsection 
applies —
(a) which is entered into by a person in the course o f carrying on investment 
business in contravention o f section above; or
(b) which is entered into —
(i) by a person who is an authorised person or an exempted person in 
respect o f the investment business in the course of which he enters 
into the agreement; but
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(ii) in consequence o f anything said or done by a person in the course of 
carrying on investment business in contravention of that section, 
shall be unenforceable against the other party; and that party shall be entitled to 
recover any money or other property paid or transferred by him under the 
agreement, together with compensation for any loss sustained by him as a result 
o f having parted with it.
Section 63
(1) No contract to which this section applies shall be void or unenforceable by 
reason o f —
(a) section 18 o f the Gaming Act 1845, section 1 of the Gaming Act 1892 or 
any corresponding provisions in fore in Northern Ireland; or
(b) any rule o f the law o f  Scotland whereby a contract by way of gaming or 
wagering is not legally enforceable.
(2) This section applies to any contract entered into by either or each party by 
way o f business and the making or performance o f which by either party 
constitutes an activity which falls within paragraph 12 o f Schedule 1 to this Act 
or would do so apart from Parts III and IV of
Schedule 1, Part 1
Options
7. Options to acquire or dispose o f —
(a) an investment falling within any other paragraph o f this Part o f this 
Schedule;
(b) currency o f the United Kingdom or o f any other country or territory;
(c) gold [palladium, platinum] or silver; or
(d) an option to acquire or dispose of an investment falling within this 
paragraph by virtue o f (a), (b), or (c) above.
Futures
8. Rights under a contract for the sale o f a commodity or property of any other 
description under which delivery is to be made at a future date and at a price 
agreed upon when the contract is made.
Notes
(1) This paragraph does not apply if  the contract is made for commercial and 
not investment purposes.
(2) A contract shall be regarded as made for investment purposes if  it is made or 
traded on a recognised investment exchange or made otherwise than on a 
recognised investment exchange but expressed to be as traded on such an 
exchange or on the same terms as those on which an equivalent contract would 
be made on such an exchange.
(3) A contract not falling within Note (2) above shall be regarded as made for 
commercial purposes if  under the terms o f the contract delivery is to be made 
within seven days.
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(4) The following are indications that any other contract is made for a 
commercial purpose and the absence o f any o f them is an indication that it is 
made for investment purposes —
(a) either or each o f the parties is a producer of the commodity or other 
property or uses it in his business;
(b) the seller delivers or intends to deliver the property or the purchaser 
takes or intends to take delivery o f it.
(5) It is an indication that a contract is made for commercial purposes that the 
prices, the lot, the delivery date or the other terms are determined by the parties 
for the purposes o f the particular contract and not by reference to regularly 
published prices, to standard lots or delivery dates or to standard terms.
(6) The following are also indications that a contract is made for investment 
purposes —
(a) it is expressed to be as traded on a market or on an exchange;
(b) performance o f the contract is ensured by an investment exchange o f a 
clearing house;
(c) there are arrangements for the payment or provision o f margin.
(7) A price shall be taken to have been agreed upon when a contract is made —
(a) notwithstanding that it is left to be determined by reference to the price 
at which a contract is to be entered into on a market or exchange or could 
be entered into at a time and place specified in the contract; or
(b) in a case where the contract is expressed to be by reference to a standard 
lot and quality, notwithstanding that provision is made for a variation in 
the price to take account o f any variation in quantity or quality on 
delivery.
Financial Services A uthority  H andbook
Glossary
Contract o f  insurance
(1) (in relation to a specified investment) the investment, specified in article 
75 o f the Regulated Activities Order (Contracts o f insurance), which is rights 
under a contract o f insurance in (2).
(2) (in relation to a contract) (in accordance with article 3(1) of the Regulated 
Activities Order (Interpretation)) any contract o f insurance which is a 
long-term insurance contract or a general insurance contract, including:
(a) fidelity bonds, performance bonds, administration bonds, bail bonds, 
customs bonds or similar contracts o f guarantee, where these are:
(i) effected or carried out by a person not carrying on a banking 
business;
(ii) not effected merely incidentally to some other business carried on by 
the person  effecting them; and
(iii) effected in return for the payment o f one or more premiums;
(b) tontines;
(c) capital redemption contracts or pension fund management contracts, 
where these are effected or carried out by a person who:
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(i) does not carry on a banking business; and
(ii) otherwise carries on the regulated activity o f effecting or carrying 
out contracts o f  insurance’,
(d) contracts to pay annuities on human life;
(e) contracts o f  a kind referred to in article 2(2)(e) o f the Consolidated Life 
Directive (Collective insurance etc); and
(f) contracts o f  a kind referred to in article 2(3) o f the Consolidated Life 
Directive (Social insurance);
but not including a funeral plan contract (or a contract which would be a 
funeral plan contract but for the exclusion in article 60 o f the Regulated 
Activities Order (Plans covered by insurance or trust arrangements)); in this 
definition, "annuities on human life" does not include superannuation 
allowances and annuities payable out o f any fund applicable solely to the relief 
and maintenance o f persons engaged, or who have been engaged, in any 
particular profession, trade or employment, or o f the dependants of such 
persons.
Firm
an authorised person, but not a professional firm  unless it is an authorised 
professional firm , (see also ■ GEN 2.2.18 R for the position o f an authorised 
partnership or unincorporated association which is dissolved.)
Insurance business
the business o f effecting or carrying out contracts o f  insurance.
Intermediate customer
(1) (except in ■ COB 3) a client who is not a market counterparty and who is:
(a) a local authority or public authority;
(b) a body corporate whose shares have been listed or admitted to trading 
on any EEA exchange;
(c) a body corporate whose shares have been listed or admitted to trading on 
the primary board o f any IOSCO  member country official exchange;
(d) a body corporate (including a limited liability partnership) which has (or 
any o f whose holding companies or subsidiaries has) (or has had at any time 
during the previous two years) called up share capital or net assets o f at least 
£  5 million (or its equivalent in any other currency at the relevant time);
(e) a special purpose vehicle',
(f) a partnership or unincorporated association which has (or has had at any 
time during the previous two years) net assets o f at least £  5 million (or its 
equivalent in any other currency at the relevant time) and calculated in the 
case o f a limited partnership  without deducting loans owing to any o f the 
partners’,
(g) a trustee o f  a trust (other than an occupational pension scheme, SSAS, 
personal pension scheme or stakeholder pension scheme) which has (or has 
had at any time during the previous two years) assets o f at least £  10 
million (or its equivalent in any other currency at the relevant time)
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calculated by aggregating the value o f the cash and designated investments 
forming part o f the trust's assets, but before deducting its liabilities;
(h) a trustee o f an occupational pension scheme or SSAS, or a trustee or 
operator o f a personal pension scheme or stakeholder pension scheme 
where the scheme has (or has had at any time during the previous two 
years):
(i) at least 50 members; and
(ii) assets under management o f at least £  10 million (or its equivalent 
in any other currency at the relevant time);
(i) another firm , or an overseas financial services institution, when, in 
relation to designated investment business, or related ancillary activities, 
conducted with or for that firm  or institution, that firm  or institution is an 
intermediate customer in accordance with ■ COB 4.1.7 R (Classification of 
another firm or an overseas financial services institution);
(j) collective investment scheme;
(k) a client when he is classified as an intermediate customer in accordance 
with ■ COB 4.1.9 R (Expert private customer classified as intermediate 
customer);
(1) a recognised investment exchange, designated investment exchange, 
regulated market or clearing house, except when it is classified as a market 
counterparty in accordance with ■ COB 4.1.8A R (Classification o f an 
exchange or clearing house); 
but excluding:
(i) [deleted]
(ii) a client who would otherwise be an intermediate customer, when he is 
classified in accordance with:
(A) ■ COB 4.1.12 R (Large intermediate customer classified as market 
counterparty); or
(B) (except for the purposes o f DISP) ■ COB 4.1.14 R (Client classified 
as private customer).
(2) (in ■ COB 3) a person  in (1) or a person  who would be such a person if  he 
were a client.
Market counterparty
(1) (except in ■ COB 3) a client who is:
(a) a properly constituted government (including a quasi-govemmental body 
or a government agency) o f any country or territory;
(b) a central bank or other national monetary authority of any country or 
territory;
(c) a supranational whose members are either countries or central banks or 
national monetary authorities;
(d) a State investment body, or a body charged with, or intervening in, the 
management o f the public debt;
(e) another firm , or an overseas financial services institution, except in 
relation to designated investment business, and related ancillary activities, 
conducted with or for that firm  or institution, when that firm  or institution is 
an intermediate customer in accordance with ■ COB 4.1.7 R (Classification 
o f another firm or an overseas financial services institution);
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(f) any associate o f a firm  (except an OPS firm), or o f an overseas financial 
services institution, if  the firm  or institution consents;
(g) a client when he is classified as a market counterparty in accordance 
with ■ COB 4.1.12 R (Large intermediate customer classified as a market 
counterparty);
(h) a recognised investment exchange, designated investment exchange, 
regulated market or clearing house when it is classified as a market 
counterparty in accordance with ■ COB 4.1.8A R (Classification o f an 
exchange or clearing house)',
but excluding:
(A) a regulated collective investment scheme', and
(B) (except for the purposes o f DISP) a client, who would otherwise be a 
market counterparty, when he is classified as a private customer in 
accordance with ■ COB 4.1.14 R (Client classified as private customer).
(2) (in ■ COB 3) a person  in (1) and a person  who would be such a person 
if he were a client.
Private customer
(1) (except in ■ COB 3, ■ COB 4.2 and ■ COB 6.4) subject to (h), a client who 
is not a market counterparty or an intermediate customer, including:
(a) an individual who is not a firm  ;
(b) an overseas individual who is not an overseas financial services 
institution',
(c) [deleted]
(d) (except for the purposes o f DISP) a client when he is classified as a 
private customer in accordance with ■ COB 4.1.14 R (Client classified as a 
private customer);
(e) a person  to whom a firm  provides basic advice on stakeholder products;
(f) (in ■ COB 6.1 to ■ 6.5) where the regulated activity (except for a 
personal recommendation relating to a contribution to a CTF ) relates to a 
CTF and there is no registered con tact, the person to whom the annual 
statement must be sent in accordance with Regulation 10 o f the CTF 
Regulations;
(g) (in ■ COB 6.7) where the regulated activity (except for a personal 
recommendation relating to a contribution to a CTF) relates to a CTF and 
there is no registered contact, the child, via the person to whom the annual 
statement must be sent in accordance with Regulation 10 o f the CTF 
Regulations;
(h) a client who would otherwise be excluded as a market counterparty or 
intermediate customer if  the client is within (e), (f) or (g);
but excluding a c lien t, who would otherwise be a private customer.
(i) when he is classified as an intermediate customer in accordance with ■ 
COB 4.1.9 R (Expert private customer classified as an intermediate 
customer); or
(ii) when the regulated activity relates to a C TF , any person other than (e),
(f), (g) or (h).
(2) (in ■ COB 3) a person  in (1) or a person excluded under (l)(h)(ii) or a 
person  who would be such a person  if  he were a client, (in ■ COB 4.2 and 6.1
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to 6.5) a person  in (1) and, in relation to the conclusion o f a distance contract, 
a retail customer.
(3) (in ■ COB 4.2 and *6 .1  to ■ 6.5) a person in (1) and, in relation to the 
conclusion o f a distance contract, a retail customer.
INSPRU 3.2.5 Derivatives and quasi-derivatives
For the purpose o f ■ GENPRU 2 Annex 7 R (Admissible assets in insurance), 
and also in relation to permitted links, a derivative or quasi-derivative is 
approved if:
(1) it is held for the purpose o f  efficient portfolio management (■ INSPRU 3.2.6 
R to ■ INSPRU 3.2.7 R) or reduction o f investment risk (■ INSPRU 3.2.8 R to 
■ INSPRU 3.2.13 G);
(2) it is covered ( ■ INSPRU 3.2.14 R to ■ INSPRU 3.2.33 G); and
(3) it is effected or issued:
(a) on or under the rules o f a regulated market; or
(b) off-market with an approved counterparty and, except for aforward 
transaction, on approved terms and is capable of valuation ( ■ INSPRU 
3.2.34 R to ■ INSPRU 3.2.35 R).
ELM 3.7 Derivatives
ELM 3.7.1
A firm must not be a party to or have a position in a derivative or quasi 
derivative contract unless ELM 3.7.2 R allows this.
ELM 3.7.2
A firm may be a party to a derivative or quasi derivative contract if:
(1) the sole purpose (ignoring any other purposes which together are 
insignificant) o f becoming a party to it is hedging market risks arising from:
(a) issuing e-money; or
(b) the e-money float;
(2) so far as reasonably possible, being a party to that derivative or quasi 
derivative contract achieves the permitted purpose described in ELM 3.7.2 R
( i ) ;
(3) the derivative or quasi derivative contract is sufficiently liquid; and
(4) either:
(a) the derivative or quasi derivative contract is an exchange rate contract 
relating to a foreign currency with an original maturity of 14 days or less; or
(b) the derivative or quasi derivative contract:
(i) is an interest rate or foreign exchange related contract;
(ii) is regularly traded on a recognised investment exchange or designated 
investment exchange; and
(iii) is subject to daily margin requirements under the rules of that 
exchange.
B uild ing Societies A ct 1986  
9A Restrictions on certain transactions!
(1) Subject to subsections (2) to (4) below, a building society shall not do, 
and shall secure that each o f its subsidiary undertakings does not do, any o f the 
following things, namely—
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(a) act as a market maker in securities, commodities or currencies;
(b) trade in commodities or currencies; and
(c) enter into any transaction involving derivative investments;
but a contravention o f this subsection shall not invalidate any transaction or 
other act.
(2) No transaction entered into by a building society, or a subsidiary 
undertaking o f  a building society, shall be taken into account for the purposes of 
subsection (l)(a ) above if—
(a) it relates only to securities or currencies or both and the amount or 
value o f the consideration given by the society or undertaking does not 
exceed £100,000; or
(b) it is entered into in the society's or undertaking's capacity as the
manager o f a collective investment scheme.
(3) No transaction so entered into shall be taken into account for the 
purposes o f subsection (l)(b ) above if—
(a) it relates only to currencies and the amount or value o f the 
consideration given by the society or undertaking does not exceed £100,000; 
or
(b) it is ancillary or incidental to another transaction entered into by the 
society or undertaking.
(4) Nothing in subsection (l)(c ) above shall apply in relation to any 
transaction entered into by a building society, or a subsidiary undertaking o f a 
building society, if—
(a) it is entered into in the society's or undertaking's capacity as the 
manager o f a collective investment scheme;
(b) it is entered into for the purpose o f limiting the extent to which the 
society, or a connected undertaking o f the society, will be affected by 
changes in any o f  the following factors, namely—
(i) interest rates;
(ii) exchange rates;
(iii) any index o f retail prices;
(iv) any index o f residential property prices; . . .
(v) any index o f the prices o f securities; [and
(vi) the ability or willingness o f one or more persons to pay or repay a 
sum or sums owing at law or in equity to the society or a connected 
undertaking o f the society;] or
(c) it involves a derivative investment falling within paragraph (d) o f the 
definition in subsection (9) below and it is entered into for the purpose of 
limiting the extent to which any person will be affected by changes in any 
interest or exchange rate applicable to—
(i) a loan owed by him to;
(ii) shares held by him in; or
(iii) a deposit o f his with,
the society, or a connected undertaking of the society.
(5) Nothing in subsection (l)(c) above shall apply in relation to any 
transaction entered into by a subsidiary undertaking o f a building society, if  it is 
entered into in the undertaking's capacity—
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[(a) as a person who has permission under Part IV o f the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 to effect or carry out contracts o f long-term 
insurance, or
(b) an EE A firm o f the kind mentioned in paragraph 5(d) o f Schedule 3 to 
that Act, which has permission under paragraph 15 o f that Schedule (as a 
result o f qualifying for authorisation under paragraph 12 of that Schedule) to 
effect or carry out contracts o f long-term insurance;]
(6) A building society shall also do all that is reasonably practicable to 
secure that neither it nor any o f its subsidiary undertakings (either alone or with 
any or any others o f those undertakings)—
(a) holds at any time more than 5 per cent o f the issued share capital; or
(b) is at any time entitled to exercise, or to control the exercise of, more 
than 5 per cent o f the voting power at any general meeting,of an undertaking 
which is, at that time, doing any o f the things which the society is prohibited 
from doing by subsection (1) above, or an undertaking whose subsidiary 
undertaking is, at that time, doing any o f those things.
(7) The monetary limit in subsection (2) or (3) above refers to the time when 
the transaction is entered into; and where the amount or value o f the 
consideration there referred to is not in sterling, it shall be converted at the rate 
of exchange prevailing at that time.
(8) For the purposes o f subsection (2) or (3) above, two or more transactions 
which form part o f a larger transaction or series of transactions shall be treated 
as a single transaction.
(9) In this section—
“collective investment scheme” has the same meaning as in the [Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000];
“commodity” means any produce o f agriculture, forestry or fisheries, or any 
mineral, either in its natural state or having undergone only such processes as 
are necessary or customary to prepare the produce or mineral for the market; 
[“derivative investment” means an investment of the following kinds—
(a) instruments giving entitlements to investments;
(b) options;
(c) futures;
(d) contracts for differences;]
“market maker” means, subject to subsection (10) below, a person who holds 
him self out as willing at all normal times to buy or sell at a price specified by 
him securities, commodities or currencies of a particular description; 
“securities” means shares, stock, debentures, debenture stock, loan stock, bonds, 
units o f a collective investment scheme and other securities of any description. 
[(9A) Subsection (5) and the definition o f “derivative investment” in 
subsection (9) must be read with—
(a) section 22 o f the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000;
(b) any relevant order under that section; and
(c) Schedule 2 to that Act.]
(10) A building society, or subsidiary undertaking o f a building society, shall 
not by reason o f holding itself out as willing to issue its own securities be
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regarded for the purposes o f this section as acting as a market maker in such 
securities.
(11) The Treasury may by order vary subsections (1) to (10) above by 
adding to or deleting from them any provision or by varying any provision 
contained in them.
(12) [The Treasury may] by order—
(a) substitute for the amount specified in subsection (2) or (3) above, or 
for the percentage specified in subsection (6) above, such other amount or 
percentage as [they think] appropriate; or
(b) vary subsection (4)(b) above by adding to or deleting from it any 
reference to a factor or by varying any reference to a factor contained in it.
(13) An order under subsection (11) or (12) above may make—
(a) different provision for different cases or purposes; and
(b) such supplementary, transitional and saving provision as appears to 
the Treasury . . .  to be necessary or expedient; and the power to make such an 
order is exercisable by statutory instrument.
(14) No order shall be made under subsection (11) above unless a draft o f the 
order has been laid before and approved by a resolution o f each House of 
Parliament.
(15) A statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (12) above 
shall be subject to annulment in pursuance o f a resolution of either House of 
Parliament.
G am bling A ct 2005  
1 The licensing objectives
In this Act a reference to the licensing objectives is a reference to the objectives 
of—
(a) preventing gambling from being a source of crime or disorder, being 
associated with crime or disorder or being used to support crime,
(b) ensuring that gambling is conducted in a fair and open way, and
(c) protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or 
exploited by gambling.
3 Gambling
In this Act “gambling” means—
(a) gaming (within the meaning o f section 6),
(b) betting (within the meaning o f section 9), and
(c) participating in a lottery (within the meaning o f section 14 and subject to 
section 15).
6 Gaming & game of chance
(1) In this Act “gaming” means playing a game of chance for a prize.
(2) In this Act “game o f chance”—
(a) includes—
(i) a game that involves both an element of chance and an element of
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skill,
(ii) a game that involves an element o f chance that can be eliminated by 
superlative skill, and
(iii) a game that is presented as involving an element of chance, but
(b) does not include a sport.
(3) For the purposes o f this Act a person plays a game of chance if he 
participates in a game o f chance—
(a) whether or not there are other participants in the game, and
(b) whether or not a computer generates images or data taken to represent 
the actions o f other participants in the game.
(4) For the purposes o f this Act a person plays a game o f chance for a prize—
(a) if  he plays a game o f chance and thereby acquires a chance of winning a 
prize, and
(b) whether or not he risks losing anything at the game.
(5) In this Act “prize” in relation to gaming (except in the context of a gaming 
machine)—
(a) means money or m oney’s worth, and
(b) includes both a prize provided by a person organising gaming and 
winnings o f money staked.
(6) The Secretary o f State may by regulations provide that a specified activity, 
or an activity carried on in specified circumstances, is or is not to be treated for 
the purposes o f this Act as—
(a) a game;
(b) a game o f chance;
(c) a sport.
9 Betting: general
(1) In this Act “betting” means making or accepting a bet on—
(a) the outcome o f a race, competition or other event or process,
(b) the likelihood o f anything occurring or not occurring, or
(c) whether anything is or is not true.
(2) A transaction that relates to the outcome of a race, competition or other 
event or process may be a bet within the meaning of subsection (1) despite the 
facts that—
(a) the race, competition, event or process has already occurred or been 
completed, and
(b) one party to the transaction knows the outcome.
(3) A transaction that relates to the likelihood of anything occurring or not 
occurring may be a bet within the meaning o f subsection (1) despite the facts 
that—
(a) the thing has already occurred or failed to occur, and
(b) one party to the transaction knows that the thing has already occurred or 
failed to occur.
10 Spread bets, etc.
(1) For the purposes o f section 9(1) “bet” does not include a bet the making or 
accepting o f which is a regulated activity within the meaning of section 22 
o f the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c. 8).
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(2) An order under section 22 o f that Act which has the effect that a class of bet 
becomes or ceases to be a regulated activity may, in particular, include 
transitional provision relating to the application o f this Act to that class of 
bet.
(3) This section is subject to section 38(3).
12 Pool betting
(1) For the purposes o f this Act betting is pool betting if  made on terms that all 
or part o f winnings—
(a) shall be determined by reference to the aggregate of stakes paid or agreed 
to be paid by the persons betting,
(b) shall be divided among the winners, or
(c) shall or may be something other than money.
(2) For the purposes o f this Act pool betting is horse-race pool betting if  it 
relates to horse-racing in Great Britain.
13 Betting intermediary
(1) In this Act “betting intermediary” means a person who provides a service 
designed to facilitate the making or acceptance o f bets between others.
(2) For the purposes o f this Act acting as a betting intermediary is providing 
facilities for betting.
296 Exceptions to offences
(1) A person does not commit an offence under section 33 by providing 
facilities for—
(a) private gaming, or
(b) private betting.
(2) Section 37 shall not apply to or in respect o f the use o f premises to carry 
on—
(a) private gaming, or
(b) private betting.
(3) A person does not commit an offence under section 33 or 37 by making or 
accepting a bet, or by offering to make or accept a bet, if he acts otherwise than 
in the course o f a business.
Non-commercial gaming and betting
297 Interpretation
(1) For the purposes o f this Act gaming is non-commercial if  it takes place at a 
noncommercial event (whether as an incidental activity or as the principal or 
only activity).
(2) An event is non-commercial if the arrangements for the event are such that 
no part o f the proceeds is to be appropriated for the purpose o f private gain.
(3) For the purposes o f subsection (2) the proceeds o f an event are—
(a) the sums raised by the organisers (whether by way o f fees for entrance 
or for participation, by way o f sponsorship, by way of commission 
from traders or otherwise), minus
(b) amounts deducted by the organisers in respect of costs reasonably 
incurred in organising the event.
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302 Non-commercial betting
For the purposes o f this Act a betting transaction is non-commercial betting if  
no party to the transaction—
(a) enters it in the course o f a business, or
(b) holds him self out as being in business in relation to the acceptance o f bets.
334 Repeal of provisions preventing enforcement
(1) The following shall cease to have effect—
(a) section 1 o f the Gaming Act 1710 (c. 19) (voiding of security for 
winnings or for repayment of gaming loan, etc.),
(b) remaining provisions o f the Gaming Act 1835 (c. 41) (security deemed 
given for illegal consideration),
(c) section 18 o f the Gaming Act 1845 (c. 109) (voiding of gaming 
contracts),
(d) section 1 o f the Gaming Act 1892 (c. 9) (voiding o f promise to repay), 
and
(e) in section 412 o f the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c. 8) 
(gaming contracts)—
(i) in subsection (l)(a), the words “section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845, 
section 1 o f the Gaming Act 1892 or”, and
(ii) subsection (l)(b).
(2) The repeals in subsection (1) do not permit enforcement o f a right which is 
created, or which emanates from an agreement made, before this section comes 
into force.
335 Enforceability of gambling contracts
(1) The fact that a contract relates to gambling shall not prevent its enforcement.
(2) Subsection (1) is without prejudice to any rule o f law preventing the 
enforcement o f a contract on the grounds of unlawfulness (other than a rule 
relating specifically to gambling).
SCHEDULE 15
PRIVATE GAMING AND BETTING
PART 1
GAMING
Introduction
1 Gaming is private if  it satisfies the conditions specified in this Part o f this 
Schedule.
2(1)  For the purposes o f this Part of this Schedule gaming is domestic if it takes 
place—
(a) in a private dwelling, and
(b) on a domestic occasion.
(2) For the purposes o f this Part o f this Schedule gaming is residential if—
(a) it takes place in a hostel, hall o f residence or similar establishment 
which is not administered in the course of a trade or business, and
(b) more than half o f the participants are residents of the hostel, hall or
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establishment.
No charge fo r  participation
3 (1) It is a condition o f private gaming that no charge is made for participation.
(2) For the purposes o f this paragraph—
(a) it is immaterial how a charge is described,
(b) it is immaterial whether a charge is in money or money’s worth,
(c) an amount deducted or levied, by a person providing facilities for 
gaming, from sums staked or won in the course of gaming is a 
charge for participation in the gaming,
(d) a charge for admission to premises where gaming takes place shall 
be treated as a charge for participation in the gaming, and
(e) a stake is not a charge for participation.
Equal chance gaming
4 (1) It is a condition o f private gaming that it is equal chance gaming.
(2) But this condition does not apply in relation to domestic or residential 
gaming.
Privacy
5 It is a condition o f private gaming that it does not occur in a place to which 
the public have access (whether or not on payment).
PART 2
BETTING
Introduction
6 Betting is private betting if  it is—
(a) domestic betting, or
(b) workers’ betting.
Domestic betting
7 (1) A betting transaction is domestic betting if made on premises in which
each party to the transaction lives.
(2) For the purposes o f this paragraph a person lives in premises if he 
habitually resides in any part o f the premises (whether or not there are 
other premises in which he also habitually resides).
Workers ’ betting
8 A betting transaction is workers’ betting if made between persons each of 
whom is employed under a contract o f employment with the same employer.
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Appendix 2 Selected US Statutes
C om m odity Exchange A ct 
7 USCS la . Definitions
(2) Board o f trade. The term "board o f trade" means any organized exchange or 
other trading facility.
(4) Commodity. The term "commodity" means wheat, cotton, rice, com, oats, 
barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum 
tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, 
cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils), cottonseed 
meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock 
products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and articles, 
except onions as provided in Public Law 85-839 (7 U.S.C. 13-1), and all 
services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently 
or in the future dealt in.
(7) Contract o f sale. The term "contract o f sale" includes sales, agreements of 
sale, and agreements to sell.
(11) Eligible commercial entity. The term "eligible commercial entity" means, 
with respect to an agreement, contract or transaction in a commodity—
(A) an eligible contract participant described in clause (i), (ii), (v), (vii),
(viii), or (ix) o f paragraph (12)(A) that, in connection with its business—
(i) has a demonstrable ability, directly or through separate 
contractual arrangements, to make or take delivery o f the underlying 
commodity;
(ii) incurs risks, in addition to price risk, related to the commodity;
or
(iii) is a dealer that regularly provides risk management or hedging 
services to, or engages in market-making activities with, the foregoing entities 
involving transactions to purchase or sell the commodity or derivative 
agreements, contracts, or transactions in the commodity;
(B) an eligible contract participant, other than a natural person or an 
instrumentality, department, or agency of a State or local governmental entity, 
that—
(i) regularly enters into transactions to purchase or sell the 
commodity or derivative agreements, contracts, or transactions in the 
commodity; and
(ii) either—
(I) in the case o f a collective investment vehicle whose 
participants include persons other than—
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(aa) qualified eligible persons, as defined in Commission rule 
4.7(a) (77 CFR 4.7(a))-
(bb) accredited investors, as defined in Regulation D of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act o f 1933 (77 CFR 
230.501 (a)), with total assets o f $ 2,000,000; or
(cc) qualified purchasers, as defined in section 2(a)(51)(A) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 [75 USCS § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)];
in each case as in effect on the date of the enactment o f the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 [enacted Dec. 21, 2000], has, or 
is one o f a group o f vehicles under common control or management having in 
the aggregate, $ 1,000,000,000 in total assets; or
(II) in the case o f other persons, has, or is one of a group of 
persons under common control or management having in the aggregate, $ 
100,000,000 in total assets; or
(C) such other persons as the Commission shall determine appropriate 
and shall designate by rule, regulation, or order.
(12) Eligible contract participant. The term "eligible contract participant" 
means—
(A) acting for its own account—
(i) a financial institution;
(ii) an insurance company that is regulated by a State, or that is 
regulated by a foreign government and is subject to comparable regulation as 
determined by the Commission, including a regulated subsidiary or affiliate of 
such an insurance company;
(iii) an investment company subject to regulation under the 
Investment Company Act o f 1940 (75 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.) or a foreign person 
performing a similar role or function subject as such to foreign regulation 
(regardless o f whether each investor in the investment company or the foreign 
person is itself an eligible contract participant);
(iv) a commodity pool that—
(I) has total assets exceeding $ 5,000,000; and
(II) is formed and operated by a person subject to regulation 
under this Act [7 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] or a foreign person performing a similar 
role or function subject as such to foreign regulation (regardless of whether 
each investor in the commodity pool or the foreign person is itself an eligible 
contract participant);
(v) a corporation, partnership, proprietorship, organization, trust, or 
other entity—
(I) that has total assets exceeding $ 10,000,000;
(II) the obligations o f which under an agreement, contract, or 
transaction are guaranteed or otherwise supported by a letter of credit or 
keepwell, support, or other agreement by an entity described in subclause (I), in 
clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (vii), or in subparagraph (C); or
(III) th a t-
(aa) has a net worth exceeding $ 1,000,000; and 
(bb) enters into an agreement, contract, or transaction in 
connection with the conduct o f the entity's business or to manage the risk
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associated with an asset or liability owned or incurred or reasonably likely to be 
owned or incurred by the entity in the conduct of the entity's business;
(vi) an employee benefit plan subject to the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act o f 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), a governmental 
employee benefit plan, or a foreign person performing a similar role or function 
subject as such to foreign regulation—
(I) that has total assets exceeding $ 5,000,000; or
(II) the investment decisions of which are made by—
(aa) an investment adviser or commodity trading advisor 
subject to regulation under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 
80b-l et seq.) or this Act [7 USCS §§ 1 et seq.];
(bb) a foreign person performing a similar role or function 
subject as such to foreign regulation;
(cc) a financial institution; or
(dd) an insurance company described in clause (ii), or a 
regulated subsidiary or affiliate of such an insurance company;
(vii) (I) a governmental entity (including the United States, a State, 
or a foreign government) or political subdivision of a governmental entity;
(II) a multinational or supranational government entity; or
(III) an instrumentality, agency, or department of an entity 
described in subclause (I) or (II);
except that such term does not include an entity, instrumentality, 
agency, or department referred to in subclause (I) or (III) of this clause unless 
(aa) the entity, instrumentality, agency, or department is a person described in 
clause (i), (ii), or (iii) o f section 1 a( 11)(A); (bb) the entity, instrumentality, 
agency, or department owns and invests on a discretionary basis $ 25,000,000 
or more in investments; or (cc) the agreement, contract, or transaction is offered 
by, and entered into with, an entity that is listed in any of subclauses (I) through 
(VI) o f section 2(c)(2)(B)(ii);
(viii)
(I) a broker or dealer subject to regulation under the Securities 
Exchange Act o f 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) or a foreign person performing a 
similar role or function subject as such to foreign regulation, except that, if  the 
broker or dealer or foreign person is a natural person or proprietorship, the 
broker or dealer or foreign person shall not be considered to be an eligible 
contract participant unless the broker or dealer or foreign person also meets the 
requirements o f clause (v) or (xi);
(II) an associated person of a registered broker or dealer 
concerning the financial or securities activities of which the registered person 
makes and keeps records under section 15C(b) or 17(h) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o 5(b), 78q(h));
(III) an investment bank holding company (as defined in section 
17(i) o f the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (75 U.S.C. 78q(i))[)]\
(ix) a futures commission merchant subject to regulation under this 
Act [7 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] or a foreign person performing a similar role or 
function subject as such to foreign regulation, except that, if  the futures 
commission merchant or foreign person is a natural person or proprietorship, 
the futures commission merchant or foreign person shall not be considered to be
287
an eligible contract participant unless the futures commission merchant or 
foreign person also meets the requirements of clause (v) or (xi);
(x) a floor broker or floor trader subject to regulation under this Act 
[7 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] in connection with any transaction that takes place on or 
through the facilities of a registered entity or an exempt board o f trade, or any 
affiliate thereof, on which such person regularly trades; or
(xi) an individual who has total assets in an amount in excess of—
(I)$ 10,000,000; or
(II) $ 5,000,000 and who enters into the agreement, contract, or 
transaction in order to manage the risk associated with an asset owned or 
liability incurred, or reasonably likely to be owned or incurred, by the 
individual;
(B)
(i) a person described in clause (i), (ii), (iv), (v), (viii), (ix), or (x) o f 
subparagraph (A) or in subparagraph (C), acting as broker or performing an 
equivalent agency function on behalf o f another person described in 
subparagraph (A) or (C); or
(ii) an investment adviser subject to regulation under the Investment 
Advisers Act o f 1940 [15 USCS §§ 80b et seq.], a commodity trading advisor 
subject to regulation under this Act [7 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], a foreign person 
performing a similar role or function subject as such to foreign regulation, or a 
person described in clause (i), (ii), (iv), (v), (viii), (ix), or (x) of subparagraph
(A) or in subparagraph (C), in any such case acting as investment manager or 
fiduciary (but excluding a person acting as broker or performing an equivalent 
agency function) for another person described in subparagraph (A) or (C) and 
who is authorized by such person to commit such person to the transaction; or
(C) any other person that the Commission determines to be eligible in 
light o f the financial or other qualifications of the person.
(13) Excluded commodity. The term "excluded commodity" means—
(i) an interest rate, exchange rate, currency, security, security index, 
credit risk or measure, debt or equity instrument, index or measure o f inflation, 
or other macroeconomic index or measure;
(ii) any other rate, differential, index, or measure o f economic or 
commercial risk, return, or value that is—
(I) not based in substantial part on the value o f a narrow group of 
commodities not described in clause (i); or
(II) based solely on 1 or more commodities that have no cash
market;
(iii) any economic or commercial index based on prices, rates, 
values, or levels that are not within the control of any party to the relevant 
contract, agreement, or transaction; or
(iv) an occurrence, extent o f an occurrence, or contingency (other 
than a change in the price, rate, value, or level of a commodity not described in 
clause (i)) that is—
(I) beyond the control of the parties to the relevant contract, 
agreement, or transaction; and
(II) associated with a financial, commercial, or economic
consequence.
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(16) Floor broker. The term "floor broker" means any person who, in or 
surrounding any pit, ring, post, or other place provided by a contract market or 
derivatives transaction execution facility for the meeting o f persons similarly 
engaged, shall purchase or sell for any other person any commodity for future 
delivery on or subject to the rules o f any contract market or derivatives 
transaction execution facility.
(17) Floor trader. The term "floor trader" means any person who, in or 
surrounding any pit, ring, post, or other place provided by a contract market or 
derivatives transaction execution facility for the meeting o f persons similarly 
engaged, purchases, or sells solely for such person's own account, any 
commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules o f any contract market 
or derivatives transaction execution facility.
(19) Future delivery. The term "future delivery" does not include any sale o f 
any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery.
(20) Futures commission merchant. The term "futures commission merchant" 
means an individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust that—
(A) is engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or 
sale o f any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any 
contract market or derivatives transaction execution facility; and
(B) in or in connection with such solicitation or acceptance of orders, 
accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to 
margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result 
therefrom.
(21) Hybrid instrument. The term "hybrid instrument" means a security having 
1 or more payments indexed to the value, level, or rate of, or providing for the 
delivery of, 1 or more commodities.
(26) Option. The term "option" means an agreement, contract, or transaction 
that is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an "option", 
"privilege", "indemnity", "bid", "offer", "put", "call", "advance guaranty", or 
"decline guaranty".
(27) Organized exchange. The term "organized exchange" means a trading 
facility that—
(A) permits trading—
(i) by or on behalf of a person that is not an eligible contract 
participant; or
(ii) by persons other than on a principal-to-principal basis; or
(B) has adopted (directly or through another nongovernmental entity) 
rules that—
(i) govern the conduct o f participants, other than rules that govern 
the submission o f orders or execution o f transactions on the trading facility; and
(ii) include disciplinary sanctions other than the exclusion of 
participants from trading.
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7 USCS 2. Jurisdiction of Commission; liability of principal for act of 
agent; Commodity Futures Trading Commission; transaction in interstate 
commerce
(a) Jurisdiction of Commission; Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
(1) Jurisdiction of Commission.
(A) In general. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction, 
except to the extent otherwise provided in subparagraphs (C) and (D) o f this 
paragraph and subsections (c) through (i) o f this section, with respect to 
accounts, agreements (including any transaction which is o f the character of, or 
is commonly known to the trade as, an "option", "privilege", "indemnity", "bid", 
"offer", "put", "call", "advance guaranty", or "decline guaranty"), and 
transactions involving contracts o f sale o f a commodity for future delivery, 
traded or executed on a contract market designated or derivatives transaction 
execution facility registered pursuant to section 5 or 5a [7 USCS § 7  or 7a\ or 
any other board o f trade, exchange, or market, and transactions subject to 
regulation by the Commission pursuant to section 19 of this Act [7 USCS § 23]. 
Except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (I) 
supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the 
United States or o f any State, or (II) restrict the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and 
responsibilities in accordance with such laws. Nothing in this section shall 
supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States or 
any State.
(B) Liability of principal for act o f agent. The act, omission, or failure of 
any official, agent, or other person acting for any individual, association, 
partnership, corporation, or trust within the scope of his employment or office 
shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such individual, association, 
partnership, corporation, or trust, as well as of such official, agent, or other 
person.
(C) Designation o f boards o f trade as contract markets; contracts for 
future delivery; security futures products; filing with Board o f Governors of 
Federal Reserve System; judicial review. Notwithstanding any other provision 
o f law—
(i) This Act [7 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] shall not apply to and the 
Commission shall have no jurisdiction to designate a board o f trade as a 
contract market for any transaction whereby any party to such transaction 
acquires any put, call, or other option on one or more securities (as defined in 
section 2(1) o f the Securities Act o f 1933 [75 USCS § 77b(a)(l)] or section 
3(a)(10) o f the Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 [75 USCS §§ 77c(a)(10)] on 
the date of enactment o f the Futures Trading Act of 1982 [enacted Jan. 11, 
1983]), including any group or index o f such securities, or any interest therein 
or based on the value thereof.
(ii) This Act [7 USCS §§ 7 et seq.] shall apply to and the 
Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, 
agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is 
commonly known to the trade as, an "option", "privilege", "indemnity", "bid", 
"offer", "put", "call", "advance guaranty", or "decline guaranty") and
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transactions involving, and may designate a board o f trade as a contract market 
in, or register a derivatives transaction execution facility that trades or executes, 
contracts o f sale (or options on such contracts) for future delivery o f a group or 
index o f securities (or any interest therein or based upon the value thereof): 
Provided, however, That no board of trade shall be designated as a contract 
market with respect to any such contracts of sale (or options on such contracts) 
for future delivery, and no derivatives transaction execution facility shall trade 
or execute such contracts o f sale (or options on such contracts) for future 
delivery, unless the board o f trade or the derivatives transaction execution 
facility, and the applicable contract, meet the following minimum requirements:
(I) Settlement o f or delivery on such contract (or option on such 
contract) shall be effected in cash or by means other than the transfer or receipt 
o f any security, except an exempted security under section 3 o f the Securities 
Act o f 1933 [75 USCS § 77c] or section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 [75 USCS § 78c(a)(12)] as in effect on the date of enactment o f the 
Futures Trading Act of 1982 [enacted Jan. 11, 1983] (other than any municipal 
security, as defined in section 3(a)(29) o f the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
[75 USCS § 78c(a)(29)] on the date o f enactment of the Futures Trading Act of 
1982 [enacted Jan. 11, 1983]);
(II) Trading in such contract (or option on such contract) shall 
not be readily susceptible to manipulation o f the price of such contract (or 
option on such contract), nor to causing or being used in the manipulation o f the 
price o f any underlying security, option on such security or option on a group or 
index including such securities; and
(III) Such group or index of securities shall not constitute a 
narrow-based security index.
(iii) If, in its discretion, the Commission determines that a stock 
index futures contract, notwithstanding its conformance with the requirements 
in clause (ii) o f this subparagraph, can reasonably be used as a surrogate for 
trading a security (including a security futures product), it may, by order, 
require such contract and any option thereon be traded and regulated as security 
futures products as defined in section 3(a)(56) o f the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 [75 USCS § 78c(a)(56)] and section la  of this Act [7 USCS § la] subject 
to all rules and regulations applicable to security futures products under this Act 
[7 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] and the securities laws as defined in section 3(a)(47) of 
the Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 [75 USCS §§ 78c(a)(47)].
(iv) No person shall offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the 
execution o f any contract o f sale (or option on such contract) for future delivery 
of any security, or interest therein or based on the value thereof, except an 
exempted security under [or] section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 [75 USCS § 78c(a)(12)] as in effect on the date of enactment of the 
Futures Trading Act o f 1982 [enacted Jan. 11, 1983] (other than any municipal 
security as defined in section 3(a)(29) o f the Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 
[75 USCS § 78c(a)(29)] on the date o f enactment of the Futures Trading Act of 
1982 [enacted Jan. 11, 1983]), or except as provided in clause (ii) of this 
subparagraph or subparagraph (D), any group or index of such securities or any 
interest therein or based on the value thereof.
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(v) (I) Notwithstanding any other provision o f this Act [7 USCS §§ 1 
et seq.], any contract market in a stock index futures contract (or option thereon) 
other than a security futures product, or any derivatives transaction execution 
facility on which such contract or option is traded, shall file with the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System any rule establishing or changing the 
levels o f margin (initial and maintenance) for such stock index futures contract 
(or option thereon) other than security futures products.
(II) The Board may at any time request any contract market or 
derivatives transaction execution facility to set the margin for any stock index 
futures contract (or option thereon), other than for any security futures product, 
at such levels as the Board in its judgment determines are appropriate to 
preserve the financial integrity o f the contract market or derivatives transaction 
execution facility, or its clearing system, or to prevent systemic risk. If the 
contract market or derivatives transaction execution facility fails to do so within 
the time specified by the Board in its request, the Board may direct the contract 
market or derivatives transaction execution facility to alter or supplement the 
rules of the contract market or derivatives transaction execution facility as 
specified in the request.
(III) Subject to such conditions as the Board may determine, the 
Board may delegate any or all o f its authority, relating to margin for any stock 
index futures contract (or option thereon), other than security futures products, 
under this clause to the Commission.
(IV) It shall be unlawful for any futures commission merchant to, 
directly or indirectly, extend or maintain credit to or for, or collect margin from 
any customer on any security futures product unless such activities comply with 
the regulations prescribed pursuant to section 7(c)(2)(B) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 [75 USCS § 78g(c)(2)(B)].
(V) Nothing in this clause shall supersede or limit the authority 
granted to the Commission in section 8a(9) [7 USCS § 12a] to direct a contract 
market or registered derivatives transaction execution facility, on finding an 
emergency to exist, to raise temporary margin levels on any futures contract, or 
option on the contract covered by this clause, or on any security futures product.
(VI) Any action taken by the Board, or by the Commission 
acting under the delegation o f authority under subclause III [(III)], under this 
clause directing a contract market to alter or supplement a contract market rule 
shall be subject to review only in the Court o f Appeals where the party seeking 
review resides or has its principal place o f business, or in the United States 
Court o f Appeals for the District o f Columbia Circuit. The review shall be 
based on the examination o f all information before the Board or the 
Commission, as the case may be, at the time the determination was made. The 
court reviewing the action o f the Board or the Commission shall not enter a stay 
or order o f mandamus unless the court has determined, after notice and a 
hearing before a panel of the court, that the agency action complained o f was 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse o f discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.
(g) Excluded swap transactions. No provision o f this Act [7 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] 
(other than section 5a (to the extent provided in section 5a(g)), 5b, 5d, or
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12(e)(2) [7 USCS § 7a, 7a-l, 7a-3, or 16(e)(2) ]) shall apply to or govern any 
agreement, contract, or transaction in a commodity other than an agricultural 
commodity if the agreement, contract, or transaction is—
(1) entered into only between persons that are eligible contract participants 
at the time they enter into the agreement, contract, or transaction;
(2) subject to individual negotiation by the parties; and
(3) not executed or traded on a trading facility.
7 USCS 6. Regulation of futures trading and foreign transactions
(a) Restriction on futures trading. Unless exempted by the Commission 
pursuant to subsection (c), it shall be unlawful for any person to offer to enter 
into, to enter into, to execute, to confirm the execution of, or to conduct any 
office or business anywhere in the United States, its territories or possessions, 
for the purpose of soliciting or accepting any order for, or otherwise dealing in, 
any transaction in, or in connection with, a contract for the purchase or sale o f a 
commodity for future delivery (other than a contract which is made on or 
subject to the rules of a board o f trade, exchange, or market located outside the 
United States, its territories or possessions) unless—
(1) such transaction is conducted on or subject to the rules of a board of 
trade which has been designated or registered by the Commission as a contract 
market or derivatives transaction execution facility for such commodity;
(2) such contract is executed or consummated by or through a contract 
market; and
(3) such contract is evidenced by a record in writing which shows the date, 
the parties to such contract and their addresses, the property covered and its 
price, and the terms of delivery: Provided, That each contract market or 
derivatives transaction execution facility member shall keep such record for a 
period of three years from the date thereof, or for a longer period if the 
Commission shall so direct, which record shall at all times be open to the 
inspection of any representative of the Commission or the Department of 
Justice.
Securities Act o f 1933 
15 USCS 77b. Definitions
(a) Definitions. When used in this title [15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.] unless the 
context otherwise requires—
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
bond, debenture, evidence o f indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation 
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral—trust certificate, preorganization 
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting—trust 
certificate, certificate o f deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in 
oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on 
any security, certificate o f deposit, or group or index of securities (including 
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
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option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to 
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as 
a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any o f the foregoing.
Securities Exchange A ct o f 1934
15 USCS 78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use o f any 
means or instrumentality o f interstate commerce or o f the mails, or o f any 
facility of any national securities exchange—
(a)
(1) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop—loss order in 
connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to security futures 
products.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale o f any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or 
any securities—based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the 
Gramm—Leach-Bliley Act [75 USCS § 78c note]), any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention o f such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection o f investors.
Rules promulgated under subsection (b) that prohibit fraud, manipulation, or 
insider trading (but not rules imposing or specifying reporting or recordkeeping 
requirements, procedures, or standards as prophylactic measures against fraud, 
manipulation, or insider trading), and judicial precedents decided under 
subsection (b) and rules promulgated thereunder that prohibit fraud, 
manipulation, or insider trading, shall apply to security—based swap agreements 
(as defined in section 206B of the Gramm—Leach—Bliley Act [75 USCS § 78c 
note]) to the same extent as they apply to securities. Judicial precedents decided 
under section 17(a) o f the Securities Act of 1933 [75 USCS § 77q(a)] and 
sections 9, 75, 16, 20, and 21A o f this title [15 USCS §§ 78i, 78o, 78p, 78t, and 
78u—1], and judicial precedents decided under applicable rules promulgated 
under such sections, shall apply to security—based swap agreements (as defined 
in section 206B of the Gramm—Leach—Bliley Act [75 USCS § 78c note]) to the 
same extent as they apply to securities.
SEC Rule 10b-5
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17 CFR 240.10b~5 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality o f interstate commerce, or o f the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
o f the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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List of Abbreviations
ABS asset-backed securitisation
ANZ Australian and New Zealand Banking Group
CAT bond catastrophe bond
CBOT Chicago Board of Trade
CDO collateralised debt obligation
CDS credit default swap
CEA Commodity Exchange Act
CFD contract for differences
CFMA Commodity Futures Modernization Act
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission
CIF cost, insurance, and freight
CIS Collective Investment Scheme
CJA 1993 Criminal Justice Act 1993
CME Chicago Mercantile Exchange
COB California Oregon Border
DJIA Dow Jones Industrial Average
EDSP exchange delivery settlement price
EFET European Federation of Energy Trader
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EFP exchange-for-physical
EFS exchange-for-swap
EU European Union
FBE Banking Federation of the European Union
FCM futures commission merchant
FOA The Futures and Options Association
FOB free on board
FOSFA Federation of Oils, Seeds, and Fats Associations
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSMA 2000 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
FTSE 100 Index Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 index
GAFT A Grain & Feed Trade Association
GMPA Global Master Repurchase Agreement
HTA Hedge-to-arrive
I AT A International Air Transport Association
ICE IntercontinentalExchange
IPE International Petroleum Exchange
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association
L/C Letter of Credit
LCH London Clearing House
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate
LIFFE London International Financial Futures Exchange
LME London Metal Exchange
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LSE London Stock Exchange
NASD National Association of Securities Dealers
NASDAQ National Association o f Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations
NFA National Futures Association
NYMEX New York Mercantile Exchange
NYSE New York Stock Exchange
O TC over-the-counter
P&G Procter & Gamble
RAO 2001 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated
Activities) Order 2001
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SPV special purpose vehicle
TBM A/ISM A The Bond Market Association and the International
Securities Market Association
TSA The Securities Association
UCC Uniform Commercial Code
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
US United States of America
USD United States Dollar
W TI West Texas Intermediate oil
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